Both these two petitions under section 482 CrPC arose out of the same order, and therefore, they are heard together and disposed by a common judgment. 2. Criminal Revision No.76 of 1997 is directed against the order dated 5.12.96 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Changlang, more particularly the adverse remarks made against the petitioner, and prays for expunction thereof. 3. The Criminal Revision No. 77 of 1997 is preferred by the accused person who was ordered to be released on bail. His contention is that the impugned order dated 5.12.96 passed by the Deputy Commissioner is not only malafide but also vindictive towards the petitioner. The new conditions imposed by the Deputy Commissioner in the impugned order (Annexure B) are as follows : "(1) That the accused shall make himself available for interrogation by Police Officer as and when required. (2) That the person shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case to dissuade from disclosing such facts to the Court. (3) That the person shall not leave India without permission of the Court and he shall not leave Changlang District without the permission of the Court. (4) And he should appear in the Court once in a 3 (three) months preferably 1st day of the month. If the 1st day is Sunday or Holiday the immediate following day." 4. The petitioner hi Criminal Revision No.76 of 1997 Shri Shep Kumar Agarwal is a practising Advocate and member of the Tinsukia Bar Association, but at times has to attend the Courts in Arunachal Pradesh. He was engaged by Shri. Longkhap Mirang Yenger (petitioner in Criminal Revision No.77 of 1997) who was arrested by the police on 18.8.96 in connection with Jairampur PS Case No. 11/96 and kept in jail custody. A bail application Criminal Original Application No. 1103 of 1996 was moved on behalf of the accused before this Hon'ble Court and by order dated 29.11.96 the said accused was ordered to be released on bail on furnishing a bond of Rs.5,000/- with one surety of like amount to the satisfaction of the Deputy Commissioner, Changlang. The petitioner on 2.12.96 filed an application before the Deputy Commissioner along with the above order passed by the High Court and the bond as directed. It was place4 before the Additional Deputy Commissioner, who was in charge. The petitioner on 2.12.96 filed an application before the Deputy Commissioner along with the above order passed by the High Court and the bond as directed. It was place4 before the Additional Deputy Commissioner, who was in charge. The Additional Deputy Commissioner in his turn referred the application to Shri RK Sharma, Extra Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) to accept the bond. It was he, who has passed remand orders on earlier occasions in this very case. He accepted the Bond and released the accused on bail. On 21.1.97 the petitioner was served with a copy of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner on 5.12.96 with a covering letter dated 24.12.96 issued by Shri RK Sharma, EAC. The order itself is explanatory and reproduced hereinbelow: "The accused got the opportunity of getting himself enlarge on the doubtful situation caused due to pleading of learned Advocate in lower Court having no jurisdiction to hear the bail petition. The Court which has granted bail has done his duty negligently having without jurisdiction which is bad in law and an action void ab-initio. ......... It is unfortunate to note that an Advocate of highly experienced defence counsel like Shri SK Agarwalla, Tinsukia should have argued a case for releasing the accused on bail in a Court which does not have the jurisdiction to consider bail petition itself. As a defence counsel he should have acted wisely for the benefit of his client and also bringing proper fact to the notice of learned Court. By pleading for enlarging-the accused on bail in a Court having no jurisdiction shows the learned defence counsel still lacks in certain knowledge to file his appeals and pleadings in proper Court. As a learned counsel he should have know it that the order passed by a Court having no jurisdiction is an order null and void in itself. By pleading for enlarging-the accused on bail in a Court having no jurisdiction shows the learned defence counsel still lacks in certain knowledge to file his appeals and pleadings in proper Court. As a learned counsel he should have know it that the order passed by a Court having no jurisdiction is an order null and void in itself. While pleading the case for the release of the accused on bail in the Court of an EAC (Judicial) not only shows that learned counsel have not gone through the order of the Hon'ble High Court in which it is directed the accused be released on bail.' In view of the aforesaid, I allow the petition and, directed the aforesaid accused shall be released on bail of Rs.5,000/- with one surity of the like amount to the satisfaction of DC, Changlahg' but also lack of common sense to file the case for pleading in an appropriate Court. In view of the above, I T. Bagra, Deputy Commissioner, Changlang hereby directed Sri S.K. Agarwalla, Advocate to be professional, helpful to the Court and give proper advice to their clients, bring real facts to the notice of the Court and plead properly the case in the Court having proper jurisdiction. Though it pains me and I am compel to pass stricture against him not to repeat such action in future. Copy of this order be given to learned Advocate Shri SK Agarwalla, Tinsukia for his guidance in future." 5. The above order apart from being passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, it was fervently urged by Mr. AK Bhattacharyya, senior counsel appearing for the petitioner that such adverse remarks, by the Executive against the professional discharge of duties by an Advocate, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, where the judiciary has not yet been separated from the Executive, would not only hamper the free and fair dispensation of justice, but also disuade the legal freternity in face of such wholly uncalled for remarks and unsolicited advice. He, therefore, urged not only for expunction of remarks, but also a general direction to the officers entrusted with the task of administration of justice in Arunachal Pradesh to refrain from making such remarks in future. 6. The Deputy Commissioner, opposite party No.2, Shri Tape Bagra has also filed his affidavit. He, therefore, urged not only for expunction of remarks, but also a general direction to the officers entrusted with the task of administration of justice in Arunachal Pradesh to refrain from making such remarks in future. 6. The Deputy Commissioner, opposite party No.2, Shri Tape Bagra has also filed his affidavit. Apart from disputing the correctness of certain facts as stated in the revision petition, particularly wholly denying of giving of charge to the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Mr. D. Gogoi on the material date. In the same breath, he admits that he was allowed to look after the routine work of the Deputy Commissioner for two days as he was on casual leave. He has further stated in his affidavit - "Therefore, the Additional Deputy Commissioner or Sessions Judge should not have referred the bail petition to any subordinate Magistrate as this Hon'ble Court specifically directed that the bail would be granted by Deputy Commissioner to his satisfaction as such the whole process of forwarding the application to the Extra Assistant Commissioner (J) and the said Magistrate granting bail was irregular and in violation of the order of this Hon'ble Court." He further contended, to quote his words - "Shri RK Sharma, Extra Assistance Commissioner (J) was not incharge of the Deputy Commissioner and as such the order passed by him granting bail to the accused was an act without jurisdiction and in violation of the order of this Hon'ble Court. However, the bail granted by Shri RK Sharma, Extra Assistant Commissioner (J) was not cancelled but was rather regularised by the deponent on his return after 2 days casual leave, thus the accused in no way suffer any prejudice as he was ordered not to be rearrested nor his bail was cancelled. The irregular order passed by Extra Assistant Commissioner (J) was regularised by the deponent as Deputy Commissioner/Sessions Judge after return from his 2 days casual leave." As if, the Deputy Commissioner was rather charitable to the accused. 7. The irregular order passed by Extra Assistant Commissioner (J) was regularised by the deponent as Deputy Commissioner/Sessions Judge after return from his 2 days casual leave." As if, the Deputy Commissioner was rather charitable to the accused. 7. The Supreme Court in State of UP vs. Mohammed Nain, AIR 1964 SC 703 , has laid down the following three tests - (i) Whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the Court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (ii) Whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (iii) Whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve." In that instant case, the petitioner Advocate had no opportunity of explaining his conduct nor is there evidence available on record, bearing that conduct justifying remarks and there was no occasion, nor was it necessary for the decision of the case. The Supreme Court in R.K. Lakshmanan v. A.K. Srinivasan, AIR 1975 SC 1741 , was called upon to consider the question of notice issued by a District Magistrate against an Advocate, the appellant before the Supreme Court was acting as District Magistrate, he sought to array a practicing Advocate for allegedly having falsely attested the affidavit filed by the surety. The Advocate applied to the High Court under section 561A CrPC, 1898 (the old Code) equivalent to present section 482 CrPC for withdrawal of notice alleging malafide and abuse of the process of the Court by the District Magistrate. The High Court called for a report and on consideration quashed the notice and passed certain remarks against the District Magistrate, of which he sought expunction, but did not succeed before the High Court, The matter was taken to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court observed that the appellant was called upon by the High Court to explain his conduct in issuing the impugned notice. In reply, the appellant submitted a detailed report. It is not controverted that before the High Court, the appellant was represented by a Senior Public Prosecutor who had been directed to defend him by the State Govt. The appellant had thus adequate opportunity of explaining his conduct and defending the impugned action. In reply, the appellant submitted a detailed report. It is not controverted that before the High Court, the appellant was represented by a Senior Public Prosecutor who had been directed to defend him by the State Govt. The appellant had thus adequate opportunity of explaining his conduct and defending the impugned action. Nor can it be said that this is a case where there was no evidence on record bearing on the conduct of the appellant to which the remarks in question pertain. There was ample material before the High Court bearing on the impugned conduct of the appellant, justifying the adverse comments in question. Again, the passages sought to be expunged could not be said to be irrelevant or alien to the subject matter of the case before the High Court. The substance of the other remarks in question is that the issue of the impugned notice to the Advocate by the appellant was illegal and arbitrary and amounted to a gross abuse of the process of the Court. These remarks were an integral part of the reasoning of the High Court. They were not irrelevant or foreign to the matter in issue. They were inextricably intertwined with the findings and the order recorded by the High Court in that case. Excision of these remarks would emasculate the order of the High Court, robbing it of its very rationale. 8. The Deputy Commissioner has undoubtedly imposed conditions, which was not imposed by the learned Single Judge of this Court while passing the bail order. The grant of bail was subject to conditions furnishing bail bond to the satisfaction of the Deputy Commissioner acting in his capacity as Sessions Judge. He appears to be confused on the point of grant of bail. It was undoubtedly granted by the High Court and it was only the acceptance of bail bond with surety which was left to the satisfaction of the Deputy Commissioner, his business was only to satisfy himself about the solvency of the surety while accepting bonds. If it was intended to impose conditions, as imposed by the Deputy Commissioner by the impugned order, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State should have brought it to the notice of this Court while granting bail and if it so desire, it can at all be done by a suitable application. If it was intended to impose conditions, as imposed by the Deputy Commissioner by the impugned order, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State should have brought it to the notice of this Court while granting bail and if it so desire, it can at all be done by a suitable application. But, it was none of the business of the authority, namely, the Deputy Commissioner who has superimposed the conditions. Section 440 CrPC prescribed the amount of bond and sub-section (2) thereof empowers the High Court or the Court of Sessions to reduce the amount. Section 441 deals with the bond to be furnished and the surety. Sub-section (2) of section 441 provides that whether any condition imposed on any person released on bail bond shall contain that condition and sub-section (4) thereof provides that for the purpose of determining whether surety is fit or sufficient, the Court may accept affidavit in proof of the facts or if it considers necessary, may either hold an enquiry itself or cause an enquiry made by a Magistrate subordinate to the Court as to ascertain such sufficiency or fitness. That was the duty of the Deputy Commissioner in complying with the bail order as passed by this Court. When the High Court did not impose any such condition, the Deputy Commissioner could not have impose the same while accepting the bail bond. All that was left to him to be done was release the accused on acceptance of bail bond of course, on satisfying himself about the sufficiency and solvency of the surety. 9. Admittedly, the Deputy Commissioner was on casual leave for two days. On his own showing, the Additional Deputy Commissioner was holding the charge in his absence, but as explained by him in his affidavit, it was only for looking after the routine works. Going by his affidavit, the question of grant of bail as such may not fall within the purview of routine work, but once bail is granted mere acceptance of bail bond for releasing an accused cannot be said to be a work of substantive nature. 10. Without being too pedantic and rigid, as it would tentamount to being Unjust unfair and unreasonable to the accused, whose personal liberty, an integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution was at stake. 10. Without being too pedantic and rigid, as it would tentamount to being Unjust unfair and unreasonable to the accused, whose personal liberty, an integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution was at stake. The Additional District Judge or the Additional Sessions Judge enjoying concurrent jurisdiction would be equally competent to accept the bailbond otherwise the accused petitioner who was granted ball by the High Court would not have been released till actually the Deputy Commissioner assume his duties after enjoying the casual leave on one hand to his personal liberty on the other hand, the doctrinair approach resulting in a unjust, unfair and unreasonable procedure, which must be avoided in such matters. 11. Although the accused petitioner has alleged malafide and vindictiveness, the Deputy Commissioner was undoubtedly not fair in his approach in passing the impugned order, as he did, on 5.12.96 that too behind the back of the accused without affording him any opportunity of hearing. The opening sentence of the order reveals his biased mind. 12. In view of the foregoing discussions, the impugned order fails on both the counts, imposition of conditions as well passing the remarks against the learned Advocate by the Deputy Commissioner, it was wholly uncalled for and unwarranted in the circumstances of the case. The petition stands allowed and the Deputy Commissioner is cautioned to exercise restrain in future.