B. C. PATEL, J. ( 1 ) THE present Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned single Judge rejecting Special civil Application No. 4414 of 1996 which was filed against the order of preventive detention. ( 2 ) THE appellant-detenu came to be detained by an order dated 12-4-1996 by the district Magistrate, Bharuch, under the provisions of the Gujarat Prevention of anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the "act" ). The appellant is under detention since 15-4-1996. ( 3 ) THE grounds of detention indicate that the appellant is involved in three cases registered against him under the Bombay prohibition Act, being Criminal Case No. 564 of 1994 dated 3-12-1994, Criminal case No. 115 of 1996 dated 20-3-1996 and criminal Case No. 116 of 1996 dated 21- 3-1996. From the order passed by the learned single Judge it transpires that the petitioner was involved in all these cases as he was engaged in transporting foreign liquor in huge quantity, i. e. 3137 bottles worth Rs. 94,110/-, 1260 bottles of foreign liquor worth Rs. 54,000/- and 2675 bottles of foreign liquor worth Rs. 1,46,900/- these bottles were recovered from the petitioner in the aforesaid three cases respectively and the appellant-detenu is facing trial in all these cases before the Court. The detaining authority discussed the statements of five witnesses which were made to the Police inspector, Police Station, Rajpipla, on 21- 10-1995, 21-11-1995, 7-12-1995, 16-1- 1996 and 22-2-1996 with regard to the incident dated 16-10-1995,. 17-11-1995, 1- 12-1995, 6-1-1996 and 17-2-1996 respectively. ( 4 ) ON consideration of the statements, the detaining authority felt satisfied that the appellant was engaged in unlawful and antisocial activities, which had become a headache to the public order, disturbing the public life every now and then and the proceedings of exterment under the Bombay police Act would not be conducive in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is also recorded by the learned Judge that the detaining authority also found that the witnesses were frightened of the petitioner and therefore, their identity was not to be disclosed claiming privilege under Section 9 (2) of the Act. The detaining authority on perusal of the material placed before it passed the order of detention on 12-4-1996. which came to be executed on 15-4-1996. The detaining authority on perusal of the material placed before it passed the order of detention on 12-4-1996. which came to be executed on 15-4-1996. ( 5 ) AGAINST the said order of detention the aforesaid Special Civil Application came to be filed urging the following contentions : (1) that Pages 32,44 and 46 of the compilation of the documents, supplied to the detenu by the detaining authority are not legible; (2) that the letter of proposal which was made for detention of the appellant was not supplied to the detenu alongwith the detention order; (3) that the detaining authority has mechanically exercised the power without actually examining and verifying the apprehension of the witnesses; (4) that there was a delay in passing the detention order inasmuch as the last statement against the appellant was recorded on 22-2-1996, however, the detention order was passed on 12-4-1996; and (5) that the material which has been considered by the detaining authority against the detenu, does not make out a case of breach of public order and it can at the most be said to be a case of breach of law and order. ( 6 ) BEFORE us the learned Advocate for the appellant-detenu has raised the same contentions. ( 7 ) SO far as the contention regarding the non-supply of the legible copies is concerned, the learned single Judge, in para 4 of the judgment, has in detail discussed this aspect of the case and on consideration of legal submissions and on perusal of documents on questions were clearly legible. One document which is at page 44 is nothing but a reverse side of the bail order and the document shows that it is clearly legible and it only hears the Court seal. Even the learned Advocate for the appellant, when questioned, could not point out that there was anything on this page from which any submission could be made either to the detaining authority or to the Court. So far as Page 46 is concerned, the learned Judge has expressed his opinion that it cannot be said to be illegible. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of what is stated above on merits, we find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge on this ground. So far as Page 46 is concerned, the learned Judge has expressed his opinion that it cannot be said to be illegible. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of what is stated above on merits, we find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge on this ground. ( 8 ) THE learned Advocate for the appellant-detenu was not in a position to point out to us as to how it can be said that the non-supply of the letter of proposal made for the detention of the appellant vitiates the detention order. This contention has no merits in view of the decision of the Apex court in the case of State of U. P. v. Shakeel Ahmed, (1996) 1 SCC 337 . It is not mandatory for the detaining authority to supply a copy of the letter of proposal made for detention of the detenu. It is not the grievance that the documents on which reliance was placed by detaining authority were not supplied. Hence the submission is without merits and has been rightly rejected. ( 9 ) SO far as the third contention is concerned, it is required to be noted that the learned single Judge has discussed in detail the said issue and has come to the conclusion that the authority has rightly claimed privilege under Section 9 (2) of the Act and therefore, the contention raised by the appellant is required to be rejected. ( 10 ) BEFORE us it was submitted that the detaining authority has not inquired from the witnesses, whose statements were recorded, about the fact that they were apprehending danger to their life and property. It is submitted before us that the apprehension or fear expressed by the witnesses in their statements was before the detaining authority. It is submitted by the learned advocate that if the detaining authority has recorded the statements, it can be said that the detaining authority was satisfied about the apprehension appearing in the mind of the witnesses. Reliance has been placed by the learned Advocate for the appellant- detenu on the decision of this Court in the case of Jakirbhai Rahimbhai Nagori v. District Magistrate, Mehsana and Ors. , (37 (1) GLR 80) and in the case of Kalidas chandubhai Kahar v. State 1993 (2) GCD 740 (Guj. ). Reliance has been placed by the learned Advocate for the appellant- detenu on the decision of this Court in the case of Jakirbhai Rahimbhai Nagori v. District Magistrate, Mehsana and Ors. , (37 (1) GLR 80) and in the case of Kalidas chandubhai Kahar v. State 1993 (2) GCD 740 (Guj. ). ( 11 ) THE learned Advocate for the appellant-detenu has relied upon certain observations made by the learned single Judge in the case of Jakirbhai (supra) and the observations made by the Division Bench in the case of Koli Ashwin v. State of Gujarat (Sp1. Criminal Application No. 1812 of 1993 decided on September 12, 1994) quoted in the case of Jakirbhai for contending that the detaining authority ought to have himself recorded the statement of the witnesses, or the apprehension of the witnesses against disclosure of their names ought to have been urged in presence of the detaining authority. We are afraid, neither the judgment of the learned single Judge in the case of Jakirbhai nor the observations of the Division Bench in the case of Koli ashwin quoted therein lay down any such broad proposition as contended by the learned Advocate for the appellant-detenu. The observations of the learned single judge as well as of the Division Bench quoted in the case of Jakirbhai were made in the facts of the respective cases, wherein the concerned Court came to the conclusion that there was no genuine satisfaction of the detaining authority about the apprehension expressed by the witnesses. The observations were made in the facts of the concerned case and they do not lay down any such proposition of law as urged on behalf of the appellant detenu ( 12 ) RELIANCE has been placed on the decision in the case of Kalidas Chandubhai kahar v. State reported in 1993 (2) GCD 740 (Guj) for contending that for making an effective representation, it is the duty of the Detaining Authority to not only supply the statement but also the names of the persons who made the statements. 12-A. In that case, the proposal was made on 16th October 1992 and the order of detention was passed on 17th October 1992. 12-A. In that case, the proposal was made on 16th October 1992 and the order of detention was passed on 17th October 1992. In the facts and circumstances of that case, the Court observed :"it is rather curious that the entire bunch of material was supplied by the sponsoring authority at the time of making the pro- posal and that has been promptly accepted by the detaining (authority) and passed the order on the next day itself. There was no sufficient time for the detaining authority to examine the possibility of exercising the power under Section 9 (2) as the proposal was made on 16th October 1992 and the order of detention was passed on the following day, i. e. 17th October 1992; nor is there any material to show as to how he examined the necessity of exercising the power under Section 9 (2 ). "it was under the aforesaid circumstances that the Court came to the conclusion that it was a wrong exercise of power under section 9 (2) of the Act. However, in the instant case, learned Advocate could not point out anything to indicate that the detaining authority exercised its power in haste, and had no time even to consider about the right of exercise under Section 9 (2) of the Act in the nighttful manner. The submissions of the learned Advocate for the appellant, therefore, has no merit. ( 13 ) SECTION 9 (2) of the Act is carved out on the basis of Article 22 (6) of the constitution which provides that nothing in subsection (1) shall require the Authority making such order to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose. In our view it is the duty of the detaining Authority to strike a balance between the public interest in giving a person under preventive detention a reasonable opportunity to make an effective representation against the order of detention by referring to the witnesses and explaining why their statements should not be acted upon and the public interest in protecting the witnesses by non-disclosure of their names and addresses, if the disclosure is likely to bring personal harm to those witnesses and may also deter any other person from corning forward to bring to light the activities of detenu prejudicial to public interest. ( 14 ) BEFORE the Division Bench of this court in the case of Shaikh Ali Shaikh kalu v. State, 1993 (2) GCD 138 (Guj.), a question was raised to the effect that nondisclosure of the name of the witnesses would take away the right of a detenu to make an effective representation. The Court perused the statements and observed that the statements were read over to each of the witnesses and each of them said that the statements were correctly recorded and they also requested even before the authority which verified the same for not disclosing their names and addresses, otherwise even if police protection is given, they or their family members will be put to harm. After making necessary inquiry the detaining authority has exercised the privilege under section 9 (2) of the Act. The detaining authority has also considered the public interest before exercising the discretion for not disclosing the names and addresses of the witnesses. The Court in the above case held that :"therefore, it cannot be said that he has strongly exercised the discretion. When that is so, we do not find any force in this contention also. Hence this submission is also rejected. "thus, it is clear that if the statements which are recorded by the Police Officer were verified by the superior officer and after making necessary inquiry the detaining authority has exercised the privilege under Section 9 (2) of the Act it cannot be said that he has wrongly exercised the discretion. In the instant case on receipt of the proposal, each and every statements were taken into consideration by the detaining authority before passing the detention order. ( 15 ) IN the case of Chandrakant N. Patel v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 1994 (1) GLR 761 , the Full Bench of this Court has observed as under :". . . We are also of the opinion that even otherwise also, it cannot be said that bai Amina s case does not lay down good law. As stated above, the observation which have been made as to when and how the privilege can be regarded as proper application of mind to all the relevant aspects; what can be regarded as sufficient for the purpose of claiming privilege can be regarded as bona fide. As stated above, the observation which have been made as to when and how the privilege can be regarded as proper application of mind to all the relevant aspects; what can be regarded as sufficient for the purpose of claiming privilege can be regarded as bona fide. Whether that privilege has been exercised bona fide and properly or not obviously will have to be decided in each case by reference to the facts of the case. . . . Whether the detaining authority can be said to have applied its mind to all the relevant aspects properly or not would be question of fact in each case and will have to be decided with reference to the facts of that case. " ( 16 ) THE authority has exercised the privilege under Section 9 (2) of the Act and whether the same has been exercised bona fide and properly or not will have to be decided in each case by reference to the facts of the case. The learned Judge in his judgment, while considering this aspect in detail, has held that the privilege is claimed rightly by the detaining authority. As the question was raised, we also perused the statements given by the witnesses. They are also required to be read in the context of the large-scale business of the appellant- detenu which will be apparent from the quantity of foreign liquor recovered from the detenu as mentioned in the judgment of the learned single Judge and para 3 herein. It is, therefore, difficult to say, after reading the grounds of detention, that the detaining authority has not passed the order in accordance with law. The detaining authority has in the impugned order stated that it considered the request of the persons concerned to keep their names and addresses secret and the authority has exercised the privilege under Section 9 (2) of the act in the public interest. It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the submission made by the learned Advocate for the appellant. ( 17 ) IT is also required to be noted that the obligation which flows from the constitutional and legal scheme is to furnish the detenu the material and documents in order to enable the detenu to make a representation against the order of detention. ( 17 ) IT is also required to be noted that the obligation which flows from the constitutional and legal scheme is to furnish the detenu the material and documents in order to enable the detenu to make a representation against the order of detention. However, the detaining authority has to consdier whether the disclosure of names of witnesses would be against public interest. The detaining authority has to strike a balance as already discussed above. In the instant case, we find that the detaining authority has struck the balance and decided not to disclose the names and addresses of any of the witnesses in public interest. Thus, the detaining authority has applied its mind and claimed privilege. The learned single Judge has come to the conclusion that the privilege has been rightly claimed. This finding given on the question of fact as held in the case of Chandrakant Patel (supra) cannot be interfered with in this appeal under the letters Patent. ( 18 ) LEARNED Advocate next urged that as there was delay in passing the detention order, the same is required to be quashed. Learned single Judge considered the facts and the decision pointed out by the learned advocate reported in 1992 (2) GLR 1193. It is stated by the petitioner himself in the petition itself that the last offence against him was registered on 21-3-1996. The last witness made a statement on 22-2-1996 and the statements were verified by the Divisional police Officer on 21-3-1996. Therefore, hardly after 12 days, the order has been passed. In the reported decision on which reliance is placed, it seems that there was a delay of more than ten months which was un-explained and the Court found it to be inadequate. That is not the situation here. Therefore, this ground also has no merit. ( 19 ) LASTLY, learned Advocate made an attempt to request the Court to allow the petition on the ground that the material considered by the detaining authority docs not make out a case of breach of public order, and at the most, it can be said to be a case of breach of law and order. ( 20 ) THE Apex Court, in the case of Arun ghosh v. State of West Bengal reported in air 1970 SC 1228 has pointed out the distinction between "public order" and "law and order". ( 20 ) THE Apex Court, in the case of Arun ghosh v. State of West Bengal reported in air 1970 SC 1228 has pointed out the distinction between "public order" and "law and order". Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the community as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals who do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may he very different . ( 21 ) THE detenu has been prosecuted for offences punishable under the provisions contained in the Bombay Prohibition Act. He has engaged himself in the business of illicit liquor without any authority in public, and number of anti-social elements gather together at his den which has become a matter of nuisance to all good citizens residing nearby. AH the witnesses have referred to the activities of the appellant. Not only that the appellant is dealing in illicit liquor, but they have also pointed out the manner in which the appellant is acting by which the life of the community in the locality is affected. One witness has pointed out that nearby the den, women and unmarried young girls are being teased and joked upon while passing through the locality where the den is located. The detenu and other are moving with dangerous weapons like hockysticks, sword, etc. and the same arc being frequently used by the detenu and others. It is also pointed out by the said witness that on a particular day when he questioned about the purpose for taking his vehicle, the witness was dragged and was beaten, appellant and his associates ran after others with weapons in their hands; shopkeepers closed their shops. There are also statements of other witnesses pointing out the den and dealing in prohibited liquor and under what circumstances people are running and closing their shops. It is clear that the persons are very much frightened. There are also statements of other witnesses pointing out the den and dealing in prohibited liquor and under what circumstances people are running and closing their shops. It is clear that the persons are very much frightened. People used to run helter-skelter; shopkeepers used to close down their shops; innocent persons were beaten up by the appellant. One witness has also pointed out that under the doubt that he was a police informal, he was beaten and with a view to save himself when he ran, the appellant and his associate ran after him, as a result of which people run helter- skelter, shopkeepers closed their shops and thus, public order was disturbed. One has to consider the illegal activities of the appellant which affects peace in the locality which causes general disturbance of public tranquillity. Statement of witnesses considered by the authorities vis-a-vis the bootlegging activities of the petitioner, it is very clear that he is running his den in public and persons coming to his den are also misbehaving. Therefore, it can be said that potentiality of such incidents can never be undervalued. If such incident happen, apart from particular individuals who have given their statements, even tempo of life of the community of the locality would also be affected and when such things are being done repeatedly, that would amount to affecting the public order. Thus considering the activities of the appellant, statement of five witnesses and the cases registered against the appellant, the case of the petitioner is clearly within the term "public order". Similar view is also taken by this court in case of Bhikhabhai Thakorebhai patel v. Commissioner of Police reported in 1989 (2) GLH 420 . ( 22 ) IN view of what we have stated hereinabove, none of the contention raised by the learned Advocate for the appellant have any merit at all. The learned single judge has rightly dismissed the petition. The Appeal is required to be dismissed, and is hereby dismissed. ( 23 ) AS the appeal has been dismissed, the Civil Application does not survive, and the CA stands disposed of accordingly. Appeal dismissed. .