JUDGMENT 1. - Rajasthan Road Transport Corporation (for short the Corporation) is a statutory body incorporated under the Road Transport Act, 1950. It is engaged in plying buses in the State of Rajasthan and other States to provide means of transportation to the public. By this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the Corporation is challenging the order dated, July 11, 1994 of the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur whereby approval of dismissal of the respondent-Conductor Shri Girdhar Singh under Section 32(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) has been declined. 2. Necessary facts of the case are extensively set out in the impugned order of the Labour Court. Put shortly, on April 30, 1989, the respondent- workman was Conductor in Bus No. 7060 of the Corporation which was plying from Bhilwara to Ajmer. It was checked at village 'Nanga-Ji-Kheda' by the checking party and 22 passengers, out of 23 total passengers travelling in the bus, were found without tickets and 60 Kg. of luggage was being transported without paying fare, though the conductor had charged fare from them. A domestic enquiry was initiated for the above misconduct. The conductor was suspended and a regular charge-sheet was served upon him. After completing regular enquiry, the officer found his guilt established. The Competent Authority, after service of a show cause notice, imposed penalty of dismissal agreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer. Since a general demand character was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur an application under 32(2)(b) of the Act was moved by the Corporation before the Tribunal to accord approval of dismissal of the workman. The learned Judge of the Tribunal, though held that the workman was paid wages of one month as required by the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, declined to accord approval holding domestic enquiry proceeding to be vitiated for violation of the principles of natural justice on the ground that the enquiry officer himself put questions and cross-examined defence witness Nainu Ram and the workman was not allowed to cross-examine the witness thereafter the opportunity was also not afforded to him to explain the facts. The learned Judge placed reliance on the decision of this court in Hukam Chand v. Union of India and others, 1990(1) RLR 647 . 3. The learned Judge placed reliance on the decision of this court in Hukam Chand v. Union of India and others, 1990(1) RLR 647 . 3. Shri Kewal Ram, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation, while assailing the order of the Tribunal strenuously contended that the scope and power of the Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act is limited to the extent as to whether a prima facie case has been made out by the employer against the employee or not. That the Tribunal is not required to consider merits of the case as trying the case itself or as an appellate authority. Criticising the impugned order of the Tribunal, learned counsel urged that the principles of natural justice can neither be reduced to any hard and fast formula nor it can be put in a strait/jacket. Their applicability depends in the context and facts and circumstances of each case. The objective is to provide a fair and impartial hearing and a fair deal to those whose rights are going to be affected. Learned counsel contended that by mere putting certain questions to a defence witness and eliciting answers from him, in absence of anything more, does not warrant the criticism that the enquiry officer acted both as a prosecutor and the Judge when he recorded evidence in the case. It was further submitted that there is nothing on record to show that the workman was not allowed to re-examine on cross-examining his own witness Nainu Ram or that he was denied the opportunity to explain the facts narrated by the witness in his cross-examination. In absence of any material on record, learned counsel contended, the Tribunal committed serious error on the face of the record by assuming those facts and therefore, in holding the proceedings of the domestic enquiry to be vitiated.On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the workman-conductor, supported the order of the Tribunal relying on the decision of Hukam Chand's case. 4. I have given my careful consideration to the respective submissions made on behalf of the parties.At the out-set, it may be stated that under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the only function of the Tribunal is to decide whether to grant or refuse to grant permission. 4. I have given my careful consideration to the respective submissions made on behalf of the parties.At the out-set, it may be stated that under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the only function of the Tribunal is to decide whether to grant or refuse to grant permission. The Tribunal is not required to examine the sufficiency of evidence in proof of the findings in the domestic enquiry nor it is concerned with the major or harshness of punishment. No doubt, if the Tribunal is satisfied that the finding recorded in domestic enquiry is perverse in the sense that it is not justified by any legal evidence whatsoever, in such case it may be entitled to consider whether the approval should be accorded to the employer or not. But it is essential to bear in mind the difference between the finding which is not supported by any legal evidence and a finding which may appear to be not supported by sufficient or adequate evidence. In other words there are two exceptions in which the findings of a domestic enquiry can be interfered by the Tribunal one is where the findings are not based on legal evidence and the other is where the findings are such where no reasonable man could have arrived at on the basis of material in the domestic enquiry. It is also to be borne in mind that an approval accorded by the Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) does not debar an industrial dispute from being raised by the workman. Then, in a domestic enquiry, strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Evidence Act are not applicable. 5. In the above legal perspective, the question for consideration is whether the proceedings in the domestic enquiry against the workman stood vitiated as being in violation to the principles of natural justice on the ground that the enquiry officer had put certain questions to a defence witness ?One of the principles of natural justice is that in an inquiry, the enquiry officer should not act both as a prosecutor and the Judge when he records evidence in the case. The principle has an objective behind it. The objective is to ensure a fair and unbiased enquiry proceeding. The principle has an objective behind it. The objective is to ensure a fair and unbiased enquiry proceeding. Whether an enquiry officer acted both as a Prosecutor and the Judge and whether the enquiry proceedings stand vitiated or not on the ground of bias or unfairness, depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. No such principle can be laid down in abstract that by mere putting some questions to a witness or witnesses by the enquiry officer itself would vitiate the entire proceedings on the ground of bias or being unfair. The principle of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formula or in a strait-jacket, but it has to be considered in the context and the facts and circumstances of that particular case. No restriction can be made on the power of the Tribunal or the enquiry officer to put questions to any witness to elicit and clear up certain points of doubt or to throw light on some shaded area in the enquiry. The entire conduct of the enquiry officer has to be seen before he is labelled to be biased. 6. In Workmen to Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, Madras v. Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, Madras, 1970(1) LLJ 26 the Senior Labour Officer who was the enquiry officer, put certain questions to the witnesses and elicited answers from them. A similar criticism raised in that case that he acted both as a Prosecutor and the Judge when he recorded evidence in this case was rejected by the Supreme Court. Their Lordships observed as under:- "There is no warrant for the criticism levelled by the appellant that the senior Labour Officer has acted both as the prosecutor and the judge when he recorded the evidence in the case. No doubt there was no officer separately conducting the prosecution on the side of the management, but what the Labour Officer had done, as evidence by Ex.M.9, was to put questions to the witnesses and elicit answers and allow the worker to cross-examine those witnesses. Similarly he has also taken the statements of the worker and asked for clarification from him wherever necessary. Therefore, the enquiry proceedings, as held by the Labour Court have been completely fair and impartial." 7. In Chunni Lal Rathore v. Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal and another, 1976 Lab. Similarly he has also taken the statements of the worker and asked for clarification from him wherever necessary. Therefore, the enquiry proceedings, as held by the Labour Court have been completely fair and impartial." 7. In Chunni Lal Rathore v. Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal and another, 1976 Lab. IC 1498, the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court also considered this aspect and held as under : "It is said that the enquiry officer cross-examined the delinquent and his witnesses closely which reduced him to the position of the prosecutor and, accordingly, showed his bias. Again, on looking to the question asked by the enquiry officer we are not in a position to say that he cross-examined the witnesses for the delinquent with any bias. The questions were a few in number and were directed to clear up some points of doubt or to throw light on some shaded areas in the enquiry. We fail to perceive from them that the enquiry officer was biased against the petitioner, except making a sincere effort to reach clarity on some points." 8. In State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K. Sharma, 1991(II) CLR 29 the Apex Court of the country, after considering the entire case law on the principles of natural justice, laid down that while applying the rule of natural justice in a case, the validity of the order has to be decided on the touch-stone of prejudice. It would be convenient to refer the following observations made in this connection:- "It would not be correct in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar (supra) should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e. adequate or a full hearing) or a violation of a procedural rule of requirement governing the enquiry, the complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid." 9. The decision in Hukam Chand's case (supra) is based on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court in Abdul Wahib v. State of Karnataka, 1981(1) SLJ 388. In that case, the enquiry officer cross- examined the prosecution witness who had supported the version of the workman treating him as a hostile witness and also cross-examined the defence witnesses, particularly suggesting them that they were uttering false-hood. In these circumstances, it was held that the enquiry officer was biased and he had made up his mind to find the petitioner guilty to the charge. The learned Single Judge categorically observed thus:- "In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the Enquiry Officer was biased and had played the role of Prosecutor and therefore, the enquiry is vitiated. Moreover, in the present case, since the petitioner was not allowed to further cross-examine the witnesses after questions were put by the Enquiry Officer it also amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. Since we are in agreement with this argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, we refrain ourselves from mentioning or dealing with other points raised in the petition." 10. In Hukam Chand's case, the Enquiry Officer had cross-examined all the witnesses who had appeared before him during the course of enquiry and he did not allow further cross-examination to the workman after cross-examination done by him. Hence, the enquiry officer was held to be biased and to have played the role of prosecutor. 11. In backdrop of legal proposition as laid down above, it may now be examined as to whether the enquiry officer acted both as a prosecutor and the Judge when he recorded the evidence in the enquiry proceedings.The Tribunal held the enquiry to be in violation of principles of natural justice on two grounds. One is that the enquiry officer had put question on important points to defence witness Nainu Ram and the other is that the workman was not allowed to further cross examine the witness after his cross examination by the enquiry officer and he was also not allowed to give explanation to the facts elicited in cross examination of the witness. 12. 12. So far second ground is concerned, there was no material on the record to establish or even to show that the workman wanted to re-examine or cross-examine the witness Nainu Ram after questioning by the enquiry officer or he was denied an opportunity to explain any fact narrated by the said witness either in examination-in-chief or in cross-examination. On the other hand, the workman has stated in the enquiry that reply dated 5.7.89 filed by him be treated his statement in defence and he did not want to make further statement in his defence. For the sake of convenience, his statement given in defence on 23.8.89 (which was recorded after the statement of Nainu Ram on 21.8.89) may be reproduced herein. " lQkbZ & c;ku Jh fxj/kj flag iq= Jh ujsUnz flag ifjpkyd HkhyokM+k vkxkj eSa Jh fxj/kj flag ifjpkyd HkhyokM+k vkxkj c;ku djrk gwWa fd esjs }kjk iwoZ esa vkjksi i= la[;k 1409 fnukad 02-06-1989 dk tokc izLrqr 05-07-1989 dks gh lQkbZ dk c;ku ekuk tkosA eSa i`Fkd~ ls lQkbZ c;ku nsuk ugha pkgrk gwWaA eSa viuh tkWap izfdz;k ls lger gwWa rFkk vc bl ekeys esa u rks xokg fjdkMZ dqN Hkh is'k djuk ugha pkgrk gwWaA " 13. In written reply submitted before the Industrial Tribunal also no such objection was taken by the workman that he was not allowed to cross- examine or re-examine the witness Nainu Ram or to give an explanation to his statement. On the contrary, the objection taken by him is that he was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses of the Corporation or to produce his defence witnesses in the enquiry. 14. On perusal of the statement of the witness Nainu Ram, it would transpire that statement given by him even in examination-in-chief is contrary to the defence taken by the workman. The questions which were put to him by the enquiry officer and reply given by the witness are wholly innocuous. Having minutely gone through the statement of Nainu Ram, I am convinced that neither the enquiry officer was biased against the workman nor his case is prejudiced by putting 3-4 questions to the witness-Nainu Ram. The view taken by the Tribunal that there has been violation of the principles of natural justice in the enquiry proceeding is without any basis, rather it is contrary to the record. The view taken by the Tribunal that there has been violation of the principles of natural justice in the enquiry proceeding is without any basis, rather it is contrary to the record. As observed earlier, by mere putting a few questions to a defence witness by the inquiry officer, it cannot be presumed and held that he acted both as a prosecutor and the judge and the enquiry proceeding is vitiated on the ground of bias and being unfair. The charge of misconduct proved against the workman is of grave nature and order of his dismissal cannot be said to be harsh. Dismissal from service is proper punishment in such a grave misconduct. 15. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The impugned order of the tribunal withholding approval of dismissal of the workman under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act is quashed and set aside. The case is sent back to the Tribunal for deciding the application afresh in light of the judgment and pass necessary orders. In the facts and circumstances, parties are left to bear their own costs.Petition allowed. *******