Both these appeals arise out of the same judgment and award dated 30th November, 1993 as passed by the Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Shillong in MAC Case No.14 of 1993 and 15 of 1993. 2. The first case MAC 14 of 1993 was filed by Smt. Manbhari Devi. as wife of the deceased driver Baldewa Ram and on behalf of his legal representatives and the second case MAC 15 of 1993 was filed by Shri Ganpat Ram Nayak as father of the deceased Handyman Kanta Ram Nayak and legal representative of all the legal heirs of the deceased. Both of whom lost their lives in the motor accident. The Tribunal by the impugned judgment and award in MAC Case No. 14 of 1993 awarded a total compensation of Rs.2.93.000/- while in MAC Case No. 15 of 1993 the amount of compensation awarded is Rs. 1.10.600/-. Aggrieved by the same, the insurer M/s Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd has preferred these appeals under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. for short 'the Act'. 3. Few basic facts need be noted. The deceased driver and handyman were employed b}' the owner of the truck. bearing registration No.ML 05A/0483. On 13.1.93 the truck was on its usual round to Cherrapunjee. It was driven by Baldewa Ram Nayak. who started from Shillong to Cherrapunjee for transporting cement. The Handyman Kanta Ram Nayak was also on the truck which met with the accident. As alleged by the claimant respondent it was due to the negligence of the owner of the truck who Fail to maintain the vehicle in proper condition and order. It lights and brakes were not properly functioning as averred by the claimants there was no negligence on the part of the deceased driver. They were instructed by the owner respondent No.2 to make a trip to Cherrapunjee even though it was a foggy night. The truck in question went off the road and fell down into gorge of about 500 ft. below where both the driver and the handyman died on the spot. Their dead bodies were recovered and were brought to the hospital. A criminal case was also registered being GDE No.365 dated 14.1.93 at the Cherrapunjee Police Station. On obtaining death certificates from the hospital authorities and collecting other material the respective claimant respondents filed the claim petitions before the Tribunal. 4. Their dead bodies were recovered and were brought to the hospital. A criminal case was also registered being GDE No.365 dated 14.1.93 at the Cherrapunjee Police Station. On obtaining death certificates from the hospital authorities and collecting other material the respective claimant respondents filed the claim petitions before the Tribunal. 4. The respondent owner, insurer were noticed who filed their written statements and on the basis of pleadings of the parties the Tribunal framed the following issues : "1. Whether the petition is maintainable in its present form ? 2. Whether there is cause of action for filing the instant petition ? 3. Whether the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of ML 05 A-0483 or through negligence of the owner of the vehicle ? 4. Whether the claimant is entitled to get compensation ? If so, to what extent ? 5. Whether the answering OPs are liable to pay compensation ? If so, to what extent ? 6. What reliefer reliefs the parties are entitled to ?" 5. In claim case MAC No. 14 of 1993 the claimant respondent apart from examining themselves has also examined five other witnesses. Similarly in claim case MAC 15 of 1993 the claimant examined herself along with six other witnesses. What is significant to be noted is that the owner respondent neither entered the witness box nor examined any witness, so also the insurance company did not examine any witness in support of its case. The Tribunal on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties, awarded the compensation as already noted above. Hence these appeals. 6. Learned counsel Mr. The Tribunal on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties, awarded the compensation as already noted above. Hence these appeals. 6. Learned counsel Mr. SK Dev Purkayastha, appearing for the appellant raised the following points : (1) that the Tribunal in passing the impugned award completely ignored the fact that the deceased driver himself was negligent and responsible for the accident, as such the claimant respondent is not entitled to any compensation, inasmuch as one cannot take the advantage of his own wrong and negligence; (2) that both the driver and the handyman knowing fully well that the truck was not fit to ply they proceeded to Cherrapunjee from Shillong and met with the accident, as such, they contributed to the negligence; (3) that the Tribunal erred in disposing of the claim under section 166 of the Act without framing proper and material issues as to whether the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the vehicle ? and whether the accident occurred due to the contributory negligence of the driver himself ? (4) that at best, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, the deceased driver could claim compensation, if any, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923; (5) that the multiplier of 22 as applied in the case of driver without making any deduction for uncertainties of life and the lump sum payment made, the award was liable to be set aside. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the claimant respondent, on the other hand, referring to section 149 (2) of the Act submitted that the appellant insurance company cannot widen the scope of appeal which is restricted to the pleas available to it under section 149 of the Act. The question of quantum of compensation cannot be allowed to be raised in an appeal. As for claim compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, learned counsel submitted that under section 167 of the Act an option is available to the claimant. 8. Taking up the first point as raised by the learned counsel for the appellant which would also be helpful in disposing of the other points as raised by him, let us first have a look at the plea taken in this behalf by the appellant. 8. Taking up the first point as raised by the learned counsel for the appellant which would also be helpful in disposing of the other points as raised by him, let us first have a look at the plea taken in this behalf by the appellant. The first six paragraphs of the written statement as filed by the appellant are pleas of a general nature invariably and mechanically taken by almost all insurance companies in their written statement, little realising the object of the General Insurance Nationalisation Act, 1972. Paragraph 7 of the written statement refers to an omission on the part of the claimant to state whether the claimant has availed of any remedies or reliefs under the Workmen Compensation Act. Paragraph 8 is merely the reiteration of the same plea putting the claimant to strict proof of the aforesaid fact. Paragraph 9 refers to want of notice of the accident as requires to be given under the Rules. Paragraph 10 of the written statement is a denial of the statements made in item No. 1, 2 and 7 of the claim petition. The same is the case with paragraph 11 denying item in paragraph 8 of the claim petition. Paragraph 12 relates to absence of post mortem examination report. Now paragraph 13 refers to the term of the policy so far as it relates to the driver holding a valid licence. Paragraph 14 is again a denial of information given in item 14 and 15 of the claim petition for want of knowledge. Similarly para 15 is regarding lack of co-operation shown by the owner and para 16 contains for a prayer for directing him to produce the necessary documents. While paragraph 17 of the written statement is the reiteration of limited liability to pay compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act as per terms of the policy and para 18 reserves the right of filing additional written statement. While in paragraph 19 it is averred that the risk giving rise to the claim is not covered by the terms of the policy as such interim award under section 140 of the Act is not admissible and paragraph 20 contains the prayer for dismissal of the claim with costs of Rs.5.000. 9. While in paragraph 19 it is averred that the risk giving rise to the claim is not covered by the terms of the policy as such interim award under section 140 of the Act is not admissible and paragraph 20 contains the prayer for dismissal of the claim with costs of Rs.5.000. 9. The purpose of quoting the gist of the written statement as filed by the appellant insurance company is to show that there is not even the remotest suggestion, much less a specific plea taken by the appellant insurance company to show that it was the driver of the vehicle who was negligent in driving and it was due to this negligent driving that the accident occurred. Apart from those absence of pleas the verification appended to the written statement is also worth nothing : "I, Shri RP Blah. Divisional Manager Incharge, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Shillong do hereby solemnly-affirm and state that the statements made in para 1 to 19 above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief and the rest of the statements are my submission to the Hon'ble Tribunal. And I sign this verification on this the 7th day of July, 1993." 10. These are the pleas taken by a nationalised insurance company, having its offices and record, without making any attempt whatsoever to ascertain facts from record available in its own office. All that is stated is that the statements made in paragraph 1 to 19 are true to the best of knowledge of the deponent, who in the instant case is the Divisional Manager, such verification does not meet minimal requirements of Order VI Rule 3 CPC and verification is not an empty formality. Was it not expected of the appellant a nationalised insurance company to go through its own record and find out the ascertainable facts not from any other source but from its own record ? Even that has not been done but the plea is taken that the accident was the result of the driver's negligence. 11. Having taken the above plea, the least that was expected of the appellant to examine someone and to adduce some evidence or atleast try-to bring on record some material by cross examining the witnesses examined by the claimant. But there is absolutely no material to suggest an inference that it was the driver who was negligent. 12. 11. Having taken the above plea, the least that was expected of the appellant to examine someone and to adduce some evidence or atleast try-to bring on record some material by cross examining the witnesses examined by the claimant. But there is absolutely no material to suggest an inference that it was the driver who was negligent. 12. Now coming to the question of framing of issues firstly in absence of a specific pleading as regard the driver's negligence, where was the scope for the Tribunal to frame an issue as desired by the appellant. If at all it was so necessary, what prevented the appellant from raising an objection at the proper stage ? The issue does not arise for want of specific pleadings. Assuming for the sake of argument that it does, it is hardly of any consequence when the parties have gone ahead participating in adducing evidence, cross examining the witnesses knowing fully well as to what their case is and what case they are called upon to meet ? It is too late at the appellate stage to contend that a particular issue was not framed. 13. The other points is about contributor}' negligence. Here again there is absolutely no evidentiary support except for a bald assertion, let alone evidence, there is not even a specific plea of contributory negligence on the part of the victims of the accident. Merely saying that the deceased knew that the vehicle in question was not in its road worthy condition and yet they drove the vehicle to Cherrapunjee, that too at the appellate stage, is nothing but ignoring the realities of life. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to establish negligence per se. No doctrine can operate in vacuum. In the instant case there is lack of pleadings as well as evidence on the part of the appellant. Before dealing with the evidence it would not be out of place to recapitulate the legal connotation of 'negligence per se'. "Negligence has many manifestations - it maybe active negligence, collateral negligence, comparative negligence, concurrent negligence, continued negligence, criminal negligence, gross negligence, hazardous negligence, active and passing negligence, wilful or reckless negligence or negligence per se. Before dealing with the evidence it would not be out of place to recapitulate the legal connotation of 'negligence per se'. "Negligence has many manifestations - it maybe active negligence, collateral negligence, comparative negligence, concurrent negligence, continued negligence, criminal negligence, gross negligence, hazardous negligence, active and passing negligence, wilful or reckless negligence or negligence per se. (Negligence per se is denned in Black's Law Dictionary thus : "Conduct, whether of action or omission, which may be declared and treated as negligence without any argument or proof as to the particular surrounding circumstances, either because it is in violation of a statute or valid municipal ordinance, or because it is so palpably opposed to the dictates of common prudence4hat it can be said without hesitation or doubt that no careful person would have been guilty of it. As a general rule, the violation of a public.duty, enjoyed by law for the protection of person or property, so constitutes.") Where a person is guilty or negligence per se, no further proof is needed." (See Poonam Verma vs. Ashwin Patel, AIR 1996 SC 2111 ) 15. Appellant's pleaded case has already been noted above. Now let us have a look at the evidence so as to ascertain whether the negligence per se on the part of the driver and the handyman is if at all inferrable. Cross examining CW 1. Mahavir Prasad on behalf of the appellant who had seen the vehicle in question being driven by the deceased driver Baldewa Ram, this is what the witness stated in his cross examination on behalf of the appellant: "I have not seen the accident. The vehicle may be having a fitness certificate. The driving licence was not filed in this case and it is lying with the owner of the offending vehicle and the owner has told that the same may be handed over to the insurance company. The vehicle may be having a fitness certificate. The driving licence was not filed in this case and it is lying with the owner of the offending vehicle and the owner has told that the same may be handed over to the insurance company. I am not the claimant in these cases but the clainrapplications were brought by me from the Rajasthan." The other witness CW 2 has testified to the effect that the driver had told the owner that the vehicle was not working properly, the lights, brake, battery are weak and the vehicle was required to be repaired but it as the insistent of the Ashok Kumar, husband of the owner Gayatri Devi that somehow one trip has to be made to Cherrapunjee and the repair could be done afterwards. In his cross examination he admitted that to reach the place of accident it took one and half hours but he could not say the exact distance from Shillong to the place of accident. He could not also testify as to how the accident took place. He did not know whether the vehicle in question had a fitness certificate. According to him the place where the accident took place is almost in the middle between the road of Shillong to Cherrapunjee. He admitted being not present at the time when the vehicle was started by the deceased driver. The Doctor who performed the post mortem examination was examined as CW 3. She has proved the report Ext 11 and 12. She was not cross examined by either opposite parties or the appellant. CW 4 Ram Singh knew both the driver and the deceased handyman. His evidence is substantially the same as that of CW 2. In Claim Case No. 14 of 1993 CW 5 Manbhari Devi, the wife of the deceased driver is the claimant. On being cross examined by the appellant she stated : "I have no paper nor any documents to show that my husband was adopted by his grand maternal parents. The deceased father and mother did not raise any objection authorising me to receive the claim for compensation. It is not a fact that the accident occurred due to the fault of my husband. I have no document regarding the monthly income of my husband stated to be at the rate of Rs.2,000/- PM. The deceased father and mother did not raise any objection authorising me to receive the claim for compensation. It is not a fact that the accident occurred due to the fault of my husband. I have no document regarding the monthly income of my husband stated to be at the rate of Rs.2,000/- PM. I do not have any paper to show that my husband used to send Rs.2000/- PM. It is not a fact that my husband used to smoke and drinks. The grand maternal parents of my husband are spending money for the maintenance of my family." 16. In Claim Case No. 15 of 1991. CW 5 is the father of the handyman. In his cross examination by the owner and also adopted by the appellant his statement is "My son used to send money through people who visited Rajasthan from Shillong I have not called the person to depose here who brought the money to me at Rajasthan from Shillong. I do not have any list of expenditure to show that I have spent Rs. 10,000/- to perform the last rites of my deceased son. I have got 4 other sons who are older than my deceased son all of them residing at Rajastrian. It is not a fact that my son did not send money to me. It is not a fact that I have not spent Rs. 10,000/- for performance of last rites of my deceased son." 17. The other two witnesses CW 6 in MAC 14 of 1993 Shri Arjun Singh is the elder brother of the claimant Manbhari Devi and in MAC Case No. 15 of 1993, CW 6 Bhawan Lal is the elder brother of Smti Choti Devi the wife of the deceased hanch nan Kanta Ram Nayak.They are not the eye witnesses, they have testified on th basis of information received b}' them. So far as the accident is concerned Arjun Singh testified on the basis of information he received and in the same breathe is the evidence of Bhawan Lal. CW 6. 18. This is the state of evidence that the doctrine res ipsa loquitor is sought to be invoked to establish negligence per se on the part of the deceased driver so as to avoid the appellant's liability. Needless to add that the plea as raised must be rejected for want of any evidentiary support and specific plea. CW 6. 18. This is the state of evidence that the doctrine res ipsa loquitor is sought to be invoked to establish negligence per se on the part of the deceased driver so as to avoid the appellant's liability. Needless to add that the plea as raised must be rejected for want of any evidentiary support and specific plea. It is accordingly, rejected. 19. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any merit in the submissions made by appellant's learned counsel in support of these appeals. The appeals are thus liable to fail which are accordingly with costs of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees two thousand) only. 20. The amounts payable to the claimant respondent shall be deposited in a Nationalised Bank for a fixed term of 66 (sixty six) months except Rs. 10,000/- which shall be paid to the claimant. Since there are other minor claimants as well, to protect their interest the above order is passed.