JUDGMENT - B.N. SRIKRISHNA, J. :---The learned Judge (Savant, J.), who admitted the writ petition, was constrained to observe that this writ petition "represents a very sorry state of affairs". I am not only inclined to agree with the said observations, but I would go ahead and add that, but for intervention by this Court, public money would be frittered away in rewarding an undeserving person against whom serious charges of criminal misappropriation have been levelled by the Government, thanks to the casual manner in which the case of the Government was represented before the Industrial Court. This, indeed, is a sorry state of affairs and someone in the Government should sit up, take notice and put an end to it. 2.This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impugns an order of the Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Kolhapur, dated 1st March, 1993 made in Complaint (ULP) No. 45 of 1988 under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 3.The first petitioner is the Superintending Engineer, Irrigation Projects and Water Resources, Investigation Circle, Pune, and the Second petitioner is the Sub-Divisional Engineer, Water Resources, Sub-Division No. 6, Kolhapur. The petitioners carry on the work of research regarding water resources under the Irrigation Department of the Government of Maharashtra. The first respondent was appointed under the petitioners as a Junior Clerk on 6th November, 1979 and posted at Kolhapur and at the material time he was holding the post of Stores Clerk. While he was holding a post of Stores Clerk, a serious case of misappropriation of an amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) came to notice and the first respondent came to be suspended pending enquiry into the said allegation. On 23rd July, 1987 a F.I.R. was lodged in the Kolhapur Shahupuri Police Station for the offence of misappropriation of the aforesaid amount. Police investigated the case and a charge-sheet came to be filed under sections 409, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code on 19th July, 1988 against the first respondent and the said criminal case is pending before the Criminal Court at Kolhapur. Police investigated the case and a charge-sheet came to be filed under sections 409, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code on 19th July, 1988 against the first respondent and the said criminal case is pending before the Criminal Court at Kolhapur. The first respondent was suspended from service on 16th July, 1987 and on 11th September, 1987 he was informed that he would be paid subsistence allowance as provided under Rule 68 of the Maharashtra Civil Service Regulation Rules, 1981. Under the said Rule the first respondent was entitled to half of the wages and allowances and paid leave as subsistence allowance computed on the basis of his last drawn wages. The order of suspension issued on 16th July, 1987 was initially for a period of six months which came to an end on 15th January, 1988. The first respondent was served with a charge-sheet on 19th February, 1988. By an order dated 9th June, 1988, the suspension period was extended upto 22nd February, 1988 with the sanction of the Chief Secretary. 4.On 16th March, 1988 the first respondent filed Complaint (ULP) No. 45 of 1988 before the Industrial Court, Kolhapur, invoking Items 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Act. The grievance made in the complaint was that on the date of the filing of the complaint the first respondent had been suspended for a period exceeding six months, contrary to the Service Rules and further that the amount of suspension allowance paid was not in accordance with the Maharashtra Civil Service Regulation Rules. Hence, the first respondent prayed that the suspension order be declared to be an unfair labour practice and sought consequential reliefs. 5.The Industrial Court, Kolhapur, tried the complaint and came to the conclusion that the suspension order was contrary to the applicable Service Rules and amounted to an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. After granting an appropriate declaration, the Industrial Court directed the petitioners to permit the first respondent to join duty after six months after the order of suspension on any other suitable post or at any other suitable place by transferring him. The Industrial Court held that the first respondent was entitled to get full back-wages from six months after the period of suspension order. The Industrial Court held that the first respondent was entitled to get full back-wages from six months after the period of suspension order. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Industrial Court, the petitioners are before this Court by the present writ petition. 6.When the writ petition came up for admission before Brother Savant, J., on 22nd April, 1993, it was pointed out to the learned Judge that the Industrial Court had reached its conclusion about the illegality of the suspension order, as the relevant order of extension issued by the Government had not been brought to its notice. Savant, J., made an order on 22nd April, 1993 directing the petitioners to file an affidavit explaining fully the circumstances. An affidavit of Ashok Laxminarayan Bhatt, petitioner No. 2, came to be filed on 26th April, 1993 pursuant to the liberty granted by the Court. In this affidavit it was pointed out that, because of the nature of the offence detected, namely, criminal misappropriation, calling for extensive investigation to be carried out by the Departmental Officers, the charge-sheet could not be served on the first respondent on or before 15th January, 1988 on which date the period of six months from the date of suspension (16th July, 1987) came to an end. It was further pointed out that the charge-sheet was served on the first respondent on 19th February, 1988 and that the Chief Secretary of the Government of Maharashtra had been moved by the petitioners for extension of the period to serve the charge-sheet beyond 15th January, 1988, that such extension had been granted by the Chief Secretary and communicated to the petitioners by the letter of the Government dated 9th June, 1988 and that the time for service of the charge-sheet had been extended upto to 22nd February, 1988. It was further pointed out in the affidavit that the investigation done by the Departmental Officers disclosed that one G.R. Phatak, who was the Sub-Divisional Officer at the relevant time and a Class II Officer, was also involved in the misappropriation along with the first respondent workman. Since one Class II and one Class III Officer were found jointly involved in the same misconduct, it was decided by the Government to hold a common enquiry in the interest of proper proceedings. Since one Class II and one Class III Officer were found jointly involved in the same misconduct, it was decided by the Government to hold a common enquiry in the interest of proper proceedings. Since the competent authority for serving a charge-sheet on the Class II Officer was the Chief Engineer, while the competent authority in the case of the first respondent was the Superintending Engineer, it was decided to issue a fresh charge-sheet to the first respondent under the authority of the Chief Engineer. By an order dated 23rd May, 1988 the Government directed the petitioners to hold a joint enquiry against both persons under the provisions of Rule 12, sub-Rules (1) and (2) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979. Pursuant to the said order a fresh charge-sheet through the Chief Engineer was issued on 3rd June, 1988. Since considerable delay had occurred between the initial date of suspension and the service of the charge-sheet on the first respondent, recourse was taken to Clause 4(4) of the Government Resolution dated 25th February, 1988. It was pointed out that the Government had accorded a second extension of time for service of the charge-sheet upto 30th June, 1988. Consequently, it was pointed out in the affidavit of Ashok Laxminarayan Bhatt that the time for service of the charge-sheet had been extended by the Government in accordance with the applicable Government Resolution and was, therefore, validly served on the first respondent. 7.Copies of the relevant documents referred to in the affidavit as well as the Government Resolution have been placed on record of this writ petition. I am informed by the learned Additional Government Pleader that these documents were actually shown to the District Government Pleader who appeared before the Industrial Court, but since there was an endorsement that they were confidential documents, the learned District Government Pleader did not place the said documents on record of the Industrial Court. 8.I may observe that this is one occasion where the Government's obsession for secrecy has put the Government in an embarrassing situation. 8.I may observe that this is one occasion where the Government's obsession for secrecy has put the Government in an embarrassing situation. If it had been realised that there was nothing confidential in the correspondence by which the Chief Secretary extended time and permitted service of the charge-sheet on the first respondent, the District Government Pleader, perhaps, would have been emboldened to put it before the Industrial Court, and this "sorry state of affairs", brought to the notice of this Court, would not have arisen. 9.Be as it may, it appears to me that there is justification in the submissions of the learned Additional Government Pleader, Mr. Malvankar. A perusal of the impugned order clearly indicates that the learned Judge of the Industrial Court held against the petitioners solely on the ground that specific sanction for extension of time for service of the charge-sheet on the first respondent had not been granted. Since this basic premise is erroneous and unsustainable, the impugned order would have to be quashed and set aside. 10.Mr. Malvankar pointed out that, at the time when the Industrial Court tried the complaint the issue agitated was regarding the suspension of the first respondent. Subsequently, the first respondent was taken back in service pursuant to the order of the Industrial Court. He was subsequently subjected to Departmental Enquiry which resulted in his being found guilty of a major misconduct for which the punishment of dismissal from service was imposed on him. Mr. Malvankar submits that this fact was brought to the notice of the High Court when the matter came up for admission and that is why the learned Judge hearing the writ petition for admission (Puranik, J.) made an order saying "Rule only on question of extension of suspension period and back wages". 11.Mr. Pawar, learned Counsel for the first respondent, urged that the extension of the suspension period can only be done by 'prior sanction' of the Chief Secretary, if it is beyond six months, and by prior sanction of the Government, if it is beyond one year. He relies only on the 1974 Circular which was produced before the Industrial Court and on which the Industrial Court relied. If the 1988 Circular is to be taken into consideration, it is urged that even under this Circular the extension of suspension period has to be done only with the 'prior sanction' of the Chief Secretary. He relies only on the 1974 Circular which was produced before the Industrial Court and on which the Industrial Court relied. If the 1988 Circular is to be taken into consideration, it is urged that even under this Circular the extension of suspension period has to be done only with the 'prior sanction' of the Chief Secretary. In the present case the suspension has lasted for eleven months. The proposal for extention of the suspension not having been forwarded to the Chief Secretary within the initial period of six months, the Chief Secretary could not have post facto sanctioned the extension of the suspension period. Hence, the suspension period beyond first six months is illegal and the first respondent is entitled to his full pay and allowances on and from 16th January, 1988; is the submission. 12.It is not possible to accept the contention urged on behalf of the first respondent. It is clear from a perusal of the impugned order that the learned Judge of the Industrial Court placed reliance only on the Circular dated 18th September, 1974 and that his attention was not drawn to the subsequent Circular dated 25th February, 1988 which, in my opinion, substantially changes the situation. It is true that, on the language of the 1974 Circular, decisions of this Court have taken the view that a Government Servant could not be suspended for a period in excess of six months. The Government was faced with a number of cases where serious allegations of serious misconducts like forgery, fabrication, misappropriation and possession of assets disproportionate known sources of income, and since investigation of such cases took long time, the Government felt that automatic revocation of the suspension order only for not completing the investigation and filing the charge-sheet in Court or serving it on the delinquent employee, would result in undue advantage to the Government Servant against whom there are serious allegations. To mitigate the rigour of the legal effect of 1974 Circular, the Government modified the 1974 Circular by its Circular No. CDR-1387/1776/47/11 dated 25th February, 1988. After indicating the reasons which actuated it to modify the Circular of 1974, the Government, in partial modification of the previous Circular, has now made the Rule that "as far as possible" the investigations should be completed within six months and the charge-sheet filed in Court or served on the delinquent. After indicating the reasons which actuated it to modify the Circular of 1974, the Government, in partial modification of the previous Circular, has now made the Rule that "as far as possible" the investigations should be completed within six months and the charge-sheet filed in Court or served on the delinquent. However, in complicated cases, and for strong and justifiable reason, if it is felt that the ,limit of six months cannot be adhered to, then the disciplinary authority is required to move the competent authority for extension of time. Though the general Rule is "as far as possible" the charge-sheet should be filed in the Court or served on the delinquent employee within a period of six months from the date of commencement of suspension, when it is found not possible to adhere this time limit, the time limit can be extended upto a period of one year with the previous sanction of the Chief Secretary. The Circular further provides that, if the case is so complicated that it is not possible to submit the charge-sheet or serve it on the delinquent employee within the period of one year from the first date of suspension then the period of suspension could be further extended upto one year with the previous sanction of the Government. 13.In my view, it would not be possible to hold that the rigour which operated as a result of 1974 circular, as interpreted by the decisions of this Court, would apply now. It is not possible to say that under the Circular of 1988, if the suspension continues beyond six months, it would automatically result in revocation of the suspension order. It is true that for extension of time beyond six months and upto one year the previous sanction of the Chief Secretary, and for extension of time beyond one year, the previous sanction of the Government is necessary. In my view, these previous sanctions have not been prescribed as conditions precedent, but only to impress upon all concerned officers that without such previous sanction no charge-sheet could be served on the delinquent employee beyond the initial period of six months. In my view, these previous sanctions have not been prescribed as conditions precedent, but only to impress upon all concerned officers that without such previous sanction no charge-sheet could be served on the delinquent employee beyond the initial period of six months. In my judgment, under Circular dated 25th February, 1988, there is no automatic revocation of suspension if the charge-sheet is not filed before the Criminal Court or served on a delinquent employee within a period of six months from the first date of suspension, as long as there is sanction to such course. The conditions of previous sanction of the Chief Secretary/Government are in the nature of conditions the non-fulfillment of which would render the action illegal. 14.In the instant case, serious allegations of criminal misappropriation, fabrication of documents and forgery were levelled against the first respondent. That such charges require careful and prolonged investigation in order to be brought home, is obvious. The suspension of the first respondent commenced from 16th July, 1987 and the initial period of six months ended on 15th January, 1988. By an order dated 9th June, 1988 Chief Secretary sanctioned extension of the suspension period upto to 22nd February, 1988 in view of the complicated nature of the case against the first respondent. A charge-sheet was served on the first respondent on 19th February, 1988. In the meanwhile, the Government discovered that, apart from the first respondent, a Class III Officer, another Officer G.R. Phatak, a Class II Officer, was also involved in the same fact of misconduct. Hence, the Government decided to hold a joint enquiry and, since the disciplinary authorities of the two delinquent Government employees were different, it was decided to empower the Chief Superintending Engineer to issue fresh charge-sheets to both of them. This too entailed further delay. By an order dated 29th December, 1988, the Chief Secretary approved further extension of the suspension period and the service of charge-sheet upto 30th June, 1988. The second charge-sheet came to be served on 3rd June, 1988. Factually, it would be incorrect to say that the period of suspension of the first respondent was not extended from time to time. It is true that both extension orders dated 9th June, 1988 and 29th December, 1988 gave post facto sanction to the extension of the suspension period. The second charge-sheet came to be served on 3rd June, 1988. Factually, it would be incorrect to say that the period of suspension of the first respondent was not extended from time to time. It is true that both extension orders dated 9th June, 1988 and 29th December, 1988 gave post facto sanction to the extension of the suspension period. I am unable to agree with the submission of the learned Advocate for the first respondent that the Chief Secretary had no power to post facto sanction extension of the suspension period. As said earlier, the language in the Circular dated 25th February, 1988 does not lend itself to the interpretation that, if the period of suspension is not extended by the Chief Secretary prior to the date of its initial expiry, then the suspension order falls. In fact, it is because of such a situation which obtained under the 1974 Circular as interpreted by the judgment of this Court that the Government felt the necessity of issuing the fresh Circular dated 25th February, 1988 partially modifying the effect of 1974 Circular. In these circumstances, it is not possible to accept the contention of the first respondent that the suspension order came to an end after the expiry of initial period of six months or that the subsequent extensions were without jurisdiction and null and void. Consequently, it has to be and it is held that the suspension order issued to the first respondent was validly extended from time to time by the Competent Authority and the suspension order was validly continuing till 3rd June, 1988, on which date the first respondent was served with the charge-sheet. 15.In the aforesaid circumstances, I am of the view that the Industrial Court erred in holding that there was an unfair labour practice on the part of the petitioners and directing the petitioners to pay full back-wages to the first respondent for the period of suspension beyond the initial period of six months. 16.In the premises, writ petition is allowed. The order of the Industrial Court dated 1st March, 1993 made in complaint (ULP) No. 45 of 1988 is hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioners shall be entitled to withdraw the amount of back-wages of Rs. 49,952/- deposited by them in the Industrial Court. 17.Rule accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs. Petition allowed.