JUDGMENT 1. :- We are sad to see the respondents' conduct in the Court. Their conduct, during the proceedings of appeals, had been extremely improper. This is not the end of the matter. After giving full opportunity of hearing, the judgment was reserved on 3.11.1997. The matter was subjudice even then they have gone to the media (Dainik Bhaskar, a daily newspaper dated 5.11.1997) making complaints against the court that the opportunity of hearing has not been given to them. Apart from this, a telegram followed by a letter was-sent in the name of one of us (M.P. Singh, J.) by respondent No.1 that in case he was not given an opportunity of hearing be will release the matter to press and make complaints to the President of India, Prime Minister, Chief justice of India and the Law Minister of India. 2. Does this action, of the respondent No.1, not amount to lowering the image of the judiciary in the eyes of public ? Does it not amount to interfering with the administration of justice ? Does it not amount to committing contempt of Court ? 3. The Press has already been given a general caution that the reporting of court proceedings which amount to disinformation among the public and erosion of the credibility of the judiciary, should not be done. Before any information is printed it is the duty of the press to verify the correctness of the same. 4. Ignoring their conduct, for the time being, we are deciding the matter on merit with a free mind. 5. The public interest writ petition was presented before the learned Single Judge on 3.6.1995. It was admitted on 20.9.1995. But the file was not sent to the office thereafter. In normal course after a case is admitted, it comes for final hearing in due course. If the matter is urgent or is of general importance, it can be listed for hearing out of turn after the Chief Justice passes an order for early hearing. It makes no difference whether it is a public interest litigation or otherwise. 6. Of course, a Judge is always free to dispose of the matter finally d the admission stage, if he 'so desires. After the admission of the writ petition without there being any order of the Chief Justice, the hearing of the case went on from time to time. 6. Of course, a Judge is always free to dispose of the matter finally d the admission stage, if he 'so desires. After the admission of the writ petition without there being any order of the Chief Justice, the hearing of the case went on from time to time. Ultimately, on 26.2.1996, it was marked as part-heard 7. On 22.4.1996, an impleadment application under Order 1 Rule 10 the Civil Procedure Code was filed by Mr. B.S. Shekhawat, Advocate. It w allowed without recording any reason. He was allowed to be impleaded petitioner No.2, but the writ petition was not got amended. It was ultimately decided on 5.7.1997 treating it to be a non-admitted matter. 8. Since the respondents have made baseless complaints against court of not giving an opportunity of hearing, few facts from the order sheet of the Special Appeals may be incorporated in the Judgment. 9. The first special appeal against the impugned order was filed by N.K. Bairwa, who is a Civil Servant. It was admitted on 10.7.1997 and the operation of the order was stayed. Thereafter, other appeals were also filed. Similar orders were passed. All the appeals were listed for orders on 16.9.1997 in the supplementary cause list. A request was made by all the counsel for different appellants that the matter is of great urgency and undue publicity was being given by the media which is damaging the image of the institution, so they may be heard. But since there was no order of the Chief justice, we declined to dispose of the appeals finally. The bunch was order to be listed on 17.9.1997. 10. In the meantime, the Chief Justice passed an order on 16.9.1997 directing the matter to be disposed of by the Bench presided over by one of us (M.P. Singh, J.). Thus, the matter came up before this bench for final hearing on 17.9.1997. 11. On 17.9.1997 Mr. B. S. Shekhawat appeared and raised an objection that inspite of the fact that he was impleaded as a party in the writ petition he has not been made a party in Special Appeals and no notice was served on him. The Court, agreeing with the objection, directed Mr. Paras Kuhad and Mr. R.N. Mathur, to implead him as respondent and also to supply him relevant copies. The Court, agreeing with the objection, directed Mr. Paras Kuhad and Mr. R.N. Mathur, to implead him as respondent and also to supply him relevant copies. The case was ordered to be listed on 22.9.1997 along with the omnected matters for final hearing. Respondent No.1, Sripal Jain did not raise any objection on that date. 12. The hearing commenced on 22.9.1997. Mr. R.N. Mathur after arguing the case for about one-and-a-half-hour, concluded his submissions in special appeal No.812/97 (N.K. Bairwa v. Sripal Jain) . Both the respondents were present in the Court. Before the commencement of the arguments, no objection was raised by any one of them regarding the hearing of the matter. 13. After Mr. R.N. Mathur concluded his submissions, then the respondent No.1, Sripal Jain made a mention that no counsel from Jaipur is prepared to argue his case and as Mr. R.N. Mathur has raised some important questions of law, he himself cannot argue the matter. He prayed for time to engage a counsel from outside. We granted him three weeks time. The case was then ordered to be listed on 13.10.1997 as part-heard. 14. One of the Members of the Bench (P.K. Tewari, J.) had to go out an 13.10.1997 and, so the Bench could not be constituted. Notice was given to both the respondents and the appellants counsel, much in advance, that the use would now be listed on 3.11.1977 for final hearing. 15. On 3.11.1997, Mr. Paras Kuhad started his submissions on behalf of the Judges in the presence of Mr. B. S. Shekhawat, respondent No.2. At about 11.00 AM Mr. Shekhawat stood-up and made a mention that just now the son of Sripal Jain has informed him that he has been hospitalised, so the case may be adjourned. We rejected the prayer for adjournment. The hearing proceeded further. After the conclusion of the agreements of the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Shekhawat made his full submissions. The judgment was reserved. 16. It appears that on 3.11.1997, Sripal Jain filed four applications raising objections regarding the powers of the Chief Justice to allot the case to this Bench and his passing an order for final hearing. According to him, there was no urgency in the matter. By these applications, he wanted these cases to be adjourned. These applications, however, were not on record on 3.11.1997. According to him, there was no urgency in the matter. By these applications, he wanted these cases to be adjourned. These applications, however, were not on record on 3.11.1997. They were sent by the Registry to us on 5.11.1997. We examined the same and found no merit in these applications. The Chief justice has every jurisdiction to pass an order for early hearing of any case and nominate any Bench to hear it. The respondent No.1 has no right to raise any objection regarding the power of the Chief Justice. This shows that he has some personal interest in the matter, that is why he was interested in causing delay in hearing of public interest litigation. He has been given full opportunity. It was for him to avail it or not. 17. The learned Single Judge while allowing the petition held that the Civil Servants who are having their own houses in Jaipur City, were not entitled to occupy official accommodations. Rents, which they are realising from the tenants, were required to be deposited with the Government. The Court expressed its concern as to why the order passed by the State Government regarding eviction from the Government accommodation and recovery of rent were not being carried out and why the Government was so lethargic in getting the Government accommodations vacated through the police force and why disciplinary proceedings have not been initiated against these officers so far. 18. Court further directed to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the then Law Officer, Chairman and Commissioner of the Rajasthan Housing Board. 19. Against the Judges of this Court it was held that they got the houses allotted in their names jrom the Housing Board by making wrong declarations. They could not be allotted houses under self-financing-scheme. The special scheme under which allotments were made in their favour has been held to be arbitrary and discriminatory. The scheme itself has been cancelled. He further observed : "1. Judges of the High Court including the Chief justice had asked for a favour of the client of the State Government which obliged them in most arbitrary and discriminatory manner; 2. When a Single Judge has to decide the case against the State Government the Judge is asked for special favour of the State Government which in turn obliged them in distributing them largesse. 3. When a Single Judge has to decide the case against the State Government the Judge is asked for special favour of the State Government which in turn obliged them in distributing them largesse. 3. The Scheme was confined only to sitting Judges as the State Government cannot get any favour from the retired Judges, the State Government was directed to make a thorough enquiry regarding the sale and purchase of the house by the Judges as well as ownership of other plots by certain Judges in Jaipur. 4. Either the papers have deliberately been removed from the file or they have been withheld intentionally in order to help them in the present litigation for the reasons best known to the Government." 20. Three sets of special appeals were filed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 5.7.1997. 1. By the Civil Servants; 2. by the High Court Judges; and 3. by the State Government and the Housing Board. 21. Since in all the appeals common questions of facts and law are involved, they are being disposed of by a common order. 22. Respondent Sripal Jain who was a railway employee has filed this public interest litigation as a social worker. It has been filed on the basis of a news item published in a newspaper stating that there were many IAS, IPS and RAS Officers, who inspite of owning their houses in the Jaipur City, are occupying the Government accommodations. 23. Prayer was made that the respondent be directed to recover the entire amount of rent so collected by the officers, who come within that criteria, either by deducting the amount from their salary or recovering from their other sources. The respondent may be directed to take appropriate disciplinary action against them and they should be directed to vacate the Government accommodation. It is only five paragraphs writ petition and averments have been made on the basis of personal knowledge. 24. The State of Rajasthan through the Chief Secretary, Jaipur was the only opposite party. The Officers against whom the order was sought to be passed were not made parties in the writ petition. High Court Judges, against whom orders have been passed, were also not parties. 25. 24. The State of Rajasthan through the Chief Secretary, Jaipur was the only opposite party. The Officers against whom the order was sought to be passed were not made parties in the writ petition. High Court Judges, against whom orders have been passed, were also not parties. 25. A reply was filed on behalf of the Government in which it was stated that after receiving the notice for demand of justice sent by the respondent No.1, the matter was processed. A proforma was prepared by the Department. It was sent to all the concerned officers regarding furnishing the information of their own houses in Jaipur. Detailed informations were received from them. Action under Rule 9(4) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Allotment of Residential Accommodation) Rules, 1958 have been initiated. Effective action has been taken by the concerned departments against those officers. Notices for disciplinary proceedings have also been issued. 26. The machinery of the Government has already been set in motion. It is expected that the Government will take some reasonable time to get the official accommodations vacated and to recover the rent from them, which they have realised or are realising from their tenants. Thus we are of the view that the reliefs prayed for, have in substance been granted by the Government and the petition had become infructuous on the date of its decision. 27. Even if the petition, as such, was to be allowed, the only order which the court could have passed was to direct the Government to get the official accommodation vacated and also to recover the rent realised by them. Order could have also been passed for initiating disciplinary proceedings as well. The Government has already done it. Nothing remained to be decided by the Court. If the petition is held not to be infructuous, the salient feature of the case is that the Civil Servants against whom orders have been passed, they were not parties. They were allotted the houses under the unamended rules of 1958, the allotment orders have not been cancelled. Even then, the order of eviction has been passed against them. Recovery proceedings have been initiated. Orders for initiating disciplinary proceedings have also been passed. 28. Before such an order could be passed, these officers should have been impleaded as parties and given an opportunity of hearing. Having not done so, they have been denied the principles of natural jstice. Even then, the order of eviction has been passed against them. Recovery proceedings have been initiated. Orders for initiating disciplinary proceedings have also been passed. 28. Before such an order could be passed, these officers should have been impleaded as parties and given an opportunity of hearing. Having not done so, they have been denied the principles of natural jstice. 29. Apart from this, the findings recorded against them depended on investigation of facts, whether they owned their houses, whether their houses were complete in all respects, whether they were worth occupying, whether the houses met their requirements, whether the houses were occupied by the tenants and what amount was being received by them ? All these questions should have been investigated by the Government, before taking any action against them. 30. Thus it is held that findings recorded against them were wholly illegal and are accordingly set aside. No order could be passed against them without hearing them. In compliance of the order of the learned Single Judge the Government is not required to do anything further. They will be heard before any action is taken. 31. In the writ petition filed by Sripal Jain, respondent No.1 seeking the ejectment of Civil Servants, an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code has been filed by Mr. B.S. Shekhawat, who had absolutely no interest in the matter. 32. Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that where a suit has been instituted in the name of a wrong person as plaintiff or whether it is instituted in the name of a right plaintiff, the court may at any stage of the suit if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bonafide mistake and it is necessary for the determination of the real matters in dispute, it may order such person to be added as plaintiff on such terms and conditions as it may deem just and fit. 33. The idea behind this Procedure is that all persons who are necessary parties in a suit may be impleaded as parties in order to give a finality of the judgment and there may be a proper adjudication of the matter. A person may be proper, but may not be a necessary party for adjudication of the dispute. 33. The idea behind this Procedure is that all persons who are necessary parties in a suit may be impleaded as parties in order to give a finality of the judgment and there may be a proper adjudication of the matter. A person may be proper, but may not be a necessary party for adjudication of the dispute. Proper persons may or may not be impleaded, but necessary party has to be impleaded and should ber impleaded as party. 34. The test of a necessary party is whether in his absence an effective order can be passed or not. This is the well recognised principle as enunciated by the Supreme Court in its decisions reported in Aliji Momonji & Company v. Lalji Mavjil 1995 (5) SCC 379 and New Red Bank Tea Company v. Kuna Mittal 1994 (1) SCC 402 . 35. Though, the Civil Procedure Code as such is not applicable but the principle underlying may be made applicable. Even then the principle of Order 1 Rule 10 will not be attracted in this case because the writ petition has been filed in the name of Mr. Sripal Jain, who can be said to be a correct person. There was no defect in the frame of writ petition nor Mr. Shekhawat was a necessary party for effective disposal of the writ petition. Without examining this aspect of the matter the application was allowed. Before allowing it, a finding should have been recorded whether the application met the requirements of the provisions of law or not. The learned Single Judge should not have allowed the application without giving his own reasons. 36. Before permitting a party to be impleaded, it is the duty of the court to satisfy itself about the bona-fide of the applicant, the plausibility of his claim and genuineness of his interest in the litigation. After the amendment application was allowed, pleadings and relief should have been amended. It appears that he has been given the liberty to argue the points, for which there was no factual foundation. Without any justification, he has been permitted to indulge in bringing constitutional functionaries in disrepute. His entire focus was confined to two or three Judges which is evident from the impugned order itself. The scope of the writ petition could not be enlarged on the oral submissions of Mr. Shekhawat. 37. Without any justification, he has been permitted to indulge in bringing constitutional functionaries in disrepute. His entire focus was confined to two or three Judges which is evident from the impugned order itself. The scope of the writ petition could not be enlarged on the oral submissions of Mr. Shekhawat. 37. The order allowing the application for impleadment legally not being correct, is accordingly set aside. The application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is accordingly rejected. 38. Now, we take up the allotment of houses by the Government in Mansarovar to High Court Judges under a Special Scheme framed by the Government which has been challenged by the impleaded person. 39. The State of Rajasthan issued a notification No.F.7 (56)/LJDH/3J90, dated 4.5.1991 under the signature of the Secretary to the Government, Urban Development Housing Department stating : "The State Government has taken a formal decision to open a registration in Mansarovar Housing Scheme of Rajasthan Housing Board exclusively for sitting High Court Judges of Rajasthan High Court of plot size 40' x 90' in exercise of powers of the State Government conferred under Section 26(3) of the Rajasthan Housing Board Act, 1970. Earlier on the directions of the State Government special housing scheme exclusively for MLAs/MPs has been executed by the Board. Special registration scheme in this behalf may be started by the Board early." 40. The proposal for the scheme, for the first time, was initiated by the then Minister for Housing, Mr. B.D. Calla in 1990. The matter was considered, thereafter, in the meeting presided over by the then Chief Minister on 31.10.1990, the Minister for Urban Development, the Chairman Housing Board and the Secretary Urban Development Housing Department were also present. In the aforesaid meeting, the scheme for registration of houses for lawyers and scheme for registration of houses for Judges of the High Court were considered. The Scheme was framed thereafter. The special registration scheme did not provide any undue advantage to the Judges. It was the usual practice of the Board to frame such schemes for specified lasses. 41. There was no mala fide intention on the part of the State Government while framing special registration scheme. There was nothing arbitrary or discriminatory in framing the special scheme for allotment of houses only to the sitting Judges. 42. It was the usual practice of the Board to frame such schemes for specified lasses. 41. There was no mala fide intention on the part of the State Government while framing special registration scheme. There was nothing arbitrary or discriminatory in framing the special scheme for allotment of houses only to the sitting Judges. 42. The reason given by the Single Judge for setting aside the scheme was "why the scheme was framed only for sitting Judges, who were living in Government accommodations and enjoying all the privileges and amenities of Ministers of Cabinet rank. If the State Government wanted houses allotted to them under the special scheme, it should have been done for the retired Judges as well. The houses were of standard big size which were allotted to sitting Judges under the self-financing-scheme but none of the Judges occupied the same during tenure as a Judge of this Court." This is a factually incorrect finding recorded in the order. There is nothing on record to substantiate it. 43. The size of the house was only 40' x 90'. All the judges have been allotted houses of same specific sizes. It is the normal size in H.I.G. Scheme. The Judges have been required to pay the same cost which has been demanded from others. The house allotted was only a skeleton and was incapable of being occupied. 44. Affidaivt has been filed by N.L. Sharma on 9.5.1997 on behalf of Housing Board. It has been stated that the skeleton houses in Mansarovar scheme were on the same rate without giving any concession to the Judges as against the cost and land of construction. The cost of skeleton house measuring 12m x 27m under H.I.G. allotted to MLAs/MPs was on hire-purchase basis and cost of land has been at the rate of Rs. 295/- per sq. meter as charged from Judges also who were allotted the houses under self-finance-scheme under H.I.G. category. 45. The scope of Article 14 of the Constitution which permits reasonable classification, has not been correctly appreciated. Reasonable classification, which distinguishes one class from another is always permissible. The sitting Judges can very well be treated different from retired Judges. They constitute a different class. Nothing wrong has been done by the State Government in framing the Scheme for sitting Judges alone. Reasonable classification, which distinguishes one class from another is always permissible. The sitting Judges can very well be treated different from retired Judges. They constitute a different class. Nothing wrong has been done by the State Government in framing the Scheme for sitting Judges alone. There was nothing arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust in the Scheme for allotment of the houses to the sitting Judges. 46. In our view the scheme was valid and the Government has not shown any favour to the Judges by allotting the house under that special scheme. There was no arbitrariness on the part of the Government. The findings recorded against the judges were incorrect. 47. It was further held that the Judges have not given correct declaration before getting the allotment of the houses. Some of the Judges who had sold their allotted houses have not sought any prior approval for doing so. At page 41 of the judgment it has been held : "that Judges , should keep distance from the executives and should never ask for favour. The status of the State in the Court is not different than the ordinary litigant. It is not desirable on the part of the Hon'ble High Court Judges to ask for a favour from the State Government which is a biggest litigant. In totality of the circumstances and the facts as well as material available on record, I have no hesitation in saying that the Hon'ble Judges of the Rajasthan High Court asked for a favour and the State Government also obliged them in most arbitrary and discriminatory manner. Keeping in view the fact that Judges are constitutional functionaries who are supposed to discharge divine duty, it is matter to be judged by the people at large." 48. Then finally he has cancelled the scheme itself. Now only the consequential order cancelling the allotment of houses is to be passed. This amounts to final adjudication of the the matter. Accordingly, we hold that the Special Appeals are maintainable. The objection of Mr. Shekhawat challenging the maintainability of Special Appeals is rejected. 49. Then finally he has cancelled the scheme itself. Now only the consequential order cancelling the allotment of houses is to be passed. This amounts to final adjudication of the the matter. Accordingly, we hold that the Special Appeals are maintainable. The objection of Mr. Shekhawat challenging the maintainability of Special Appeals is rejected. 49. We find no reason in the order as to why the learned Single Judge confined himself to the cancellation of the allotment of houses to the Judges only when Shri Shekhawat, in his applications, for impleadment and summoning the record from the Government, has said against the allotment of the Houses to the Members of Parliament, Members of Legislative Assembly and Advocates as well. Their allotments have not been cancelled. Why ? Cancelling the allotment of houses to the Judges only amounts to discrimination. 50. A finding has been recorded:- Government has no power to distribute "largesse" in discriminatory manner. The use of the word "largesse" in reference to Judges is not a happy one. There is absolutely no justification to record such a finding. The position of Judges has been reduced to that of a begger. We strongly disapprove the phraseology used in the order and that also when it is in reference to Constitutional Authorities. 51. The writ petition was confined against IAS, IPS and RAS Officers only. Reliefs sought were against them. On account of impleadment of Mr. B.S. Shekhawat and without there being any amendment in pleadings and the prayer in the writ petition the scope of the writ petition could not be enlarged. The matter should not have been taken so lightly when it concerns constitutional functionaries. 52. The learned Single Judge was in error in assuming jurisdiction over a matter regarding which there was no 'lis'. 53. The Court has recorded very damaging findings against the Judges. Three Judges of this Court have been required to file special appeals and they are:-1. Justice M.B. Sharma (Lokayukta), 2. Justice Mohini Kapur; and, 3. Justice Ram Sharan Kejriwal. 54. JUSTICE M.B. SHARMA (SPECIAL APPEAL No.1145/97) Findings against Justice M.B. Sharma at different places in the order are:- "The declaration submitted by him is contrary to the conditions, he owns a house in the name of his son. He purchased a house in the name of his son when his son was not an earning member. 54. JUSTICE M.B. SHARMA (SPECIAL APPEAL No.1145/97) Findings against Justice M.B. Sharma at different places in the order are:- "The declaration submitted by him is contrary to the conditions, he owns a house in the name of his son. He purchased a house in the name of his son when his son was not an earning member. Subsequently, revised patta was also taken in the name of Mir. Alok Sharma in the year 1986 apart from this material has been placed to show that justice M.B. Sharma has paid Rs. 10,000/- to Meena Griha Nirman Sahakari Samiti for allotment of a plot." "That Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.B. Sharma, Lokayukta, Rajasthan decided the case of Meena Griha Nirman Samiti Limited Jaipur as a Judge of Rajasthan High Court in 1989 by which the land of Moti Doongri belonging to the said society was treated as Agricultural land and exempted the society from the operation of ceiling law, though in fact the land situated at Moti Doongari was urban property. Counsel contended that this fact shows that some plots were taken differently by Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.B. Sharma for which he issued a cheque for Rs. 10,000/-." "That the house in which he is living is alleged to be in the name of Mr. Alok Sharma. It is admitted fact that originally the plot was taken in the name of Mr. Alok Sharma in the year 1986. Counsel contended that admittedly, Mr. Alok Sharma had no earning of his own in the year 1982 and was solely dependent on the earning of his father Shri M.B. Sharma." 55. Surprisingly these findings have been recorded on the basis of only the oral submissions made by petitioner No.2, a practising advocate, without filing any affidavit or the material in support of the same. The submissions made by him are not only defamatory, false and unfounded, but are scandalous as well. No finding could have been recorded without any pleading and giving an opportunity to Mr. Justice M.B. Sharma and Mr. Alok Sharma. They were not even made parties in the petition. 56. Justice Sharma has been allotted a house at Mansarovar, Jaipur, in special registration scheme. No finding could have been recorded without any pleading and giving an opportunity to Mr. Justice M.B. Sharma and Mr. Alok Sharma. They were not even made parties in the petition. 56. Justice Sharma has been allotted a house at Mansarovar, Jaipur, in special registration scheme. It has been declared to be arbitrary and discriminatory and the scheme has been cancelled by recording the finding : "Since the special scheme was drawn by the Rajasthan Housing Board contrary to the decision of the State Government which though is arbitrary and discriminatory, the special scheme having been framed without approval of the Chairman/Commissioner, Rajasthan Housing Board is liable to be quashed in toto." And then he recorded a finding : "There are allegations against Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.B. Sharma that he owns a house in Income Tax Colony though it is in the name of his son Mr. Alok Sharma but the said plot was purchased by him in the year, 1982 in the name of his son when he was not an earning member. It is also alleged that he owns certain other plots in the city of Jaipur and one of the illustrations cited by the petitioner is regarding purchase of a plot from Meena Graha Nirman Samit, Jaipur for which a cheque of Rs. 10,000/- was issued by Justice M.B. Sharma. This question also being a question of fact in the absence of proper enquiry, no finding can be recorded." 57. This shows the inherent contradictions in the order, as at one place he recorded his own findings and then he said that disputed questions are involved so the matter cannot be decided.58. It is unfortunate that justice M.B. Sharma, who is the Lokayukta of Rajasthan, has been driven to a situation which required him to file his personal affidavit in this appeal and that also when oral allegations made are all false but relying on same findings have been recorded. Mr. Justice Sharma in his affidavit has stated : "That Alok Sharma, Advocate, is the eldest son of the appellant. He passed his Post-Graduation in 1979 and became an earning member of the family and was gainfully employed even before joining the legal profession in 1985. Mr. Justice Sharma in his affidavit has stated : "That Alok Sharma, Advocate, is the eldest son of the appellant. He passed his Post-Graduation in 1979 and became an earning member of the family and was gainfully employed even before joining the legal profession in 1985. It is pertinent to state that Alok Sharma was the benficiary of a family settlement of properties at Bharatpur and proceeded to build a house K-39, Income Tax Colony in association with his brother and grandmother some time in 1983 on the plot allotted to him in 1982. The property is assessed under statutory laws in the name of these persons. No plot was ever allotted by Meena Grah Nirman Samiti to Shri Alok Sharma. He had applied for a plot. The appellant had given a cheque for Rs. 10,000/- but the allotment was never made. The cheque was not encashed. Thus, the allegations against the appellant are prima-facie false and merely scandalous." 59. None of the respondents could dare to file any counter affidavit. Thus the irresistable conclusion is that the contents of the affidavit are correct which vitiates all the findings recorded against him.60. Undue publicity has been given by the national media to the judgment of the learned Single Judge on account of which the prestige and reputation of justice Sharma has suffered a lot for no fault of his. The declarations given by him to the Housing Board were all correct. All his acts are perfectly justified and were within the ambit of law. Such as damaging finding could not have been recorded without hearing justice Sharma and Mr. Alok Sharma and that also in the absence of pleading and material on record. All the findings against him are set aside.61. JUSTICE SMT. MOHINI KAPUR (SPECIAL APPEAL NO.1146/97): She was allotted a skeleton house at Jodhpur measuring 12.15 m x 27m. The total area was 328.05 sq. meters. The cost of the house worked out by the Housing Board was Rs. 3,24,688.70 p. which included the cost of the land and the construction.62. She wanted to get a house at Jodhpur, as after retirement, she intended to settle down there. At the relevant time, she did not have any house either at Jaipur or at Jodhpur or in any other city of Rajasthan. 3,24,688.70 p. which included the cost of the land and the construction.62. She wanted to get a house at Jodhpur, as after retirement, she intended to settle down there. At the relevant time, she did not have any house either at Jaipur or at Jodhpur or in any other city of Rajasthan. She gave a declaration that there was no house or land in her name or in the name of her husband or minor children. On account of change of circumstances, she changed her mind and decided to settle down at Jaipur. After the allotment of the house, she purchased a plot at Jaipur and decided to sell the house allotted to her at Jodhpur by the Housing Board.63. She entered into an agreement for sale in March, 1995, with Mr. Dharam Narain Mathur and Smt. Shanti Mathur. Subsequently, a sale-deed was executed for Rs. 4,25,000/-. In the allotment order, there was no condition that the appellant could not sell the house.64. The appellant had paid Rs. 3,24,688.70 p. to the Housing Board at the time of the allotment of the skeleton house in 1992. If the interest on the aforesaid amount paid by the appellant is calculated, then it would have become much more than Rs. 4,25,000/- in 1995. Thus, she has not earned any profit out of the transaction. On the other hand, she had incurred considerable loss in that sense. The Housing Board even after due notice by her for sale invited objections. There was no objection. So the permission was granted. She had a valid title to the house. She had a legal right to sell it. She had done nothing wrong.65. The learned Single Judge has certainly committed a serious error in accepting the oral submission of Shri Shekhawat and passing the order against her. She was also neither a party nor was given the opportunity of hearing. Findings are incorrect on facts and law both. They are accordingly set aside.66. JUSTICE R.S. KEJRIWAL (SPECIAL APPEAL NO.1022/97): Justice R.S. Kejriwal also filed a special appeal challenging the findings that:-"he has filed declaration contrary to the conditions prescribed by the State Government, he had his own house and got the same transferred in the name of his son. The declaration was incorrect."67. They are accordingly set aside.66. JUSTICE R.S. KEJRIWAL (SPECIAL APPEAL NO.1022/97): Justice R.S. Kejriwal also filed a special appeal challenging the findings that:-"he has filed declaration contrary to the conditions prescribed by the State Government, he had his own house and got the same transferred in the name of his son. The declaration was incorrect."67. In case the Court desired to record this finding, then it should have given an opportunity of hearing to him and should have been allowed to be impleaded as party. Justice Kejriwal has stated in appeal that at no point of time, he owned or possessed any house either as an ancestral property or self-acquired. He does not have any house at Jaipur.68. Even the Rajasthan Housing Board and the State of Rajasthan do not say that the declaration given by any Judge, including Justice Kejriwal was incorrect. There is no justification to hold otherwise. The finding is incorrect.69. A careful reading of the impugned order shows that the entire focus was confirmed only on three Judges, namely, Justice M.B. Sharma, who is Lokayukta of Rajasthan, Justice Smt. Mohini Kapur and Mr. Justice A.K. Mathur, at present Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court. But why it has been done so ?70. Justice A.K. Mathur: The way in which Mr. Justice A.K. Mathur has been criticised in the order gives an impression that there was a calculated effort to cause damage to his reputation for certain reasons, obviously, nothing on record. At present he is the Chief Justice of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. He may have an ancestral house at Jodhpur, but there is nothing on record to establish that he has two houses at Jodhpur. He had given, a declaration that he does not own any house at Jaipur which has been accepted by the Housing Board and the State Government in the reply as correct. It was only after due inquiry made by them, the allotment was made to him.71. He was also not impleaded as a party but scandalous submissions were allowed to be made against him. When Dr. S.K. Tiwari, Advocate, wanted to be heard and place some material on his behalf, the Court surprisingly refused to hear him on the ground that no notice was issued to him, and therefore, he cannot be heard, whereas he permitted Mr. When Dr. S.K. Tiwari, Advocate, wanted to be heard and place some material on his behalf, the Court surprisingly refused to hear him on the ground that no notice was issued to him, and therefore, he cannot be heard, whereas he permitted Mr. Shekhawat to be impleaded as party and to make unfounded and defamatory submissions. He had nothing to do with the controversy in the main writ petition. Normally courts can hear anybody in opposition of a writ petition but justice Mathur was denied the right of hearing. Grave injustice has been done to him. The findings recorded against him have really tarnished his image. He has deliberately been victimised. This act was not only improper but unjudiciouds.72. The procedure adopted by the learned Single Judge de-hors the principles of natural justice. As a matter of fact, it was the prime duty of the court itself to have issued notices to him and all other Judges whose names find place in the order and they should have been heard. The view of the learned Single Judge that justice Mathur has committed contempt is basically erroneous. If Justice A.K. Mathur tried to be heard in a matter, in which he was deliberately dragged, no contempt has been committed by him. He has only tried to place his casti before the court that he did not give any wrong affidavit in the Housing Board at the time of the allotment of house, that he had no land or house in Jaipur in his name. As a matter of fact, it was his sincere effort to assist the court in coming to a correct conclusion. In our opinion in these circumstances, it was certainly his duty to do so. There was an unfair effort to cause damage to the dean reputation which he enjoyed as a Judge of this Court. Do these Judges have no right of reputation ?73. The right of reputation is well recognised. The Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Bedi & Jinder Singh v. Committee of Enquiry reported in AIR 1989 Supreme Court 714 , held that a man's reputation is a part of himself as his body and limbs are, and reputation is a sort of right to enjoy the good opinion of others. Detraction of a man's reputation is an injury to his personality and thus injury to reputation is a personal injury.74. Detraction of a man's reputation is an injury to his personality and thus injury to reputation is a personal injury.74. Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of S. Santannam v. State of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petitions No.2396 and 2397 of 1993 , decided on 15.10.1993, while considering the question as to whether taking away reputation will infringe the right of reputation guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, has observed that right of reputation is one of the nature of fundamental right of the Constitution and the right to live as a dignified man carries a right of reputation with it. In case where the reputation is so impaired by any action that amounts to infringement of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution without an opportunity of hearing to them.75. The sweeping observations made against judges making insinuation against them, touching their integrity were unwarranted. Use of strong and carping language while criticising the conduct of the Judges should have been avoided. A Judge is expected to act within the limit of judicial restraint. Harsh and disparaging language have caused considerable harm and resulting in injustice to Judges. Decision of the court should have been confined within the limit of the points raised in the writ petition. Enlarging the scope of the controversy is always beyond the jurisdiction of the court. The practice and procedure regarding pleadings is that it should be supported by an affidavit. Non-filing of the same gives a presumption of non-existence of the fact. The submission of Mr. Shekhawat should have been rejected outright. It was not even worth consideration.76. Discussion of the speech of the Chief justice of India in the Seminar at Jaipur has been made in a very lighter vein and reading of the order gives a feeling of sarcasm which should have been avoided keeping the self-imposed-judicial-discipline/self-imposed-restriction in the forefront. Due respect to the highest Constitutional Authority is an inbuilt ingredient of the Judicial System. There was absolutely no relevancy or necessity of this patch work in the impugned order.77. Judges are wedded to the judicial discipline and unless the wedlock comes to an end there has to be self-imposed judicial discipline by restraint in their conduct and expression both. Due respect to the highest Constitutional Authority is an inbuilt ingredient of the Judicial System. There was absolutely no relevancy or necessity of this patch work in the impugned order.77. Judges are wedded to the judicial discipline and unless the wedlock comes to an end there has to be self-imposed judicial discipline by restraint in their conduct and expression both. There was no occasion for him to discuss the conduct of the sitting Judges or retired Judges in such a way and come to the conclusion that they got the houses illegaly allotted from the Rajasthan Housing Board.78. Without there being any pleading, scandalous arguments were raised by the respondent No.2 against the constitutional functionaries. Does he have any protection under any provision of the Constitution of India or any other law. The insinuation and imputation made against the Judges appeared to be deliberate either to get publicity or to achieve some other object. He knew it very well that by doing so, he would undermine the peoples' confidence in the judiciary. There was deliberate effort of bringing the Judges of this Court into disrepute which touched even the boundary line of contempt. Scurrilous attack on the Judges have definitely undermined their image in public eyes.79. Was it essential for the court to deal with each and every submission raised by Mr. Shekhawat which were wholly irrelevant to the main case ? No. There was no obligation under law to do so. the settled view is that every question raised need not be decided unless the case cannot be disposed of without deciding the question for granting or refusing to grant the relief.80. The other serious error in the order is that there has been flagrant violation of principle of natural justice. Without the Judges being parties and without hearing them, no order could be passed against them and the scheme under which the allotment of the houses was made could not be cancelled. Valuable rights which had already accrued in their favour have been seriously affected.81. The Punjab & Haryana High Court, while considering the illegalities committed by the Haryana Public Service Commission making the selections of the candidates who appeared for Haryana Civil Services (Executive & Allied Service), held that the selection of the Chairman and the Members of the Haryana Public Service Commission itself was bad. They were men lacking integrity, calibre and qualifications. The Punjab & Haryana High Court, while considering the illegalities committed by the Haryana Public Service Commission making the selections of the candidates who appeared for Haryana Civil Services (Executive & Allied Service), held that the selection of the Chairman and the Members of the Haryana Public Service Commission itself was bad. They were men lacking integrity, calibre and qualifications. Corrupt motivations were found against them. On appeal, the Supreme Court said that the disparaging observations could not be made by the High Court against the Members of the Public Service Commission nor could have set aside their appointments. They could not be condemned as men of lacking integrity, calibre and qualifications without hearing them. There has been flagrant violation of principle of natural justice. ( AIR 1987 Supreme Court 454 - Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana) .82. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1996 (9) JT (SC) 630 (S. Jaffar Sahib v. Secretary, A.P.P.S.C. & Others) , it was observed : "It is too well settled that without impleading a person as a party whose rights would be affected no court/Tribunal can pass any order against him."83. In another case reported in 1996 (6) SCC 234 (Dr. Dalip Kumar Deka v. State of Assam) , while considering the adverse remarks recorded by the High Court against the Doctors of a hospital it was held that such remarks could not have been made without giving them an opportunity of explaining and, as such, principle of natural justice has been violated. The impugned order becomes bad on this ground as well.84. Proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution are certainly civil proceedings. But a civil proceeding is one in which a person seeks to enforce by appropriate relief against the alleged infringment of his civil rights against another person or the State and which, if the claim is proved would result in declaration of his right. But in a public interest litigation a person who is filing petition is not seeking-a-relief or making-a-complaint of infringment of his own civil right. He is only informing the court about the inaction or illegal action of the State Government concerning a segment of weaker section of people. It is, in substance, a corrective measure. No civil right of petitioner was involved in this case.85. He is only informing the court about the inaction or illegal action of the State Government concerning a segment of weaker section of people. It is, in substance, a corrective measure. No civil right of petitioner was involved in this case.85. Another equally important issue to be considered is whether Sripal Jain, respondent No.1, had any right of personal hearing in a public interest litigation.86. Sripal Jain is claiming the right of personal hearing in this public interest litigation. He filed this public interest litigation praying for ejectment of civil servants from Government accommodation. Scope of petitioners right of hearing in such case may be examined. The "right" of those who bring the action on behalf of the others must necessarily be subordinate to the interest of those for whose benefit the action is sought. Law does not recognise any vested right of such a petitioner.87. After the public interest litigation is filed the petitioner ceases to have any control over the matter. His duty is over as soon as the complaint is made to the Court. Now it is for the court to decide whether the complaint made is right or wrong, whether there is violation of any constitutional guarantee given to the people or not. The petitioner has no right even to withdraw the petition without the leave of Court. Public Interest Litigation, in substance, spouses a public cause. Seeking waiver of the locus standi rule should not be taken in a casual manner. The court would permit the waiver of locus standi rule only on being satisfied that the carriage of the proceedings is in the hands of a person who is genuinely concerned in public interest. (1996) 6 SCC 734 S.P. Anand v. H.D. Devegowda) .88. He has no right of personal hearing in a Public Interest Litigation, If the right of personal hearing and a right to withdraw is acknowledged and status of a dominus litis to a person who brings the public interest litigation is also recognised the entire proceedings under public interest litigation would become vulnerable to and susceptible of a new dimension which might, in conveivable cases be used by persons for personal ends resulting in abuse of the process of court.89. The Supreme Court, in the case reported in 1988(4) SCC 226 (Sheela Barse v. Union of India & Others) , while examining the nature of proceedings and the relief sought in a public interest litigation held that unlike traditional disputes, in a public interest litigation, there is no determination or adjudication of individual rights. The proceedings in a public interest litigation are to adjudicate upon the public interest which refers to the rights and interest of the group of persons. The concept of personal hearing is connected with the vested right of the petitioner. In a public interest litigation the petitioner does not have that right.90. We hold that Sripal Jain has no right to be heard personally. If he wants personal hearing, he will have to establish his personal interest in the matter. If he does so then it will cease to be a public interest litigation petition. It will take the character of a personal interest litigation.91. What is the Public Interest involved in this case ? The scope of public interest is a limited one. Issues falling within the sway of public interest, affecting a large segment of society and which go beyond the interest of immediate parties to a dispute and affecting general public, come within the perview of public interest.92. Public interest litigations protect the interest of a broad section of down trodden, socially and economically weak citizens whose legal rights are otherwise affected but they are unable to approach the court for protection of their interest. The allotment of houses in the name of ten Civil Servants made in accordance to law or not, in no way touches the field of public interest.93. The forum of public interest litigation in no way can be misused for personal gains or other similar objects. It could not be used for making intentional attempt to indulge in mud-slinging against the authorities much less the constitutional authorities. In such cases courts cannot afford to be a sleepy-watchman or absent-minded-umpire. But the courts cannot exceed their jurisdiction. If it is done they would be guilty of adventurism.94. Time has come to lay down dear guidelines and outline the criteria parameters for entertaining such petition. In such cases courts cannot afford to be a sleepy-watchman or absent-minded-umpire. But the courts cannot exceed their jurisdiction. If it is done they would be guilty of adventurism.94. Time has come to lay down dear guidelines and outline the criteria parameters for entertaining such petition. If the courts do not restrict the filing of frivolous public interest litigations, the traditional litigation will suffer and the court of law instead of dispensing with the justice, will have to take upon themselves the administrative and executive functions. This view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1109 (Sachidanand Pandey Vs. State of West Bengal) .95. Court while dealing with the public interest litigation should prima facie be satisfied that information led before it is of such a nature that it calls for examination and this satisfaction of the court is derived from:-(1) the credence of the informant, his character and integrity; (2) the nature of information supplied; (3) the gravity or seriousness of complaint set out in the petition; (4) any other circumstances appearing from communication addressed to the Court; (5) it should not smack of malice intent; (6) it may not be used as a self-image-building machinery; (7) it is not to malign others; (8) the petitioner should not have any personal interest or self-motivations; (9) that the process is not being abused to delay the ligitimate administrative action; (10) that the member of the public who approaches the court in such cases is acting bona fidely; (11) that it is not a publicity oriented litigation; and (12) that is really in the public interest.96. From the facts of this case, it is evident that the petition has been filed either to achieve some personal or political object. The way in which this case got coverage in the national media is a proof of this fact that it was purely a publicity oriented writ petition. It can also be said to be a self-image- building machinery by bringing the Judges and judiciary in disrepute. All these have been done by Mr. B.S. Shekhawat who is an Advocate of this Court.97. Though the Judges have been badly criticised but there was no valid reason for it. What has been pleaded in this case against the allotment of houses to Judges ? All these have been done by Mr. B.S. Shekhawat who is an Advocate of this Court.97. Though the Judges have been badly criticised but there was no valid reason for it. What has been pleaded in this case against the allotment of houses to Judges ? How any finding could be recorded in the absence of the pleadings. Even a public interest litigation needs material facts to be pleaded. The Supreme Court, in a case reported in 1995(1) SCC 391 (Giani Devendra Singh v. Union of India & Another) , considered the scope of pleading in public interest litigation. Giani Devendra Singh filed a public interest litigation asking the Government to stop smuggling and selling of opium, heroin, brown sugar and poppy husk. The High Court granted the relief in the following words : "Howsoever, absurd the prayer may be and whatever be the intention of the petitioner in filing this petition, one thing is quite clear that he is obsessed with great and lofty ideals. Therefore, for whatsoever worth it is, in order to satisfy his vanity, we hereby direct to whomsoever it may concern, that smuggling and underground dealing in such dangerous articles as mentioned above, should be stopped and the sooner the better for the country." On appeal' the Supreme Court held : "If the High Court intends to pass an order on application presented before it by treating it as a public interest litigation, the High Court must precisely indicate the allegations or the statements contained in such petition relating to public interest litigation and should indicate how public interest was involved and only after ascertaining the correctness of the allegations should give specific directions as may deem just and proper in the facts of the case." (Emphasis supplied). It was further observed : "that the petition which was presented in the form of the public interest litigation lacks in material particulars and it was difficult to discern precisely the allegations sought to be made in the said application. Wide and sweeping allegations made against a Judge of the High Court without giving any instance how and in what manner the said Judge has influenced the other judicial officer of the State. This has seriously been deprecated in clear terms." 98. Wide and sweeping allegations made against a Judge of the High Court without giving any instance how and in what manner the said Judge has influenced the other judicial officer of the State. This has seriously been deprecated in clear terms." 98. Even in public interest litigation, after examining the pleadings, the court has to record a finding that on the allegations or the statements contained in such petition as to how the public interest was involved, it has to scrutinise the allegations made carefully.99. The learned Single Judge could not have entered into disputed questions of fact even in public interest litigation. The Supreme Court in a case reported in 1997 (4) SCC 62 (Daljeet Singh v. Union of India) , has stated in a very clear terms that if disputed questions of facts are involved then, even the public interest litigation can be thrown out because under Article 226 of the Constition of India, it is beyond the power of the High Court. Similar view has been expressed earlier by the Rajasthan High Court in a case reported in 1983 RLR 57=AIR 1983 Rajasthan 192 (Kailash Meghwal v. State of Rajasthan) and AIR 1985 Delhi 268 (Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights Vs. Ministry of Home Affairs) .100. The learned Judge himself has held at different places in the order that the writ petition involves disputed questions of facts which cannot be investigated under Article 226 of the Constitution and even then he decided all those disputed questions. Findings are self-contradictory.101. The view expressed in the order against the Government is as if the State Government was a corrupting agency and it had tried to corrupt the Judges by allotting them houses. A finding has been recorded that the State Government has allotted the houses to the sitting Judges in order to oblige them and to get favour from them. Has the State Government really tried to corrupt the Judges by allotting them houses ?102. Allotments of houses were made by the Government in the year, 1992. Five years have passed. In the impugned order, no mention has been made of any single instance when the State Government has approached any allottee Judge for any favour on the judicial side. Had it been the intention of the State Government in 1992, then by 1997 there must have been some instance or instances. Five years have passed. In the impugned order, no mention has been made of any single instance when the State Government has approached any allottee Judge for any favour on the judicial side. Had it been the intention of the State Government in 1992, then by 1997 there must have been some instance or instances. In the absence of any complaint by any Judge or any material on record, the finding was uncalled for and a caring Government has been wrongly branded as a corrupting agency.103. Scope of judicial review in such matters is very limited. The policy cannot be held to be bad unless it is found to be against the constitutional provisions or has been framed on extremely extraneous considerations. For that, there should be elaborate pleadings and material in support of the same.104. The Supreme Court in the case reported in 1997 (6) JT 97 (M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P.) , while dealing with the scope of Judicial Review, observed : "The Court cannot and should not out step its limit and tinker with the policy decision of the executive functionary of the State. This Court, in no uncertain term, has sounded a note of caution by indicating that policy decision is in the domain of the executive authority of the State and the Court should not embark on the unchartered ocean of public policy and should not question the efficacy or otherwise of such policy so long the same does not offend any provision of the statute or the Constitution of India." "....The power of judicial review of the executive and legislative action must be kept within the bounds of constitutional scheme so that there may not be any occasion to entertain misgivings about the role of judiciary in outstepping its limit by unwarranted judicial activism being very often talked of in these days." "....The decision of the State Government to extend the protection for further period cannot be held to be per se irrational, arbitrary or capricious warranting judicial review such policy decision..... The scope of judicial review is limited and circumscribed." 105. Whether the policy framed by the Government in the shape of special scheme for allotting the house to the High Court Judges, was arbitrary or not, can be examined by an expert committee. The scope of judicial review is limited and circumscribed." 105. Whether the policy framed by the Government in the shape of special scheme for allotting the house to the High Court Judges, was arbitrary or not, can be examined by an expert committee. In this matter, the State Government and the Rajasthan Housing Board were the only expert bodies and they find it valid. Of course if the policy or Scheme is found to be arbitrary it can always be set aside. But we find nothing irrational or arbitrary. While deciding the case of M.P. Oil Extraction (supra) earlier cases reported in AIR. 1994 SC 2466 (Bihar Public Service Commission v. S.J. Thakur) , AIR 1994 Supreme Court 1207 (K. Ashok Reddy v. Government of India) ; and AIR 1987 Supreme Court 454 (Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana) , were also considered.106. Recently legal experts from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Malaysia, Maldives, Japan, United States of America and Canada, in a Seminar on "Judicial Activisim", held at Delhi, organised by the International Bar Association discussed the scope of judicial activism in India. Issues for discussion were:-(1) Can there be any limit to judicial activism ? (2) Has judicial activism politicised the judiciary ? (3) What are the experiences of Asian Countries in this regard ? Most of the countries expressed the view that one of the limits is that the judiciary should restrict its judicial wings and not to touch the matters relating to 'policy' of the Government. One of the jurists expressed his view that in exercise of judicial review actively, Judges must constantly guard against the dangers of judicial populism and generation of hero worship. There should be no hankering after Press publicity. Judicial orders should not be passed in fields in which the court had no expertise without the benefit of full materials and data as well. Even well intentioned orders passed out of excessive zeal without understanding the long term implication could in the long run do more harm than good to the people.107. In the ease reported in 1996 (9) SCC 709 (Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited v. Union of India) , the Supreme Court said that the court should not transgress into the realm of policy-making, unless the court is satisfied that the policy so framed is wholly arbitrary. It must exercise the jurisdiction with circumspection.108. In the ease reported in 1996 (9) SCC 709 (Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited v. Union of India) , the Supreme Court said that the court should not transgress into the realm of policy-making, unless the court is satisfied that the policy so framed is wholly arbitrary. It must exercise the jurisdiction with circumspection.108. An unprecedented finding has been recorded in the form of direction that a Committee consisting of the Secretaries of the Rajasthan Government will make inquiries against the High Court Judges who are the Constitutional functionaries, in the matter of allotment of houses to them by the Housing Board.109. In order to protect the judicial process from being abused or misused, courts have to impose stringent terms in frivolous cases. So that such unscrupulous litigants should not dare to play with the Courts. If they do so they will have to bear the consequences. Heavy costs would be imposed on them which they have to pay for abusing the process of the Court. Nobody should be allowed to advance his oblique motives in the process of Public Interest Litigation.110. The Supreme Court in the case reported in 1995 (Suppl. III) SCC 741 (Yogesh K. Bhatia v. State of U.P.) , approved awarding of punitive costing in frivolous public interest litigations.111. Thus, the findings recorded by us are:- 1. The writ petition filed by Sripal Jain, respondent No.1 against the Civil Servants had become infructuous on the date of the decision. 2. If it was not infructuous then the learned Single Judge has erred in law while passing orders against them without their being parties to the writ petition and without hearing them. 3. Even in Public Interest Litigation the pleadings are to be specific. 4. Courts cannot enlarge the scope of a Public Interest Litigation at the instance of a stranger to the controversy. Principles of natural justice cannot be ignored even in Public Interest Litigation. 5. Before entertaining a public interest litigation, the Court has to satisfy itself that it is a bonafied one and really public interest is involved. 6. There should be no hankering after press publicity. 7. Public Interest Litigation may also be used as a self-image- building-machinery or to achieve some personal gain or some other object or to cause damage to others' reputation. Oblique motives should be condemned. 8. 6. There should be no hankering after press publicity. 7. Public Interest Litigation may also be used as a self-image- building-machinery or to achieve some personal gain or some other object or to cause damage to others' reputation. Oblique motives should be condemned. 8. A person filing public interest litigation has no civil rights of his own. He has no right of withdrawing the petition without leave of the Court. The court has to be satisfied for such a request. 9. Sripal Jain, respondent No.1, has no right of personal hearing in this matter. 10. If judicial process is abused for some ulterior motive, the petitioner should be saddled with heavy cost. 12. Scope of judicial review in policy matters is very limited. Courts should avoid indulging in adventurism. 13. Sarcasm has no place in judicial orders. After giving our thoughtful consideration to the entire matter and for the reasons recorded above, we are of the view that the order of the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside. 112. Accordingly, all the appeals succeed and are allowed. The impugned order dated 5th July, 1997 is hereby set aside.113. Under these circumstances, we will be failling in our duty if we do not impose a heavy cost on the respondents who have filed this destructive Public Interest Litigation by abusing the process of the court and have deliberately brought the Judges of the High Court in disrepute with malice intent.114. Looking to the peculiar facts of this case and the conduct of the contesting respondents, we impose a cost of Rs. 5,000/- on respondent No.1 (Sripal Jain) and also the same amount of cost on respondent No.2 (B.S. Shekhawat). They are directed to deposit the cost in the High Court within three weeks. In case of deafult, it will be recovered as land revenue. The amounts so deposited in the Court, shall be placed at the disposal of the Legal Aid Committee for a constructive work in the field of judicial literacy concerning Public Interest Litigation.115. The Registry is directed to issue certified copies of the order within three days from filing of the applications by the respondents.SPL. Appeals allowed with heavy costs. *******