Judgment :- S.M. Abdul Wahab, J. The above habeas corpus petition has been filed by the detenu aggrieved by the order of detention in F.No.673/66/96-Cus.VIII, dated 1.8.1996, passed by the first respondent for quashing the said order and to produce the petitioner M.Y.S.M. Jamaiudeen son of late Mohamed Yusuf, from the Central Prison, Madras, before this Court and set him at liberty. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he was arrested by the Enforcement Officers on 15.2.1996, even though no incrimination documents were seized from his house. He was subjected to ill-treatment and torture by the Enforcement Officers keeping him in prolonged custody. They have extorted false and incriminating statement from him. On 17.2.1996, the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (EO-II), Egmore, Madras, remanded him to judicial custody. The petitioner was in jail for 65 days and thereafter released on bail. The Detaining Authority has passed the order of detention after a very’ long gap of 5 1/2 months, during which period, he did not indulge in any act prejudicial to the interest of the State and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. 3. On 24.9.1996, the petitioners son forwarded ten copies of representation to the Superintendent of Central Prison, Madras, requesting him to get the signature of the petitioner and forward it to the appropriate authorities. The third respondent-Superintendent of Central Prison, Madras, obtained the signature of the petitioner on 25.9.1996 for forwarding the representations to appropriate authorities. On 16.10.1996, the petitioner received a memorandum from the Under Secretary to Government of India, New Delhi, stating that his representation was considered by the Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA) and rejected. There is a delay of 23 days in considering the petitioners representation and communicating the decision to him. Further, his representation was not considered by the second respondent-Union of India. On these two grounds the detention has become illegal. The detention order with the enclosures supplied to the petitioner were illegible and fudged, in spite of his request, clear copies were not furnished. This is a handicap to the petitioner in submitting a proper representation. Therefore, there is violation of Art.22(5) of the Constitution. The Detaining Authority did not apply his mind to the relevant facts, but has implicated the petitioner. 4. This is a handicap to the petitioner in submitting a proper representation. Therefore, there is violation of Art.22(5) of the Constitution. The Detaining Authority did not apply his mind to the relevant facts, but has implicated the petitioner. 4. The petitioner has made several allegations in his affidavit about the non-application of mind and absence of evidence to connect him with one Naina Mohamed, whom he is alleged to have helped. On the aforesaid grounds set out in the affidavit mentioned above, the petitioner has prayed for the relief mentioned above. 5. The counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the first respondent. It is stated that detention order was issued on 1.8.1996 after considering the voluminous documents, which are relied upon in the detention order. The petitioners premises was searched on 15.2.1996. Based on the documents seized from his residence and the documents seized from the residence of shri Naina Mohamed, M.Y.S.M. Jamaludeen and the statement dated 15.2.1996, establishing his involvement in making hawala payments, the detention order has been issued. There was no ill-treatment. He was kept as a remand prisoner for 2 1/2 months as it was necessary for taking follow up action. 6. It is further stated that the petitioners representation dated 25.9.1996 was forwarded by the Superintendent of Prison, COFEPOSA unit on 25.9.1996 to the Joint Secretary. It was received on 1.10.1996. Parawise remarks were called for from the sponsoring Authority on 3.10.1996. The parawise remarks were received by the COFEPOSA Unit on 7.10.1996. Again on 16.10.1996 the comments of the sponsoring authority were received and the Joint Secretary considered the representation and rejected the same on 16.10.1996. On 16.10.1996 intimation of rejection of the representation was sent. Thus there is no delay at all in considering the representation. 7. The Central Government considered the representation of the petitioner promptly on 11.12.1996 and rejected it on 13.12.1996. The copies of the papers sent to the petitioner was legible and contain translations. The amount of Rs.35,000 seized from the petitioner was the commission for the amount of Rs.2,71,55,000, which he received and paid. Hence, it is denied that the amount was kept for his Haj Pilgrimage. The statements given by the detenu were voluntary. The respondent has also denied the various allegations set out in other paragraph of the affidavit in support of the petition. 8. Hence, it is denied that the amount was kept for his Haj Pilgrimage. The statements given by the detenu were voluntary. The respondent has also denied the various allegations set out in other paragraph of the affidavit in support of the petition. 8. The counsel for the petitioner Mr.S.M.Abdul Nazeer contended that four copies of the representation were furnished to the Superintendent of Jail for forwarding to various authorities. The Superintendent of Prison has forwarded only one copy to the Joint Secretary alone and he has not sent representations to the other authorities. Hence, the detention order has become vitiated. The learned counsel secondly contended that the competent authority is the Government under Sec.3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short “COFEPOSA”). But the order rejecting the representation was passed by the Joint Secretary-first respondent. Hence, on that ground also the detention order cannot be sustained. 9. The learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel Mr.K.Kumar, appearing for the first and second respondent contended that the petitioner was released on 7.8.1997, therefore the habeas corpus petition has become infructuous and there is no necessity for continuation of the proceedings. Hence, the petition must be rejected. He also contended that the rights of the petitioner to challenge the detention order on merit can be reserved and as and when any consequential proceedings are initiated against the petitioner, he can agitate the same on merits. The learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel has also produced all the records before this Court. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr.S.M.Abdul Nazeer, contended that his client is entitled to an adjudication on the merits of the detention order. Hence, this habeas corpus petition has not become infructuous, as contended by the learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel. 11. The learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel has substantiated his contention by referring to the prayer in the writ petition. The prayer is to produce the detenue before this Court and set him at liberty. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the relief is not only for setting the petitioner at liberty but also to quash the order of detention as it is illegal. He also stated that the possibility of taking action against the petitioner under the provisions of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 is there. 12. He also stated that the possibility of taking action against the petitioner under the provisions of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 is there. 12. It is admitted that the petitioner was released on 7 8.1997 and a portion of the prayer in the writ petition i.e., to produce the petitioner before this Court and set him at liberty has become infructuous. The first part of the prayer, namely, calling for the records relating to the detention order dated 1.8.1996, passed by the first respondent and quash the same alone remains. It is also true that the records were called for and they have been produced. Therefore, the only question that remains for consideration is, whether the said order should be quashed or left open to be be challenged in future as and when the petitioner or his property is sought to be proceeded with under the smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976. 13. The learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel urged that the validity of the Act need not be gone into at this stage and opportunity may be given to the petitioner to challenge the said order in future as and when action is taken under the aforesaid Act. The impugned erder dated 1.8.1996 has been issued by the first respondent-Joint secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi. 14. Sec.2(2)(b) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976, defines the persons to whom the said Act is applicable. (b) every person in respect of whom an order of detention has been made under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (52 of 1974) : …. …. (iv) such order of detention has not been set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction.” 15. The petitioner comes under the definition of the aforesaid section. Now, what is the result. The result is, the provisions of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976, applies to him, as per Sec.2 of the said Act. Once the Act applies to a person, then Sec.7 of the said Act empowers the competent authority to issue a show-cause notice. Further, after giving such a notice, the competent authority can forfeit the property. 16. Once the Act applies to a person, then Sec.7 of the said Act empowers the competent authority to issue a show-cause notice. Further, after giving such a notice, the competent authority can forfeit the property. 16. In Attorney General of India v. Amartlal Prajivandas Attorney General of India v. Amartlal Prajivandas , A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 2179the Apex Court has held in paragraph 41 as follows: “It may be remembered that a writ petition questioning Ramlals detention under the order dated July 1, 1975 (evidently, an order of detention to which Sec.12(a) of COFEPOSA applied) was dismissed by the Delhi High Court (W.P.No.115 of 1975) and even Writ Petition No.720 of 1975 (in which he was allowed to raise ail the available grounds against his detention) was also dismissed. From the facts stated above, it is clear that the basis of action under Safema against Manohar Lal Narang was his brother Ram Lals detention during the period of emergency, which detention was governed by Sec.12-A of COFEPOSA. According to our opinion indicated hereinbefore, such an order can constitute a basis for taking action under Safema. So far as the reasoning of the said decision is concerned, it is to the effect that the validity of such an order of detention can be questioned by the detenu or his relative as and when such an order is sought to be made the foundation for taking action against them under Safema. On that basis, the court proceeded to examine the validity of the order of detention of Ram Lal and found that the said order is bad for non-application of mind to certain highly relevant and material circumstances. We must however, say that the validity of an order of detention to which Sec.12-A of COFEPOSA applied, could yet be examined even during the emergency on the touchstone of the law as it obtained during the operation of the Presidential Order under Art.359(1) say on the ground that the provisions of Sec. 12-A were not complied with, or on other grounds, as may not have barred during the said period. But a person who could have so challenged the order of detention and yet chose not to do, cannot be allowed to do so when such an order or detention is made the basis for applying Safema to him this is for the reason that even if he is allowed to challenge the said order when he is served with the notice under Sec.6 of Safema, the challenge has to be examined with reference to the position of law as was obtaining at the time the said order was made and the law in force during the period the said order of detention was in operation. Same would be the position in the case of a person who challenged the order but failed in his challenges, Even in the case of a normal order of detention under COFEPOSA, the position would be the same. A person who did not challenge, (either by himself or through his next friend) the order of detention or challenged it but failed cannot be allowed to challenge the order of detention when action is taken against him under Safema.”; 17. In Nutan J.Patel v. S.V.Prasad Nutan J.Patel v. S.V.Prasad , 1996 S.C.C. (Crl.) 269 which is an identical case like ours, the Apex Court has held as follows: “;It is contended for the respondents that since the detenu had already undergone the period of detention, the question becomes one of academic interest. We cannot accede to the contention. Since the order of detention would form the foundation to consequential actions to ensue, we are of the view that it would be proper to consider validity of the order of detention, though the detenu had undergone the period of detention by the time the matter came up for final disposal.” 18. As against the aforesaid decisions, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 cited the following decisions: (1) M.C. Saha v. The District Magistrate, Alipore, Calcutta M.C. Saha v. The District Magistrate, Alipore, Calcutta , 1972 S.C.C. (Crl.) 841 ; and (2) Sri Dam Saha v. The State of West Bengal Sri Dam Saha v. The State of West Bengal , 1973 S.C.C. (Crl.) 21. In the aforesaid cases, the Supreme Court refused to interfere when the order of detention was challenged after the detenu was set at liberty. In the aforesaid cases, the Supreme Court refused to interfere when the order of detention was challenged after the detenu was set at liberty. The learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel urged that the aforesaid decisions were rendered by more than two Judges of the Supreme Court, while the decision reported in Nutan J.Patel v. S.V.Prasad Nutan J.Patel v. S.V.Prasad , 1996 S.C.C. (Crl.) 269 was rendered by two judges of the Apex Court. Therefore, the decision rendered by more number of Judges of the Apex Court should be preferred and followed. He also urged that at the time of hearing of Nutan J. Patel v. S.V.Prasad Nutan J. Patel v. S.V.Prasad , 1996 S.C.C. (Crl.) 269 the earlier two decisions, namely, M.C.Saha v. The Districe Magistrate, Alipore, Calcutta M.C.Saha v. The Districe Magistrate, Alipore, Calcutta , 1972 S.C.C. (Crl.) 841 and Sri Dam Saha v. The State of West Bengal Sri Dam Saha v. The State of West Bengal , 1973 S.C.C. (Crl.) 21 were not cited before the Supreme Court. 19. As regards the decisions of the Supreme Court, Art.141 of the Constitution of India categorically states that the law declared by the Supreme Court is the law of the land. Therefore, whenever a decision is rendered and the law is declared by the Supreme Court, it comes into force and binds all automatically by the operation of Art.141 of the Constitution of India. If a law is declared by the Supreme Court, on a particular point of time, it alone will govern a situation that arises after the law declared by the Supreme Court. It will continue to be in force till a different view is expressed by the Apex Court. It is immaterial to find out whether in rendering a later decision, the earlier decision or decisions were taken note of or not. In that view, there is no necessity to go into the question whether a decision of the Supreme Court rendered by more number of Judges is to be preferred than to a decision rendered by less number of Judges. 20. In that view, there is no necessity to go into the question whether a decision of the Supreme Court rendered by more number of Judges is to be preferred than to a decision rendered by less number of Judges. 20. In view of the aforesaid later decisions of the Supreme Court, we are of the view that the validity of a detention order can be considered even if the detenu kept in detention pursuant to the detention order has been released or set at liberty on account of the expiry of the period of detention. 21. In the light of out view expressed above, we have to take up the next question relating to the validity of the detention order dated 1.8.1996. The learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the said order on several grounds. The main grounds urged by him are two fold, namely, that though sufficient number of copies of representation of the petitioner were furnished to the Superintendent, Central Prison, Madras, the representation has not been forwarded to the Central Government. Hence, the Central Government has not passed any order on the representation of the petitioner. Therefore, the detention order is vitiated. 22. As per Art.22(4) and (5) of the Constitution of India and under Sec.11 of COFEPOSA Act, there is an indication that when a detention order is made by an officer of the Central Government not below the rank of Joint Secretary to Government, the representations of the detenu has to be forwarded by the authority who passed the detention order to the Advisory Board and the Central Government. Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India contemplates the earliest opportunity of making the representation against the detention order. As per Sec.8(b) of the COFEPOSA Act, a representation has to be forwarded to the Advisory Board, As per Sec.11 (1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act, the Central Government is empowered to revoke the detention order, if such an order was passed by the officer of the Central Government or by the State Government. Therefore, it implies that the detenu has a right to make a representation to the Central Government also in case when a detention order is passed by an officer of the Central Government or by the State Government. Therefore, it implies that the detenu has a right to make a representation to the Central Government also in case when a detention order is passed by an officer of the Central Government or by the State Government. Thus, a detenue is entitled to make a representation to the Advisory Board and to the Central Government when the order of detention is passed by an officer of the Central Government. Apart from the above, Art.22(5) of the Constitution provides the detenu an earliest opportunity of making representation against the order to the authority who made the order. Therefore, in all, the detenu, who was detained pursuant to an order of the Officer of the Central Government is entitled to make three representations as we have seen above. But the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that no representation was forwarded to the Central Government. As this contention involved question of fact, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the third respondent was directed to produce the records relating to the detention of the detenu. The records were produced. 23. In the typed set of papers, a copy of the covering letter dated 24.9.1996 is enclosed. The said letter shows that totally ten copies of representation of the petitioner were furnished to the Superintendent, Central Prison, Madras-3 There is no denial of this fact by the third respondent. In the affidavit in paragraph 2 at page 4 it is stated that his representation was not considered by the second respondent-the Union of India. In the counter on this allegation in paragraph 4 (iii) (2), it is submitted that the petitioners representation dated 25.9.1996 was received with the report of the Advisory Board on 25.10.1996 by the Central Government. The Parawise comments were called for from the sponsoring authority on the same day i.e., 25.10.1996. The letter from the sponsoring authority was received on 14.11.1996 vide its letter dated 11.11.1996 regarding parawise comments. Reminder regarding parawise commends was sent to the sponsoring authority by Fax/by speedpost on 15.11.1996. Complete parawise comments were received on 9.12.1996 vide its letter dated 18.11.1996. The parawise comments along with the case records were processed and submitted to Director (Ad-VI) on 10.12.1996. Director (Ad-VI) considered the representation and submitted to Secretary (Revenue) on 11.12.1996. Secretary (Revenue) considered the representation and rejected the same on 11.12.1996. The petitioners representation was considered by the Central Government prompt on 11.12.1996. The parawise comments along with the case records were processed and submitted to Director (Ad-VI) on 10.12.1996. Director (Ad-VI) considered the representation and submitted to Secretary (Revenue) on 11.12.1996. Secretary (Revenue) considered the representation and rejected the same on 11.12.1996. The petitioners representation was considered by the Central Government prompt on 11.12.1996. A memo was issued to the petitioner intimating the rejection of his representation by the Central Government on 13.12.1996. 24. From the narration of the facts in the counter it is seen that the representation dated 25.9.1996 was forwarded by the Superintendent, Tamil Nadu Prison, Madras, was received by the COFEPOSA unit on 1.10.1996 and it was rejected by the Joint Secretary on 16.10.1996. But paragraph 4(iii) (2) of the counter states that the petitioners representation dated Nil was received with the Advisory Boards report on 25.10.1996 and it was rejected by the Central Government on 13.12.1996. We have seen earlier that ten copies of representations were submitted to the Superintendent, Central Prison, by the detenus son on 24.9.1996. The copy forwarded to the Joint Secretary is dated 25.9.1996 i.e., immediately on the next day, the representation has been dated and forwarded. But with reference to the representation forwarded to the Central Government date is not mentioned. That apart, the COFEPOSA unit has received the representation on 1.10.1996, but the representation stated to have been received with the Advisory Boards report by the Central Government only on 25.10.1996. There is no explanation whatsoever either from the counter filed by the first respondent or from the records as to why there was such an inordinate delay even in receiving the representation by the Central Government. Secondly, we have also to note the representation to the Central Government has been forwarded along with the report of the Advisory Board, this kind of procedure is also not a proper one to be followed. The representations have to be expeditiously disposed of by the authorities contemplated by the Constitution as well as the provisions contained in COFEPOSA Act. Sec.3 of the COFEPOSA Act contemplates the serving of the detention order within five days, in ordinary circumstances and only in exceptional circumstances, it can be within 15 days. Art.22(4) empowers the Detaining Authority to detain a person for a period of three months and only in cases where the Advisory Board finds sufficient cause, it may be for a longer period. Art.22(4) empowers the Detaining Authority to detain a person for a period of three months and only in cases where the Advisory Board finds sufficient cause, it may be for a longer period. Sec.8(b) of the COFEPOSA Act requires the Detaining Authority to make a reference to the Advisory Board within five weeks, Sec.8(c) of the Act requires the Advisory Board to submit its report within eleven weeks from the date of detention of the detenu. 25. Sec.11 of the COFEPOSA Act empowers the Government State or central to revoke or modify the order at any time. A close scrutiny of Secs.8 and 11 of the Act goes to show that the Government Central or state need not wait for report of the Advisory Board for exercising the powers conferred under Sec.11 of the Act. Sec.8(f) of the Act states that the Government may confirm the detention order when the Advisory Board has reported that there is sufficient cause. Therefore even if the Advisory Board expressed its opinion with reference to a case, the Government can continue the detention order for a period of three months. But, however, under the very same sub-section, it is stated that if the Advisory Board expressed that there was no sufficient cause, the Government should revoke the detention order. But Sec.11 of the Act is independent of Sec.8 of the Act, because the expression found there “at any time” mean that it may be immediately after the detention order was served and before or after the report of the Advisory Board. Therefore, in our view there is no justification for forwarding the representation of the detenu in this case along with the opinion of the Advisory Board. 26. From the counter, it is not clear as to who or which authority is responsible for the waiting for the Advisory Boards report. But whatever it is, undoubtedly, we can presume that the report furnished to the Superintendent of Central Prison on 24.9.1996 has been received only on 25.10.1996, nearly one month after the representation was submitted to the Superintendent of Central Prison, Madras. The delay is due to some authority mistakenly waiting for the Advisory Boards report and it is not a ground to excuse the delay. The delay is due to some authority mistakenly waiting for the Advisory Boards report and it is not a ground to excuse the delay. Not only there is a delay by the Central Government in receiving the representation dated 25.9.1996, but the Central Government has taken nearly seven weeks for the disposal of the representation. This is also very long. It also tantamounts to under delay when the Constitution and the Act commands expeditious disposal of representations from a detenu. Therefore, we feel that the detention order is vitiated on account of the delay in the disposal of the representation of the detenu by the Central Government. 27. Apart from this fact, when we come to the merits of the disposal by the Central Government, we feel that there is non-application of mind by the appropriate authority. The order of rejection by the Central Government is dated 30.12.1996. From the file, we find that the Director (AD-VI) has recommended the rejection of the representation on 11.12.1996. The Secretary (Revenue) has simply affixed his signature below the said recommendation. There is no indication that the file was sent to the Finance Minister. The Finance Ministers initial or signature is not found in the said file. His opinion as to whether the recommendation by the Director (AD-VI) to reject it as it did not have any merit was accepted or not. Because nothing is found above the signature of the Secretary of the Secretary (Revenue) on 11.12.1996, the memorandum for the rejection of the representation sent by the detenu is found. This is the position with reference to the disposal of the representation by the Central Government. 28. From the records, we find that the representation to the Central Government was not considered by the Finance Minister,on the other hand, the Secretary (Revenue) alone has considered and rejected it on 11.12.1996. 29. In Kamleshikumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India Kamleshikumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India , (1995)4 S.C.C. 5)the Apex Court has upheld the view of the Bench of this Court in quashing the detention order for the failure on the part of the Detaining Authority to inform the detenu about his right to make representation to the Detaining Authority himself resulting in denial of Constitutional right guaranteed under Art.22(5) of the Constitution. In the said judgment in paragraph 38, the Apex Court has laid down the law in unmistakable terms, as follows: “Having regard to the provisions of Art.22(5) of the Constitution and the provisions of the COFEPOSA Act and the PIT NDPS Act the question posed is thus answered: Where the detention order has been made under Sec.3 of the COFEPOSA Act and the PIT NDPS Act by an officer specially empowered for that purpose either by the Central Government or the State Government the person detained has a right to make a representation to the said officer and the said officer is obliged to consider the said representation and the failure on the part to do so results in denial of the right conferred on the person detained to make a representation against the order of detention. This right of the detenu is in addition to his right to make the representation to the State Government and the Central Government where the detention order has been made by an officer specially authorised by a State Government and to the Central Government where the detention order has been made by an officer specially empowered by the Central Government, and to have the same duly considered.” Now, therefore, the position is that even though the Detaining Authority has considered the representation and rejected it, as is seen from the counter, by its order dated 16.10.1996, the representation to the Central Government has not been considered properly in the sense that it was no considered by the Finance Minister and there is an inordinate delay in the disposal of the representation i.e., the date of representation is 25.9.1996, but the rejection has been communicated only on 13.12.1996. Recently, a Division Bench of this Court has held in Mrs.Aminatha Naseeha v. Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, New Delhi and two others, H.C.P.No.500 of 1996, dated 14.5.1997 has held as follows: “;Coming to the question of independent consideration and disposal of the representation by the second respondent-Central Government, we are, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, of the view that there is no independent consideration at all, uninfluenced or not contaminated by the opinion of the first respondent-Detaining Authority. As already indicated, after noting of the minutes by the first respondent-Detaining Authority, that the representation merits rejection, the file had been circulated to Additional Secretary, then to the Secretary Revenue, and ultimately to the Finance Minister, who in turn, rejected the representation. Of course, the Finance Minister, in his notings minuted that the representation had been independently considered and rejected. The fact that the Finance Minister had stated that the representation had been independently considered and rejected, is nothing but a ritualistic sermon and from that alone, we cannot come to the conclusion that the representation of the detenu had been considered independently, without being uninfluenced or not contaminated by the hues of views of the first respondent-Detaining Authority. For the reasons as above, we are persuaded to hold the view that neither the first respondent-Detaining Authority considered and disposed of the representation, nor was there any independent consideration and disposal of the representation by the second respondent-Central Government, uninfluenced by the views of the first respondent-Detaining Authority. We, accordingly, answer the points 2 and 3.” In the aforesaid case, the representation was forwarded to the Finance Minister. But in the case on hand, the file has been the file has been circulated upto the Secretary (Revenue) and pursuant to his order dated 11.12.1996, the communication has been sent to the detenue. Therefore, there is not only no independent consideration and disposal of the representation by the Central Government, but also non-consideration of the representation by the Central Government in the sense that the representation was not forwarded to the Minister for his consideration and hence he has not passed any order on the representation. 30. It is true that from the tile we are able to see an order contain the Finance Ministers signature on 29.10.1996. That is an order on the proposal for confirmation of the order of detention submitted by the Under Secretary to the Finance Minister on 25.10.1996. We are not concerned with the proposal and the decision taken for the confirmation of the order, but we are concerned only with the disposal of the representation made by the detenu on 24.9.1996 and the disposal by the Central Government on 13.12.1996. 31. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the detention order cannot be sustained and the writ petition has to be allowed. 31. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the detention order cannot be sustained and the writ petition has to be allowed. However, the relief is confined only to set aside the order of detention dated 1.8.1996 in the proceedings of the first respondent in F.No.673/66/96-Cus. VIII, as indicated above. Since the detenu has been already released on 7.8.1997, the grant of other relief i.e., setting him at liberty does not arise. The he beas corpus petition is allowed. However, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.