JUDGMENT - V.P. TIPNIS, J. :---The petitioner was working as a Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai. One Advocate K.U. Joshi lodged a complaint against the petitioner regarding an incident which took place before the petitioner as the Metropolitan Magistrate in his chamber on 2nd December 1994. Broadly stated, the allegation was that the petitioner, while dealing with an application for bail in respect of a client of Advocate Joshi, demanded illegal gratification from Mr. Joshi and repeated his demand with his client. Mr. Joshi appears to have made a complaint to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 9th December 1994 as also forwarded the complaint on the very day to this Court and a copy was also sent to the Bar Council of Maharashtra. It appears that the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate commenced some enquiry and statements of Mr. Joshi and his client Dr. Patel were also recorded. It appears that the Special Investigation Department of this Court also commenced investigation. The petitioner was suspended by order dated 19th June 1995. Mrs. R.S. Dalvi, City Civil Sessions Judge, was appointed as the Inquiry Officer. After completing the enquiry, the said Inquiry Officer submitted her report. After considering the said report and the papers of the inquiry, the Committee of Judges appointed in that behalf by the learned Chief Justice recommended dismissal of the petitioner from service for the misconduct which decision was endorsed by the learned Chief Justice and as per the recommendations of this Court, the petitioner was ultimately dismissed by order dated 3-9-1996 under the authority and in the name of the Governor of the State. By this petition, the aforesaid order of dismissal is challenged by the petitioner. 2.We have heard Mr. Adik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, as also Mr. Bharucha, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No.1, the learned Chief Justice, respondent No. 2, Registrar, and respondent No. 4, the Inquiry Officer. We have also heard Mr. Palshikar, learned Asstt. Govt. Pleader, appearing for the State. We have also gone through the petition, the affidavit-in-reply, as also the inquiry report and such other material, including depositions, which were specifically brought to our notice by the parties. 3.Mr. Adik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, firstly, contended that it is essential under the Rules and practice to hold a preliminary enquiry before holding a departmental enquiry and, therefore, he submitted that in this case no such inquiry was held. Mr. 3.Mr. Adik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, firstly, contended that it is essential under the Rules and practice to hold a preliminary enquiry before holding a departmental enquiry and, therefore, he submitted that in this case no such inquiry was held. Mr. Adik, in that behalf, relied upon some part of Manual of Departmental Enquiries of the Government of Maharashtra and the relevant extract is annexed at page 116 of the petition. The Chapter is titled as "Preliminary Enquiry/Investigation". Item 1.1 titled as "Preliminary Enquiry" provides as under :- "(1) Before ordering a departmental enquiry, the authority competent to order the departmental enquiry should clearly decide whether there is sufficient evidence on record to draw the precise charges and the statement of allegations. If the evidence is not so sufficient, a preliminary enquiry/investigation is essential to collect the evidence. A case for a departmental enquiry may arise on the basis of a report of misbehaviour or a complaint. While the report may often contain adequate material to start a departmental enquiry straightway, a complaint will usually require investigation and collection of evidence before such a decision can be taken. (2) Where the allegations made against Government servant are grave or are such as would entail a major punishment such as reduction, removal or dismissal, a preliminary enquiry will usually be necessary for the purpose of collection of the necessary evidence against him. Where the investigation or enquiry has been made by the Police and a report has been received it may not be necessary to order a further preliminary enquiry. The investigation or enquiry by the Police may be sufficient to draw a proper charge sheet and statement of allegations." In our opinion, the first rule contemplates preliminary inquiry/investigation only if the evidence is not so sufficient to draw the precise charge. Even the second clause states that in case of grave allegations entailing major punishment like removal or dismissal, a preliminary enquiry will usually be necessary for the purpose of collection of the necessary evidence. In other words, if there is material sufficient to frame a charge, it is not mandatory that the preliminary enquiry must be held. Mr. Bharucha, learned Counsel appearing for respondents No. 1, 2 and 4 submitted that, firstly, a preliminary enquiry in every matter even under these guidelines is not mandatory and, secondly, it can be either a preliminary inquiry or investigation., Mr. Mr. Bharucha, learned Counsel appearing for respondents No. 1, 2 and 4 submitted that, firstly, a preliminary enquiry in every matter even under these guidelines is not mandatory and, secondly, it can be either a preliminary inquiry or investigation., Mr. Bharucha further submitted that, in any case, in this matter, after the matter was referred to the Special Investigation Department of this Court, it is the Special Investigation Department which has conducted the preliminary investigation and thereafter only the departmental enquiry has been ordered. On the basis of facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the requisite preliminary investigation has been made by the Special Investigation Department. We do not find much merit in the first submission of Mr. Adik. 4.Mr. Adik then submitted that under Rule 5 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules"), such major penalties under Rule 5(1)(viii) and (ix) can be imposed only when the charge is of acceptance of gratification other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Mr. Adik submitted that in the facts of this case, the charge is only demanding illegal gratification and, as such, the penalty of dismissal could not have been imposed. Mr. Adik, in support of his submission, relied upon the first proviso to Sub-Clause (ix) of Clause (1) of Rule 5 which is as under :- "Provided that, in every case in which the charge of acceptance from any person of any gratification, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act is established, the penalty mentioned in Clause (viii) or Clause (ix) shall be imposed." We do not find any merit at all in this submission. Reading Rule 5 and the first and second proviso to Rule 5(1) (ix), it is clear that what the rule provides is that in case of a charge of acceptance from any person of any gratification, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act, penalty of removal from service under Clause (viii) or dismissal from service under Clause (ix) shall be mandatory and the second proviso states that in any exceptional case and for special reasons recorded in writing any other penalty may be imposed. It does not mean that penalty under Clause (viii) or Clause (ix) cannot be imposed for any other misconduct. The second submission of Mr. Adik is also, therefore, devoid of any merit. 5.Mr. Adik thirdly submitted that even on merits, if the entire evidence is taken into consideration, the Inquiry Officer was not right in coming to the conclusion that the alleged charge is proved against the petitioner. In fact, Mr. Adik took us through the evidence of Advocate Joshi, Dr. Patel, who was his client, as also the evidence of other witnesses examined in the matter in the departmental proceedings and contended that the evidence of Advocate Joshi is not at all supported by other evidence on record and, in fact, this is a case of no evidence at all. We find it difficult to accept this submission of Mr. Adik. After having gone through the portions of evidence of different witnesses brought to our notice by Mr. Adik as also the report of the Inquiry Officer, we are of the opinion that the Inquiry Officer has appreciated the evidence brought before her and has concluded that the evidence of Advocate Joshi and his client Dr. Patel is reliable and is sufficient to prove the allegation against the petitioner. It is not a case of no evidence at all. It is settled law that once there is evidence before the Inquiry Officer and the Inquiry Officer on appreciation of the evidence has come to the conclusion that it is a plausible conclusion, the High Court in its writ jurisdiction cannot reappreciate the evidence and disturb the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer. In the facts and circumstances of the case and on the basis of material on record, it is not possible to hold that no reasonable person could have come to the conclusion which has been arrived at by the Inquiry Officer. The third submission of Mr. Adik, therefore, also must fail. 6.Mr. Adik then contended that under Article 235 of the Constitution of India, the control over the subordinate Court is vested in the High Court and for the aforesaid purpose, the High Court means all the Judges of the High Court. Mr. The third submission of Mr. Adik, therefore, also must fail. 6.Mr. Adik then contended that under Article 235 of the Constitution of India, the control over the subordinate Court is vested in the High Court and for the aforesaid purpose, the High Court means all the Judges of the High Court. Mr. Adik submitted that the decision to initiate departmental enquiry, the appointment of the Inquiry Officer, the consideration of the report and the decision to dismiss the petitioner were not taken by the Full Court meaning thereby all the Judges of this Court, but was taken by the Committee of Judges appointed by the learned Chief Justice in that behalf and by the learned Chief Justice and, as such, the proceedings as well as the ultimate dismissal are clearly without jurisdiction and without authority of law. Mr. Bharucha, on the other hand, contended that this issue has been dealt with by the Apex Court in (State of U.P. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi,)1, reported in 1978(2) S.C.C. 102 . In the aforesaid case it has been held by the Apex Court as under :- "Article 235 of the Constitution provides that the control over District Judges and courts subordinate thereto shall be vested in the High Court. Though the control over the subordinate courts is vested constitutionally in the High Court by the Article it does not follow that the High Court has no power to prescribe the manner in which that control may, in practice, be exercised. In fact, the very circumstance that the power of control, which comprehends matters of a wide ranging variety, vests in the entire body of Judges makes it imperative that the rules must be framed to make the exercise of the control feasible, convenient and effective. The High Court has, therefore, the power under Article 235 itself to frame rules for regulating the manner in which the control vested in it may be exercised. The High Court has, therefore, the power under Article 235 itself to frame rules for regulating the manner in which the control vested in it may be exercised. The power to do a thing necessarily carries with it the power to regulate the manner in which the thing may be done." The Apex Court has further held as under :- "The power of control over the subordinate courts which is vested in the High Court comprise such numerous matters often involving consideration of details of minutest nature that if the whole Court is required to consider everyone of those matters the exercise of control, instead of becoming effective, will tend to cause delay and confusion in the administration of justice in the State. It would be better and more effectively exercised if a smaller committee of Judges has the authority of the Court to consider the manifold matters falling within the purview of Article 235. It is wrong, therefore, to "characterise" as "delegation" the process whereby the entire High Court authorises a Judge or some of the Judges of the Court to Act on behalf of the whole Court. The administrative Judge or the administrative committee is a mere instrumentality through which the entire Court Acts for the more convenient transaction of the business, the assumed basis of the arrangement being that such instrumentality will only act in furtherance of the broad policies evolved from time to time by the High Court as a whole. It is therefore inappropriate to say that a Judge or committee of Judges of the High Court authorised by the Court to Act on its behalf is a delegate of the Court." This authority, in our opinion, clearly shows that it is always permissible to the High Court to form a Committee of Judges to exercise the powers under Article 235. 7.Mr. Adik then relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of the Nagpur Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 3095 of 1995 (Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra anr.)2, delivered on 26-4-1996 reported in 1997(1) Bom.C.R. 303 . In para 38 of the judgement, the Division Bench referred to the resolution passed in one Chamber Meeting held on 2nd May 1981. Clause IV(A) provides that the decisions on the following matters shall be taken at a meeting of all the Judges :- "(1) .............................................................................................. (2) .............................................................................................. (3) ............................................................................................... (4) .............................................................................................. In para 38 of the judgement, the Division Bench referred to the resolution passed in one Chamber Meeting held on 2nd May 1981. Clause IV(A) provides that the decisions on the following matters shall be taken at a meeting of all the Judges :- "(1) .............................................................................................. (2) .............................................................................................. (3) ............................................................................................... (4) .............................................................................................. (5) ............................................................................................. (6) Recommendation by way of Disciplinary action against any Judge or Magistrate. Decision : Accepted. " Clause VII is as under :- "Decisions of all matters except those enumerated in paragraph IV (A) shall be taken in accordance with the practice followed hitherto or in accordance with the directions that the Chief Justice may issue from time to time hereafter." Relying upon the said clause, the Division Bench held that under the resolution of the Full Court itself, the matter regarding recommendation by way of disciplinary action against any Judge or Magistrate has to be dealt with by the Full Court. 8.Mr. Bharucha brought to our notice the order of the Apex Court passed on 16th December 1996 in Interlocutory Application in Civil Appeal No. 9894 of 1996 by which the Apex Court has ordered that pending the hearing and final disposal by the Court of the appeal mentioned above, the operation of the judgement and order dated 26th April 1996 of the Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 3095 of 1995 "be and is hereby stayed". As such, the operation of the judgement and order relied upon by Mr. Adik is stayed by the Apex Court. 9.However, Mr. Adik submitted that the reasoning in the said judgement may be taken as his submissions. Mr. Bharucha then pointed out that as asserted in the affidavit filed by the Addl. Registrar (Legal) of this Court, the aforesaid Division Bench referred to and relied upon the decision of the Full Court in the Chamber Meeting held on 2-5-1981 and the subsequent decision modifying the aforesaid decision was not brought to the notice of the said Division Bench. The extract of the Minutes of the Chamber Meeting held on 15th December 1984 are annexed to the affidavit-in--reply as annexure "1" which is as under :- "Subject No. 4 : Change in the procedure for imposition of penalties on Judicial Officers. The extract of the Minutes of the Chamber Meeting held on 15th December 1984 are annexed to the affidavit-in--reply as annexure "1" which is as under :- "Subject No. 4 : Change in the procedure for imposition of penalties on Judicial Officers. Decision : The powers of the High Court in respect of punishment of Judicial Officers are delegated to a committee of 5 Judges to be appointed by the Chief Justice." Mr. Bharucha submitted that thus the 1981 Full Court decision is expressly and clearly amended by the Full Court decision dated 15-12-1984 under which the powers of this Court in respect of punishment of judicial officers are delegated to a Committee of five Judges to be appointed by the learned Chief Justice. We accept the submission of Mr. Bharucha. In our opinion, in view of the subsequent decision of the Full Court, the decision or resolution of Full Court of the meeting held on 2nd May 1981 stands modified in respect of powers of this Court in respect of punishment of judicial officers. Thus it is clear that the Full Court had invested the Committee of five Judges to be appointed by the learned Chief Justice with the power in respect of punishment of judicial officers. In the aforesaid circumstances, we do not find any merit in the last submission of Mr. Adik as well. 10.In the result, we find no merit in the petition and the petition is rejected. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.