ORDER 1. By this petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks quashment of the Orders Annexure J and passed in revisions by Dy. Chief Settlement Commissioner and the Principal Secretary, Rehabilitation Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh, respectively. The petitioner further seeks direction to the respondents No. 1 to 4 to restore the order of joint allotment of House No. 3888 situated at Jaora, Distt. Ratlam, in favour of the petitioner and the respondent No.5. 2. The petitioner's late father Harumal and respondent No. 5's late father Tikyomal both were displaced persons and they were allotted separate portions of house No. 3888 situated at Jaora, Distt. Ratlam which was the evacuee property, on tenancy basis, by the Government of India. Admittedly, the petitioner and the respondent No.5 are still in occupation of the said portions. Both Harumal and Tikyomal had left properties in Pakistan for which they preferred claims under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation), Act, 1954 (for short, 'the Act'). During the process of finalisation of these claims the value of the portion occupied by Harumal was fixed at Rs. 3,140/- while that of the portion occupied by Tikyomal was fixed at Rs. 2,410/-. It appears that late Tikyomal had deposited Rs. 4,575.31 towards the price of the entire house under an order dated 15.2.58 of the Asstt. Settlement Commissioner. However, the Managing Officer issued a conveyance in respect of that portion of the said house only which was in possession of Tikyomal. It was further intimated by him that he should claim refund of the excess amount deducted from his compensation. Against this order of the Managing Officer the said Tikyomal preferred an appeal before the Asstt. Settlement Commissioner, Indore which was registered at No. 86/ASC(SC)/59. Late Harumal was impleaded as respondent in the case. This appeal was dismissed by the Asstt. Settlement Commissioner vide his order dated 6.1.60 (Annx.-I). It was inter alia held that since the said house is divisible in two parts, the appellant i.e., Tikyomal is entitled to have conveyance deed only in respect of the portion occupied by him while the other portion in occupation of Harumal is to be settled in latter's name. Against this order dated 6.1.60 passed in appeal, Tikyomal preferred revision u/s. 24 (1) of the Act which was registered at No. 51/Indore/32/ Appeals/60 and heard by Dy. Against this order dated 6.1.60 passed in appeal, Tikyomal preferred revision u/s. 24 (1) of the Act which was registered at No. 51/Indore/32/ Appeals/60 and heard by Dy. Chief Settlement Commissioner and allowed by order dtd. 22.3.60 (Annexure-J). By this order, the appellate order (Annx.-I) dated 6.1.60 was set-aside and it was directed that the conveyance of the entire said house be granted to Tikyomal. Aggrieved by this order passed in revision, Harumal preferred a review petition which was registered as case No. 61/Ind/58/CEC/61 and was rejected by an order dated 26.9.61 (Annx. R-2). In the meantime, claim made by Tikyomal in respect of the properties left by him in Pakistan was allowed to the extent of Rs. 4576.31 and after adjusting this amount towards the total price Rs. 5,550/- of the house in question, a demand for Rs. 973.63 was raised against him through a Memo dated 30.5.62. A copy of this Memo (Annex. R-3) was also endorsed to the petitioner's father Harumal asking him to obtain the refund of the deposit made by him in respect of the said house. However, Tikyomal died on 23.5.60. Some long correspondence went on between respondent No.5 and the authorities for obtaining conveyance in respect of the house. Eventually by a memo dated l7.5.87 (Annex. R-7) issued by Under Secretary (Rehabilitation) Government of India, Bhopal, the respondent No.5 was accepted as legal heir of late Tikyomal and finally deed of conveyance (Annx. R-9) was executed and registered in respondent's favour of by Tehsildar, Jaora, on 13.7.87. 3. The father of the petitioner also died on 30.1.71. The respondent No.5 instituted suit for petitioner's eviction from the said house. The suit was decreed and the appeal filed by the petitioner has also been dismissed. However, the execution of the decree has been stayed by this Court pending the decision of this petition. The petitioner on 1.8.88 preferred a revision petition to the Government of India invoking its residuary powers u/s. 33 of the Act. This petition was registered as revision case No. 22/107/83 (28) and after hearing both the parties it was dismissed by the Principal Secretary (Rehabilitation) Evacuee Properties, Bhopal, by his order dated 6.10.87 (Annx.-Q). The petitioner has now come up before this Court under Art. 226 & 227 of the Constitution. 4. I have heard Shri P.K. Saxena, learned Sr. This petition was registered as revision case No. 22/107/83 (28) and after hearing both the parties it was dismissed by the Principal Secretary (Rehabilitation) Evacuee Properties, Bhopal, by his order dated 6.10.87 (Annx.-Q). The petitioner has now come up before this Court under Art. 226 & 227 of the Constitution. 4. I have heard Shri P.K. Saxena, learned Sr. Counsel appearing with Shri P.K. Jain for the petitioner and Shri S.D. Sanghi and Shri B.L. Pavecha, learned Sr. Counsel appearing with Shri Sunil Jain, for respondent No.5. 5. The petitioner has assailed the impugned orders inter alia on the ground that the property in question being in possession of more than one person i.e., Harumal and Tikyomal and the property being clearly divisible, it ought to have been settled with both the occupants as envisaged under Rule 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955 (for short, 'the Rules'). Resort to Rule 25 which envisages transfer of property to one person only, by the revisional authority, was erroneous and contrary to the mandatory provision of Rule 30. The Central Government, it is contended, also fell in error by not entertaining petitioner's revision u/s. 33 of the Act merely on the ground of delay. The residuary powers u/s. 33, it is pointed out, are unlimited not fettered by any law of limitation. Reliance has been placed on two Supreme Court decisions in Mithoo Shahani's case ( AIR 1964 SC 1536 ) and Santokh Singh's case ( AIR 1990 SC 503 ). 6. The respondent No.5 has filed return in oppugnation to the petition and it is contended that the question of allotment of the entire house was decided in favour of the respondent's late father Tikyomal by the order dated 22.3.60 (Annx.-J) passed by Dy. Chief Settlement Commissioner in the presence of and after hearing late Harumal. 6. The respondent No.5 has filed return in oppugnation to the petition and it is contended that the question of allotment of the entire house was decided in favour of the respondent's late father Tikyomal by the order dated 22.3.60 (Annx.-J) passed by Dy. Chief Settlement Commissioner in the presence of and after hearing late Harumal. This order assumed finality on 26.9.61 with the rejection of review petition filed by late Harumal; by order Annexure R-2.This order has been acted upon by both the parties and all further orders including the impugned order dated 22.5.87 (Annx.-Q) have been passed in implementation of the said order Annx.-J. Late Harumal has not challenged this order Annx.-J in any appropriate proceedings and having obtained the refund of his deposit, the petitioner is now not entitled to assai I or question this order for the first time after 26 years before this Court. The petition, it is asserted, not only suffers from delay and latches. the petitioner by his own conduct and that of his late father is now estopped from challenging the order - J and claiming allotment of any portion of the said house. 7. I have gone through the orders Annx.-J and Q and I find that the authorities concerned have considered factual as well as legal aspect of the matter and reached to the conclusion which is not shown to be in contravention of any legal position. The orders are, therefore, not amenable to interference in exercises of supervisory jurisdiction vested in this Court under Art. 227. 8. The order - J was passed as back as on 22.3.60. The review petition filed against this order was also dismissed on 26.9.91. The petitioner's father thereafter did not make any grievance notwithstanding remedy by way of second revision u/s. 22 (4) of the Act being available to him. The order dated 23.3.60 thus attained finality and cannot be now challenged after 27 years under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. The petition in fact suffers from vice of latches. 9. Original record of the case has been produced before the Court and it is seen that after dismissal of his review petition, late Harumal by his application dtd : 23.4.65 applied for refund of the amount deposited towards allotment of the house. He also enclosed money receipt duly stamped and signed with this application evidencing receipt of the deposit money. Original record of the case has been produced before the Court and it is seen that after dismissal of his review petition, late Harumal by his application dtd : 23.4.65 applied for refund of the amount deposited towards allotment of the house. He also enclosed money receipt duly stamped and signed with this application evidencing receipt of the deposit money. Although according to the petitioner the money was never paid to his father in cash, the same I find, has been adjusted towards his some other claim No. 3896 vide letter dated 23.9.65 (Annex.-R 6). This conduct of late Harumal in not challenging the order - J any more and making application for refund of his amount, clearly goes to show that he had acquiesced to the transfer of the property in favour of Tikyomal. His son, the petitioner is now, therefore, estopped from challenging the transfer and taking a stand contrary to the stand taken by the former. Order 22 R. 4 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly provides that a legal representative of a deceased party can only take a stand appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased. 10. According to the counsel for the petitioner a valid contract has come into existence between the respondent No. 1 and the petitioner's father on account of the letter dated 20.10.59 (Annx.-D) and payment made by the later on 29.10.59. But, this contract was frustrated the moment late Harumal after loosing legal battle (vide Order - J) applied for refund of his deposit evidencing his unwillingness to enforce the contract anymore. Surely a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution is not the proper remedy for enforcement of the contractual fight which if any had come to an end 27 years back even otherwise. A suit filed for specific performance of such a contract would also be barred by law of limitation. 11. Sec. 33 of the Act vests the Union Government with discretionary residuary power to call for record of any proceedings and pass such orders as may be found necessary in the circumstances of the case and not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and Rules. Obviously, the power under this section is discretionary and cannot be claimed as of right by any party and can certainly be refused on the ground of delay. Obviously, the power under this section is discretionary and cannot be claimed as of right by any party and can certainly be refused on the ground of delay. The Government cannot be, therefore, said to have committed any jurisdictional error or procedural impropriety in rejecting the petitioner's application made so belatedly and in the face of the circumstances already enumerated hereinbefore. The order Annx.-Q thus suffers with no jurisdictional error or error of law apparent on the face of the record. 12. In Meneck Custodji's case (AIR. 1976 SC 2446) Hon 'ble the Supreme Court has held : "The jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution is an extraordinary jurisdiction which is to be exercised sparingly and in appropriate cases and it is not to be exercised as if it were an appellate jurisdiction or as if it gave unfettered and unrestricted power to the High Court to do whatever it liked." 13. In the instant case, as already pointed out, the petitioner is not only guilty of latches and delay, his father did not also avail the alternative remedy available to him by way of filing second revision u/s. 22 (4) of the Act. Under the circumstances I see no justification for exercising extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution. 14. In the result the petition fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs. Security deposit, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner after due verification.