JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - On the allegation of having committed fatricide Domu Gadaba (hereinafter referred to as 'accused') faced trial. Victim of alleged murder was Nicha Gadaba (hereinafter referred to as 'deceased'). 2. Accusations which led to trial of accused, filtering out unnecessary details are as follows: On 28.3.1991 at about 9 p.m. accused sent his cousin brother Ghasi Gadaba (P.W.4) to the house of deceased to bring some amount due on him. When Ghasi Gadaba approached the deceased for getting the amount, deceased made a counter claim and went to the house of accused along with Ghasi Gadaba. and a quarrel ensued between the two. In course of such quarrel, deceased pushed the accused who fell down and sustained injuries on his person. At that time P.W.4 intervened and separated them. Gori Gadabani (P.W.1) came to the spot and suddenly accused dealt a lathi blow on the head of the deceased while he was standing in front of the house. Deceased fell down with bleeding injury on his head and became unconscious. Deceased and P.W.1 went to Koraput Sadar P.S. on the next day of the occurrence and lodged F.I.R. A case punishable under Section 341/325 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, 'IPC') was registered. Requisition was sent to the District Headquarters Hospital, Koraput for medical examination and treatment of deceased. Deceased breathed his last on 31.3.1991, while undergoing treatment at the hospital. The case was treated as one under Section 302, IPC. Investigation was undertaken and on completion thereof, charge sheet was placed. 3. Accused pleaded innocence. He however stated that deceased at first started fight and assaulted him. 4. In order to further its case, eleven witnesses were examined by the prosecution. P.W.1 was stated to be witness to the occurrence, while P.W.4 was examined to prove that there was quarrel between the accused and deceased. Placing reliance on evidence of P.Ws 1 and 4, learned trial Judge found the accused guilty and convicted and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. In this appeal from jail, conviction and sentence are assailed. 5. Mr. C.R. Kar, learned counsel for appellant submitted that evidence of P.W.1 does not inspire confidence and she being the widow is an interested witness and her evidence should not have been relied upon. In this appeal from jail, conviction and sentence are assailed. 5. Mr. C.R. Kar, learned counsel for appellant submitted that evidence of P.W.1 does not inspire confidence and she being the widow is an interested witness and her evidence should not have been relied upon. Additionally, it is submitted that assault allegedly took place in course of a quarrel and therefore, Section 302, IPC has no application. It is also submitted that weapon of assault was a bamboo stick and death was not instantaneous. On the other hand, deceased was alive after the alleged assault took place and had gone to the police station to report along with his wife. These according to learned counsel for appellant are sufficient to take the case out of umbrella of Section 302, IPC. Learned Addl. Standing Counsel, on the other hand, supported the judgment of conviction and sentence. 6. There is no probation in law that a person who is related to the deceased is an interested witness. No reason has been indicated as to why P.W.1 would falsely implicate the accused who was related to her husband, the deceased being his brother. When an allegation of false implication is made, a foundation has to be led. In the instant case, no material has been brought on record to accept the plea of false implication. 7. In Dilip Singh v. State of Punjab ( 1954 SCR 145 : AIR 1953 SC 364 ), it has laid down as under: "A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not any sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts. However, we are not any sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts." 8. This decision has since been followed in Guli Chand and others, v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1974 SC 276 in which Vadivelu Thevar. v. The State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 was also relied upon. 9. We may also observe that the ground that the witness being a close relative and consequently, being a partisan witness, should no be relied upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by apex Court as early as in Dilip Singh's case (supra) in which apex Court expressed its surprise over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the members of the Bar that relatives were not independent witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, the apex Court observed: "We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eye witnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rules. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan, 1952 SCR 377 : AIR 1952 SC 54 . We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgment of the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel." 10. In this case, apex Court further observed as under: "A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal causes for enmity, that there is tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth." 11. Again, in Masalti v. State of U.P. 1964(8) SCR 133 : AIR 1965 SC 202 , apex Court observed: "But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses ... The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice." 12. To the same effect is the decision of ape` x Court in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2407 . 13. It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever a single blow is given, that would take the case out of the ambit of Section 302, IPC. It would depend upon background facts, nature of weapon used and place where injury was inflicted. Plea of learned counsel for accused-appellant that assault took place in course of sudden quarrel cannot be accepted because evidence on record clearly shows that after the deceased and accused were separated, the latter was taken to his house by his wife, P.W.1-A considerable time gap intervened after which accused came with a lathi and dealt a blow. Therefore, assault cannot be said to have been made during a sudden quarrel. 14. Residual question is whether clause Thirdly of Section 300 is applicable to the facts of the case. There was a gap of three days between the alleged time of assault and death. Mere survival fora long period is not determinative of the question about applicability of clause Thirdly of Section 300. Materials on record show that a bamboo stick was weapon of assault, size of which is quite small. Assault was made in the night in the month of March, 1991. Visibility admittedly was low. The occurrence took place over a trivial affair and one blow with a small stick was given. Materials on record show that a bamboo stick was weapon of assault, size of which is quite small. Assault was made in the night in the month of March, 1991. Visibility admittedly was low. The occurrence took place over a trivial affair and one blow with a small stick was given. In the peculiar background, it cannot be said to be case covered under clause Thirdly of Section 300. The case bears a great amount of similarity to one adjudicated by apex Court in Joseph v. State Kerala, AIR 1994 SC 34 . The accused cannot be said to have intended to cause particular injury which would ultimately prove fatal, but he can be attributed with requisite knowledge to bring in application of second limb of Section 304. It cannot be said that accused intended to cause injury which is sufficient to cause death. At the most it can be said that by inflicting such injury he had knowledge that he would likely cause death. Offence committed by him is culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Conviction is altered from Section 302 to Section 304, Part-II, IPC. Custodial sentence of seven years would meet the ends of Justice. 15. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. S.C. Datta, J. - I agree. Final Result : Allowed