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1997 DIGILAW 160 (PAT)

Vijai Kumar Yadav v. State of Bihar

1997-02-25

R.N.SAHAY

body1997
Order R.N. Sahay, J. Heard. 2. The petitioner is an accused in Sourbazar P.S. Case No. 152/96 under Section 414 I.P.C. 3. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa by a reasoned order granted bail to the petitioner ride order dated 23.8.1996. It appears that the opposite party No.2 who is not eyen the intormant in the case filed a petition before the learned Sessions Judge Saharsa for cancellation of bail granted to the petitioner and the learned Sessions Judge by his impugned order dated 10.12.1996 cancelled the bail of the petitioner. 4. In my opinion the learned Sessions Judge, Saharsa, had no jurisdiction to cancel the bail because there is no allegation that the petitioner obtained bail by suppressing any fact or the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has no jurisdiction to rant bail in this case. 5. In Dolatram and others v. State of Haryana reported in 1995 SCC (Cri) 237; 1495(2) BLJ 232; 1995 BCCR (SC) 145, the Supreme Court has held as follows : "Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered and dealt with on different basis Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally speaking the rounds for cancellation of bail broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the Court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether an, supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conclusive to fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoy in, the concession of bail during the trial. These principles, it appears were lost sight of by the High Court when it decided to cancel the bail, already granted. The High Court it appears to us overlooked the distinction of the factor relevant for rejecting bail in a non-bailable case in the first instance and the cancellation of bail already granted.” 6. These principles, it appears were lost sight of by the High Court when it decided to cancel the bail, already granted. The High Court it appears to us overlooked the distinction of the factor relevant for rejecting bail in a non-bailable case in the first instance and the cancellation of bail already granted.” 6. In an earlier case of Bhagirath Singh Judeja v. State of Gujrat, reported in AIR 1984 SC 372 , the Supreme Court had held a follows: “In our opinion, the learned judge appears to have misdirected himself while examining the question of directing cancellation of bail by interfering with a discretionary order made by the learned Session Judge. One could have appreciated the anxiety of the learned Judge of the High Court that in the circumstances found by him that the victim attacked was a social and political worker and therefore the accused should not be granted bail but we fail to appreciate how that circumstance should be considered so overriding as to permit interference with a discretionary order of the learned Session. Judge granting bail the High Court completely overlooked the fact that it was not for it to decide whether the bail should be granted but the application before it was for cancellation of the bail. Very cogent and over whelming circumstances ate necessary for an order seeking cancellation of the bail. And the trend today is towards granting bail because it is now well settled by catena of decisions of this Court that the power to rant bail is not to be exercised as if the punishment before trial is being imposed. The only material consideration in such a situation are whether the accused would be readily available for his trial and whether he is like to abuse the discretion ranted in his favour by tampering with evidence. The order made by the High Court is conspicuous by its silence on these two relevant consideration it is for these reasons consider in the interest of justice a compelling necessary to interfere with the order made by the High Court." 7. In view of the above decisions the order of the learned Sessions Judie, Saharsa dated 10-12-1996 cancelling the bail of the petitioner is hereby quashed. Order Accordidgly.