Honble SINGHAL, J.–By this special appeal the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge dated 30.11.1990 has been challenged. (2). The facts of the case are that the respondents (plaintiff) filed a suit in the court of Additional District Judge, Kishangarhbas on 5.2.1987 for specific performance of contract which was dismissed on 23.1.1990. The following issues were fra-med which was decided in favour of defendants, now appellants before us. 1- ^^D;k izfroknh us viuh vkjkth [kljk ua- 263 jdok 8 ch?kk 4 fcLok dk vk/kk fgLlk fnukad 25-9-1976 dks oknhx.k ds crkSj jgu fd;k vkSj ekSds ij tkdj oknhx.k dk djkj fn;kA 2- D;k fnukad 22-1-1983 ds izfroknh us 2 ch?kk tehu 12]000@& :i;s esa oknhx.k dks cspdj eqgk;nk c;ukek rLnhd djkus dk djds iwjh jde izkIr dj bdjkj ukek o jlhn fy[kok dj vius gLrk{kkj o vaxwBs dj uksVsjh ls rLnhd djk fn, vkSj dCtk Hkh oknhx.k dks ns fn;k rFkk fQj vius firk dk vaxwBk canj dh mifLFkfr esa yxok fn;kA 3- D;k fnukad 31-5-86 dks izfroknh us ,d bdjkj ukek vkjkth [kljk uEcj 263 jdck pkj ch?kk 2 fcLok dk fy[kk ftlds vkjkth dks dqy jde 25]000@& rd ;d 23]000@& :i;s udn izkIr dj o 2000@& :i;s oDr O;ukek ysuk r; dj eqgk;nk fy[kokdj vius gLrk{kj dj fn,A 4- D;k fnukad 31-5-86 dks dkfct nks ch?kk vkjkth dk lkSnk Hkh 12]000@& esa ekSf[kd :i ls djk fn;sA 5- D;k oknhx.k dk c;ukek djkus ds fy, cdk;k jde vnk dj geskk rS;kj Fks o gS ysfdu izfroknh us xkWao ds yksxksa ds cgdkos esa vkdj fnukad 9-1-87 dks c;ukek djkus ls bUdkj dj fn;kA 6- D;k izfroknh foks"k gtkZ 2000@& :i;s ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSA 7- vuqrks"k** (3). The first appeal was allowed and the finding recorded from issue Nos. 1 to 6 were decided in favour of the plaintiff. So far as first issue is concerned, it was found that the land was mortgaged by Ex.3 as the plaintiff Jagram PW 1 has not stated as to whether it contains the signature of the defendant Chajju Ram. The Mortgage-deed could not have been executed without registration. The order of thetrial court was up-held on this ground. So far as this issue is concerned, it is not in dispute before us and this appeal is challenged on rest of the issues. (4). The Mortgage-deed could not have been executed without registration. The order of thetrial court was up-held on this ground. So far as this issue is concerned, it is not in dispute before us and this appeal is challenged on rest of the issues. (4). The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that neither there was any execution of agreement for mortgage deed as alleged by the plaintiff and the Khatedar of the disputed land was Mangla Ram who has expired and Chaju Ram had no authority to sign such an agreement for mortgage of land. The plaintiff has prepared forged document. The first agreement for sales is said to have been executed on 22.9.1983 for 2 Bighas in respect of Rs. 12,000/- while the second agreement is alleged to have been executed on 31.5.1986 for 4 Bighas and 2 Biswasof land for Rs. 25,000/- out of which Rs. 23,000/- are said to have been received and on that very day remaining 2 Bighas of land of Khasra were said to have been agreed to be sold by verbal agreement. The entire story of the plaintiff is said to be based on fraud and the trial court was justified in dis-believing the witnesses. The conduct of the plaintiff had been contrary to normal human conduct. The trial court wasjustified in dis-believing the oral and documentary evidence of the plaintiff and dismissing the suit. The learned Single Judge was not justified to reverse the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. Attention has been drawn to the various statements recorded and the alleged written agreement also. (5). Learned counsel for the appellants has relied the decision given in thecase of Madhusudan Das vs. Smt. Narayani Bai and Others (1) wherein following observations were made:– ``In an appeal against a trial court decree, when the appellate Court considers an issue turning on oral evidence it must bear in mind that it does not enjoy the advantage which the trial Court had in having the witnesses before it and of observing the manner in which they gave their testimony. When there is a conflict of oral evidence on any matter in issue and its resolution turns upon the credibility of the witnesses, the general rule is that the appellate court should permit the findings of fact rendered by the trial court to prevail unless it clearly appears that some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the notice of the trial court or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace its opinion as to where the credibility lies. (6). Reliance has been placed on the decision of this court in the case of Janki-dass & Anr. vs. Mahant Dhangir & Ors. (2), wherein following the decision given in the case of Kedarnath vs. Sitaram (3), it was held that in an appeal u/s. 18 it would be open to the court of appeal to consider all the points necessary to be investigated for the determination of the contention of the correctness of the decree under appeal, and that such consideration could not be limited to any particular questionof fact or law, although on a question of fact, they would be extremely slow to interfere where there had been concurrent decision of courts below on such a question. Another decision given in the case of Suraj Narain vs. Gordhan (4) is also referred in the case of Jankidass where it was observed as under:– ``In the absence of any such limitation in Section 18(1) of the Rajas- than High Court Ordinance, it cannot be argued on the analogy of Sec. 100 of the Civil Procedure Code that the High Court would not be entitled to examine in appeal the findings of fact arrived at by the Judge against whose judgment, the appeal is directed. It would not be inappropriate if in an appeal against the judgment of a single Judge the High Court goes into facts and, where necessary, even interfers with findings based on them. Of course, in doing so, the Court will always keep in view the salutary principle that ordinarily it should not interfere with findings of fact, unless the findings are manifestly erroneous and against the weight of evidence on record. (7). On the basis of the above proposition of law it is submitted that the Division Bench in special appeal is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. (8). The decision given in the case of Dr. (7). On the basis of the above proposition of law it is submitted that the Division Bench in special appeal is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. (8). The decision given in the case of Dr. K.C. Sikroria vs. Smt. Saria Sikroria (5), is also relied wherein it was observed that the jurisdiction of this court in an special appeal under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance has to be exercised sparingly, but that cannot possibly means that injustice can be perpetuated. The interference in the findings arrived at by the Court given while exercising the powers under Section 96 CPC is only warranted when the findings of fact arrived at by the trial Judge are not based on the impressions he gathers from the demea-nour of witnesses, and in that situation it becomes the duty of the Appellate Court to see whether the evidence taken as a whole can reasonably justify the conclusion which the trial court arrived at or whether there is an element of improbability arising from provided circumstances. (9). Reliance has also been placed on the decision in Suraj Narain, referredto above where it is held that the High Court is competent to consider all points and not preclude from hearing on facts even where judgment of single Judge confirms finding of facts of trial court. (10). Mr. Rastogi has submitted that the scope of special appeal is very restricted one and has relied the decision given by this Court in the case of KripalSingh vs. Mst. Kartaro and Ors. (6), wherein it was observed that no interference is possible in special appeal unless warranted by glaring circumstances and even re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible. It was observed, ``No doubt, it is open to us in a special appeal to examine even findings of fact but unless there are glaring circumstances to warrant an interference with a finding of fact arrived at bythe learned Single Judge, we would ordinarily be not justified sitting as a court of special appeal u/s. 18 of the High Court Ordinance to reappreciate the evidence. (11). (11). The decision given in the case of Smt. Suraj Devi vs. Smt. Sita Devi (7), is also relied where it was observed, `We see no reason sitting in appellate jurisdiction u/s. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, to take a differentview than the one concurrently taken by the learned Single Judge and the learned District Judge. Second reappreciation of evidence is not warranted in the present case, though language of Sec. 18 of the Ordinance does not prohibit such reappreciation. (12). From the various decisions cited above we are of the view that the juris-diction in special appeal is as is vested in the Single Bench while hearing the appeal as this court while exercising the power of special appeal u/s. 18 of the Ordinance of 1949 acts as a Court of correction and correct its own orders in exercise of the same jurisdiction as is vested in the Single Judge. In other words, this court exercises the power of a court of error as has been held by the Apex Court inBuddala Lakshmaiah & Ors. vs. Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple & Ors. (8). In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court on this point the power in special appeal is quo-terminus with that of Single Judge and, therefore, (1) the evidence has to be read as a whole and if in special appeal the court comes to the conclusion that there is an element of improbability then in such a case the finding of fact can beinterfered; (2) where there is a concurrent finding of fact, this court would be extremely slow to interfere; (3) where any material evidence has escaped attention of the learned Single Judge it can be considered in special appeal. The concurrent finding of fact could be disturbed in a very rare case. Sec. 18 of the Ordinance of 1949 has not restricted the power of this court and, therefore, the proper interpre-tation which could be taken is that the powers could be exercised by the learned Single Judge could alone be exercised in special appeal. The concurrent finding of fact could be disturbed in a very rare case. Sec. 18 of the Ordinance of 1949 has not restricted the power of this court and, therefore, the proper interpre-tation which could be taken is that the powers could be exercised by the learned Single Judge could alone be exercised in special appeal. While exercising with power the other principles like the demeanour of witnesses in case of oral evidence to the credibility of the witnesses is not to be interferred, even by the appellate court particularly in a case where an issue is to be adjudicated on the basis of oral evi- dence, unless there are special features which have escaped the notice of the trial court or conclusion arrived at is based on improbability. (13). On the basis of the above, if the entire facts of this case are considered, it would be evident that so far as the execution of the agreement for mortgage is concerned, it has not been relied by the trial court or by the learned Single Judge and is not a dispute before us. The improbability in the present case of execution of the alleged agreement dated 22.1.1983 and 31.5.1986 has to be examined on the basis of evidence available before the trial court. (14). In respect of issue No. 2 the plaintiff has produced Phool Chand PW 8who has stated that the stamp paper was purchased by the defendant on 22.9.1983 and has the signature X to Y. The statement of Notary Public Bhola Nath PW 10 was also recorded who also admitted that the agreement was attested by him on 22.9.1983 and words from G to H is written by his hand and is signed by him. Chhaju Ram was identified by Jai Karan and the contents were read over to him who hasaccepted them as correct. Jai Karan was also produced who has also stated that the agreement was executed by Chhaju Ram. PW 3 Moda Ram has also stated that Chhaju Ram has put his thumb impression as well as signature. On the basis of this statement the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that simply because the statement of Chander were not recorded in whose presence, the thumb impre-ssion of the father of the defendant is alleged to have been put, this statement cannot be ignored. We have seen this document Ex. 1. On the basis of this statement the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that simply because the statement of Chander were not recorded in whose presence, the thumb impre-ssion of the father of the defendant is alleged to have been put, this statement cannot be ignored. We have seen this document Ex. 1. The alleged thumb impression of Chhaju Ram and Mangal Ram are from different inkpad. The name of the person who has typed the said agreement is not mentioned on Ex. 1. Bhola Nath PW 10 has admitted that he does not know Chhaju Ram nor he knows Jai Karan.This attestation has been done by him without any proper identification. Jai Karan, Mooliya have stated that no payments were made in their presence. The trial court dis-believed this document on two grounds; namely, that the execution of the document and payment on the basis thereof has not been proved. It is also not understandable as to how the purchaser would made the complete payment of con-sideration for sale of land more particularly when it is mentioned in Ex. 1 that the land is mortgaged with the bank. The conduct of the plaintiff has to be seen that he remained silent till the execution alleged agreement. It is also admitted fact that the thumb impression of Chander were not put on this document when thumb impression of Chhaju Ram are said to be put. It is highly improbable that a personwould make the payment of the entire consideration of a land which is mortgaged with the bank. In such a situation the part of the consideration is always remains with the purchaser so that the seller may expedite the execution of the sale-deed and redeem the mortgage. Nothing of the sort is found in the present case. The agreement for mortgage has also not been relied by the trial court as well as by thelearned Single Judge and, therefore, even the possession is not proved on the basis thereof. It is not mentioned in the agreement as to which part of the Khasra is agreed to be sold because the complete area is more than 2 Bighas and no line of demarcation was given. The trial court therefore, was justified in dis-believing the execution of Ex. 1, and deciding the issue in favour of the defendant. It is not mentioned in the agreement as to which part of the Khasra is agreed to be sold because the complete area is more than 2 Bighas and no line of demarcation was given. The trial court therefore, was justified in dis-believing the execution of Ex. 1, and deciding the issue in favour of the defendant. Mangalramwas khatedar and no document was produced that Chhaju Ram has any authority to enter into such an agreement. The order of the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be in accordance with law and is hereby set aside. (15). In respect of issue No. 3, Ex. 2 is alleged to have been executed on 31.5.1996. On the face of it without going to any other document the signature ofChhaju Ram as on Ex. 1 and 2 are different. By this document 4 Bighas and 2 Biswas is alleged to be agreed to be sold. It is mentioned that this land was mortgaged on 25.9.97 for a sum of Rs. 4,500/-. This document- agreement of mortgage dated 25.9.76 has not been relied by both the courts below and that issue was decided against the plaintiff. The learned Single Judge has considered the evidence of Phool Chand Stamp Vendor PW 8, and Heera Lal PW 2 and found that simply because the name of the person who has typed the agreement is not given, it cannot be disbelieved. In the statement of Jagram it is stated that the agreement was executed on Kishangarh Tehsil through Jagdish. There are material contradiction which have not been considered by the learned Single Judge. PW 2 Heeralal has stated that the agreement was executed at the residence of Ghanshyam. PW 3 Changiram has stated that he has gone to Kishangarh for making the payment. PW 5 Kartar has stated that the payments were made at the residence. PW 6 Ramji Lal states that the payment was made 2-3 days earlier to the agreement. There had been materialcontradictions and it is not proved beyond doubt that this agreement was executed by the defendant. This is besides the fact that the signature of Chhaju Ram are apparently different than on other document for which no explanation has been given. The agreement for mortgage-deed has already been disbelieved and, therefore, we are of the view that the trial court was justified in coming to the conclusionthat no agreement was executed. This is besides the fact that the signature of Chhaju Ram are apparently different than on other document for which no explanation has been given. The agreement for mortgage-deed has already been disbelieved and, therefore, we are of the view that the trial court was justified in coming to the conclusionthat no agreement was executed. The learned Single Judge was not justified in reversing the said finding. (16). In respect of issue No. 4 it is alleged that a verbal agreement was executed on 31.5.1986 for sale of rest of 2 Bighas of land. It is not understandable as to how a person would enter into a verbal agreement on the same date in respectof same piece of land which is agreed to be sold by written agreement. Besides that a consideration which is alleged to have been paid is admitted to have been returned. The learned Single Judge has proceeded on the basis of execution of Ex. 1 and 2. On the basis of oral evidence a conclusion was arrived that a verbal agreement was entered into. This approach of the learned Single Judge is not inaccordance with law because it is highly improbable for a person to enter into a verbal agreement on the same day on which written agreement for the part of land is entered into. It has also come on record that the consideration alleged to have been paid has been returned. Besides this there could not be any re- appreciation of evidence in such a situation where the evidence of plaintiff itself is to the effectthat a amount of Rs. 12,000/- was returned back. It is beyond human probability for a purchaser to receive refund of the consideration. The land itself was mortgaged with the bank and there could not be any verbal agreement as on the said date a written agreement in respect of same part of land has been alleged to have been executed which have been found by us as not a proper document. The finding inrespect of issues Nos. 5 and 6 on the basis of finding recorded above are also to be decided in favour of the appellants. (17). Consequently, the special appeal is allowed with a cost of Rs. 2000/-.