JUDGMENT M. Srinivasan, C. J. (Oral):- In the writ petition, two questions are urged. The first question relates to the constitutional validity of Section 7-A of Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 hereafter referred to as the Act). According to learned counsel, The Section is not provide for a judicial review or further appeal and, therefore, it is arbitrary and thus violative of Article 14 of the constitution of India. Reliance placed upon a judgment of the Delhi High Court in M/s Wire Netting Stores, u & Anr. v. The Regional Provident Funds Commissioner, New Delhi & 1981 Lab. J.C. 1015. After the judgment of the Delhi High Court was rendered there was an amendment of the provisions of the Act and the Act provided for constitution of an Appellate Tribunal under Section 7-D. As per Act a person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Presiding officer a Tribunal unless he is or has been or is qualified to be a Judge of a High tout Thus, the lacuna pointed out by the Delhi High Court has been rectified by the amendment. But, learned counsel for the petitioner contend that though the amendment has come into force, the Central Government has not chosen to constitute a Tribunal and thus, the provisions of Section 7-D are ineffective. Even so, Section 7- cannot be said to be un-constitutional in as much as the legislature has done its duty by introducing a provision for appellate Tribunal. If right have been open to the petitioner to seek a mandamus against the Central Government for constituting the Tribunal and thereby implementing the provision of Section 7-D of the Act. For our purpose, we are convinced that Section 7-A is not arbitrary and not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 2. We may also point out that a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has in Sukhchain Singh and Co. v. Food Corporation of India, 1985 Lab.J.C.-711,held thatSection7-Aisnotviolativeof Article \ 14 of the Constitution of India. The Punjab Bench has dissented from the reasoning of the Delhi Bench. In our opinion, the reasoning of the Punjab and Haryana Bench appears to be more acceptable, but it is not necessary for us to go into that question in view of the amendment of the Act referred to above. 3. The Punjab Bench has dissented from the reasoning of the Delhi Bench. In our opinion, the reasoning of the Punjab and Haryana Bench appears to be more acceptable, but it is not necessary for us to go into that question in view of the amendment of the Act referred to above. 3. The next question relates to the validity of the order passed by the t Regional Provident Fund Commissioner found in Annexure p-1. As rightly t submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner, the Regional provident Fund Commissioner has only set out the contentions of both sides and also relevant tests laid down by various judgments referred to by him for deciding the question whether the Act would apply to the petitioner, but has not chosen to give his own finding of act as to whether the petitioner will fall within the scope of the expression new establishment found in Section 16(l)(d) of the Act. Under that Section, any establishment newly setup, until the expiry of a period of three years from the date on which such establishment is, or has been set up is excluded from the purview of the Act. Section 2-a declares that where an establishment consists of different departments or has branches, whether situated in the same place or in different places, all such departments or branches can be treated as parts of the same establishment. 4. Thus, the question arises whether the petitioner by name, M/s Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. (Unit Himachal) will be a new establishment within the meaning of Section 16(1)(d). It will depend upon several factors. The Supreme Court has considered that similar question under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act in Management of Pratap Press, New Delhi v. Secretary, Delhi Press Workers Union Delhi, AIR 1960 S.C. 1213. The Court laid down certain tests to find out whether the two units in that case were one or distinct or separate. Similarly, in Isha Steel Treatment, Bombay v. Association of Engineering Workers, Bombay & Anr., AIR 1987 S.C. 1478, the provisions of Section 25-G and 25-FFFoftheIndistrial Disputes Act were considered and tests were laid down as to what would be separate industrial unit for the purpose of those Sections. Learned counsel has also drawn our attention to the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Gujchem Distillers India Ltd, Ahmedabad v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, 1985 Lab. Learned counsel has also drawn our attention to the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Gujchem Distillers India Ltd, Ahmedabad v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, 1985 Lab. I. C. 1714 and submitted that the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in the above two cases have been applied in a case arising under Section 16(1)(b) read with Section 2-A of the Act 5. It is not necessary for us at present to go into those judgments and lay down what exactly are the tests to be applied for deciding the question, which arises under Section 16(1)(d) of the Act. It is for the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to decide in the first instance all the relevant facts and give a factual finding as to whether the unit in question is a new establishment as contemplated by Section 16(l) (d) of the Act. 6. In this case, as stated already, the order of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner has not considered the question of fact and given a finding of fact as such. In the absence of such finding, the order is vitiated and it deserves to be quashed. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent invites our attention to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajasthan Prem Krishan Goods Transport Co. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors.(1996)9 S.C.C.454. The Court has pointed out in that case that the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner had given a finding of fact on the basis of the sic available and such finding would not be interferred with. That decision shows that the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner must first ascertain the facts a give a finding thereon before deciding the question. 8. In the result, we quash the order passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner dated 31.12.1996 found in Annexure p-1 and direct the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to decide the matter afresh in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court as well as the other High Courts. The said officer shall first ascertain the facts of the case and give factual finding as to whether the unit in question is a new establishment within the meaning of Section 16(1)(d) of the Act. The petitioner is at liberty to place contention that it is a new establishment. 9. With the above observations, this writ petition is allowed accordingly. The said officer shall first ascertain the facts of the case and give factual finding as to whether the unit in question is a new establishment within the meaning of Section 16(1)(d) of the Act. The petitioner is at liberty to place contention that it is a new establishment. 9. With the above observations, this writ petition is allowed accordingly. CMP No. 176/97: In view of the disposal of the writ petition, this application is also disposed of, and the interim order is vacated.