T. N. VALLINAYAGAM, J. ( 1 ) THE question that arises for consideration in this writ appeal is, whether the use of the words 'detrimental to the interests of the Bank' can be construed as a stigma on a probationer whose probation was terminated without extension. ( 2 ) THE facts that have culminated in the filing of the writappeal, are The appellant-Veeranna was appointed as a Probationary officer in the respondent-Bank on 3-8-1984 with effect from 1-1-1985. His probation was terminated in terms of Regulation 8 (1) and 8 (3) of Staff Service Regulations, 1983. On being terminated, the appellant filed an appeal to the Board of directors, which was dismissed. To quash (1) the order of termination, (2) the order of rejection of the appeal by the Board, and (3) two memos dated 3-6-1986 and 2-9-1986 wherein he was called upon to reimburse a sum of Rs. 2,000/-, which is said to have been misappropriated by him, he filed the writ petition. The contention of the appellant that the use of the word 'detrimental' in the order of termination cast a stigma on him, was rejected by the learned Single Judge of this Court; but, in respect of the other two claims Annexures-F and G, no argument was advanced before the learned Single Judge, who, however, held that in view of non-denial by the appellant of such allegations, the appellant cannot object to recovery made under annexure-G and rejected those prayers also. ( 3 ) THE only point urged before us is that the words found in the memorandum, which is the order of termination, amount to a stigma and consequently the order of termination should be quashed. ( 4 ) IT is necessary to quote the exact wording of the paragraph for the purpose of appreciating the contention of the appellant. "in view of this, the appointing authority is of the opinion that your overall performance is poor and you are not fit to be continued in the post for which you are appointed. Further, the appointing authority feels that your continuance in the service of the Bank will be detrimental to the interest of the Bank". A reading of the above passage will go to show that the word "detrimental" is used as against the Bank and it cannot be construed to describe or derogate the appellant. Further, the appointing authority feels that your continuance in the service of the Bank will be detrimental to the interest of the Bank". A reading of the above passage will go to show that the word "detrimental" is used as against the Bank and it cannot be construed to describe or derogate the appellant. ( 5 ) THE learned Single Judge has, after referring to various authorities and also taking into consideration the dictionary meaning of the word "detrimental", found that no stigma is cast upon the appellant and dismissed the writ petition. ( 6 ) WE heard the arguments of both the learned Counsel. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant brought to our notice the dictum of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Mitter v Union of india, and contended that the word "undesirable" found in that case should be equated to the word "detrimental" occurring in the order of termination in the present case. In that case, the order discharging a temporary servant in the Office of the Post master General at Ambala read as follows;"shri Jagdish Mitter, a temporary 2nd Division Clerk of this Office having been found undesirable to be retained in government service is hereby served with a month's notice of discharge with effect from November 1,1949". Construing the word "undesirable" as casting a stigma on the employee, the Supreme Court held:"it is obvious that to say that it is undesirable to continue a temporary servant is very much different from saying that it is unnecessary to continue him. In the first case, a stigma attaches to the servant, while in the second case, termination of service is due to the consideration that a temporary servant need not be continued, and in that sense, no stigma attaches to him. It seems that anyone who reads the order in a reasonable way, would naturally conclude that the appellant was found to be undesirable, and that must necessarily import an element of punishment which is the basis of the order and is its integral part. When an authority wants to terminate the services of a temporary servant, it can pass a simple order of discharge without casting any aspersion against the temporary servant or attaching any stigma to his character. When an authority wants to terminate the services of a temporary servant, it can pass a simple order of discharge without casting any aspersion against the temporary servant or attaching any stigma to his character. As soon as it is shown that the order purports to cast aspersion on the temporary servant, it would be idle to suggest that the order is a simple order of discharge. The test in such cases must be: does the order cast aspersion or attach stigma to the officer when it purports to discharge him? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then notwithstanding the form of the order, the termination of service must be held, in substance, to amount to dismissal. That being so, we are satisfied that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the appellant had not been dismissed, but had been merely discharged. It is conceded that if the impugned order is construed as one of dismissal the appellant has been denied the protection guaranteed to temporary servants under Section 240 (3) of the Government of India act, 1935, or Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, and so, the order cannot be sustained". ( 8 ) THE next decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in The Management of Utkal Machinery Ltd. v workman, Santi Patnaik, wherein the Supreme Court considered whether the termination of the services of the probationer because of unsatisfactory work was valid. The following passage in the said decision, is relied upon by the learned Counsel:"in the absence of any Standing Order the unsatisfactory work of an employee may be treated as misconduct and when the respondent was discharged according to the management for unsatisfactory work it should be taken that her discharge was tantamount to punishment for an alleged misconduct. If this conclusion is correct the management was not justified in discharging the respondent from service without holding a proper enquiry". It is significant to note that in that case, the Labour Court held that there was no evidence adduced on behalf of the management to show that the work of the employee was unsatisfactory, when the case was taken up to the Labour Court. It is significant to note that in that case, the Labour Court held that there was no evidence adduced on behalf of the management to show that the work of the employee was unsatisfactory, when the case was taken up to the Labour Court. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel next placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Samsher Singh v State of Punjab and another , for the proposition that if a stigma is attached to an order of termination, such order must be set aside. The relevant passage of the said decision, which was relied upon by the learned Counsel, reads as follows:"63. No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination than that the services are terminated it can never amount to a punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct, or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it may in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 64. Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved, in this. The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. But, in those cases, the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a chance to make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation. But, in those cases, the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a chance to make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation. If, on the other hand, the probationer is faced with an enquiry on charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and if his services are terminated without following the provisions of Article 311 (2), he can claim protection". ( 10 ) FINALLY, the learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision in the case of Anoop Jaiswal v Government of India and Another, wherein it has been held:"the form of the order is not decisive as to whether the order is by way of punishment and that even an innocuously worded order terminating the service may in the fact and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry into allegations of serious and grave character of misconduct involving stigma has been made in infraction of the provision of Article 311 (2 ). 12. It is, therefore, now well-settled that where the form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the Court before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. If the Court holds that the order though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a cloak for an order of punishment, the Court would not be barred, merely because of the form of the order in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the employee 13. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Even though the order of discharge may be non-committal, it cannot stand alone. Though the noting in the file of the Government may be irrelevant, the cause for the order cannot be ignored. The recommendation of the Director which is the basis or foundation for the order should be read along with the order for the purpose of determining its true character. Though the noting in the file of the Government may be irrelevant, the cause for the order cannot be ignored. The recommendation of the Director which is the basis or foundation for the order should be read along with the order for the purpose of determining its true character. If on reading the two together the Court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground as the appellant has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. " ( 11 ) AS against this, the learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in The Manager, government Branch Press and Another v D. B. Belliappa and in particular, the passage occurring therein as follows:"the principle that can be deduced from the above analysis is that if the services of a temporary Government are terminated in accordance with the conditions of his service on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct or his unsuitability for the job and/or for his work being unsatisfactory or for a like reason which marks him off a class apart from other temporary servants who have been retained in service, there is no question of the applicability of Article 16". ( 12 ) THE next case relied upon, is Oil and Natural Gas Commission and Others v Dr. Mohd. S. Iskanderali, wherein it has been held:"12. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FROM the undisputed facts detailed by us in an earlier part of the judgment, it is manifest that even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the employer to terminate the services of the employee, a power which the appellants undoubtedly possessed, even so as under the terms of appointment of the respondent such a power flowed from the contract of service it could not be termed as penalty or punishment". ( 13 ) RELIANCE was placed on the decision in Union of India and Others v P. S. Bhatt, wherein it has been held:"8. ( 13 ) RELIANCE was placed on the decision in Union of India and Others v P. S. Bhatt, wherein it has been held:"8. The only question which falls for determination in the present appeal is whether the impugned order was passed by way of punishment or not. It has not been argued that the impugned order attaches any kind of stigma to Sri Bhatt. We have earlier noticed the order and it is clear from the order that the order is an order of termination of the employment on probation simpliciter and reversion to the old post without attaching any kind of stigma. The High Court had proceeded on the basis that the impugned order was by way of punishment. 9. It may be true that in deciding whether an order is by way of punishment or not, the relevant facts and circumstances may have to be considered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On a proper consideration of these facts, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment; and in our view, the High Court was in error in arriving at the finding that the impugned order was by way of punishment, as the report of the Station Director had influenced the Director-General to pass the said order. Loose talks and filthy and abusive language which had been used against the Station Director and the other officers may legitimately in the facts and circumstances of the case lead to the formation of a reasonable belief in the minds of the authorities that the person behaving in such fashion is not a suitable person to be employed as a producer. This undesirable conduct on the part of Sri Bhatt might have been the motive for terminating the employment on probation and for reverting him to his old post of Announcer. Even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the authority to terminate the service of the employee on probation, such termination cannot be termed as penalty or punishment". ( 14 ) FINALLY, the learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision in Ram Chandra Tripathi v Uttar Pradesh public Service Tribunal TV and Others , wherein it has been held:"9. . . . . . . . . . . ( 14 ) FINALLY, the learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision in Ram Chandra Tripathi v Uttar Pradesh public Service Tribunal TV and Others , wherein it has been held:"9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THE finding of the Tribunal that the impugned order of termination was passed without any stigma and not as a punitive measure has been upheld by the High Court and we find no justification in taking a contrary view simply because the appellant was a president of local union at Kanpur, and according to him, he had raised demands on behalf of the employees. There are no materials warranting a finding that he was picked up for incurring displeasure of the higher authorities and the service was sought to be terminated mala fide on some pretext. It appears that although the appellant had remained in service for 16 years but the service record of the appellant was not at all convincing even within a span of five years prior to the date of consideration of his suitability to be retained in temporary service. He suffered an adverse entry and despite opportunity to make representation, such entries were maintained. The assessment of other years of service in the recent past was also not assuring and the appellant was rated as average. If on consideration of such service records, the appropriate committee did not find the appellant suitable to be confirmed in service and the concerned authorities on consideration of poor service record of the appellant had come to the finding that he was not suitable to be retained in service and the impugned order was passed without any stigma and in accordance with the service rules, the same cannot be held illegal or invalid. We, therefore, find no justification to set aside the impugned order of termination of service". ( 15 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant brought to our notice an opinion of a third Judge in Y. N. Krishna Murthy v karnataka Silk Industries Corporation Limited, Bangalore , regarding the question whether a stigma was attached to a particular order of termination of a probationer. We have carefully considered the judgment of the learned Judge also. ( 15 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant brought to our notice an opinion of a third Judge in Y. N. Krishna Murthy v karnataka Silk Industries Corporation Limited, Bangalore , regarding the question whether a stigma was attached to a particular order of termination of a probationer. We have carefully considered the judgment of the learned Judge also. In that case, the following is the order of termination:"sri Y. N. Krishna Murthy was appointed as Assistant sales Officer in the Company of 3 years contract. The contract period would be treated as probationary period and the management had the discretion to extend the probationary period. Due to various circumstances as narrated above, his probationary period came to be extended upto 31-3-1994. The post of Assistant Sales officer in the company is a responsible position. The assistant Sales Officer functions in charge of any one of the show-rooms of the Company and is fully in-charge of the stocks, cash and all other valuables of the Company in the show-rooms. At any point of time the approximate value of such stock is Rs. 20 lakhs. Therefore, the position of the Assistant Sales Officer is one of trust and responsibility. The Assistant Sales Officer is also required to exercise co-ordination with his superiors in the marketing Division in Head Office and also with his subordinate sales staff in the show-room with a view to maximise sales. The Assistant Sales Officer is entrusted with a fair amount of discretion in dealing with customers, and hence he is expected to be vigilant in the performance of his duties and in taking due care of the stocks entrusted to him. A perusal of the confidential reports of Sri Y. N. Krishna Murthy and also the correspondence between him and the Head Office in the past several years reveals that sri Y. N. Krishna Murthy is not suitable for the post of assistant Sales Officer. Although Sri Y. N. Krishna Murthy was addressed more than once to improve his work and his probation was extended to give him an opportunity, he has not done so. Although Sri Y. N. Krishna Murthy was addressed more than once to improve his work and his probation was extended to give him an opportunity, he has not done so. Hence, Sri Y. N. Krishna Murthy is discharged from service w. e. f. 31-3-1994 (A. N.)",but, it is significant to note that in that case, before passing the order, there was a perusal of the confidential report of the delinquent employee and also the correspondence between him and his higher Officer in the past several years. The learned judge felt that after reliance was placed on the confidential report and the correspondence, before arriving at the conclusion, the delinquent employee must have been given an opportunity to explain the adverse remarks in the confidential report as well as the correspondence. Therefore, the opinion of the learned third judge is of no assistance to the learned Counsel for the appellant. ( 16 ) WE have carefully considered the decisions, referred to above. As rightly pointed out by the learned Single Judge, the word "detrimental" can be applied only to the Bank and it does not mean that the appellant is an undesirable or a danger person. The word "undesirable" meant in Jagdish Mitter's case, supra, cannot be taken as to confer the same meaning to the word "detrimental" used in the instant case. Therefore, we are of the view that the memo of dismissal impugned in the writ petition, does not cast any stigma on the petitioner appellant. ( 17 ) NO other arguments were canvassed before us. ( 18 ) IN view of our foregoing discussion, we confirm the order of the learned Single Judge and dismiss the writ appeal. --- *** --- .