Judgment R.N.Sahay, J. 1. This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of Additional District Judge, Patna, dated 27th March, 1996, whereby the appeal preferred by the appellant against the decree of Munsif in Eviction suit No. 26 of 1992 was dismissed. 2. The current decree of the Court below is assailed in this appeal inter alia on the following grounds: (a) The court below did not apply their judicial mind to the oral and documentary evidence that has come on record and that evidence has not been considered resulting in erroneous finding. (b) There is no finding that the plaintiff had cause of action to institute the suit prior to the institution of the suit. (c) Finding of the Court below on default in payment of rent for the months of November and December, 1990, as mentioned under Exhibit, dated 21.12.90 paid under exhibit C 17 dated 7.2.91 when the admitted payment for the month of November, 1990 was made by the appellant to the ex-landlords under exhibit No. 37, dated 25.11.90. (d) The question of personal necessity was not raised on the ground of eviction. 3. The plaintiff No. 1 had purchased the suit premises under a registered sale deed dated 16.8.90. The defendant-appellant was a tenant in the suit premises at the monthly rental of Rs. 400.00 per month. According to the plaintiff he purchased the suit property for his own personal necessity. It is alleged in the plaint that the defendant defaulted in payment of rent willfully and deliberately from the month of November, 1990, and as such he is liable to be evicted. A legal notice dated 21.12.90 was served on defendant asking him to pay the rent to plaintiff No. 2 and also wrote to the ex-landlord not to accept rent any more from the defendant and rent received so far be refunded. The plaintiffs in paragraph No. 18 of the plaint states as follows: 18. A legal notice dated 21.12.90 was served on defendant asking him to pay the rent to plaintiff No. 2 and also wrote to the ex-landlord not to accept rent any more from the defendant and rent received so far be refunded. The plaintiffs in paragraph No. 18 of the plaint states as follows: 18. That the cause of action for suit arose on 16.8.90 when the plaintiff No. 1 purchased the house and on expiry of last day of each month when rent became due and first week of each month, when it became payable in the first week of January, 1991, when the rents for November and December, 1990 became payable but was not paid on each subsequent months when the defendant did neither pay the arrears of rent nor vacated the suit premises at Mohalla Nayatola, P.S. Kadamkuan, District-Patna, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon ble Court. The plaintiffs claimed the rent from November, 1990 till January, 1991 at the rate of Rs. 400.00 and filed the suit on 23rd March, 1992. 4 The appellant denied the allegation of the plaint and stated that he was not a defaulter as he has already paid rent to ex-landlord till November, 1990 at the rate of Rs. 350.00 and also paid C tax till May, 1990 on behalf of the ex-landlords. The rent for the months of August, September, October and November, 1990 was sent in advance through Money Order to the ex-landlords who received the rent for the month of November, 1990 on 22.11.90 vide Ext. C. The appellant further asserted that he has no knowledge about the said sale before 21.12.90 as on the said date he received the legal notice and he also gave reply on 24.12.90. He also made enquiry from his ex-landlords as no reply was sent. On 7.2.91 again rent for the months of December, 1990 and January, 1991 at the rate of Rs. 350.00 plus Rs. 27.00 (Municipal Tax) was paid to the new landlord through Money Order but the same was refused. 5. The learned Munsif decreed the suit by negativing the defence of the tenant. The learned Munsif in his judgment has discussed the documental evidence as follows: From perusal of documents filed on behalf of the defendant it appears that he used to pay the monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 350.00 as rent. Ext. 5. The learned Munsif decreed the suit by negativing the defence of the tenant. The learned Munsif in his judgment has discussed the documental evidence as follows: From perusal of documents filed on behalf of the defendant it appears that he used to pay the monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 350.00 as rent. Ext. F series filed on behalf of the defendant establishes the fact that the defendants father sent Rs. 350.00 as rent for the month of August, 1990 (Ext. F) for month of October 90 (Ext. F/2) and for the month of Sept 90 (Ext. F/1). The documents filed on behalf of the plaintiff does not establish the fact that rate of rent was Rs. 400.00 per month. Ext-A series filed and exhibited on behalf of the defendant discloses the fact that in addition to house rent the defendant used to pay P.M.C. tax at the rate of Rs. 27.00 per month. Plaintiff has not challenged or controverted the Ext. A series and Ext. F series filed on behalf of the defendant. So on the basis of aforesaid documents it can be said with certainty that the rate of rent of the tenanted premises was at the rate of Rs. 350.00 per month. Now the question is whether the defendant is defaulted in the payment of rent from November 90 to the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff he has purchased the suit house through registered deed of sale dated 16.8.90, became owner of the suit premises. Defendant has not refuted or challenged Ext. 7 and after the aforesaid purchase, through Ext. 3 i.e. Advocates notice dated 21.12.90 Sri Vinay Kumar Sinha Advocate on behalf of the plaintiff No. 1 asked the defendant to pay the rent to the plaintiff No. 2. The plaintiff in his plaints para 6 has alleged that the defendant has full knowledge of the purchase of the suit house to the plaintiff room the stage of negotiation and the defendant deliberately and willfully did not pay the rent to the plaintiff. On the other hand the defendant in his pleading has stated that he has paid rent for the month of August, September, October and November 90 to his ex-landlord because he has no knowledge about the transfer of suit property. Ext. On the other hand the defendant in his pleading has stated that he has paid rent for the month of August, September, October and November 90 to his ex-landlord because he has no knowledge about the transfer of suit property. Ext. 3 is important document on this point to suggest that whether the defendant has prior knowledge of the aforesaid purchase of the suit property by the plaintiff informing the defendant that he is the owner of the suit premises and asked the defendant to pay the rent to the plaintiff No. 2. Ext. 3 shows that the defendant for the first time came in knowledge of the transfer of the suit building to the plaintiff No. 2. This document also establishes the fact that on 21.12.90 he received the information in writing about the aforesaid purchase of the suit house. Oral evidence of plaintiff that the defendant has knowledge of the purchase of the suit house by the plaintiff from the stage of negotiation cannot take place of the documentary evidence filed on behalf of the plaintiff himself that the defendant was informed on 21.12.90. Therefore, I am of the firm view that from the date of the receiving of the Ext. 3 Advocates notice by plaintiff the defendant came to know about the aforesaid transaction of sale/purchase plaintiff. 6. The learned Munsif has further observed as follows; On perusal of document-I find that through Ext. 3 dated 21.12.90 defendant acquired knowledge of the fact that the suit house was purchased by the plaintiff No. 1 and then he remitted the rent for the month of November, and December, 90 through Ext. C/17 and F/11. Ext/ C/17 is money order coupons and Ext. F/11 is postal receipts. But the rent for the month of November and December, 90 was sent to the plaintiff No. 1. on 7.2.91 i.e. the remittance was beyond two months. of course the intention of the defendant was not malafide in sending the rent to plaintiff for the month of Nov. and December in Feb., 91 but he has defaulted in payment of rent for the purpose of Clause D and Sec. 11 of the B.B.C. Act. on 7.2.91 i.e. the remittance was beyond two months. of course the intention of the defendant was not malafide in sending the rent to plaintiff for the month of Nov. and December in Feb., 91 but he has defaulted in payment of rent for the purpose of Clause D and Sec. 11 of the B.B.C. Act. Sec. 11 (d) provides that the amount of two months rent lawfully payable by the tenants and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within time fixed by the contract or in the absence of such contract by the last day of the month next following for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted. By sending the rent for month of November and December to the plaintiff No. 2 the defendant has admitted that he has not paid rent for the month of Nov. and December to his ex-landlord as claimed by the defendant. The defendant should have send the rent in January as required by the provision of B.B.C. Act. Therefore, on the basis of aforesaid discussion I am of the opinion that the defendant has defaulted in payment of rent. 7. Thus according to the Court below the appellant has not paid rent for the month of November and December, 90 within time and it was sent through money order to the new owner on 7.2.1991. The defendant committed default in payment of rent and hence plaintiffs suit is liable to be decreed. Learned Munsif has further held that plaintiff had proved that he required the suit premises bona fide for instalation of offset printing machine. Both the issues decided against the appellant. 8. The Appellant Court held that in his oral evidence the appellant also stated that he sent the rent for the month of November and December, 1990 through money order of 7.2.91 prima facie there is default in payment of rent for the month on November and December, 1990. The case of the appellant is that he paid rent in advance for the months of August, September, October and November, 1990 to the former owner. In this connection he submitted postal receipts, i.e. Ext. F, F/1, F/2 and F/37. The Appellate Court refused to accept this plea. According to the appellant rent for the month of November, 1990 was sent again to the new owner by way of abundant precaution. In this connection he submitted postal receipts, i.e. Ext. F, F/1, F/2 and F/37. The Appellate Court refused to accept this plea. According to the appellant rent for the month of November, 1990 was sent again to the new owner by way of abundant precaution. The Appellate Court held that this explanation advanced only in course of argument has neither been stated in the deposition of the appellant nor was part of the message on the money order coupon Ext. C/17. Having considered the entire evidence regarding payment of rent, it is crystal clear that there is almost admission regarding default about payment of rent for the month of December, 1990. The Court below further held that explanation advanced by the appellant that rent for the month of November, 1990 was received by the former landlord is not all convincing. The Appellate Court confirmed the findings of the learned Munsif with regard to default of payment. Having regard bona fide personal requirement of landlord the Appellate Court relied upon a decision of this Court reported in 1988 PLJR 255; 1989 (1) B.LJ.R. 562 and held: It is almost clear from the evidence that the house of respondent No. 1 where he present printing press is situated is in a narrow gali and offset printing machine cannot be taken to that house. It is also clear on the evidence that suit premises are situated on a comparatively wider gali. P.W. 12 has stated width of the gali 9 feet. Some of the defence witnesses D.Ws have stated that gali is about 6 feet wide. Thus offset printing press can be taken up to the door of the suit premises. It was argued that there is evidence that the door of the suit premises is only 3.5 feet wide and offset printing machine cannot be taken inside the suit premises. If suit premises are reasonably, bonafidely and in good faith required for setting up offset printing machine, and the offset printing machine can be taken up to the suit premises, it is for the respondent/ plaintiff to put machine inside the house nether by breaking the door or some part of the wall etc. There is evidence on record that printing business is very competitive and it is very difficult to stand in completion without offset printing press. Therefore, the requirement of the respondent No. 1 cannot be said as unreasonable, Ext. There is evidence on record that printing business is very competitive and it is very difficult to stand in completion without offset printing press. Therefore, the requirement of the respondent No. 1 cannot be said as unreasonable, Ext. 4,5 and 6 are income-tax assessment of Respondent No. 1 for the year 1978-79, 1990-91 and 1992-93. These documents goes to show that her business had expanded. 9. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that there is no case in the pleadings of the respondent/plaintiff that the suit premises were required or setting up offset printing machine but evidence was led to this effect. 10. learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the findings of the Courts below are erroneously. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the appellant had paid the rent for the month on November, 1990 to the former landlord could not be disbelieved only because the rent for the said month was again sent through money-order. 11. The other argument, namely, whether the landlord requires the said premises for installation of offset printing machine. The learned Court held that for setting up off printing press in such premises it cannot be accommodated in part of the suit premises. Therefore, in this case partial eviction will not fulfill reasonable and bonafide requirements of respondent/plaintiff. 12. For the reasons stated there is no substantial ground to interfere with the judgment of the Court below. This appeal is dismissed but without costs. 13. However, the appellant is granted three months time to vacate the suit premises, failing which the decree holder may execute the decree in accordance with law.