ORDER D.P.S. Chauhan, J. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the applicant and the learned counsel for the respondent on the application for condonation of delay moved under section 5 Indian Limitation Act, 1963. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted firstly that section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to the delay which has occurred in filing of the appeal which is barred by 19 days, and secondly when Limitation Act is applicable, then, there exists sufficient cause for condonation of delay within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act. 3. Both the submissions have been rebutted by the learned counsel for the respondent Shri G. C. Jain. He submitted that firstly, section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply as per the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and secondly, the each day's delay has not been explained and the explanation given in the application does not constitute sufficient cause which may warrant condonation of delay. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant in regard to his first submission, relied on the case of the Supreme Court in Smt. Lata Kamat v. Vilas, AIR 1989 SC 1477 . The facts of that case were different. The question involved in that case was whether the time spent in obtaining the copy of the judgment could be excluded for computing the period of Limitation of appeal. The Court considered the provisions of Sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act. In Para 12, the Court observed that "According to clause (2) of section 29, provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 will be applicable unless they are not expressly excluded. It is clear that the provisions of the Act do not exclude operation of provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act and therefore it could not be said that these provisions will not be applicable. It is, therefore, clear that to an appeal under section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, provisions contained in section 12, clause (2) will be applicable, therefore, the time required for obtaining copies of the judgment will have to be excluded for computing the period of limitation for appeal." 5. It is, therefore, clear that to an appeal under section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, provisions contained in section 12, clause (2) will be applicable, therefore, the time required for obtaining copies of the judgment will have to be excluded for computing the period of limitation for appeal." 5. The question for consideration is regarding sub-section (3) of section 29 of the Limitation Act and the Court held in Para 10 that so far as clause (3) is concerned, the impact of it will be that the provisions of the Limitation Act will not apply so far as the issue or pending proceeding under the Act is concerned but clause (3) will not cover the appeal. It appears that other proceedings have been interpreted as original proceedings. 6. In view of the above, the first point has to be decided in favour of the applicant. 7. The second point is regarding the sufficiency of the cause and the objection of the learned counsel for the respondent is two fold :- (1) That each day's delay has not been explained; and (2) What has been stated, does not constitute a sufficient cause. 8. For the first limb of the arguments he relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Randal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 . The relevant portion is extracted below :- "In our opinion, it would be immaterial and even irrelevant to invoke general considerations of diligence of parties in construing the words of section 5. The context seems to suggest that "within such period" means within the period which ends with the last day of limitation prescribed. In other words, in all cases falling under section 5 what the party has to show is why he did not file an appeal on the last day of limitation prescribed. That may inevitably mean that the party will have to show sufficient cause not only for not filing the appeal on the last day but to explain the delay made thereafter day by day. In other words, in showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay the party may be called upon to explain for the whole of the delay covered by the period between the last day prescribed for filing the appeal and the day on which the appeal is filed." It is not that mechanical process that the delay can be explained. In other words, in showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay the party may be called upon to explain for the whole of the delay covered by the period between the last day prescribed for filing the appeal and the day on which the appeal is filed." It is not that mechanical process that the delay can be explained. The Court is required to consider the application on overall considerations and not as a mark of mechanical process. In the case of Nathulal v. Nathibai, 1989 MPLJ 86 , the Court in Para 14 observed as under :- "14. The Supreme Court decision in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Smt. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 = 1987(II) MPWN 118, makes an illuminating reading on section 5 of the Limitation Act. The decision points out that the doctrine of equality before law entitles the State to be treated like any other litigant and that due to impersonal machinery delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The following observations from the decision may profitably be reproduced :- "The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of the matter on merits. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realised that :- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 9. The basic foundation of the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act is sufficiency of the cause and it has a wider arena depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 10. So far as the first limb is concerned, the objection in sans substance. 11. The second limb of statement relates to existence of sufficiency of the cause. The sufficiency of the cause may depend upon the variety of the factors such as negligence of the party, error in calculation of the period of limitation, the ignorance regarding the availability of the right to appeal, negligence on the part of the agent, mistake of the party, or general ignorance of fact or law, existence of conflicting decision, wrong legal advice, inadvertence of the lawyer, basic illness of the party, illiteracy, fraud, poverty and wants of funds, alternative of legal position by subsequent decisions, detention of the party in prison, non-availability of court fees, mistake of the court or its officer, party being misled by declaration as to holidays etc. 12. Here, in the present case, the facts are that the suit was pending in the Court of First Sessions Judge, Rewa which was for the relief of decree of divorce instituted by Prakash Kumar Gavane, husband of the present petitioner in that suit. The respondent husband lives at Rewa, whereas the wife resides in Bilaspur. 12. Here, in the present case, the facts are that the suit was pending in the Court of First Sessions Judge, Rewa which was for the relief of decree of divorce instituted by Prakash Kumar Gavane, husband of the present petitioner in that suit. The respondent husband lives at Rewa, whereas the wife resides in Bilaspur. Notices were issued by the Court and the same were published in the Hindi daily local newspapers of Bilaspur Desh Bandhu and Madhyavrat and notified on 14-10-1995, notifying the date for hearing of the suit on 10-11-1995. Apart from this the notices were also issued on 9-10-1995 for the same date. 13. The Court finding it sufficient service, proceeded ex parte and passed the order for proceeding ex parte on 10-11-1995. Thus, the ex parte decree was passed on 29-1-1996. The explanation given is that the father of the present petitioner went to Rewa on 16-5-1996 and obtained a copy of the judgment and decree the same day and then he went to Bilaspur and on 20-5-1996 he gave the case to the counsel at Jabalpur and believing that the summer vacation have started from 20-5-1996 and it was ending on 23-6-1996. Hence the appeal was filed on the opening day. 14. The affidavit has been given on wrong fact regarding summer vacation, as is stated, the summer vacation started from 12-3-1996. The affidavit filed by Smt. Vinita Gavane does not contain the explanation as to how her father went to Rewa on 16-5-1996 and obtained the copy. 15. In view of the above, no sufficient cause has been made out. Application for condonation of delay is rejected.