Judgment :- K. A. SWAMI, C.J. The respondent is represented through senior counsel, Shri Somayaji. As the matter lies in a narrow compass, the writ appeal is heard for final disposal. 2. This appeal is preferred against the order dated 10th October, 1996 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 10585 of 1996. 3. In the writ petition, the petitioner/respondent herein sought for quashing the orders dated 24-6-1996 passed by the State of Tamil Nadu in G.O.D. No. 177, Industries (E2) Department and further to direct the 1st respondent to consider the application dated 14-9-1995 for grant of quarrying lease afresh in respect of 25 acres situate in S. No. 104/2 in Ikondankothahalli Village, Krishnagiri Taluk, Dharmapuri District and pass such other orders as may be considered necessary. 4. The land in question is a Government poramboke wherein a stone quarry in question is situate. The State Government has rejected the application on the grounds that the application dated 14-9-1995 filed by the petitioner/respondent was not accompanied by the income-tax clearance certificate, that the solvency certificate produced was not current and that no mining due certificate "was not enclosed with the application. 5. Learned single Judge has allowed the writ petition, following an earlier decision of this Court in W.P. 15880 of 1989 dated 10-7-1990, in which it was held as follows :- "For all the above reasons, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed. In as much as the petitioner is coming to this Court for the third time, I feel that no useful purpose will be served by directing the authorities to consider the matter again and pass orders. I, therefore, direct the 1st respondent to grant the lease in favour of the society subject to the usual conditions within three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order." Learned single Judge has also referred to the two directions issued by the Supreme Court on 21-8-1995 and 6-5-1996 in respect of the earlier application filed by the very same petitioner for a mining lease relating to the land in question. 6. Having regard to the contentions urged by both sides, the following point arises for consideration :- Whether the impugned order dated 24-6-1996 passed by the State Government rejecting the application of the petitioner/respondent requires to be interfered with. 7. 6. Having regard to the contentions urged by both sides, the following point arises for consideration :- Whether the impugned order dated 24-6-1996 passed by the State Government rejecting the application of the petitioner/respondent requires to be interfered with. 7. The facts necessary for the purpose of deciding the point are no more in dispute. As already pointed out, the land in question is a Government poramboke. The petitioner/respondent made an application on 22-6-1982 for the first time for grant of mining lease in respect of the aforesaid land under Rule 8-C of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) before the Collector of the District. The said application was rejected on 22nd March, 1983. Aggrieved by the said order the petitioner/respondent preferred an appeal before the State Government, which was dismissed on 4-8-1983. Aggrieved by the order rejecting the application by the Collector of the District, the petitioner/respondent preferred W.P. No.2583 of 1984. The same was dismissed. An Appeal was preferred against the order dismissing the writ petition No. W.A. 1327 of 1988, which was also dismissed by the Division Bench on 22-10-1990. The matter was carried to the Supreme Court in S.L.P. 1180 of 1991. The Supreme Court disposed of the S.L.P. by the order dated 21-8-1995 with the following directions :- "The appellants are free to make an application for grant of a mining lease for Grey Granite in Dharmapuri District under the provisions of the added Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959. When the application is so made, the State Government may dispose of the same in accordance with laws as early as possible. The applicants should make the application within four weeks from to-day. The challenge to the retrospectivity of the Notification issued under Rule 38 and all other contentions raised in the present appeals, stand rejected. The appeals are disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs." Pursuant to the aforesaid direction, the petitioner/respondent made an application on 14-9-1995 before the State Government under Rule 39 of the Rules. That application was not disposed of within the period stipulated by the Supreme Court. Therefore, it filed an application, I.A. 3 of 1996 in the disposed of S.L.P. 1180 of 1991. That application was not disposed of within the period stipulated by the Supreme Court. Therefore, it filed an application, I.A. 3 of 1996 in the disposed of S.L.P. 1180 of 1991. That application was disposed of by the Supreme Court on 6-5-1996 in the following terms :- "The appropriate authorities shall consider the application for grant of lease to quarry granite in the land measuring 25 acres in Survey No. 104/2, Ikondankothahalli Village, Krishnagiri Taluk, Dharmapuri District, Tamil Nadu, within a period of 8 weeks in accordance with law. If any Miscellaneous application is filed it is obvious, the same shall also be considered according to law." Therefore, the application in question was taken up by the State Government for consideration and rejected on 24-6-1996 on the three grounds referred to above. We have also pointed out that the learned single Judge has allowed the writ petition on the basis of an earlier decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in W.P. 15880 of 1989 dated 10-7-1990 and also the direction issued by the Supreme Court referred to above. 8. We may point out here that though the direction was issued by the Supreme Court permitting the petitioner to file an application under Rule 39 of the Rules and the State Government to consider the same in accordance with law, the petitioner/respondent was required to comply with all the requirements in order to make a valid application. It was necessary under the Rules to produce along with the application income tax clearance certificate, current solvency certificate and no mining due certificate. These three requirements cannot be considered to be formal. Appendix VII to the Rules prescribes the form of the application and also the required particulars to be given by the applicant. Column 7 of the application specifically states that the applicant has to file an affidavit stating that the applicant has filed up-to-date income tax returns, has paid the income-tax assessed on him and has also paid the income-tax on the basis of self-assessment as prescribed in the Income-tax Act, 1961. Column 15 says about the mining dues clearance certificate towards payment of quarrying dues, if any. These 3 requirements were necessary, to be complied with, which admittedly, the petitioner had not complied with. The solvency certificate produced was not current. Column 15 says about the mining dues clearance certificate towards payment of quarrying dues, if any. These 3 requirements were necessary, to be complied with, which admittedly, the petitioner had not complied with. The solvency certificate produced was not current. No income-tax clearance certificate was produced, nor the no mining due certificate." Admittedly, it is not the case of the petitioner that in the application, it did not held any mining lease earlier nor having any mining lease so as to state anything regarding the mining due. No affidavit is also stated to have been filed to that effect. Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the State Government cannot be held to have committed an illegality in rejecting the application for non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements. The direction of the Supreme Court was to consider the application in accordance with law. As already pointed out, the petitioner/respondent was required to comply with all the requirements in order to make the application a valid one as required by the Rules. Of-course, the other course open to the State Government was to call upon the applicant to rectify those defects. Therefore, it is argued on behalf of the petitioner/respondent that the order suffers from legal infirmity as the State Government did not call upon the applicant to remove the aforesaid deficiencies in the application. It was more so, when the petitioner/respondent, it is contended, has been trying to secure the mining lease since the year 1982 and has approached the Supreme Court twice in this regard and the Supreme Court has issued the aforesaid directions. 9. We would not have any difficulty, if Rule 39 of the Rules continued to exist, to remit the matter to the State Government to grant time to the petitioner/respondent to comply with the requirements, but, the legal position has been altered from 27-6-1996 in that Rule 39 itself has been deleted with effect from 27-6-1996. 9. We would not have any difficulty, if Rule 39 of the Rules continued to exist, to remit the matter to the State Government to grant time to the petitioner/respondent to comply with the requirements, but, the legal position has been altered from 27-6-1996 in that Rule 39 itself has been deleted with effect from 27-6-1996. In view of the deletion of Rule 39, there cannot be any direction to the State Government to consider the application and to grant the mining lease under Rule 39 of the Rules, having regard to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. M/s. Hind Stone Etc., reported in 1981 AIR(SC) 711, 1981 (1) Scale 237 , 1981 (2) SCC 205 , 1981 (2) SCR 742 , 1981 UJ 408 . In that case, there were applications pending and by the time, the applications came to be considered, the Rules were changed. Therefore, one of the questions that arose as to whether the pending applications should be directed to be considered under the old Rules, because the old Rules did provide certain advantages to the applicants, whereas the new Rules did not provide for such advantage. Considering all the aspects, the Supreme Court laid down the law as follows :- "Another submission of the learned Counsel in connection with the consideration of application for renewal was that applications made sixty days or more before the date of G.O.Ms. No. 1312 (2-12-1977) should be dealt with as if Rule 8C had not come into force. It was also contended that even applications for grant of leases made long before the date of G.O.Ms. No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8C had not come into force. The submission was that it was not open to the Government to keep applications for the grant of leases and applications for renewal pending for a long time and then to reject them on the basis of R. 8C notwithstanding the fact that the applications had been made long prior to the date on which Rule 8C came into force. The submission was that it was not open to the Government to keep applications for the grant of leases and applications for renewal pending for a long time and then to reject them on the basis of R. 8C notwithstanding the fact that the applications had been made long prior to the date on which Rule 8C came into force. While it is true that such applications should be dealt with within a reasonable time, it cannot on that account be said that the right to have an application disposed of in a reasonable time clothes an applicant for a lease with a right to have the application disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of the making of the application. No one has a vested right to the grant or renewal of a lease and none can claim a vested right to have an application for the grant or renewal of lease dealt with in a particular way, by applying particular provisions. In the absence of any vested rights in any one, an application for a lease has necessarily to be dealt with according to the rules in force on the date of the disposal of the application despite the fact that there is a long delay since the making of the application. We are therefore, unable to accept the submission of the learned Counsel that applications for the grant or renewal of leases made long prior to the date of G.O.Ms. No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 80 did not exist." (Emphasis supplied) The Rules other than Rule 39 which had now been deleted provide a procedure different from the one provided under the deleted Rule 39 for grant of a mining lease. Hence in the absence of Rule 39, the application in question cannot be considered. In view of the rule laid down by the Supreme Court relating to the very grant of mining lease, we find it difficult to accept the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner/respondent. 10. It is also contended that if the State Government had disposed of the application pursuant to the earlier direction dated 21-8-1995, the petitioner/respondent would have had the benefit of Rule 39 and therefore, the State Government must be held to have committed an illegality in not complying with the order of the Supreme Court. 11. 10. It is also contended that if the State Government had disposed of the application pursuant to the earlier direction dated 21-8-1995, the petitioner/respondent would have had the benefit of Rule 39 and therefore, the State Government must be held to have committed an illegality in not complying with the order of the Supreme Court. 11. We may point out here that when the petitioner approached the Supreme Court for the second time with I.A. 3 of 1996, the Supreme Court took note of the earlier direction and issued further direction to dispose of the application in accordance with law, within a period of 8 weeks by the order dated 6-5-1996. Accordingly, the State Government has disposed of the application, in accordance with law, on 24-6-1996, when Rule 39 itself was in operation. Therefore, the application was considered in accordance with law and it was rejected, because the applicant did not comply with the requirements. 12. For the reasons stated above, we hold, and answer the point raised for determination that the order of the State Government does not call for interference. That being so, the order of the learned single Judge has to be set aside. Accordingly, the writ appeal is allowed. The order dated 10th October, 1996 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. 10585 of 1996 is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. The CMP also stands disposed of. Appeal allowed.