JUDGMENT P.K Palli, J —The State of Himachal Pradesh has filed this second appeal aggrieved against the judgment of reversal. The suit filed by the plaintiffs for declaration that they are owners in possession of the suit land with consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their ownership and possession, was ordered to be dismissed by the learned Trial Court. On appeal by the plaintiffs/respondents, the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court stands set aside and consequently, the suit stands decreed as prayed for by the plaintiffs hence the State is in second appeal before this Court. The parties, here in after in this judgment, shall be referred to as plaintiffs’ and defendant’. 2. Learned State counsel, while opening his address, contends that the suit land has rightly been held to be "Shamlat Deh" and validly came to vest in the State of Himachal Pradesh under the provisions of the H.P. Village Common Land (Vesting and Utilization) Act. It is sought to be contended that the plaintiffs, on the strength of their possession simplicitor, could not be held to be owners in possession of the suit land. 3. Learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs, has, in reply, adopted the same line of reasoning as stands projected in the impugned judgment given by the learned first appellate Court. It is further stated by learned Counsel for the plaintiffs Ms. Sunita Sharma that the land in suit would not fail within the purview of "Shamlat Deh" as given in the Act. 4. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and on the careful examination of the impugned judgment and the record, I find that there is no merit in this appeal. Undisputedly, the land in question formed part of the Pepsu State and later it came to vest in the State of Punjab by virtue of the provisions contained in the Punjab Act of 1961 whereafter it has come to vest in the State of Himachal Pradesh in view of the provisions contained in the H.P. Village Common Land (Vesting and Utilization) Act. Concededly, the plaintiffs are continuously recorded to be in possession of the suit land from times immemorial Their possession has been continuous, peaceful and without any invasion on their rights by the State or its agencies It is also too well-known that mere sanction of mutation in favour of a person does not vest any right, title or interest m the given situation. 5. Oo a perusal of the record, I find that the plaintiffs and earlier 1 to them their predecessors are recorded in possession from the first Settlement available on the record which pertains to the year 1915. It is not the case of either of the parties that the plaintiffs ever surrendered their rights over the suit land or they were ever threatened of dispossession. In the "Misal" Hakiat" of the year 1915 (Ext, DW-2/A), the entries record ed are like this : “Shamlat Taraf Chausa Kala Hasab Rasad Araji Khewat". Though some part of the land in suit is recorded as "Gair Mumkin Charand, Kuhal, Path etc.” yet we are not cooceraed with this land as the learned first appellate Court has already excluded this land and the plaintiffs have been denied the decree in that respect. 6. The mutation in favour of the Nagar Panchayat was sanctioned on March 5, 1956 vide Ext. PL. The land was thereafter mutated in the name of the State on August 14, 1973 vide Ext. PM. It is too well-known that only that kind of land can be recorded as “Shamlat Taraf Pati" which according to the entries comprising record-of-rights, is used by the villagers or is reserved for their benefit. If it is proved that the land was never put to use for common purposes and was in exclusive possession of the proprietors and was also subject to the payment of land revenue, the land would be excluded from the definition of "Shamlat Deh”. On my pointedly asking the learned Counsel for the appellant-State to refer to any piece of evidence on the strength of which it could be held that any part of the suit land was used for the benefit of the village community, no satisfactory answer has been supplied 7. The cut off date for the purposes of the decision would be January 26, 1950. Entry regarding the land in dispute as "Shamlat Deh" I simplicitor docs not advance the case of the State further. The cut off date for the purposes of the decision would be January 26, 1950. Entry regarding the land in dispute as "Shamlat Deh" I simplicitor docs not advance the case of the State further. It may be I made clear that the learned First Appellate Court in paragraph 1 of the judgment has already excluded the land which is recorded as “Gair Mumkin Sarak. Gair Mumkin Hospital, Gair Mumkin Talab and Gair Mumkin Kuhl” The suit in respect of the land coming under the head of these items, has been excluded from the decree which has been passed in favour of the plaintiffs. 8. Reference can also be usefully made to the entries comprised in the Jamabandi of the year 1948 49 where it is recorded "Shamlat Deh Hasab Rasad Araji Khewat Taraf Chausa Kala". Its proprietors are recorded as owners and their names appear in the column of cultivation as well. It has also been noticed that the land is assessed by payment of land revenue If in any stray entry "Bashindgan Deh" appear to be recorded in possession of the suit land/the entry has to be ignored in the absence of any proof in respect as to how this entry came to be substituted for the entries which were existing earlier, 9. In my considered view, the judgment passed by the learned First appellate Court appears to be absolutely just and proper and is based on correct appreciation of evidence. The appeal does not call for any interference by this Court and is consequently ordered to be dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. -