JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - In this appeal from jail Laikhan Bate (hereinafter referred to as the 'accused') calls in question legality of his conviction for commission of an offence punishable under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, 'IPC') and sentence of imprisonment for life as awarded by the learned Sessions Judge, Koraput, Jeypore. Allegation of uxoricide led accused to trial. Manika Bate (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') was the victim. 2. Stated in brief, prosecution version is as follows: On 25.9.1991 at about 5 p.m. the accused returned home and asked his wife (deceased) to serve food. As the deceased did not serve food, the accused got angry and caught hold of tuft of her hair and twisted, her neck was removed by the accused to his backyard where it was thrown. During assault, bangles of the deceased were broken and were lying on the floor. Then the dead body was seen by Lachhman Bate (P.W.1) son of the accused and other villagers including P.W.2 blood was found to be coming out from her nostrils and month. Accused confessed his guilt before several persons. The matter was reported at Malkangiri Police Station by P.W.2, brother of the accused, Investigation was conducted and on completion thereof, charge-sheet was placed. Accused pleaded innocence during trial. 3. In order to fasten the guilt on the accused seven witnesses were examined. It was claimed that extra judicial confession was made by the accused before P.W.s 1, 2 and 4. Placing reliance on such extra-judicial confession learned trial Judge found the accused guilty, conviction was recorded and sentence was awarded as aforesaid. 4. In support of the appeal Mr. B.K. Sharma, learned counsel argued that the version relating to extra-judicial confession is not acceptable as P.Ws.1 and 2 did not state before the Investigation Officer during investigation about the so-called extra-judicial confession. In any event evidence relating to extra-judicial confession is a weak one and should not form basis of conviction. Mr. R.K. Patnaik, learned counsel appearing for the State, supported the judgment of conviction and sentence. 5. Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short, the Evidence Act') deals with confession caused by inducement, threat or promise, which is irrelevant in criminal proceedings. The expressions 'confession' has not been defined in the evidence Act. Mr. R.K. Patnaik, learned counsel appearing for the State, supported the judgment of conviction and sentence. 5. Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short, the Evidence Act') deals with confession caused by inducement, threat or promise, which is irrelevant in criminal proceedings. The expressions 'confession' has not been defined in the evidence Act. A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime. The law relating to confessions is to be found generally in Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and Sections 162 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (described hereinafter as 'old code') Corresponding to identical provisions of 1973 Code described as 'Code' hereinafter). Confession is a specimen of admission, and is dealt with in Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act. A confession or an admission is evidence against the Maker of it, its admissibility is not excluded by some provision of law. Section 25 is imperative, and a confession made to a police officer under no circumstance is admission in evidence against the accused. The Section covers a confession made when he was free and not in police custody, as also the one made before any investigation has begun. The expression "accused of any offence" covers a person accused of an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of the offence when he made the confession. The partial ban imposed by Section 26 relates to a confession made to a person other than a police officer. The absolute ban imposed by Section 25 on a confession made to a police officer is not qualified by Section 26. Section 27 is in the form of a proviso. It partially lifts the ban imposed by Sections 26. 25 and 26. The words of Section 16 of the Code are wide enough to include a confession made to a police officer in the course of an investigation. A statement of confession made in the course of an investigation may he recorded by a Magistrate under Section 164 of the Code subject to the safeguards imposed by the Section. 25 and 26. The words of Section 16 of the Code are wide enough to include a confession made to a police officer in the course of an investigation. A statement of confession made in the course of an investigation may he recorded by a Magistrate under Section 164 of the Code subject to the safeguards imposed by the Section. Thus, except as provided by Section 27 of the Evidence Act, Section 25 of that Act absolutely protects a confession by an accused to a police officer and it is also protected by Section 162 of the Code if it is made in the course of an investigation, and a confession to any other person made by him while in the custody of a police officer is protected by Section 26, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. These provisions proceed upon the view that confessions made by an accused to a police officer or made by him while he is in the custody of a police officer are not to be trusted, and should not be used in evidence against him. The provisions are based upon grounds of public policy, and they should be given fullest effect. This position was succinctly stated by the Apex Court in Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 119 In Pakala Narayanaswami v. Emperor: AIR 1939 PC 47 , the privy Council had occasion to define the term 'confession' and observed that no statement that contains self-exculpatory matter can amount to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which if true would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. Moreover, a confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not of itself a confession. The observations of the Privy Council were approved by the Supreme Court in Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab: AIR 1952 SC 354 , Om Prakash v. State of U.P.: AIR 1960 SC 409 : Faddi v. State of M.P.: AIR 1964 SC 1850 , and Kanda Padavachi v. State of Tamilnadu: AIR 1972 SC 66 . To be a confession, admission should contain an acknowledgment of guilt. Therefore, all confessions are admission, but every admission may not be a confession. To be a confession, admission should contain an acknowledgment of guilt. Therefore, all confessions are admission, but every admission may not be a confession. It was observed by the Apex Court in Nishi Kanta Jha v. State of Bihar: AIR 1969 SC 422 that if the exculpatory portion is found to be inherently improbable after rejection that portion the Courts may get on the exculpatory portion. A confession admitting in terms an offence and substantially all facts constituting that sentence does not by the addition of a plea of justification become self-exculpatory. 6. Confession may be divided into two classes, i.e., judicial and extra-judicial. Judicial confessions are those which are made before Magistrate or Court in the course of judicial proceedings. Extra-judicial confessions are those which are made by the party elsewhere than before a Magistrate or Court. Extra-judicial confessions are generally those made by a party to or before a private individual which includes even a judicial officer in his private capacity. It also includes a Magistrate who is not especially empowered to record confessions under Section 164 of the Code or a Magistrate so empowered but receiving the confession at a stage when Section 164 does not apply. As to extra-judicial confessions, two questions arise; (i) were they made voluntarily ? and (ii) are they true? As the Section enacts, a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding. If the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise, (1) having reference to the charge against the accused person, (2) proceeding from a person in authority, and (3) sufficient, in the opinion of the Court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he should gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. It follows that a confession would by voluntary if it is made by the accused in a fit stage of mind, and if it is not caused by any inducement, threat or promise which has reference to the charge against him, proceeding from a person in authority. It follows that a confession would by voluntary if it is made by the accused in a fit stage of mind, and if it is not caused by any inducement, threat or promise which has reference to the charge against him, proceeding from a person in authority. It would not be involuntary, if the inducement, (a) does not have reference to the charge against the accused person, or (b) it does not proceed from a person in authority: or (c) it is not sufficient, in the opinion of the Court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it, he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. Whether or not the confession was voluntary would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, judged in the light of Section 24. The law is clear that a confession cannot be used against an accused person unless the Court is satisfied that it was voluntary and at that stage the question whether it is true or false does not arise. If the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of a confession appear to cast a doubt in the veracity or voluntariness of the confession, the Court may refuse to act upon the confession, even if it is admissible in evidence. One important question, in regard to which the Court has to be satisfied with is, whether when the accused made confession, he was a free man or his movements were controlled by the police either by themselves or through some other agency employed by them for the purpose of securing such a confession. The question whether a confession is voluntary or not is always a question of fact. All the factors and all the circumstances of the case, including the important factors of the time given for reflection, scope of the accused getting a feeling of threat, inducement or promise, must be considered before deciding whether the Court is satisfied that in its opinion the impression caused by the inducement, threat or promise if any has been fully removed. A free and voluntary confession is deserving of highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the highest sense of guilt. (See R.V. Narwickshall: (1783) Leach 263. A free and voluntary confession is deserving of highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the highest sense of guilt. (See R.V. Narwickshall: (1783) Leach 263. It is not to be conceived that a man would be induced to make a free and voluntary confession of guil, so contrary to the feelings and principles of human nature, if the facts confessed were not true. Deliberate and voluntary confessions of guilt, it clearly proved, are among the most effectual proofs in law. An involuntary confession is one which is not the result of the free will of the maker of it. So whether the statement is made as a result of the harassment and continuous integration for several hour after the person is treated as an offender and accused, such statement must be regarded as involuntary. The inducement may take the form of a promise or of treat, and often the inducement involves both promise and threat a promise of forgiveness if disclosure is made and threat of prosecution if it is not (See Woodroffe Evidence, 9th Edition, page 284). A promise is always attached to the confession, alternative while a threat is always attached to the silent alternative, thus, in the one case the prisoner is measuring the net advantage of the promise, minus the general undesirability of a false confession, as against the present unsatisfactory situation; while in the other case he is measuring the net advantage of the present satisfactory situation) minus the general undesirability of the confession against the threatened harm. It must be borne in mind that every inducement, threat or promise does not vitiate a confession. Since the subject of the rule is to exclude only these confessions which are testimonially untrustworthy, the inducement, threat or promise must be such as is calculated to lead to an untrue confession. On the aforesaid analysis the Court is to determine the absence of presence of inducement, promise etc. or its sufficiency and how or in what measure it worked on the mind of the accused. If the inducement, promise or threat is sufficient in the opinion of the Court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he should gain any advantage or avoid any evil, it is enough to exclude the confession. If the inducement, promise or threat is sufficient in the opinion of the Court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he should gain any advantage or avoid any evil, it is enough to exclude the confession. The words "appear to him" in the last part of the Section refer to the mentality of the accused. 7. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true, and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to the confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made. The value of the evidence as to the confession depends on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. It is not open to any Court to start with a presumption that extra-judicial confession is a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances the time when the confession was made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction can be founded therein if the evidence about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be undesired, not even remotely inimical to the accused and in prospect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused, the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is emitted by the witness which may militate against it. After subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it passed the test of credibility. 8. P.Ws. 1 and 2 are none else than son and brother of the accused respectively. They have no reason to falsely implicate the accused. It is stated that the deceased was mother of the former and sister-in-law of the latter, and therefore, there has been false implication. The plea has no leg to stand. 8. P.Ws. 1 and 2 are none else than son and brother of the accused respectively. They have no reason to falsely implicate the accused. It is stated that the deceased was mother of the former and sister-in-law of the latter, and therefore, there has been false implication. The plea has no leg to stand. Even if relationship of the deceased with P.Ws 1 and 2 was as stated above, the accused is also father and brother respectively of the said two witnesses. There is no reason as to why they would falsely implicate the accused and shield the actual culprit. 9. It is to be noted that first information report was lodged by P.W. 2. Therein a reference was made to the extra-judicial confession made before P.ws 1, 2 and 4. P.Ws. 1 and 2 are persons on whom accused could repose confidence. Even if P.W. 4 did not tell the Investigating Officer about the extra-judicial confession in the house of the accused, he has categorically stated about the confession made before the members of the punch. So far as P.W.1 is concerned, though he had not specifically stated before the Investigating Officer that the accused told him about his guilt, he has stated before the I.O. that the accused disclosed before him about the occurrence. P.W. 4 was a member at the relevant point of time, and is a co-villager on whom the accused could repose confidence. He has also no axe to grind so far as accused is concerned and no reason was indicated as to why he would falsely implicate the accused. The learned trial Judge was justified in placing reliance on the evidence of P.Ws 1, 2 and 4 regarding extra-judicial confession. 10. The inevitable result is that the judgment of conviction and sentence deserves to be maintained which we direct. 11. The appeal is without any merit, and is dismissed. S.C. Dutta, J. - I agree. Final Result : Dismissed