Judgment S.K.Chattopadhyaya, J. 1. This civil revision application is directed against an order dated 15.2.96 by reason of which the learned court below has directed the petitioner-judgment debtor to execute the sale deed in favour of the opposite party/decree holder on accepting Rs. 1200.00 and on failure of which the opposite party has been directed to deposit the said amount in the court for enabling the court to pass order for registration of the sale deed. 2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass: The opposite party/plaintiff filed a title suit No. 73/84 for a decree for specific performance of contract stating, inter alia, that the petitioner/defendant entered into an agreement with the opposite party/plaintiff on 9th July, 1977 by which it was agreed that the petitioner would execute the sale deed in respect of the suit land in favour of the opposite party if the opposite party tenders consideration amount of Rs. 1000.00 to him latest by 8.7.84. It is stated that the plaintiff/opposite party wanted to tender the said consideration amount to the petitioner on 8.7.80, 8.7.83, 8.6.84 and even on 28.6.84 with a request to execute the sale deed in his favour but the defendant deferred the matter on one pretext or the other. Ultimately the petitioner having refused to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff filed the suit expressing his readiness and willingness to pay, the consideration money of Rs. 1000.00 to the defendant but as the defendant is not willing to perform his part of contract, the plaintiff had no option but to file the said suit. 3. The petitioner/defendant filed written statement and admitted the existence of the agreement between them but contending that the suit was not maintaibable and is barred by limitation. The defendant/petitioners case was that the plaintiff /opposite party never tendered the consideration amount and, as such, there was no question of executing the sale deed. 4. The learned trial court decreed the suit and orders, inter alia, as follows:- The defendant is hereby directed to execute and register the sale deed with respect to the suit land on receipt of consideration amount of Rs. 4. The learned trial court decreed the suit and orders, inter alia, as follows:- The defendant is hereby directed to execute and register the sale deed with respect to the suit land on receipt of consideration amount of Rs. 1000.00 from the plaintiff within a period of one month from the date of this order failing which the plaintiff shall be entitled to get the same executed and registered through the process of the court on depositing the consideration amount of Rs. 1000.00 at his cost which shall be binding upon the defendant. 5. The judgment is dated 26.2.86 and the decree was signed on 10.3.86. It appears that, thereafter, after lapse of about nine years the plaintiff/opposite party filed execution case No. 1/95 on 18.7.95 praying therein for execution of the decree passed on 10.3.86. 6. The petitioner raised objection and by overruling his objection, by the impugned order dated 15.2.96 the learned court below has extended the time for execution of the sale deed and directed the opposite party/plaintiff to deposit the total amount of Rs. 12, 00.00 to the defendant/petitioner within 15 days and defendant/petitioner was directed to execute the said sale deed. It was further ordered that if the defendant/petitioner refuses to execute the decree, the plaintiff would deposit the said amount in court and the court will get the sale deed registered. 7. Mr. R.N. Sahay, counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the court below has acted in excess/ of its jurisdiction in extending the time in a case in which the decree for specific performance was passed as far back as in the year, 1986. According to him, after the said decree was passed in favour of the opposite party, no attempt was made by him either to tender the said amount to the petitioner or even on alleged refusal by the plaintiff, the said amount was not deposited in court as directed in the decree itself. In support of his contention that under these circumstances the court can/not extend time mechanically, Mr. Sahay has relied in the case of Bank of India V/s. James Fernandez and Anr. . 8. Mr. Manjul Prasad appearing on behalf of the opposite party/plaintiff, however, contended that in a suit for specific performance of contract, the court which has passed the decree has ample jurisdiction to extend the time considering the facts and circumstances of the case. Sahay has relied in the case of Bank of India V/s. James Fernandez and Anr. . 8. Mr. Manjul Prasad appearing on behalf of the opposite party/plaintiff, however, contended that in a suit for specific performance of contract, the court which has passed the decree has ample jurisdiction to extend the time considering the facts and circumstances of the case. He argues that the court was satisfied that even before the decree was passed for specific performance of contract, the defendant/petitioner with oblique motive did not accept the consideration amount and ultimately refused to execute the sale deed. The trial court being satisfied that the defendant/petitioner was adopting a dubious method in not executing the sale deed on the basis of the agreement entered into between the parties, passed the decree for specific performance of contract. His further contention is that even after the suit was decreed and opposite party was directed to pay the consideration amount but when in spite of his repeated insistence the defendant /petitioner did not accept the same and refused to obey the decree passed by the court below, the court was within its jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. Lastly he urged that if the opposite party was negligent in tendering the said amount to the petitioner or even to deposit the said amount in court, under Sec. 28 of the Specific Relief Act, the defendant/petitioner could have prayed before the court to resicnd the contract and that step having not be taken by the defendant/petitioner, he cannot be allowed to raise objection against the impugned order. In support of his contention Mr. Manjul Prasad has relied in the case of Ramankutty Guptan V/s. Avara reported in A.I.R. 1994 ScC1699. 9. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties penaltimate order in the aforesaid title suit maybe looked into. While decreeing the suit for specific performance, the learned court below has ordered as follows;- Let the suit be and the same is decreed with costs Pleaders fee Rs. 32.00 and pleaders clerk fee Rs. only is allowed. The defendant is hereby directed to execute and register sale deed with respect to the suit land on receipt of consideration amount of Rs. 32.00 and pleaders clerk fee Rs. only is allowed. The defendant is hereby directed to execute and register sale deed with respect to the suit land on receipt of consideration amount of Rs. 1000.00 from the plaintiff within a period of one month from the date of this order failing which the plaintiff shall be entitled to get the same execute and registered through the processes of the court by deposting the consideration amount of Rs. 1000.00 at his costs which shall be binding upon the defendant. 10. From the aforesaid direction it appears that the defendant/petitioner was directed to execute and register the sale deed with respect to the suit land if consideration amount of Rs. 1000.00 is paid to him by the plaintiff/opposite party within a period of one month from the date of the order i.e. 26.2.88 (decree signed on 10.3.88). The plaintiff was given liberty to get the sale deed executed and registered through the process of the court by depositing the said consideration amount at his cost if the defendant/petitioner fails to execute the same even after receiving the consideration amount from the plaintiff/opposite party. It was further directed that the said execution of the deed shall be binding upon the defendant/petitioner. Though the decree was passed on 10.3.86, admittedly, the plaintiff/opposite party filed the execution case in the year, 1995 and filed a petition under Sec. 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 29.1.96 praying before the court to extend the period of one month originally allowed by the said decree. It was stated in the petition that after the decree was passed, the decree holder opposite party repeatedly tried to pay the consideration amount of Rs. 1000.00 to the judgment-debtor/petitioner but on each occasion the petitioner/judgment-debtor refused to accept the same. The opposite party even tried to meet the lawyer of the defendant but without any success. He expressed his willingness to deposit the said amount in court. Therefore, he prayed for some time. The said plea of the plaintiff/ opposite party was vehementally opposed by the petitioner/judgment-debtor by-contending that neither the opposite party ever offered the consideration amount nor deposited the same in the court within the period allowed and, as such, after such long gap, time cannot be extended. 11. Therefore, he prayed for some time. The said plea of the plaintiff/ opposite party was vehementally opposed by the petitioner/judgment-debtor by-contending that neither the opposite party ever offered the consideration amount nor deposited the same in the court within the period allowed and, as such, after such long gap, time cannot be extended. 11. It appears that the learned Munsif by the impugned order has extended the time for 15 days directing the petitioner to accept the amount and to register the sale deed. It was further order that if the petitioner refuses to accept the said amount the opposite party will deposit the said amount in court and the court will pass order directing to execute the said sale deed. 12. From the aforesaid facts it is apparent that though the judgment and decree was passed in the suit in the year 1986 but till 1995 the plaintiff/opposite party did not take any step for getting the sale deed executed by the petitioner/defendant even by depositing the said amount in the court. It is not in dispute that the court can extend the time fixed in the decree for payment of money and such extension can be made even after expiry of time originally granted in view of Sec. 148, CPC. It is also well settled that though Section 28 recognises courts right to extend the time, it does not expressly confer any such right on the court and it cannot be concluded that until application for rescission of contract is made the defaulting party can seek extension of time . 13. From the nature of the decree in the instant case, it is clear that an failure of the defendant/petitioner to execute the decree after receipt of consideration amount within one month, the plaintiff was given liberty to deposit the consideration amount in the court and on such deposit the court was to execute the decree. Thus, in my view, the decree was a conditional one and admittedly the opposite party/plaintiff did not take any step to deposit the said amount in court after the alleged refusal by the defendant/petitioner to execute the consideration amount. Thus, in my view, the decree was a conditional one and admittedly the opposite party/plaintiff did not take any step to deposit the said amount in court after the alleged refusal by the defendant/petitioner to execute the consideration amount. In the case of Sunity Chandra Bose V/s. Nil Ratan Sinha reported 1985 Calcutta 282, it has been held that in case of a conditional decree having default clause, the court neither has power exporte to modify the decree nor extend the time for deposit of purchased money. There is no cogent reason as to why the plaintiff/opposite party waited for nearly nine years to file execution case to get the said decree executed. From the impugned order it appears that the court below has extended the time mechanically relying on the statements made by the opposite party that in spite of his best effort the defendant refused to accept the said amount. No evidence was led by the plaintiff to substantiate his assertion. 14. The facts and circumstances of the case of Ramankutty Guptan V/s. Avara (supra) is entirely distinguishable from those of the instant case. In the reported case, the judgment-debtor filed a petition in the executing court to rescind the contract on the plea that the plaintiff had committed default in depositing the balance consideration amount within one month as directed by the appellate court. The said application was dismissed by the executing court holding that the deposit was made within time. The High Court also dismissed the revision application filed by the judgment-debtor and then he moved the Supreme Court. Their Lordships found that while second appeal was pending the balance consideration amount was deposited and judgment-debtor did not take any step to bring it to the notice of the High Court that the decree holder had committed default in compliance of the appellate decree by depositing the balance amount with in the given time. Their Lordships further found that the decree holder was in possession of the land for a long time and the execution was in mid-way. Under these circumstances their Lordships dismissed the appeal filed by the judgment-debtor. 15. In the case of Smt. Periyakhal and Ors. Their Lordships further found that the decree holder was in possession of the land for a long time and the execution was in mid-way. Under these circumstances their Lordships dismissed the appeal filed by the judgment-debtor. 15. In the case of Smt. Periyakhal and Ors. V/s. Smt. Dakshyani reported in -- while holding that the time for deposit stipulated amount by the parties became the time allowed by the court and this gave the court the jurisdiction to extend time in approprite cases, their Lordships observed as follows:- Of course, time would not be extended ordinarily nor for the more asking. It would be granted in rare cases to prevent manifest injustice. 16. Similarly, the facts and circumstances in the case of Vidya Sagar Rat V/s. Ram Laqan Thakur reported in 1996 (1) PLJR 57 are quite distinguishible. In my considered opinion, this decision does not help the opposite party/plaintiff in the instant case. In the reported decision the consideration money could not be deposited in time as because the petitioner had no knowledge with respect to the conditional decree. The decree holder was in dark about the said decree and could know about the aforesaid condition only after obtaining the certified copy of the judgment. 17. On the contrary, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Sunity Chandra Bose (supra), while distinguishing the case of Tapen Kumar Chatterjee V/s. Kalyani Devi , has held that in facts and circumstances time can not be extended. 18. I have already indicated above that since nine years from the date of passing of the decree, the plaintiff/opposite party kept silent in getting the sale deed executed. Even assuming that plaintiff/defendant did not execute the sale deed by accepting the consideration amount, it was open for the plaintiff/opposite party to get the sale deed execute through the process of the court by depositing the said amount in the court itself. This was the direction of the learned court below who passed the decree for specific performance. There is no whisper in the impugned order that the opposite party did take any step in this regard. In this regard another aspect is to be considered and that is in the year 1977 the agreement was for sale of the land for Rs. There is no whisper in the impugned order that the opposite party did take any step in this regard. In this regard another aspect is to be considered and that is in the year 1977 the agreement was for sale of the land for Rs. 1000.00 but after nine years, the value of the land surely has been gone high and so if the plaintiff/opposite party is allowed to have that land on a megre sum of Rs. 1000.00 , it will not be justified. 19. Considering facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be sustaing in law. 20. In the result, the revision application is allowed and impugned order dated 15.2.96 is set aside.