JUDGMENT A. L. Vaidya, J.: The present respondents who happened to be the wife and daughter of the appellant, respectively, had filed a suit under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be called as the Act) for the grant of maintenance of Rs.1,800/- per month. 2. The case of the plaintiffs as pleaded has been that the appellant and respondent No. l were married in the year 1961 at Shimla and after marriage they remained at Shimla for about eight years. Where after the husband sought employment in the Central Government and he shifted to Delhi and ever since the parties had been residing in Delhi. Three children have been born out of the said wedlock. The eldest is the present respondent No.2 who was born on 18th August, 1965 and at the time of the filing of the suit was studying in B. A. Part - II in St. Bedes College, Shimla. It was alleged that this respondent No.2 was under the care and custody of respondent No. l. The second child was Master Vibhu Singh, who was born on 28th January, 1971 was Kumari Richa. The two children, that is, son and youngest daughter were alleged to be under the care and custody of the present appellant. 3. The suit was filed in the year 1984 and it was pleaded that for the last 7-8 years, the behaviour of the appellant had completely changed and he has started maltreating (he wife and for the last two years the husband was alleged to have become more aggressive and as a consequence thereof he used to come late during the night and even started giving beatings to the wife. Further case of the plaintiffs has been that towards the beginning of 1982, it became intolerable to continue receiving the maltreatment from the respondent-husband, and all efforts on the part of the wife to had peaceful married life failed. Further case of the plaintiffs has been that towards the beginning of 1982, it became intolerable to continue receiving the maltreatment from the respondent-husband, and all efforts on the part of the wife to had peaceful married life failed. According to the plaintiffs, husband became more aggressive and wife had no alternative but to reside separately keeping in view the fact that she had reasonable apprehension in her mind that it would be dangerous for her life and health to continue staying with the husband and therefore wife came to Shim la in he month of February, 1982 when the respondent No.2 was still studying in Delhi and in the month of May, 1982 she joined the company of her mother. 4. It has also been pleaded by the plaintiffs that the present appellant was employed as Assistant Director in RAW in Cabinet Secretariat, New Delhi, and was drawing pay to the tune of Rs.2, 500/- per month and he had also considerable landed property situated in Tehsil Suni, Distt. Shimla, and net income from out of the landed property was estimated not less than Rs.2, 000/- per month. Plaintiffs further plea has been that the present appellant was legally bound to provide maintenance to the plaintiffs. According to the wife, she had studied upto B.A. and it was with great difficulty she got employment temporarily in Himalayan International School at Chharabhra and was getting Rs.500/- only, which amount was not sufficient for her and her daughters maintenance and as they had no other means of livelihood, hence the suit was preferred. The plaintiffs in their plaint have referred that respondent No. 1 had to dispose of her jewellery under certain compelling circumstances in order to meet the expenses of respondent No. 2 and also to meet their day to day expenses. 5. The suit was contested by the present appellant and in the written statement various preliminary objections with respect to the misjoinder of causes of action and parties along with plaint disclosing no cause of action, were taken. On merit, the present appellant denied various allegations made in the plaint, with respect to his behaviour with his wife. It was pleaded that his daughter, respondent No.2, was employed as Supervisor, Social Welfare Department of Himachal Pradesh and at that time was posted at Nerwa, Tehsil Chopal, Distt. On merit, the present appellant denied various allegations made in the plaint, with respect to his behaviour with his wife. It was pleaded that his daughter, respondent No.2, was employed as Supervisor, Social Welfare Department of Himachal Pradesh and at that time was posted at Nerwa, Tehsil Chopal, Distt. Shimla and she was getting emoluments to the tune of Rs.2, 500/-per month. According to the appellant, she was living independently and was not under the care and custody of her mother. The appellant in very specifically terms averred that it was absolutely incorrect that he started maltreating the plaintiff No. 1 since 1978 as alleged and it was also incorrect that he became more aggressive for the last two years before filing of the pauper application before the Court. The allegations regarding defendants coming late to his house were incorrect and it was also denied that defendant had been beating plaintiff No. 1 as alleged. But on the other hand, according to the present appellant behaviour of his wife- plaintiff No. 1 had been patient through out and he had given no cause to plaintiff No. 1 or even to plaintiff No. 2 to leave his house. According to the present appellant, plaintiff No. 1 left his house of her own sweet will and despite his request to her to return and lead a family life, she has refused to do so and it appears that she docs not want to lead a family life. In very clear terms, the husband stated in his written statement that he was always prepared to welcome the plaintiffs to his house at any moment they desire to come back. According to the present appellant, plaintiff No. 1 was an ambitious type of lady and prefers to live beyond her means, it was admitted that his left his house in the month of February, 1982, however, without any cause. According to the appellant, neither the plaintiff No. 1 nor plaintiff No. 2 was entitled to claim maintenance from him, in view of the facts detailed in the written statement. As both the plaintiffs were alleged to have left the house of the appellant of their own sweet will and without any cause, therefore they were not entitled to the relief asked for. As both the plaintiffs were alleged to have left the house of the appellant of their own sweet will and without any cause, therefore they were not entitled to the relief asked for. It has been pleaded that plaintiff No. 1 is employed as a resident teacher in Himalayan International School, Chharabhra for the last several years and it was expected that she must be getting a handsome salary. The appellant pleaded that plaintiff No. 1 was living comfortably and has sufficient means to support herself. Apart from the salary she was provided free boarding any lodging and she had also got 13 bighas of orchard land in Tehsil Theog. According to the appellant, he would be willing to meet the reasonable expenses for the marriage of plaintiff No.2 when she shows her willingness to get married and found a suitable match. As according to the appellant, he being father of plaintiff No.2 has a moral duty to perform the marriage and he would incure the expenditure in this behalf, keeping in view the prevailing social condition. The other averments made in the plaint have not been admitted. 6. The parties were put to trial on the following issues: 1. Whether the plaint does not disclose any cause of action, as alleged ?OPD 2. Whether the suit in the present form is not competent ? OPIX 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any separate residence and maintenance on the averments made in the plaint? OPP 4. If issue No.2 is proved to what amount the plaintiffs are entitled by way of maintenance and on what terms ? OPP 5. Relief. 7. Issue No. l was decided in the negative and under Issue No. 2 it was held that the suit in the present form was competent. Under Issue No. 3 the finding was that the plaintiff No. l, that is, wife was entitled for maintenance. Under No. 4, Rs.700/- per month as maintenance was granted in favour of the wife alone. The trial court also made amount of maintenance a charge on the property owned by die present appellant, as detailed in the decree. 8. The aforesaid judgment and decree have been assailed in the present first appeal on various grounds. 9. Under No. 4, Rs.700/- per month as maintenance was granted in favour of the wife alone. The trial court also made amount of maintenance a charge on the property owned by die present appellant, as detailed in the decree. 8. The aforesaid judgment and decree have been assailed in the present first appeal on various grounds. 9. This appeal was taken for hearing on 24th April, 1997 and during the course of arguments it was felt that circumstances of the case desired that the m alter could be amicably settled between the husband and wife and accordingly the parties along with their children were required to be present on 30th April, 1997 for making an attempt for reconciliation. 10 On 30th April, 1997 the parties along with their lawyers and three grown up children were present and for quite some time the efforts were made for settling the matter amicably. The children of the parties were associated in these reconciliation proceedings for the sole purpose that they would try to patch up the differences between the parents as those were only the persons going to be adversely affected in case parents fail to come together on the basis of some mutual compromise. It was after some deliberations, suggested that a discussion among ail the five of them (parents and three children) be taken place that night and the matter be reported to the court on next day and it was proposed that all of them should stay for the night together at Solan in the residential apartment of the eldest daughter Kumari Ira Tanwar. The matter was to be taken on 1st May, 1997. 11. On the adjourned date, that is, 1st May, 1997 at 2.00 PM when the case was called, learned counsel for the parties informed that the matter could not be compromised/amicably settled and it was thereafter that the remaining arguments of the learned counsel for the parties were heard. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted the following points: 1. The plaint did not contain any pleading giving any instance of cruelty. But on the other hand the general allegations have been made by the wife which under the law are to be ignored; 2. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted the following points: 1. The plaint did not contain any pleading giving any instance of cruelty. But on the other hand the general allegations have been made by the wife which under the law are to be ignored; 2. The evidence examined during the trial of the suit revealed that the wife has herself voluntarily withdrawn from the society of the appellant (her husband) and this circumstance will disentitle her for the relief claimed for; 3. The appellant, that is, husband has done his best and was still making every effort to restore the relationship between the two; 4. Even on merit, the cruelty as required to be established under Section 18 of the Act has not been legally established; 5. The wife was in service and was earning and the income she was deriving was sufficient for her keep up and maintenance. 13. On the other hand, Mr. G. D. Verma, learned counsel for the wife has supported the judgment and decree on the following pleas: 1. Under the provisions of the Act, the husband was legally bound to maintain his wife and as per Section 18(1) of the Act, even if factum of cruelty was not proved, wife was still legally entitled for maintenance from the husband; 2. In the present case, the cruelty as provided under Section 18(2) of the Act stood legally established on record and as such the wife was entitled for maintenance, which has been so rightly granted by the court below. 14. Before the aforesaid submissions put forth on behalf of the parties can be appreciated, for the sake convenience Section 18 of the Act is being reproduced hereunder: "18. Maintenance of wife - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Section, a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her life time. Maintenance of wife - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Section, a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her life time. (2) A Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance - (a) if he is guilty of desertion, that is to say, of abandoning her without reasonable cause and without her consent or against her wish, or of wilfully neglecting her; (b) if he has treated her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her mind that it will be harmful or injurious to live with her husband; (c) if he is suffering from a virulent form of leprosy; (d) if he has any other wife living; (e) if he keeps a concubine in the same house in which his wife is living or habitually resides with a concubine elsewhere; (f) if he has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion; (g) if there is any other cause justifying her living separately. (3) A Hindu wife shall not be entitled to separate residence and maintenance from her husband if she is inchaste or cease to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion. 15. At this stage, the legal plea taken by the learned counsel for the wife can at the first instance be taken note of. It has been argued that under Section 18(1) of the Act, the wife was legally entitled to be maintained by her husband even if the circumstances referred in sub-Section (2) of Section 18 of the Act were not there. According to the learned counsel, wife can claim maintenance as of right under the aforesaid provision of law. We think learned counsels interpretation in this behalf and as submitted above in view of the provisions of Section 18 of the Act does not hold good. 16. According to the learned counsel, wife can claim maintenance as of right under the aforesaid provision of law. We think learned counsels interpretation in this behalf and as submitted above in view of the provisions of Section 18 of the Act does not hold good. 16. Sub - Section (1) of Section 18 of the Act is not an independent provision as it starts with the wording "Subject to the provisions of this Section........." meaning thereby that the wife shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her life time whether they were married before or after the commencement of this Act subject to the provision of the Section, which is Section 18, which included sub-Sections 2 and 3 also. 17. There is no doubt that a Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance, which only reflected that a separate residence along with maintenance by a Hindu wife can be claimed as provided under sub-Section (1) and (2) of the Section 18 of the Act. The wife definitely can live separately and also can claim maintenance but only when one more of the seven grounds mentioned in sub-Section (2) of the Act are satisfied and also subject to the condition that wife should remain chaste and should not cease to be Hindu by conversion to another religion as per sub-Section (3) of the Act. Thus Section 18 no doubt confers statutory right on a Hindu wife to live separately without forfeiting her claim to maintenance, but as per Section 18 of the Act. 18. Learned counsel for the wife has tried to take some advantage from a decision of Bombay High Court in Madhukar Akhand v. Smt. Bhima Akhand & ors., A.I. R. 1983 Bombay 480. Para 8 of the aforesaid case is relevant, which is being reproduced hereunder: "Adverting firstly to Sec. 18, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, and analysing the Section, it would be clear that sub- Section (1) confers an absolute right upon the Hindu wife to maintenance by her husband during her lifetime. This right is controlled and subject only to sub-Section (3) and that is where the wife is unchaste or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion. Sub-Section (2) confers a right to live separately from the husband upon a Hindu wife only under certain circumstances. This right is controlled and subject only to sub-Section (3) and that is where the wife is unchaste or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion. Sub-Section (2) confers a right to live separately from the husband upon a Hindu wife only under certain circumstances. In the present case, such a right is also pleaded by the plaintiffs. Leaving aside that aspect of the matter for the time being, it seems to me clear that the right to maintenance even in the house-hold of a husband where the husband neglects or does not provide maintenance to his wife is conferred by sub-Section (1) of Section 18. It is not necessary for the operation of sub-Section (2) the liability to maintain is spelt out by Section 18(1) and is absolute and is not subject to any conditions excepting so far as may be provided by sub-Section (3). 19. The aforesaid ratio will not in any way help the case of the wife so far as circumstances in the present case are concerned. In the present case, the wife is not asking for maintenance while residing with the husband who was alleged to have neglected her. Here in the present case, the wife was asking for maintenance and also for a separate residence. Such a relief can be granted under the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, as discussed above which was subject to the provisions of sub-Section (2) of the Act. A wife under the law cannot have both the aspects in her favour, that is, she wanted to raised separately by ignoring sub-Section (2) of Section 18 of the Act and asking for maintenance also. 20. On factual side, the wife in order to be granted reliefs asked for has to establish through legally competent evidence that the husband has treated her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her mind that it would be harmful or injurious to live with her husband. 21. Wording of clause (b) of sub-Section (2) of Section 18 of the Act, requires firstly the act of cruelty and secondly resultant effect on the mind of the wife. So it requires consideration of the facts in each individual case. 22. "Cruelty" has not been defined under the Act. 21. Wording of clause (b) of sub-Section (2) of Section 18 of the Act, requires firstly the act of cruelty and secondly resultant effect on the mind of the wife. So it requires consideration of the facts in each individual case. 22. "Cruelty" has not been defined under the Act. But, however, under Section 18(2) (b) of the Act, nature of the cruelty which would entitle the wife for separate residence and maintenance has been in a way explained, that is, behaviour of the husband to his wife no doubt is to be cruel but the magnitude of that cruelty should be such as would cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the wife that it would be harmful or injurious to live with her husband. It is not an ordinary cruelty which gives cause of action to the wife. 23. There is no doubt, the cruelty as interpreted by the courts is of two kinds: 1. Physical. 2. Mental Physical violence may consists of actual or threatened violence which should be such as to give rise to reasonable apprehension of danger to life, limb or health. In mental cruelty, physical violence though absent, the conduct of the husband by using intemperate words, or display of temper, emotion or perversion so as to injure the health, will have to be present. This mental cruelty reflects adverse affect on the mind of the wife with respect to the conduct and behaviour of husband towards her. Such an adverse affect should not be the result of highly sensitive mind but it should be as is experienced by an ordinary prudent man. 24. The evidence examined by the parties as such has to be appreciated in the background of the aforesaid circumstances. 25. The pleadings referred in the plaint nowhere contained the averments of any specific instance of cruelty. There has been general allegation made therein regarding behaviour of husband towards her wife. There is a general allegation that for the last two years, the husband has become more aggressive, no instance of his aggressiveness has been pleaded. What to speak of his becoming more aggressive, a general statement has been made that the husband used to come late at night and that he started giving beatings to the wife. There is a general allegation that for the last two years, the husband has become more aggressive, no instance of his aggressiveness has been pleaded. What to speak of his becoming more aggressive, a general statement has been made that the husband used to come late at night and that he started giving beatings to the wife. There is nothing in the plaint as to when such occurrence took place Wife simply averred that towards the beginning of 1982 it became in-tolerable for her to continue receiving the maltreatment from her husband. All efforts on the part of the wife to have peaceful married life have failed. There is no plea as to what were the facts or conduct of the husband which made the wife to feel that it had become in-tolerable to continue receiving the maltreatment. What was the alleged maltreatment, the pleadings are silent. 26. Even if the statement of the plaintiff made on oath is considered, it will not improve her case at all. She stated on oath that her husband used to misbehave with her physically, mentally and also used to torture and harass her socially also. She further added that behaviour of her husband being cruel towards her started even since the day of her marriage and she continued tolerating such like behaviour but ultimately it became intolerable in the year 1982 whereby she was compelled to return to her parents house. Needless to say, not a single instance of the alleged mis-behaviour or that of the cruelty has been deposed by her on oath. She admitted that she did not intimate her parents about the behaviour of the respondent at any time till the year 1980. She further added that lastly when she was beaten and tortured by the respondent, she intimated her father, cousin and maternal uncle asking them to come to Delhi when she sent a telegram to them. She also disclosed that after her coming to village Kiar in February, 1982, she had no source of income till she joined as a teacher in Himalayan International School at Chhrabra, drawing Rs.500/- per month. She further disclosed that she was getting total employments to the tune of Rs.1,000/- since 1993 and her personal boarding and lodging in the aforesaid school continued to be free. She further stated that she was unable to maintain herself and her daughter with that meagre salary. She further disclosed that she was getting total employments to the tune of Rs.1,000/- since 1993 and her personal boarding and lodging in the aforesaid school continued to be free. She further stated that she was unable to maintain herself and her daughter with that meagre salary. She has also disclosed that she had sold her jewellery for meeting the expenses. 27. The plaintiff also stated that she had passed 5th Class examination at the time of her marriage and at that time her age as 15 years. She also disclosed that she graduated after from marriage but her husband not helped her. She further disclosed that she graduated from Delhi University while residing with her husband through out. According to her, no other member of her parents family had passed any examination beyond matriculation examination. She admitted it to be correct that during the period commencing from the year 1961 till 1982 she used to visit her parental village every year and reside there for a couple of months every time. She also added that she had undergone appendioitis operation and her husband as also her maternal uncle and other relations from parental side attended her during that time and those persons used to provide meals etc. during that period in Snowdon Hospital. She has been very specific in deposing that she did not complain of harassments and misbehaviour of her husband to her parents or to any member of the family of her parental side, right from 1961 to 1982. She has given the reasons that the acts of the respondent were shameful and she never felt comfortable to disclose the same. She denied the suggestion that the moment she graduated and became capable of seeking job, she deserted her husband and her children. She again stated that she did not complain of harassment and misbehaviour of her husband to any one of his friends at any time till the filing of the suit. She also admitted that she never wrote any letter regarding harassment or misbehaviour to her husband. She denied the suggestion that one Mr. J. C. Gupta tried to patch up the differences cropped up between the parties in the year 1982. She also denied the suggestion that Col. Vikram Singh also persuaded her not to desert her husband. 28. PW-2 is Ms Ira Tanwar, the eldest daughter of the parties. She denied the suggestion that one Mr. J. C. Gupta tried to patch up the differences cropped up between the parties in the year 1982. She also denied the suggestion that Col. Vikram Singh also persuaded her not to desert her husband. 28. PW-2 is Ms Ira Tanwar, the eldest daughter of the parties. She stated that she felt that her father had strained relations with her mother and the latter had suffered extensively at the hands of her father, whereby she was compelled to leave his company. The witness added that she chose to reside with her mother than her father. She disclosed that she saw her mother being beaten by her father on various occasions and the only reason which she can give for such incidence was that her father used to tease her mother, but then further added that the behaviour of her father was improper and dispute also arose on account of some financial matters and sale of inherited property belonging to her father. Again, this witness has not given any instance whatsoever of cruel behaviour of her father towards her mother except making a general statement as referred to above. Unless and until those instances are brought on record and proved as an independent legal fact it cannot be inferred that such behaviour was of such a nature which was requirement of Section 18(2) (b) of the Act. 29. PW.3 is Krishan Chand, who is cousin of the plaintiff. He stated that outwardly, the relations between plaintiff No. 1 and the defendant appeared to be cordial, but however, in the year 1982 he received a telegram from the plaintiff from Delhi and after consulting his uncle, he along with kameshwar Singh (brother of plaintiff No. 1) and late Sh. Mohinder Singh (maternal uncle of plaintiff No. 1) had gone to Delhi to the house of plaintiff No. 1 and when they reached there they found plaintiff No. 1 in a depressed mood and they asked the cause of sending the telegram, upon which plaintiff No. 1 complained that defendant gave beatings to her and their relations were not cordial. The witness further added that he attempted to make them understand that such disputes do occur in the family and they should live by having cordial relations with each other, but they failed in their attempt. The witness further added that he attempted to make them understand that such disputes do occur in the family and they should live by having cordial relations with each other, but they failed in their attempt. Witness further added that they stayed there for about three days and thereafter he continued to stay with his real sister for some time, who also complained of the mis-behaviour of the defendant with respect to some ancestral property located in village and also about the joint account opened by them. 30. PW-4 is Sh. Kameshwar Singh, the real brother of the wife. He has also repeated the same facts as stated by PW.3 Sh. Kishan Chand. Additionally, he stated that defendant told them that these are the family disputes and some-times quarrel does take place in between them. According to the witness, despite their efforts in making them to live cordially, they failed in their goal. 31. On the other hand, husband examined three witnesses including himself. 32. DW-1 is Mr. J. C. Gupta who stated that he knew Col. Bikram Singh who was sisters husband of the plaintiff. He further added that defendant along with his wife and children resided in my house as tenant from march 1981 to 1990. He also disclosed that in March, 1981 defendant had shifted along with his children to first floor of his house rented out to him and at that time his wife was at Shimla and thereafter his children also went to Shimla during summer vacation and returned along with their mother after the vacation. The witness stated that in the beginning relations between husband and wife as well as children were cordial but lateron there were some differences. He also added that before shifting to his house the defendant alongwith his family was residing in House No.D-15, owned by R. L. Sardana, which was in the same block in which house of the witness was situated. Witness also disclosed that during that period also they were on visiting terms. He also disclosed that plaintiff Uma Tanwar was pursuing her studies and did her graduation by correspondence course and for this reason defendant used to do household chore. Witness also disclosed that during that period also they were on visiting terms. He also disclosed that plaintiff Uma Tanwar was pursuing her studies and did her graduation by correspondence course and for this reason defendant used to do household chore. The witness has been very specific in deposing that to his knowledge defendant had never misbehaved with his wife Uma Tanwar in any manner, but on the other hand the husband looked after her like an affectionate and caring husband. He further added that he had noticed that whenever his wife used to have any physical ailment, he used to bring medicines as well tonics for her in plenty. According to this witness, Ms. Uma Tanwar plaintiff started complaining about her husband when he was to come late due to his office compulsions being posted in RAW whose office was in Lodhi complex at a distance of 20 k.m. from his residence. The witness narrated one incident and stated that when defendant and his son had gone out to the house of Col. Bikram Singh to bring gas cylinder and were late by few minutes and on their return plaintiff No. 1 Ms. Uma Tanwar became so furious that she closed all the doors of the house and in these circumstances the witness was compelled to help the defendant to seek entrance by rear door by putting ladder. The witness also added that in February, 1982 he noticed that three of the relations of plaintiff No. 1 had visited them and on his inquiry they told him that they had come in response of a telegram sent by her and they were taking her to Shimla. Witness further disclosed that he persuaded them not to do so in the interest of children who in the absence of their mother may turn delinquent. But the brother of plaintiff No. l replied that at that time she was very much upset and they will send her back after a few days when she cools down. Thereafter, she went alongwith them and did not return, 33. DW-2 is one Sh. Z. R. Siddiqui, who has retired as Joint Director, Public Relations Department, Himachal Pradesh. The witness has stated that the defendant had joined the medical department in the year 1962 and he was residing at that time in the building Alicot, Ram Bazar, Shimla. Thereafter, she went alongwith them and did not return, 33. DW-2 is one Sh. Z. R. Siddiqui, who has retired as Joint Director, Public Relations Department, Himachal Pradesh. The witness has stated that the defendant had joined the medical department in the year 1962 and he was residing at that time in the building Alicot, Ram Bazar, Shimla. According to the witness, he was already married at that time. Witness stated that defendant No. l was introduced to him through a common friend, namely, Mr. Rattan Singh Himesh, who was his colleague in the Medical Department where he was earlier working as Editor. This witness has stated about the relations between the husband and wife as he has been visiting them as a friend of the husband. According to him, their relations have been cordial. However, he stated that in the year 1981, plaintiff No. l came to his house alongwith 5 or 6 Trunks and leaving them at his house, she went to the house of her parents near Theog and she had come alone. This witness further added that he happened to visit Delhi when at the instance of the defendant No. 1 he brought their children, who were having holidays, from Delhi and left them at Kiar. Witness also stated that the defendant had come to take them back to Delhi and he was told by Kanwar Mohinder Singh that plaintiff No. 1 had also gone to Delhi alongwith the fam ily. Thereafter, at the instance of Kanwar Mohinder Singh, he took the trunks to Delhi and even at that time the relations between the husband and wife were normal. Witness also added that in the year 1982 plaintiff No. l again came from Delhi but did not visit him and went directly to Kiar. Witness further added that in July, 1982 she came to Shimla alongwith her daughter, and she stayed with for 8/9 months and she got her daughter admitted in St. Bedes college. According to the witness, at that time she told him about their strained relations and after getting her version he talked to the defendant at Delhi who gave him a different version. Witness further stated that according to the plaintiff No. l she was being tortured by the husband which was denied by the defendant. Bedes college. According to the witness, at that time she told him about their strained relations and after getting her version he talked to the defendant at Delhi who gave him a different version. Witness further stated that according to the plaintiff No. l she was being tortured by the husband which was denied by the defendant. According to this witness, many a time he tried reconciliation to which the defendant was inclined but the plaintiff No. 1 was not. Witness was cross-examined with respect to the relationship of the defendant with one Madhu Thakur. That aspect of the matter may not be relevant as the evidence was beyond the pleadings of the plaintiff and she even also did not state even a word about the same. This witness in very clear terms stated that there was no relationship between the defendant and Mrs. Madhu Thakur. 34. DW-3 is the defendant himself, who has tried to support his case. According to him, wife withdrew from his society voluntarily without there being any cause to take that step. This witness has in detail given the events and according to him he was not at all at fault and was ready to take wife back and reside with her comfortably. This witness has been put a copy of the letter Ex. Dx on record, alleged to have been written by the present appellant to his maternal uncle. There is another letter Ex. PW- I/A brought on record which has been written by the husband to his wife. - 35. We have been taken through the contents of these two letters and the learned counsel for the wife has referred some portion of these letters. Those alleged portions referred do not contain any admission on the part of the husband with respect to alleged cruelty pleaded by the plaintiff. The contents of letter have included various events which might have taken place during the life time of the husband and wife, but the husband at every stage has tried to reconcile and requested the wife to resume his company. The contents of letter have included various events which might have taken place during the life time of the husband and wife, but the husband at every stage has tried to reconcile and requested the wife to resume his company. Learned counsel has pointed out one sentence in the letter Ex.PW-1/A wherein the husband has narrated some incident whereby it was averred that wife had used such words against her husband which could not be so stated or uttered by even males and in this context the husband wrote in the letter that he was very much moved and he also raised his hands towards her. This is being interpreted that husband gave her beatings but it is to be noted that the husband in the very next sentence felt sorry for his behaviour. " 36. D W-4 is Sh. Vibhu Tanwar, the son of present appellant and respondent No. 1. He deposed that his mother wanted to have her dominance in the family affairs and this conduct of her continued and thereafter she left the house of her own accord. He stated that his father did not say anything to his mother. He further added that he asked his father to stop the mother form going, but according to him his father stated that she would come back after some lapse of time when her rage would cool down. This witness has tried to support his father. 37. This is the entire evidence examined by the parties. 38. Learned counsel for the parties have cited some case law which can be dealt with at this stage. 39. In Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, A.I.R. 1988 Supreme Court 121 the following observations made by the Apex Court are very much relevant: "The word "cruelty" has not been defined and could not have been defined, it has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial durites and obligations. It is a course of conduct of one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. There may be cases where the conduct complained of it self is bad enough and perse unlawful or illegal. Then the impact of the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. There may be cases where the conduct complained of it self is bad enough and perse unlawful or illegal. Then the impact of the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted. There has been a marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, there is a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the Court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. The Judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import their own notions of life. Judges may not go in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between the Judges and the parties. It would be better if the Judges keep aside their customs and manners. It would be also better if Judges less depend upon precedents. A new dimension has been given to the concept of cruelty. Explanation to Sec. 498-A provides that any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide would constitute cruelty. Such willful conduct which is likely to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical of the woman) would also amount to cruelty. Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security would also constitute cruelty. The cruelty as a ground for dissolution of marriage if not admitted requires to be proved on the preponderance of probabilities as in civil cases and not beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal case." 40. In Rajinder Bhardwajv. Mrs. The cruelty as a ground for dissolution of marriage if not admitted requires to be proved on the preponderance of probabilities as in civil cases and not beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal case." 40. In Rajinder Bhardwajv. Mrs. Anita Sharma AIR 1993 Delhi 135 para 21 of the judgment is relevant and for the shake of convenience is being reproduced hereunder: "This clause (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act was amended in 1976. Before the amendment of 1976, the Act contained a different formulation of cruelty. Then the petitioner was required to show that the respondent had treated him or her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his or her mind that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent. The formulation of cruelty after the amendment of 1976 has been brought at par with its formulation under the Special Marriage Act, and the Special Marriage Act has borrowed it from the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950. The Change in the formulation of cruelty under the Hindu Marriage Act not merely brought it at par with the Special Marriage Act, but has also simplified it. Cruelty in such cases has to be of the type which should satisfy the conscience of the Court to believe that the relations between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent due to the conduct of one of the spouses that it has become impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress. Cruelty as a ground of divorce under Section 13(1) (a) of the Act is a conduct of such type that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. Now the act or omission or conduct which constitute cruelty need not cause any sort of apprehension in the mind of the petitioner." 41. In Kamaljit Bhullar v. NimratPreet Singh Bhullar 1991 (1) Sim. L. C. 156, the Division Bench of this Court held as follows: "The legal concept of cruelty and the kind or degree or cruelty necessary to amount to a matrimonial offence have not been defined by any statute of the Indian Legislature relating to marriage and divorce; nor has the expression been defined in the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950. L. C. 156, the Division Bench of this Court held as follows: "The legal concept of cruelty and the kind or degree or cruelty necessary to amount to a matrimonial offence have not been defined by any statute of the Indian Legislature relating to marriage and divorce; nor has the expression been defined in the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950. The accepted legal meaning of this expression, which is rather difficult to define, had been " conduct of such character as to have caused danger to life, limb or health (bodily or mental), or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger." 42. V. Bhagat v. Mrs. D. Bhagat AIR 1994, Supreme Court 710 was a case of divorce sought on the ground of mental cruelty. Their Lordships while dealing with this aspect as to what constitutes a mental cruelty, observed as follows: "Mental cruelty in Section 13(l) (ia) can broadly be defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the petitioner. While arriving at such conclusion regard must be had to the social status, educational level of the parties, the society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the parties ever living together in case they are already living together in case they are already living apart and all other relevant facts and circumstances which it is neither possible nor desireable to set out exhaustively. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. If it is a case of accusations and allegations, regard must also be had to the context in which they were made." 43. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. If it is a case of accusations and allegations, regard must also be had to the context in which they were made." 43. The ratio of the aforesaid precedents cited on behalf of the parties is to be made applicable in the background of facts alleged and proved in a particular case. So far as the principle, enuciated in these cases, is concerned there wont be any dispute to that aspect. , 44. At the cost of repetition, it may be very specifically pointed out there that neither any instance of physical cruelty nor the circumstances which could amount to mental cruelty have been pleaded nor proved during the trial of the suit. What ever have been brought on record only reflected that the husband and wife had some strained relations and what were the reasons for such strained relations have neither been spelt out in the pleadings nor in the evidence examined by the parties. A general statement made by the wife and other witnesses will not in any way absolve the wife to establish this factum of cruelty in accordance with Section 18(2)(b)of the Act. 45. The learned District Judge, has acted illegally in appreciating the evidence, examined during the trial. The observations of the learned District Judge with respect to the letters Ex. PW-1/A and Ex. Dx were not correct. These letters no where proved the admission on the part of the husband with respect to his alleged cruel behaviour towards his wife. Thus, on the basis of the material as discussed in detail above, the plaintiff has failed to prove the scope of Issue No.3. 46. The additional argument submitted on behalf of the wife again has to be not considered favourably, whereby it has been stressed that the lady was in service in a private institution where her services can be terminated at any time and therefore she was required under these circumstances to be maintained by the husband. Admittedly, the wife is earning at present and she has asked for maintenance and separate residence under Section 18 of the Act on certain grounds I which have not been legally established by her. Admittedly, the wife is earning at present and she has asked for maintenance and separate residence under Section 18 of the Act on certain grounds I which have not been legally established by her. She otherwise could not ask for maintenance as she was having sufficient income to maintain herself. In future, in case there is any cause of action for the lady to ask for maintenance from the husband in accordance with the provisions of the Act or in accordance with the provisions of the Act or in accordance with the other law for the time being in force, she can avail that cause of action at the relevant time. For the present, she is not legally entitled to any relief whatsoever as prayed by her. 47. Respondent wife has filed some cross-objections which have been registered as C. O. No. 145 of 1996 whereby she has prayed that the trial court erred in not granting her costs of the litigation which through these cross-objections she has prayed to be granted the costs of the proceedings and also she may be paid enhanced amount of compensation as has been pleaded by her in the cross - objections. 48. The cross-objections on the basis of the reasons detailed above cannot be favourably considered as her main suit is to be dismissed. 49. Before concluding, we may like to bring on record some glaring lapse committed by the court below in admitting the documentary evidence. Order 13 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure at this stage can be referred which is being reproduced hereunder: "4. Endorsements on documents admitted in evidence - (1) Subject to the provisions of the next following sub-rule, there shall be endorsed on every document which has been admitted in evidence in the suit the following particulars, namely:- (a) the number and title of the suit, (b) the name of the person producing the document, (c) the date on which it was produced, and (d) a statement of its having been so admitted; and the endorsement shall be signed or initialled by the Judge. (2) Where a document so admitted is an entry in a book, account or record, and a copy thereof has been substituted for the original under the next following rule, the particulars aforesaid shall be endorsed on the copy and the endorsement thereon shall be signed or initialled by the Judge." 50. Same is the provision given in Chapter -1 Part G of Rule 14 of the Rules and orders of Punjab and Haryana High Court, as applicable to Himachal Pradesh. The proforma is as under: "Suit No._________OF___________19 Title_________Plaintiff_______v._______Defendant Produced bv_______________:__________________ On the________day of______19 Nature of document_______________ Stamp duty paid Rs. n. p. (is not) correct. Admitted as Exhibit No. On the___________day of____________19." 51. The entries in the above form as referred in Order 13 Rule 4 should be filled in at the time when the document is admitted in evidence under the signature of the Judge. This precaution is necessary to prevent any substitution or tampering with the document. Details as to the nature of the document and the stamp duty paid upon it arc required to be entered in order that Courts may not neglect the duties imposed on them by the Indian Stamp Act. 52. Every court is required to have a stamp containing the aforesaid form. It is the duty of the Court Reader to affix that stamp on the document admitted in evidence, which is to be signed by the Judge, admitting the document in evidence. 53. The present case earlier was being tried by this Court under its original jurisdiction but because of variance in pecuniary jurisdiction this case was assigned to the learned District Judge to complete the trial. One document Ex. DX was produced on 28th August, 1995 and admitted in the evidence by the learned District Judge. The aforesaid endorsement on this exhibited document Ex. DX, has not been applied by the Reader of the Court nor the learned Presiding Officer has verified the same. Similarly, Ex. PW-1/A which was referred to in the statement of PW-1 recorded on 2nd March, 1994 before this Court also does not contain the requisite endorsement which has to be made by the Reader of the Court, though other documents tendered in evidence during the trial pending before this court, such endorsement has been made by the Reader and signed by the Honble Judge. The non-compliance of the aforesaid provision may not render the document inadmissible in evidence, but the fact remains that the purpose for which this provision has been made in the Code of Civil Procedure and in the Rules and Orders of High Court, does not stand served. It is as such directed that the Court Reader of this Court and Readers of the Presiding Officers of the courts below henceforth are required to strictly comply with the aforesaid provisions in its true sense. 54. No other point has been stressed. 55. In view of the foregoing reasons, the appeal is accepted, the judgment and decree under appeal are set aside and as a consequence thereof suit filed by the plaintiffs is dismissed. The cross-objections preferred by the respondent also stand dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.