R. P. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment dated 21-1-87 passed by Special Judge, Damoh in Special Case No. 1/86 whereby the appellant was convicted for having committed the offence under S. 5 (1) (d) read with S. 5 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act and S. 161 of the Indian Penal Code. He was sentenced to R. I. for one year under S. 161 of the Indian Penal Code and R. I. for 2 years and a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default, R. I. for one year under S. 5 (a) (d) read with S. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. ( 2 ) THE charge proved against him is that he being a Patwari of Halka No. 39/31 of village Kadipur was obliged to issue on demand and on legal payment, copy of a document, i. e. Khasra, the original of which he maintained. Complainant P. W. 1 Hallu needed certified copy of Khasra for producing the same in some civil court in a land dispute case and when he approached this Patwari on 24-6-85, the Patwari told him that he could not give copy unless he paid Rs. 500/- for it. This was a demand of illegal gratification. Hallu did not accept it lying down and complained to the Collector of District Damoh. A written complaint was lodged by him as Ex. P. 1. So a raid was organised with the help of police. One Dy. Collector, Shrivastava and D. S. P. Bansal and a public witness accompanied complainant Hallu and approached the accused-appellant on 26-6-85, as this was the date fixed for payment. Earlier to that, 5 currency notes of Rs. 100/- each, duly marked by the Dy. Collector under his signatures were handed over to the complainant for being passed on to the accused-appellant as a part of the trap. So this trap-party approached the accused-appellant and the Dy. Collector and others waited on the road-side in front of the Tahsil building. The accused-appellant was on some Chabutara in front of the tahsil building. The complainant approached him and paid Rs. 500/- in those currency notes and he gave pre-determined signal to the waiting trap-party. Two witnesses were with the complainant at that time. Raiding-party of the police along with the Dy. Collector caught hold of the accused and recovered 5 currency-notes from his pocket. The complainant approached him and paid Rs. 500/- in those currency notes and he gave pre-determined signal to the waiting trap-party. Two witnesses were with the complainant at that time. Raiding-party of the police along with the Dy. Collector caught hold of the accused and recovered 5 currency-notes from his pocket. They were the same currency-notes which were handed over by the complainant to the accused. So it was found established that this accused in his capacity as public servant and towards performance of his duty demanded and accepted illegal gratification. Hence, he was convicted. ( 3 ) THE finding of the trial Court is based on the evidence of Dy. S. P. Bansal P. W. 5 and Dy. Collector, M. C. Shrivastava P. W. 3 and partly on the evidence of Hallu P. W. 1 who supported the prosecution case regarding the demand of money and forming of trap-party and that he approached the accused appellant with the marked currency-notes, but did not support the acceptance of money from him by the accused and only narrated that the accused refused to accept the money and so he threw it on the Chabutara where the accused was sitting and then the raiding-party on his signal reached and collected money from Chabutara. The Dy. Collector and the police officer have narrated that the money was recovered from the pocket of the accused after the signal was given to them by Hallu P. W. 1. Independent witnesses, who acted as shadow public witnesses with Hallu, were Komal P. W. 2 and one more who is not produced. However, Komal totally declined to support the prosecution case. He also said that the money was thrown by Hallu on the Chabutara when the accused refused to accept it. The Court found that sanction had been given by the prescribed authority namely the Settlement Officer, U. D. Mishra, who appeared in the witness-box as P. W. 4 and proved the sanction given by him as Ex. P. 7. Needless to say that seizure memo of the currency-notes from the accused had been prepared and F. I. R. was recorded thereon, on the report of Dy. S. P. about the whole episode. P. 7. Needless to say that seizure memo of the currency-notes from the accused had been prepared and F. I. R. was recorded thereon, on the report of Dy. S. P. about the whole episode. ( 4 ) IN this appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently urged only two points : (i) that the sanction to prosecute under S. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 is not valid and that in fact, it is no sanction and that whatever it is, it is not established to have been given after perusal of the material collected by way of evidence and it is also premature, as most likely the material was in the process of collection and it may be a sanction conditional on opinion of some other person, namely 'the police Advocate'. Secondly, it was argued that since the witnesses, namely the complainant and the shadow witness, did not say so that the accused accepted the money as an illegal gratification for issuing certified copy and in fact the money was thrown near him by the complainant, there is no evidence of accepting illegal gratification and, therefore, the demand of money earlier, even if established, it does not disclose commission of any offence. It is argued that there is serious doubt about this prosecution version and the mere evidence of Dy. Collector or Police Officer that the marked currency notes were recovered from the pocket of the accused, is not an evidence that the accused-appellant had accepted that money as bribe. ( 5 ) I have heard both the sides. Taking up the first contention of the learned counsel, the sanction is in the form of letter purported to be written by the Settlement Officer to S. P. Damoh. It is signed on 30-11-85. At the head of the letter, the date is 4th December, 1985. Sanction is incorporated in the contents of the letter the relevant words of which are as under :-THE Settlement Officer, U. D. Mishra, appeared in the witness box as P. W. 4 and said that he had given this sanction. He was not cross-examined. No further questions were put to him whether he perused any record. How the matter came to him was not asked from him. He was not cross-examined. No further questions were put to him whether he perused any record. How the matter came to him was not asked from him. The validity of this sanction was not at all questioned before the trial Court and there is no discussion in the Judgment of the trial Court about the validity of this sanction, as it was not challenged. ( 6 ) HOWEVER, the validity of the sanction is a legal question. It has certainly a factual nuance also. It pre-supposes that there should be an authority who can issue such sanction. That means the authority who appoints a particular public servant, and that authority can remove him. Not much challenge has been raised at the bar regarding the legal authority of the Settlement Officer to appoint and remove a Patwari. In fact, certain provisions of the Land Revenue Code (S. 104 (2)) with certain notifications issued by the Govt. of M. P. , suggest that a Settlement Officer, who is also a Land Record Officer, is the person who appoints a Patwari and, therefore, he is authorised to remove him also. So, this officer certainly was an authorised person. He did issue sanction and proved that he had issued the sanction and signed it. Only question is whether there is any legal infirmity. ( 7 ) THIS sanction has various interesting features. Firstly it leaves the matter of prosecution to the opinion of the Police Advocate. It is really strange as to how the opinion of the Police Advocate, taken after the sanction, becomes a material factor for the sanctioning authority. There is nothing on record to show that any opinion of Police Advocate had been obtained by prosecution before launching this prosecution. The sanctioning authority may certainly obtain legal opinion including the legal opinion of Police Advocate. But then this should be a material to be collected by him, which is the relevant factor. That material was certainly not before him. So at least one material, which he considered as relevant, was not before him and may or may not have come into existence afterward. But if something else was before him, it was not disclosed by him. Of course, it was not challenged by the defence in cross-examination. That material was certainly not before him. So at least one material, which he considered as relevant, was not before him and may or may not have come into existence afterward. But if something else was before him, it was not disclosed by him. Of course, it was not challenged by the defence in cross-examination. But there are certain factors on the face of the sanction order which makes it very doubtful whether this was an order issued by the Settlement Officer or under his direction or somebody else put it before him only as a draft, even before anything else came to him and he might have signed the draft. Challan in this case was presented before the Special Court on 27-2-86. Challan is dated 30th October, 1985. Sanction letter is dated 4th December, 1985 and is signed and on 30th November, 85, which means sanction was after the challan was prepared, but before it was filed in court. That generally would be the correct period to seek sanction. But on the sanction communication Ex. P. 7, there are few notings below the main subject matter and below signature of the sanctioning authority. One noting is as under :-"t. I. Kotwali, PSC put up Challan in the Court of Law. Sd/- MSK 7/x/ " (The Govt. Counsel suggests that date is 7/xi instead of 7/x. There is one marking RSP with date 5/12, another marking SP with date 4/12 and third marking is of 21/12. All these are recorded on the sanction letter. Nobody had appeared to state as to what these marking are, who made them and when and whether the noting of MSK is dated 7/10/ or 7/12. If it is dated 7/x, it leads to disastrous consequences regarding this sanction. ( 8 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant has relied on the Supreme Court pronouncement in a case cited as Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 677 : (1979 Cri LJ 633 ). It lays down that it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by the Sanctioning Authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the offence. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 677 : (1979 Cri LJ 633 ). It lays down that it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by the Sanctioning Authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the offence. This could be done in two ways :" (1) by producing the original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction and (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show the facts placed before the Sanctioning Authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. "this principle is undisputed and has been reiterated in a number of judgments earlier and later by the Apex Court. In this case, no doubt the sanctioning officer himself appeared in the witness box, but sanction letter does not show what material was put-up before the sanctioning officer. Sanctioning Officer remained quiet in the witness box regarding what material he considered. Assuming, in favour of the prosecution, that accused should have challenged presence of any relevant record before him by putting questions to that effect and absence of the challenge in cross-examination should lead to inference that this was not challenged, still the sanction letter itself shows that the sanctioning officer himself was not sure as to what offence had been made out and that it was not disclosed to him at any time as to what offence was made out. He was only hoping that the Police Advocate might be of opinion that offences were made out, then his office had no objection to prosecute the accused-appellant. This is hardly a sanction given by the relevant authority. ( 9 ) THUS, the sanction, prima facie, is without considering the necessary material and it appears that the sanctioning authority is leaving his job mid-way and delegating it to the police Advocate. There is no knowing whether the Police Advocate ever completed the delegated task. No doubt, the sanction to prosecute is not an order to prosecute. It is certainly 'no objection' about prosecution. There is no knowing whether the Police Advocate ever completed the delegated task. No doubt, the sanction to prosecute is not an order to prosecute. It is certainly 'no objection' about prosecution. 'but the safeguard, which has been expected to be incorporated in such provision for the accused, is that the sanctioning authority should fully satisfy itself that the material collected discloses offences, at least according to the opinion of the prosecutor and the sanctioning authority has nothing to say against those opinions on evidence collected. This much has to be implied. Here, however, there is express in the sanction letter itself that something was missing, which the authority considered material, i. e. , the opinion of the Police Advocate. So by no standard of application of the legal principle, this sanction can be called a valid sanction. The prosecution case therefore, must fall on this ground and the appeal must be allowed. ( 10 ) HOWEVER, I may note further that the evidence of the complainant and the shadow witness Komal is clear that the accused had not accepted the money and the complainant had thrown it on Chabutara. This evidence is contradicted by the evidence of the Dy. Collector and the Dy. S. P. that money was actually recovered from the pocket of this appellant-accused. Question is whether the proof of demand made on 24-6-85, along with recovery of marked money from accused which money was handed over to the complainant for being passed on as bribe to the accused, is itself sufficient to infer that it was accepted as bribe, by accused, when the person, who paid to him, denied that he had paid it as bribe. If the shadow witness had said that it was paid in his presence as a bribe, it would be different situation, even if the complainant was denying it, because he is a truth concealing witness to that extent. The Dy. Collector and the Dy. S. P. had not seen the passing of the money from the complainant to the accused. They presumed that the money passed because they had seen the signal give by the accused. Tainted money was certainly recovered from the accused. The Dy. Collector and the Dy. S. P. had not seen the passing of the money from the complainant to the accused. They presumed that the money passed because they had seen the signal give by the accused. Tainted money was certainly recovered from the accused. However, the fact of money having reached the accused is insufficient to hold that it was taken by him as bribe from complainant to perform those public duties to the complainant, which he was bound to perform as a public servant, namely, issuance of copy of khasra. Acceptance of illegal gratification is also an important part of the offence under S. 161 of the Indian Penal Code and also under S. 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, So, the important element is lacking. So irrespective of the validity of sanction, on merits also, it remains in the sphere of 'not proved' that this accused appellant had accepted the money from the complainant. It cannot be said on surmise only that it must have reached the pocket of the accused by his 'taking' it as bribe from complainant. That is not permissible in law. Criminal jurisprudence, in our country, clearly mandates that the guilt of the accused must be established beyond reasonable doubt. This standard of proof has not been achieved in this case. So also the accused-appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt. ( 11 ) IN view of the discussion aforesaid, the appeal is accepted. Judgment of conviction and order of sentence of the trial Court are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges. The fine, if paid, be refunded to the appellant. Appeal allowed. .