( 1 ) THROUGH this writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner challenges an order of detention recorded against him under the provisions of the National Security Act (in short, NSA ). The order was recorded on 6-5-1997 by the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur, as per Annexure 8 to the writ petition, and was confirmed on 19/06/1997, as per Annexure 14 to the writ petition. The petitioner prayed for quashing of the impugned orders and for immediately setting him at liberty. ( 2 ) THE impugned order dated 6-5-1997 indicates that the District Magistrate was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner under the provisions of Section 3 (2) of the NSA for preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of services essential to the community. The grounds that were appended to the detention order were also indicated to the petitioner through paper in Annexure-7 to the writ petition and it was indicated therein that the petitioner was found cutting overhead electric wires and was arrested and the cutting of the wires disrupted the supply of power to the detriment of the public in general. The grounds indicated that atleast on three occasions such offences were committed by the applicant, whereby not only the supply of electricity was disturbed but loss was also caused to a good extent to the State Electricity Board. The grounds indicated as to what were his rights to submit his representation and to claim personal hearing and who were the authorities for such redress. ( 3 ) AFTER the presentation of the application the respondents were directed to come up with a counter affidavit and counter affidavits were filed by Sri R. S. Agarwal, the Dy. Secretary in the Government of Uttar Pradesh in its Home and Confidential Department, by Sri Sanjiv Sharan, the concerned District Magistrate of Gorakhpur, as also by the Jailor of the District Jail, Gorakhpur. ( 4 ) THE detention order was challenged on four grounds, as enumerated below : (a) It was stated that the detention for 12 months was violative of provisions of Section 3 (3), proviso, of the NSA. ( 4 ) THE detention order was challenged on four grounds, as enumerated below : (a) It was stated that the detention for 12 months was violative of provisions of Section 3 (3), proviso, of the NSA. (b) It was further stated that in the FIRs of the cases in which the petitioner was allegedly involved, there were other accused persons and the act of every accused had disrupted the power supply but only the present applicant was chosen for detention and it was a clear case of discrimination and arbitrary action on the part of the authorities. (c) Learned counsel contended that the detaining authority failed to take note of the fact that the applicant had been released on bail before detention order was passed and failure to apply his mind to this important fact affected the validity of the detention order. (d) Lastly, it was further contended that the order of confirmation dated 19-6-1997 did not indicate that the representation of the detenu was ever considered. ( 5 ) SO far the point No. (a) is concerned, we are of the view that this point has been urged on a misconception of law. Section 3 (3) of the NSA empowers the State Government to direct by order in writing that during such period, as may be specified in the order, the District Magistrate may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (2), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section. The proviso comes thereafter to add that the period specified in the order made by the State Government under this sub-section shall not in the first instance exceed three months. Learned counsel was wrongly of the view that this period refers to the period of detention. A plain reading suggests that period of three months spoken of in the proviso relates to the period for which the State Government may authorise the District Magistrate to exercise the powers under Section 3 (2) of the NSA. The direction for detention for 12 months in the confirmation order dated 19-6-1997 has no bearing with this period of three months as indicated in the aforesaid proviso. The first objection raised by the petitioner fails accordingly. ( 6 ) SO far the point (d) is concerned, it has been indicated in the counter affidavit of the State Government filed through Sri R. S. Agarwal, Dy. The first objection raised by the petitioner fails accordingly. ( 6 ) SO far the point (d) is concerned, it has been indicated in the counter affidavit of the State Government filed through Sri R. S. Agarwal, Dy. Secretary, that a representation from the petitioner was received and was considered within the permissible time and it was rejected on 9-6-1997 and the fact about the rejection of the representation was communicated to the petitioner through the district authorities on 13-6-1997. The confirmation order was passed on 19-6-1997 after receipt of the report of the advisory board. Thus, the representation was considered independently of the report of the advisory board and there was no necessity for indicating in the confirmation order that the representation had already been rejected. This contention of the petitioner must also fail. ( 7 ) SO far the non-consideration of the bail order is concerned, as mentioned in point (c), the facts are clear that the applicant was arrested in a case of theft of electric wires and he was apprehended while in the act of cutting wire. It is also not disputed that he had been granted bail by the criminal Court. Learned counsel for the State, however, submitted that this point is factually not correct as the District Magistrate had before him the information that the applicant had been released on bail and only thereafter he came to a subjective satisfaction that there was an apprehension of his committing the offence again. Learned AGA drew our attention to the materials that were placed before the District Magistrate, especially the report of the Superintendent of Police, as per Annexure 5 to the writ petition. There was a clear indication that Samarjit, the applicant, had already been released on bail and he was likely to cause damage to the national property again and to commit acts prejudicial to the supply of power to the public in general. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Kerala High Court as reported in 1997 Allahabad Crl. Cases, (Vol) 34, 707. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Kerala High Court as reported in 1997 Allahabad Crl. Cases, (Vol) 34, 707. The Honble Judges of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court had before them a case where a detention order was passed after the applicant was released on bail, but there was no indication that any material was there before the detaining authority to suggest that the petitioner in that case was on bail. Their Lordships were of the view that the fact that he had moved a bail application and had been released on bail were most vital for consideration by the detaining authority and in the absence of that material before the said authority, the order of detention was bad. As indicated above, the facts in the present case are different from the facts of the case before the Kerala High Court. The District Magistrate in this case was fully aware of the fact that the applicant had been released on bail and materials were there before him to satisfy himself on this point and the sufficiency of the materials may not be questioned by this Court. The District Magistrate was further of the view that the applicant was likely to indulge in such activity which would be prejudicial to the maintainance of supply of power to the public in general. It may not, therefore, be stated that any important material was not placed before the District Magistrate for consideration and on this score also the contention of the petitioner is to be rejected. ( 8 ) THE only other point that was raised is covered by point (b) as elaborated above. It touches the question of discrimination. It was stated that there were three FIRs not only against the present petitioner but against others as well and the alleged act of each one had affected the supply of power. It was contended that in the absence of any distinguishing feature to hand- pick the case of the petitioner, the action against him alone was arbitrary and certainly discriminatory. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this High Court in Hari Narain Awasthis case, as reported in 1996 (33) All Crl Cas 841. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this High Court in Hari Narain Awasthis case, as reported in 1996 (33) All Crl Cas 841. Three persons were charged for rape on a minor girl and the ghastly act allegedly created a terror in the minds of the people in the locality and the public order was, thus, disturbed. All of them were proceeded against under the NSA for their detention but the order was revoked in respect of one accused, Satish alais Raju. It was argued before the Court below that parity should have been there as on the basis of the same FIR all the persons were prosecuted and the FIR was the basis of the detention order also. The Court found that relevant materials were placed before the advisory board but the important mateials were not considered by the board and there was rejection of the representation which exhibited non-application of mind. The Court was of the view that the order impugned in the writ petition was not passed after taking into consideration the important material fact involved in the petitioners case that the public at large had been terrorised not knowing the name of the particular person but with the abominable nature of the offence. The Court found that the petitioners representation was rejected without considering the material fact on record and the order was passed arbitrarily without application of mind. ( 9 ) IN this regard, the learned State counsel again drew our attention to the affidavit sworned by the District Magistrate. It was stated that he was subjectively satisfied that an order under Section 3 (2) of the NSA was necessary to prevent the petitioner from indulging in similar activties which were prejudicial to the maintenance of the supplies to the community. There was reason to believe that the petitioner would indulge in such activities in future, hence it was necessary to record the detention order. It was indicated in the affidavit that preventive action was taken against the co-accused Ramayan Singh also as there were materials for the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate that he too was likely to commit the offence again. It was indicated in the affidavit that other co-accused had accepted their guilt in their confession before the police officers and prayed for pardon. It was indicated in the affidavit that other co-accused had accepted their guilt in their confession before the police officers and prayed for pardon. It was contended by the learned AGA that the preventive action is not to be confused with a punitive action and under the garb of preventive action a person is not supposed to be punished for his past acts. The purpose of preventive detention was to see that a person is not allowed to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies etc. The likelihood of commission of such prejudicial activities is the core of the satisfaction. It was contended further that the past acts simply indicate the tendency and there must have been some satisfaction in the detention order that he was likely to repeat the act. This satisfaction, according to the learned AGA, was very much expressed in the detention order and the grounds and this differentiates the case of the other co-accused of persons from the case of the present applicant. He relied on a decision of the High Court as reported in AIR 1988 SC 1835 : (1988 Cri LJ 1825) (Yongendra Murari v. State of U. P. ). Here also a plea of discrimination was raised as the detenu along with others was charged with murder but the detention order was passed against the detenu alone. The court found in paragraph 9 of the judgment that there was no merit in the petitioners grievance of discrimination on the ground that the co-accused persons had not been detained. The Court found on fact that role of the petitioner and that of the others were not identical and the reasonable apprehension as to their future conduct must have depended on the relevant facts and circumstances which differed from individual to individual. ( 10 ) LOOKING to the averments in the ground, as also the affidavits of the parties, we are of the view that while it is true that common FIRs were there against the present petitioner and others, there was further subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the petitioner was likely to commit the offence again. The affidavit of the District Magistrate indicates that other accused persons had shown their penitence over the past incident and this is certainly a distinguishing feature to separate the case of the petitioner from that of the others. The affidavit of the District Magistrate indicates that other accused persons had shown their penitence over the past incident and this is certainly a distinguishing feature to separate the case of the petitioner from that of the others. It may not be an argument for any wrong doer to say that when hundreds of wrong doers are at large, he may not be proceeded according to law. If at all it is a dereliction on the part of any officer charged with maintenance of law and order not to pick any particular miscreant, he may be taken to task by his superiors, but when a particular authority acts accordingly to law and gives good grounds for an action under a preventive legislation and there are materials to distinguish his case from others, a plea of discrimination may not be accepted. This point also fails. ( 11 ) ALL the points raised by the petitioner having failed, the writ petition stands dismissed. Petition dismissed. .