JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J. (Oral): Heard learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance I have also examined the record of this case. 2. A suit for specific performance was filed by late Smt. Parwatoo plaintiff against Atma Ram and others defendants (hereinafter referred to as such) in respect of agreement dated 10-10-1984 and for possession of land described in the plaint. According to plaintiff, Atma Ram owner of the land agreed to sell the suit land vide agreement dated 10-10-1986 for a consideration of Rs.18,918/-, out of which Rs.10,600/- were received as earnest money by Atma Ram in the shape of Rs.8,000/- being mortgage money paid by her to mortgagee Krishan Lal on behalf of Atma Ram and the balance Rs.2,600/- was paid in cash to him Sale deed was to be executed on or before 10-12-1984 on receipt of balance sale consideration which was agreed to be received at the time of execution of the sale deed. However, instead of executing the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs, Atma Ram in connivance with the defendant No.5, when the latter had full knowledge of the agreement dated 10-10-1984, purchased the suit land in favour of his sons i.e. defendants No.2 to 4. Immediately on coming to know of this fraud on 9-11-1984, the plaintiff filed the suit. It was further pleaded by her that she is ready and willing to perform her part of agreement. 3. This suit was resisted and contested by defendants, who claimed to be bonafide purchaser for consideration without notice and estoppel was also pleaded against the plaintiff. The trial court after deciding issues No. l to 3 in favour of the plaintiff decreed the suit. This judgment and decree passed by the trial court was questioned by defendants No.2 to 5 in Civil Appeal No. 3 8-S/l 3 of 1986 wherein pi ain tiff as well as Ann a Ram original defendant No. 1 was arrayed as respondent and by means of Civil Appeal No.64-S/13 of 1988 by Atma Ram wherein plaintiff as well as defendants No.2 to 5 were arrayed as respondents* By means of impugned judgment and decree, the lower appellate Court allowed both the appeals and consequently dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. It is this judgment and decree of the first appellate Court which is questioned by the plaintiff in the present appeal. It is this judgment and decree of the first appellate Court which is questioned by the plaintiff in the present appeal. During the pendency of the present appeal Smt. Parwatoo died and Khazana Ram and Devkoo were ordered to be impleaded as appellants No. l-A and 1-B as per orders passed on C.M.P. (M) 166 of 1993 dated 12-10-1993 and that is now both of them have been substituted as appellants. 4. It is hot in dispute between the parties that appeal titled as Atma Ram v. Partwatoo was listed before the first appellate Court on 1-3-1990 when Khazana Ram, attorney of the plaintiff, was absent, therefore, he was ordered to be proceeded against ex-parte, although he was appearing on the previous hearings as is evident from the record of the trial court. Consequently, the case was adjourned on 29-5-1990 and by means of impugned judgment both the appeals have been allowed by the first appellate Court. From the record it appears that an application under Order 41 Rule 21 for re-hearing of the appeal which was registered as 133- S/6 of 1990 and another application which was registered as 132- S/6 of 1990 were moved. Along with both these applications which were filed for re-hearing the appeals separate affidavits of the learned counsel representing the plaintiff Smt. Parwatoo were attached wehre in it was specifically pleaded by the learned counsel that he could not attend the Court of District Judge, Solan on 29-5-1990 as MASIK SHARAD of his mother had been fixed on the said date by the Pandit. The first appellate Court has dismissed the applications on two counts, firstly that no reason or cause has been shown as to why the applicant or counsel could not come inspite of due notice/service and secondly the application was considered to be beyond 30 days from the date of decision. The appellate Court was further of the view that detailed judgment has been passed after considering the evidence, oral as well as documentary of both the parties on merits, therefore, he saw no reason to allow the application which was accordingly rejected. 5. The appellate Court was further of the view that detailed judgment has been passed after considering the evidence, oral as well as documentary of both the parties on merits, therefore, he saw no reason to allow the application which was accordingly rejected. 5. In the face of averments made in the application which was supported by the affidavit of learned counsel, who had given a plausible reason for his not coming to the Court on 29-S-1990 when the case was heard ex-parte, the rejection of the application observing that no cause/reason has been made out in the application is not correct. As a prudent litigant, plaintiff had made all i possible arrangements for conduct of her appeal and nothing more could be expected from her. On the other hand, learned counsel representing the plaintiff had specifically spelt out in his affidavit that because of MASIK SHARAD of his mother, he could not attend the Court on 29-5-1990. In these circumstances, first appellate Court was not correct in holding that no cause/reason has been made for out condonation of delay. So far the matter relating to limitation is concerned, suffice it to say that it was not in the interest of the plaintiff to have filed a time barred application. Further, dismissal of the application for re-hearing by the first appellate court has resulted in failure of justice inasmuch as the original plaintiff-present appellants have been condemned un-heard her/their prejudice for no fault of her. 6. Needless to point out in this behalf that rules of procedure are hand made for advancing the cause of justice as well as for doing substantial justice between the parties and not to throw out the cases on technical pleas or otherwise to deny a party a fair hearing. In case the application for re-hearing was allowed, the only consequence would have been that the matter was to be re- heard in presence of both the parties who would have got fair chance to put their respective pleas before the Court below. In these circumstances the trial court has fallen in error in rejecting both the applications. 7. In case the application for re-hearing was allowed, the only consequence would have been that the matter was to be re- heard in presence of both the parties who would have got fair chance to put their respective pleas before the Court below. In these circumstances the trial court has fallen in error in rejecting both the applications. 7. Faced with this situation, Shri Bhupender Gupta, Advocate, learned counsel appearing for the respondents urged that the matter is stale and looking to the time gap, it would not be in the interest of justice to order remand of the case for re- hearing the appeals after allowing the applications in questions. Prima facie this argument appears to be attractive but when examined in the light of the facts detailed hereinabove and the circumstances explained by the learned counsel due to which he could not appear on 29-5-1990 on his affidavit, this argument has been raised simply to be rejected and it is ordered accordingly. 8. Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances explained in the applications for re-hearing, it was in the interest of justice, equity and fair - play as well as for doing substantial justice between the parties and setting the controversy at rest for all times to come that the first appellate court ought to have re- heard the matter; by not doing so also it has fallen into error. 9. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this appeal succeeds and the quashed and set aside, consequently both the applications, 133-S/6 of 1990 titled as Parwatoo v. Atma Ram and 132-S/6 of 1996, titled as Parwatoo v. Khem Singh for re-hearing of both the appeals, which were heard and decided ex-parte are hereby allowed and the first appellate court is directed to re hear both these appeals after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to both the parties concerned. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Parties are directed to appear before the Court of District Judge, Solan on 23-6-199, who is directed to hear both these appeals with expedition looking to their age. Registry will ensure that the records of this case are sent well in time so as to reach the lower appellate court below before the date fixed.