Pankajam Ammal v. Thulasidoss — 1997 DIGILAW 1569 (MAD)

Judgment :- 1. The tenants aggrieved against the order of eviction passed by the authorities below have filed the above Revision. 2. The landlords filed R.C.O.P.No.16 of 1989 on the file of the learned Rent Controller/District Munsif, Karur to evict the tenants, under Secs.l0(2)(l) and 14(l)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 as amended. In the petition it is stated that by a settlement deed dated 9.2.1962. one Govindarajulu Naidu who is the original owner . of the property settled the property in question along with the other properties in favour of his sons, including one G.Ramachandran who is the husband of the second petitioner. He died issueless. But, during his lifetime, on 6.3.1963, the second petitioner in the R.C.O.P. and her husband duly adopted the first petitioner in the R.C.O.P. She had executed a release deed in respect of her life-interest in the property in favour of the first petitioner in the R.C.O.P., the adopted son. According to the landlords, the factum of adoption was made known to the tenants. Inspite of the same, they have not paid the rent to the landlords. But, on the other hand, they denied the title of the first petitioner in the R.G.O.P. On that basis the landlords claimed that on the ground of denial of title, the tenants are liable to be evicted. It is their further case that the tenants have not paid rent since January, 1988, in spite of demand and so they committed wilful default in payment of rent. With respect of their requirement for demolition and reconstruction, it is the case of the landlords that the petition mentioned property is situated in a prominent locality at Karur. For the purpose of augmenting the income and to have better return from the said property they want to demolish the entire superstructure and put up new construction over the site. According to the first petitioner in the R.C.O.P., he is having necessary resources for the same. It is stated in the petition that the first petitioner has become the landlord and so he has filed the petition and to avoid technical objection from the tenants, the second petitioner also had been impleaded as a party. She has also verified the petition. This petition was objected by the tenants by filing a detailed counter. It is stated in the petition that the first petitioner has become the landlord and so he has filed the petition and to avoid technical objection from the tenants, the second petitioner also had been impleaded as a party. She has also verified the petition. This petition was objected by the tenants by filing a detailed counter. In the counter it is stated that the first petitioner in the R.C.O.P. cannot get any right in the property on the basis of the alleged adoption. They have also submitted that the adoption and release deeds are illegal. With respect to the payment of rent, money orders were sent on 18.1.1988and 15.2.1988 etc., to the second petitioner in the R.C.O.P. but she refused to receive the same. As soon as the R.C.O.P. was filed, they have immediately paid all the rent up-to-date. With respect to the requirement of the building for demolition and reconstruction, it is the case of the tenants that such requirement is not a bona fide one. It is only with an oblique motive to evict the tenants, and the landlords have no funds for the same. 3. The Rent Controller in his order dated 6.7.1990 allowed the eviction petition accepting the case of the landlords. Aggrieved against the same, the tenants filed R.C.A.No.19 of 1990 on the file of the learned Appellate Authority/Sub Judge, Karur. The Appellate Authority in his order dated 29.7.1992 found that the denial of title by the tenants cannot be construed as a bona fide one, that the tenants have committed wilful default in payment of rent and that the requirement of building for demolition and reconstruction by the landlords cannot be said to be bona fide one. On the basis of the above finding, the Appellate Authority has confirmed the order of eviction. Further aggrieved, the tenants have filed the above revision. 4. Pending the revision, the 2nd respondent died. The tenants have filed C.M.P.No.8104 of 1996 to record the tenants and the 1 st respondent also as Legal Representatives of the deceased 2nd respondent’. I will deal with the same separately. 5. The main question involved in this case for con- sideration is whether the denial of title of the landlords with respect to the property iri question by the tenants is a bona fide one” or not. 6. I will deal with the same separately. 5. The main question involved in this case for con- sideration is whether the denial of title of the landlords with respect to the property iri question by the tenants is a bona fide one” or not. 6. Before going into that question, it is necessary to see how the first respondent herein claims right in the property in question. Admittedly, the property in question originally belonged to one Govindarajulu Naidu. He executed a settlement deed on 9.2.1962 in favour of his sons in respect of the property in question and other properties. The relevant portion of the same marked as Ex.A-1 is as follows: "TAMIL" Admittedly, the said G.Ramachandran is also one of his sons and one of the settlee in the abovesaid Ex.A-1. The second respondent is his wife. Since they did not have any issues of their own, they adopted the first respondent on 6.3.1963, and the same was reduced into writing by a deed of adoption under Ex.A-2, dated 11.1.1988. On the date of adoption, namely, 6.3.1963, the said Ramachandran was alive. Since the second respondent was having life-interest in the said, properties, she released her right under the release deed dated 11.1.1988 marked as Ex.A-3. Pursuant to the same, the second respondent informed the tenants that the property in question has been given to the 1st respondent and they have to pay the rent accordingly. In spite of the same, the tenants raised a dispute to the title of the 1 st respondent for the property in question, regarding his capacity to be a landlord. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the adoption deed is not in accordance with law, and, more than that, the second respondent was having only enjoyment right in the said property, and so the first respondent cannot get any right under the alleged adoption and release deeds marked as Exs.A-2 and A-3. I am deciding the rights of the parties only for the restricted purpose to see whether the denial of title by the tenants is a bona fide or not, and I am not deciding the dispute between the parties as to the title of the property in question. According to the 2nd respondent, the adoption was as early as in 1963, and that has been reduced into writing under Ex.A-2. According to the 2nd respondent, the adoption was as early as in 1963, and that has been reduced into writing under Ex.A-2. Since the second respondent was having life interest in the said properties, the same has been released in favour of the 1st respondent, under Ex.A-3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has tried to assail the case of the first petitioner by submitting that he is not denying the title of the second respondent to the said properties, and his denial is only with respect to the right of the first respondent in the property in question, on the basis that he will not get any right in the property in view of the recitals in Ex.A-1. On a mere reading of Ex.A-1 prima facie I feel that the intention of the testator was that each branch should retain the property described therein within their branch. Merely because it is stated therein that "TAMIL" it cannot be said that the same is only with respect to the children born to the parents. Further, adopted son also can be taken as a son. So, in view of the adoption of the first respondent as stated in Ex.A-2 the branch of the said Ramachandran is entitled to retain the said property. 8. As stated earlier the second respondent has also released her right in the properties in favour of the first respondent. So, on the date of filing of the R.C.O.P., the 1 st petitioner claims that he is the landlord of the premises in question. 9. So, the denial of title with respect to the first petitioner in the said property dates back to the date of filing of the R.C.O.P. So to reject the R.C.O.P. as not maintainable at the instance of the first petitioner, it has to be decided whether such a denial is a bona fide one at the relevant point of time when the same was raised. If any authority is needed, the same is found in Thanvagel, A. v. A.Mariappan Thanvagel, A. v. A.Mariappan Thanvagel, A. v. A.Mariappan, 109 L.W. 381 wherein Abdul Hadi, J, has held as follows: “Even though originally the petition for eviction was made under Sec. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act on the ground that the landlady did not have any accommodation in her own possession and that she was living in the rented premises, the order of eviction cannot be interfered with merely on the ground that subsequently the landlady has come in possession of some accommodation even though that accommodation does not fully meet the need of the landlady. There is no doubt that the petition as framed when it was made was clearly maintainable because at that time the landlady was not in occupation of any premises of her own. The petition does not automatically become non-maintainable because of subsequent events. All that has to be seen is whether the accommodation which has now secured subsequent to the order of eviction is sufficient to meet the need of the family and forcing the landlady to have recourse to another proceeding will only mean multiplicity of proceedings.” The abovesaid decision has also been followed by Abdul Hadi, J. as he then was in Abdur Rashed Sahib, M.K. v. A.R.Rahimunnissa Begum Abdur Rashed Sahib, M.K. v. A.R.Rahimunnissa Begum Abdur Rashed Sahib, M.K. v. A.R.Rahimunnissa Begum , (1990)1 L. W. 582. 10. After the execution of the adoption and release deeds the second respondent has written a letter to the tenants under Ex.38 to pay the rent to the first respondent. The second respondent is also a signatory to the eviction petition recognising the rights of the first respondent to be a landlord and to collect the rent from the tenants. She has also deposed to that effect. In spite of the same, the tenants have denied the title of the 1 st respondent to the property in question, which cannot be construed other than mala fide denial of title and so order of eviction on that ground is sustainable. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that now the second respondent is dead and so the first respondent cannot have any right. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that now the second respondent is dead and so the first respondent cannot have any right. As stated earlier, the nature of denial of title to the document has to be gone into on the basis of the facts available on the date of filing of the petition, and the date on which the tenant raised objection regarding the rights of the landlord. So, such a submission cannot be sustained in law. 11. With respect to the eviction on the ground of wilful default, the case of the petitioners is that the authorities below are not correct in holding that the tenants have committed wilful default. In the counter, the tenants have stated that as soon as the petitioners filed the R.C.O.P., the respondents immediately paid the arrears up-to-date. It is also stated that the rent was sent to the 2nd respondent which was refused. So, the order of the authorities below in this regard cannot be sustained in law. 12. With respect to the requirement of the premises of the landlords for demolition and reconstruction, it is their specific case that the premises is situate in a prominent locality at Karur, and for the purpose of augmenting their income and to have better return from the property in question, they want to demolish the entire superstructure and put up new one over the site. Regarding funds, it is stated that they are having sufficient funds. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners/tenants has submitted that the respondents have not proved their bona fide with respect to the such requirement. Though the Rent Controller accepted the case of the respondents herein, the Appellate Authority rejected the same, only on the ground that the premises is not in dilapidated condition. The appellate authority has not applied his mind that for seeking eviction under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act, it is not necessary that the premises should be in dilapidated condition. 13. While considering similar issue I have held in S.Saraswathiammal (Deceased) others v. RS.Malikarjun Raja and 2 others S.Saraswathiammal (Deceased) others v. RS.Malikarjun Raja and 2 others S.Saraswathiammal (Deceased) others v. RS.Malikarjun Raja and 2 others, (1997)2 MLJ. 13. While considering similar issue I have held in S.Saraswathiammal (Deceased) others v. RS.Malikarjun Raja and 2 others S.Saraswathiammal (Deceased) others v. RS.Malikarjun Raja and 2 others S.Saraswathiammal (Deceased) others v. RS.Malikarjun Raja and 2 others, (1997)2 MLJ. 474 : (1997)2 L.W. 287 that the bona fides have to be assessed with respect to the facts and circumstances of each case and the building need not be in dilapidated condition or in dangerous state of affairs for ordering eviction under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act. The Rent Controller on the basis of the evidence has found that the 1st respondent can gather sufficient funds to reconstruct the premises. That factual finding has not been assailed by the Appellate Authority. The case of the 1st respondent has also been established adducing evidence. So, the requirement of the 1st respondent of the premises in question for demolition and reconstruction is nothing but bona fide, ‘as he has proved his readiness to put up new construction. 14. In view of the above, the order of the Appellate Authority in this regard cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly the order of eviction passed by the authority below is sustainable. I do not find any merit in this Revision and the same is dismissed. No costs.