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1997 DIGILAW 171 (KAR)

SILK IMPORT AND EXPORT INC v. EXIM AIDES SILK EXPORTER

1997-03-12

A.M.FAROOQ

body1997
( 1 ) THIS is a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside the order dated 5-7-1996 passed by the learned Magistrate referring the complaint presented by the first respondent in this petition to the police under Section 156 (3) of Cr. P. C. , and to quash the First Information Report submitted by the Police in Crime No. 341/96 registered by the High Grounds Police against the petitioner for offences punishable under Sections 418 and 420, IPC. and to quash all subsequent proceedings in PCR No. 446/96 pending on the file of the learned VII Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore. ( 2 ) THE Respondent No. 1 herein filed a private complaint before the learned Magistrate under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter called the Code, alleging offences punishable under Sections 418 and 420, IPC. The gist of the complaint is as follows : That complainant is a proprietary concern doing business in Silk finished products consigning its products to various countries, U. S. A. , Germany, Australia, Italy etc. , Petitioner herein, who is the accused in the complaint approached the complainant with the request to supply with complainant's silk fabrics. It is stated that subsequent to the first letter dated 22-11-1993 sent by the petitioner herein to the complainant, several correspondences took place between the complaint firm and the accused and finally the accused-petitioner agreed to import the Silk Fabrics from the complainant firm. The bills towards the consideration of those Silk Fabrics were routed through the complainant's banker namely, Bank of Madura Ltd. , N. R. Road Branch, Bangalore. It is stated that thereafter the accused used to regularly import the Silk Fabrics from the complainant. The accused made defaults in payment of the bills. It is stated in the complaint that the petitioner is due to the complainant 72,075. 90 U. S. dollars amounting to Rs. 26,47,351/ -. It is stated that the petitioner's not honouring the payments in spite of his receiving the goods from the complainant resulted in the complainant losing the faith of his bankers. It is stated that several times, the complainant contacted the petitioner and the petitioner assured the complainant that he would pay all the dues. 26,47,351/ -. It is stated that the petitioner's not honouring the payments in spite of his receiving the goods from the complainant resulted in the complainant losing the faith of his bankers. It is stated that several times, the complainant contacted the petitioner and the petitioner assured the complainant that he would pay all the dues. It is stated that three cheques were issued by the petitioner on different dates drawn in favour of the complainant-firm on State Bank of India, California Artesia Branch, U. S. A. . It is stated that the three cheques were presented through bankers of the complainant, but all the cheques were dishonoured. Thereafter, the complainant sent registered letters to the petitioner, which were acknowledged by the petitioner. It is stated in the complainant itself that the acts of the petitioner in not paying the dues to the complainant amounted to an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It is further stated that the bankers of the complainant informed that they feel that the petitioner had no intention to pay the dues and advised the complainant to act swiftly both under civil and criminal law. It is further stated by the complainant that he apprehends that the petitioner-accused represented by its President had clear intention to cheat the complainant firm after receiving the silk fabrics and not making the payment of the same and hence, according to the complainant, the petitioner has committed to offence, under Sections 418 and 420, IPC. It is further stated that the Company's President who is petitioner herein was in India at the time, when he filed the complaint and at any moment, he may leave India and it may not be possible to apprehend him thereafter and therefore, the complainant has filed the complaint. ( 3 ) THE learned Magistrate after receipt of the complaint did not take cognizance of the offence. Instead, the learned Magistrate referred the matter to the police for investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code. ( 4 ) THE petitioner herein filed this petition on 26-7-1996 questioning the reference itself made on 5-7-1996. The Court on 30-7-1996 admitted this petition and stayed all further proceedings in PCR 446/96 pending before the 8th Addl. C. M. M. Bangalore. ( 4 ) THE petitioner herein filed this petition on 26-7-1996 questioning the reference itself made on 5-7-1996. The Court on 30-7-1996 admitted this petition and stayed all further proceedings in PCR 446/96 pending before the 8th Addl. C. M. M. Bangalore. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1, complainant filed I. A. II for vacating the interim order of stay granted by this Court in this petition and this Court rejected I. A. II filed by the complainant. Against the said order, petitioner filed Criminal Appeal No. 1797/96 (SLP (Crl.) No. 2419/96 ). The Hon'ble Supreme Court granted Special Leave, heard both the parties and set aside the order passed by this Court directing stay of all further investigation in Crime No. 341/96 registered by the High Grounds Police on a reference made by the trial Court under Section 156 (3) of the Code and directed that the Investigation Agency will proceed with the investigation of the case and it shall not submit its report under Section 173 of the Code without the leave of the High Court. ( 5 ) THE learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the second respondent submitted that now the investigation is complete and a report is ready to be filed before the trial Court and this Court may permit the prosecution to file the report before the trial Court. ( 6 ) SRI. C. V. Nagesh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that if the entire allegations made in the complaint filed by the first respondent before the trial Court are accepted, no offence is made out so as to proceed against the petitioner for an offence under the IPC. or under any other Act. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the complainant, who has also alleged an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, had already instituted a complaint alleging such an offence before the learned Magistrate and the learned Magistrate has rejected his complaint as barred by time. It is submitted that against the said order, revision petition is filed before this Court and the same is pending. It is also submitted by the learned counsel that even taking into consideration the entire materials now produced by the prosecution after due investigation has nothing more than what has been alleged by the complainant in the complaint filed by him. It is also submitted by the learned counsel that even taking into consideration the entire materials now produced by the prosecution after due investigation has nothing more than what has been alleged by the complainant in the complaint filed by him. It is stated that the statement recorded by the I. O. during the course of investigation are only carbon copy of the allegations made by the complainant in his complaint filed before the trial Court. ( 7 ) ON the other hand, Sri. G. R. Mohan, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent submitted that in para 13 of the complaint, the complainant has clearly alleged that the intention of the petitioner was to cheat the complainant and he has produced several documents especially the letter issued by the Madura Bank, the banker of the complainant, who has dealt with the transactions between the petitioner and the complainant and the bankers have noted down in their letter produced by the complainant alongwith the complaint that the bankers felt that the accused-petitioners had no intention of paying the amount and the transaction has been carried with ulterior motive and therefore, the complaint was advised by his bankers to take action against the petitioner both under criminal and civil law. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that after the investigation conducted by the police one more document has been seized by them during the course of the investigation and that is, an agreement dated 5-3-1996 executed by the accused-petitioner in favour of the complainant. Under the agreement, the petitioner-accused has assured the complainant of payment of the dues within a stiuplated time. But he has not honoured the said commitment and therefore, it has to be inferred that the petitioner had an intention at the initial stage itself to cheat the complainant. It is, therefore, submitted that there is a prima facie case against the petitioner for an offence under Section 420, IPC. It is submitted that from the said document, it can be seen that the petitioner-accused prevented the complainant from presenting all the cheques, which clearly shows the intention of the accused to cheat him. It is, therefore, submitted that there is a prima facie case against the petitioner for an offence under Section 420, IPC. It is submitted that from the said document, it can be seen that the petitioner-accused prevented the complainant from presenting all the cheques, which clearly shows the intention of the accused to cheat him. ( 8 ) IT is also submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the complainant that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the S. L. P. referred to above, which has been filed by the complainant against the interim order passed by this Court, has ordered continuation of the investigation by the police to whom the matter was referred to by the learned Magistrate under Section 156 (3) of the code. The very direction itself issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court shows that the police have been given power to file the charge-sheet or the report before the learned Magistrate and this Court sitting under Section 482, Cr. P. C. , ought not to interfere in quashing the proceedings. It is submitted by the learned counsel, it is only in very rare cases that this Court could interfere to quash the criminal proceedings. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the power to quash the criminal proceedings ought to be used very sparingly and cautiously and that too to prevent manifest injustice or abuse of the process of the Court. It is submitted by him that in this case, there is no such a case for the petitioner to urge before this Court. It was, therefore, prayed by the learned counsel that the petition is to be dismissed. ( 9 ) THE learned High Court Government Pleader who supported the argument addressed on behalf of the first respondent submitted that the police after due investigation has recorded the statement of several witnesses and also seized documents and especially the agreement executed by the petitioner dated 5-3-1996, which clearly shows the intention of the petitioner to cheat the complainant and in view of the same, this Court ought not to interfere with the proceedings and permission may be granted to be prosecution to file the report before the Court. ( 10 ) AFTER considering the various submissions made by the learned counsel on both the sides, I am of the view that there is much force in the submission made by Sri. ( 10 ) AFTER considering the various submissions made by the learned counsel on both the sides, I am of the view that there is much force in the submission made by Sri. C. V. Nagesh, learned counsel appearing for the petition. On a reading of the complaint, it is seen that the entire allegation made in the complaint is of a civil nature where the complainant has given details as to how he got into contact with the accused petitioner and entered into a business deal of sending Silk Fabrics manufactured by him to the United States and getting the payments through his banker - Madura Bank Limited -- and the non-payment of certain bills by the petitioner accused and his subsequent contacts with the petitioner-accused and the petitioner promising him and assuring him for the payment of dues and in spite of the same not paying the dues as agreed upon by the accused. Even in para 3 it was specifically pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner it is not the case of the complainant that at the initial stage when the petitioner came into contact with the complainant and agreed to do business with the petitioner, had any intention to cheat the complainant. In the said paragraph, the complainant did not say that the intention of the petitioner-accused was to cheat him from the initial stage of the transaction between him and the complainant. What is stated in paragraph 13 of the complaint is that in view of the failure of the accused in not paying the dues, he apprehended that the accused was intending to cheat him. This is what is mentioned in paragraph 13 of the complaint. "it is submitted that the proprietor of the complainant firm has also made number of trips to the accused company both at U. S. and Bombay with futile result. The complainant firm apprehends that the accused company represented by its President has clear intention to cheat the complainant after receiving the Silk Fabrics and not making payments for the same". The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. A. P. Pillai, AIR 1973 SC 326 : (1972 Cri LJ 1243) has held that to hold a person guilty of the offence of cheating, it has to be shown that his intention was dishonest at the time of making the promise. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. A. P. Pillai, AIR 1973 SC 326 : (1972 Cri LJ 1243) has held that to hold a person guilty of the offence of cheating, it has to be shown that his intention was dishonest at the time of making the promise. Such a dishonest intention cannot be inferred from the mere fact that he cannot subsequently fulfil the promise. In para 16 this is what the Supreme Court has held :"16. It would follow from the above that it was not in pursuance of any representation regarding the consignment of oil tins to the railway that the bank gave credit to the firm of the accused for the amounts of the demand drafts. On the contrary, the amounts of demand drafts were credited in the account of the firm immediately on receipt of the demand drafts even though they were not accompanied by the railway receipts. The railway receipts were not doubt to be sent by the accused to the bank subsequently, but there is no cogent evidence to show that at the time when the accused sent the demand drafts they did not have the intention to send subsequently railway receipts in respect of oil tins which were actually delivered to the railways. The material on record indicates that more than 5000 oil tins were despatched to various stations from Alwave railway station on behalf of the firm of the accused-respondents during the period from February 2, 1963 to April 24, 1963. Those oil tins were appropriated by the railway authorities towards the railway receipts of earlier dates and were sent to various stations. The fact that more than 5000/- oil tins were despatched on behalf of the firm of the accused to the various stations during the above period is hardly consistent with a dishonest intention on their part. It may be that the accused could not keep up the delivery of the oil tins to the railways and no tins could be despatched in respect of the said thirteen railway receipts but that fact can give rise only to a civil liability of the accused. It is not sufficient to fasten a criminal liability on them. To hold a person guilty of the offence of cheating, it has to be shown that his intention was dishonest at the time of making the promise. It is not sufficient to fasten a criminal liability on them. To hold a person guilty of the offence of cheating, it has to be shown that his intention was dishonest at the time of making the promise. Such a dishonest intention cannot be inferred from the mere fact that he could not subsequently fulfil the promise". Therefore, in order to label an offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC against a person, the complainant should allege that at the time of entering into the transaction, the only intention of the opposite party was to cheat him. But in this case, it is not the case of the complainant that from the beginning of the business contract that the accused had an intention to cheat. But on the other hand, it is not disputed that the accused had paid certain amounts to the complainant and the complainant had encashed those payments through his banker and it is only later on that certain amounts became due in respect of which cheques were issued and out of the seven cheques, in respect of two cheques, he has instituted the criminal proceedings alleging offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It is submitted that the other cheques were time barred and therefore, he could not initiate similar proceedings. It is further submitted that the time got barred only because of the assurance given by the petitioner in the agreement dated 5-3-1996. ( 11 ) IN Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration, 1996 (5) Supreme 742 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that when a Judge is fairly certain that there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction, the valuable time of the Court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure, to pronounce the conclusion on a future date. In Sharada Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1754 : (1977 Cri LJ 1146) it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that"it is not settled law that where the allegations set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute any offence, it is competent to the High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. The question which, therefore, arises for consideration is whether the allegations set out in the complaint constitute any offence against the appellant. "in State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla, (1996) 8 SC 164 : (1996 AIR SCW 591) it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that inherent power of the Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. should be very sparingly and cautiously used only when the Court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of process of the Court, if such power is not exercised. In the same judgment, it was pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that is was not open for the High Court either to sift the evidence or appreciate the evidence and come to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made out. In State of Bihar v. K. J. D. Singh, 1994 SCC (Cri) 63 : (1993 Cri LJ 3537) it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the power of the High Court to quash the proceedings should not be arbitrarily exercised to cut short the normal process of a criminal trial except in exceptional cases and it is not permissible to quash the proceedings or appreciate the evidence at the stage when the trial had not even commenced. ( 12 ) IT is true that this Court cannot liesurely act and accept the petition under Section 282 of the Code and quash the criminal proceedings pending before the trial Court without any reason. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the various decisions referred to above, it is only in exceptional cases where this Court comes to the conclusion that if the entire allegations made by the complainant in the complaint or in the charge-sheet filed by the police, do not amount to any offence as alleged against the accused, that it is the duty of this Court to interfere and quash the proceedings in order to see that an innocent citizen is not harassed before the criminal Court unnecessarily. In this case, as referred to in the previous paragraphs, the entire allegations of the complainant indicates as if he is filing a civil case before the criminal Court, except in paragraph 13, where it is stated that he apprehended the intention of cheating on the part of the accused petitioner in view of the fact that he did not honour his commitment and assurance given to the complainant earlier and also under the subsequent agreement entered in March, 1996. All those allegations clearly give rise to a case of civil dispute and it cannot be said that the allegations can constitute an offence as alleged. To a question put to the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, it was submitted that if the accused had any assets in the country, it could have been attached in a civil suit and the complainant would not have filed the present criminal case. This itself shows that the intention of the complainant was to force the petitioner to pay the amount even though there is dispute between the parties. Merely because, the accused persons could not be able to honour their commitments for various reasons, the creditors cannot haul them up in criminal cases. The non payment of debts may be for various reasons and if in all such cases, persons, are dragged to criminal Courts, then it is clearly the duty of this Court after considering the allegations made by the complainant, to interfere in such proceedings. Now in the present case, after reference made by the Court under Section 156 (3) of the Code, a report has been produced by the police after due investigation and it is with the learned High Court Government Pleader, who read-over to the Court all the materials which are made available to the police during the course of investigation. Except the alleged subsequent agreement dated 5-3-1996 nothing extra has been secured by the police than what was produced by the complainant along with his complaint. The agreement dated 5-3-1996 is nothing but an agreement entered into between the parties subsequently wherein the petitioner has assured the complainant that all dues will be settled by him in due course. If such dues are not settled, that will not give rise to a criminal action against the petitioner. The agreement dated 5-3-1996 is nothing but an agreement entered into between the parties subsequently wherein the petitioner has assured the complainant that all dues will be settled by him in due course. If such dues are not settled, that will not give rise to a criminal action against the petitioner. ( 13 ) IT was next submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent relying upon a judgment in Bhola Nath Arora v. the state, 1982 Cri LJ 1482 that dishonouring of a cheque issued by the accused may also amount to an offence under Section 420 IPC. For the dishonour of the cheque, it is the case of the complainant that he has already instituted separate suit in respect of two of the dishonoured cheques and in respect of the other five cheques, as submitted by him, no criminal case was instituted because, they were time barred. When once the respondent has already instituted criminal case for an offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, respondent No. 1 cannot again on the same allegations institute another similar proceedings for another offence. It is stated that the complaint has been filed subsequent to the filing of the present complaint. Whatever it may be the Negotiable Instruments Act has been amended and for bouncing of a cheque, the party who undergoes loss has been given a right to file a criminal complaint against the person, who has issued the cheque, which has been already initiated by the complainant against the petitioner. ( 14 ) IN State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, AIR 1992 SC 604 equivalent to 1992 SCC (Crl) 426 : (1992 Cri LJ 527) the Hon'ble Supreme Court while holding that the power under Section 482 Cr. P. C. , for quashing the criminal proceedings should be exercised sparingly and in rarest of rare cases. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that the following categories of cases can be stated by way of illustration wherein the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P. C. , for quashing the criminal proceedings should be exercised sparingly and in rarest of rare cases. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that the following categories of cases can be stated by way of illustration wherein the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P. C. can be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. In the illustration the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, criminal proceedings could be quashed. In the further illustration it has observed that where uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused and further where the criminal proceedings is manifestly attended with mala fide or where the proceedings is maliciously instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, such criminal proceedings could be quashed. ( 15 ) AFTER keeping in mind the various principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the various judgments referred to in this order and on considering the allegations made in the complaint in the light of those principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, I am of the view that if the entire allegations made by the complainant is to be accepted, no case is made out against the petitioner in respect of the offence alleged against him. Further the facts and materials considered by me in this case clearly point out that the complainant has filed a petition because he could not recover the money, which according to the complainant is due to him from the accused-petitioner. Further the facts and materials considered by me in this case clearly point out that the complainant has filed a petition because he could not recover the money, which according to the complainant is due to him from the accused-petitioner. The complainant has stated that he could file only two criminal cases against the petitioner for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in respect of two cheques that were dishonoured and in respect of the other cheques, he could not file complaints because of the same being time barred. The complainant himself has to be blamed for not filing the complaint in time in respect of the other cheques. When the complainant has stated that the intention of the petitioner-accused was to cheat him, he would not have waited for such a long time in filing the complaints against the petitioner-accused in respect of the cheques which had bounced. These facts further indicate that there was no criminal intention or means rea on the part of the accused petitioner while assuring the complainant regarding the payment of alleged dues. As submitted by the complainant himself, the present complaint is filed because the accused-petitioner does not own any properties in India, which could be attached by him towards the discharge of the alleged debts due to the complainant. Therefore, it has to be held that a complaint has been instituted by the complainant with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused-petitioner. ( 16 ) IN view of all these facts, I am of the opinion that if the present criminal proceedings is allowed to be continued before the lower Court, it will not only be an harassment to the petitioner, but also an abuse of process of the Court. ( 17 ) FOR the reasons stated in the above paragraphs, this Criminal petition is allowed and the entire proceedings pending before the learned Magistrate in P. C. R. No. 46/96 is hereby quashed. Petition allowed. --- *** --- .