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1997 DIGILAW 1554 (SC)

State of U. P. v. Fakir Chand

1997-10-23

M.M.PUNCHHI, M.SRINIVASAN

body1997
ORDER : M.M. Punchhi, J. 1. On hearing learned counsel for the appellant, State of Uttar Pradesh, we get to the view that this appeal must fail. Our reasons are these: The deceased was Narendra Kumar Sharma. It is alleged that his wife's brother, named Fakir Chand sprinkled kerosene on him at about 10.30 p.m. on the fateful night and the deceased's wife, Santosh Kumari ignited a matchstick and put him to fire. In burning condition, he ran to the shop of Dr Manvendra Sharma who put off the fire and gave him first-aid. On his recommendation, the deceased was removed to Medical College & Hospital, Meerut. The compounder of the aforesaid doctor took him there. On 14-3-1985, a dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by Shri Shyam Singh, Additional Sub-Divisional Magistrate which was to the effect that he was put to fire in the manner above stated, mentioning that he was put to fire on Wednesday on 13-5-1985. The real facts are that he was burnt on Tuesday on 12-5-1985. Be that as it may, even on giving some room to the mistake committed by the deceased while mentioning the date of the occurrence, it is noticeable that he strangely permitted oil being sprinkled on him without demur and made no effort to run away from the place and seek protection somewhere. Rather he let his wife put him to fire by a matchstick. This conduct is wholly unnatural. To alight a matchstick also some time is taken. The instinct of self-preservation would have put the deceased to quicker action in getting away from the accused persons. The story given in the dying declaration is further falsified by the statement of Dr. Manvendra Sharma, DW who stated that when he had asked the deceased as to what had happened to him, he had given the reply that he was fed up with life and that his injuries be attended to. Perhaps from this, one can infer that the deceased being tired of life had attempted to commit suicide. This factor and other factors for which reference has been made by the High Court in the judgment under appeal, led to hold that this was not a case of murder. It might be a case of burning, perhaps volitional by the deceased himself. There is thus no room for interference. 2. This factor and other factors for which reference has been made by the High Court in the judgment under appeal, led to hold that this was not a case of murder. It might be a case of burning, perhaps volitional by the deceased himself. There is thus no room for interference. 2. For these reasons, we find no ground to interfere. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.