JUDGMENT P.K. Sarin, J. This criminal revision application is directed against the order dated 29.3.88 passed by Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jhanjharpur at Madhubani, in T.R. No. 902/88, G.R. No. 95/87 whereby the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offences under Sections 323, 342 and 379 I.P.C. against the petitioners and two others and has ordered for issuance of process against the petitioner and other co-accused. 2. It appears that a complaint (a copy of which is at Annexure-5) was filed by O.P. No. 2 against the petitioner and two other persons before the learned Magistrate alleging that his village was badly affected by the floods and the flood relief was to be distributed and, accordingly, a list was prepared which was duly signed by the petitioner and other co-accused Mahabir Mandal, Panchayat Sevak and members of the committee of the villagers. It was alleged that subsequently the petitioner and Mahabir Mandal arbitrarily reduced the units against which the Sarpanch of the village Atiqur Rahman gave a petition on 9.10.87 for amending the units after local enquiry. It was alleged that the petitioner and other co-accused had come on 9.10.87 at about 12.30 P.M. to hold the enquiry in this regard and made enquiries. It was alleged that the petitioner was adamant that the units which had been reduced would not be changed and when the complainant O.P. No. 2 insisted that he would take the relief grains, according to the units to which he was entitled to, the petitioner abused him and took him into custody. It was further alleged that when the villagers asked the petitioner to release the complainant in order to enable him to offer Friday Namaj, the petitioner refused to do so and abused him and also ordered to apprehend whereupon the constables and the accused persons chased him and entered in the mosque and did not permit the complainant to offer Friday Namaj. It was further alleged that the petitioner dragged the complainant by his neck with a Gamcha but the complainant was rescued by the villagers. It was alleged that on the order of the petitioner, the co-accused Mahabir Mandal after taking stick from the constable, assaulted the complainant on his hand and the other co-accused assaulted the complainant by lathi on his leg. It was alleged that on the order of the petitioner, the co-accused Mahabir Mandal after taking stick from the constable, assaulted the complainant on his hand and the other co-accused assaulted the complainant by lathi on his leg. It was also alleged that the petitioner and other co-accused were taking the complainant to Police Station along with a cycle but in the way they released the complainant. The complaint was filed on 12.10.87 (a copy of which is at Annexure-5). 3. Four witnesses were examined on behalf of the complainant in the enquiry under Section 202, Cr. P.C. The learned Magistrate felt satisfied that there was a prima facie case for trial against the accused persons including the petitioner and accordingly ordered for issuance of summons against them by the impugned order. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this criminal revision application. 4. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner is a Circle Officer (Anchal Adhikari) and is a Government servant and the act complained of is alleged to have been done while the petitioner was discharging his official duty. As such, sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be referred to as the Code) was necessary before the cognizance was taken against him. It has been contended that the petitioner had gone on that day along with Panchayat Sevak for distribution of grains by way of flood relief and in that course the Sarpanch and other villagers abused and assaulted the petitioner asking as to why units have been reduced and on the order given by Sarpanch, coaccused Mahabir Mandal was abducted and an attempt was made on the life of the informant as well for which First Information Report was lodged and Mahabir Mandal was rescued by the police party. Copies of F.I.R., Sanha report etc. have been filed in the present criminal revision application. 5. As regards the materials relating to the F.I.R. lodged regarding assault on the petitioner and abduction of Mahabir Mandal, it does not appear to be relevant at this stage for deciding the question of illegality or impropriety of the impugned order as those materials were only in support of the defence case and those materials were not before the learned Magistrate when he passed the impugned order. Therefore, those documents are not considered here in this revision. 6. Therefore, those documents are not considered here in this revision. 6. As regards the contention that the sanction under Section 197 of the Code was necessary before taking cognizance against the petitioner, the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the complainant have cited several case laws which are as follows : 1979 Cr. LJ 1018 (Patna), 1982 (2) Cr. LJ NCC 21, 1983 (2) Cr. LJ, 988, 1983 S.C. 610, 1982 (1) Cr. LJ 1203 (Patna), 1986 SC, 345, 1979 SC, 1841, 1986 SC 45, 1988 SC 345, 1966 SC 220, AIR 1964 Bombay 191, AIR 1954 pepen 95, 1996 (1) SCC 478 , 1993 (2) SCC 339, 1994 (3) Suppl. SCC 615, 1991 (3) Cr. LJ 3004 (M.P), 1992 (1) Cr. LJ 26 and 1984 Cr. LJ 1667. I need not discuss every case law cited by the parties. Only a few cases may be referred to regarding the scope of Section 197 of the Code. 7. The Apex Court in the case of Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. Bhari reported in A.I.R. 1956, SC, 44 has held that the Court has to see whether it can take cognizance of a case without previous sanction and for this purpose the Court has to find out if the act complained of is committed by the accused while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. It was also observed that it does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. It has been further observed that what the court must find out is whether the act and the official duty are so inter-related that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty, though, possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation. 8. The Apex Court in a later decision in the case of Baijnath and another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1966, SC 220, has observed that where the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary. It is observed that what is important is the quality of the act and the protection contemplated by Section 197 of the Code will be attracted where the act falls within the scope and range of his official duties. It is further observed that an offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty, as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. If it is unconnected with the official duty, there can be no protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable. 9. The Apex Court in Manohar Nath Kaul vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir reported in AIR 1983, SC, 610 has referred to the observations made in Amrik Singh's case reported in AIR 1995, SC, 309 and has quoted the following passage: "The words any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty employed in S. 197 (1) of the Code are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly the section will be rendered altogether sterile for it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197 (1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision." The Apex Court observed that the rule quoted above from Amrik Singh's case correctly lays down the legal proposition as to invocability of the protection under Section 197 (1) of the Code. 10. I n the case of Director of Inspection and Audit and others vs. C.L. Subramanium reported in 1994 (3) Suppl. 10. I n the case of Director of Inspection and Audit and others vs. C.L. Subramanium reported in 1994 (3) Suppl. SCC 615, the Apex Court has observed that the object of Section 197 of the Code is to provide guard against vexatious proceedings against Judges, Magistrates and public servants and to secure the opinion of superior authority whether it is desirable that there should be a prosecution. It has been further observed that on the date of the complaint itself, it is incumbent upon the court to take cognizance of such offence only when there is a previous sanction, then unless the sanction to prosecute is produced, the court can not take cognizance of the offence. Naturally, at that stage, the court taking cognizance has to examine the acts complained of and see whether the provisions of Section 197 of the Code are attracted. It is observed that for this purpose the allegations made in the complaint are very much relevant to appreciate whether the acts complained of are directly concerned, or reasonably connected with official duties, so that if questioned, the public servant could claim to have done these acts by virtue of his office, that is to say there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of the official duties. 11. In the case of S.B. Saha and others vs. M.S. Kochar (AIR 1979, SC 1841), the Apex Court has observed that the words "any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty employed in Section 197 (1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. The Apex Court observed that if these words are considered narrowly, the Section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, "it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence; never can be". The Court further observed in the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The one broad approach pointed out by the Apex Court in the said case is whether the public servant if challenged can reasonably claim that what he does he does by virtue of his office. The one broad approach pointed out by the Apex Court in the said case is whether the public servant if challenged can reasonably claim that what he does he does by virtue of his office. The Court also observed that act constituting an offence directly or reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision and the quality of the act is important and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties, the protection contemplated under Section 197 of the Code will be attracted. 12. In the case of Balbir Singh vs. D.N. Kadian (AIR, 1986, SC 345) the Apex Court reiterated its earlier observation made in the case of Matajog Dobey (supra). 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the decision in Pukhraj vs. State of Rajasthan and another (AIR 1973, SC, 2591) and has also referred to three other decisions of High Courts. It shows that the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Matajog Dobey (supra) has been followed in subsequent decisions. 14. In a recent decision in the case of R. Balakrishna Pillai vs. State of Kerala (1996) 1 SCC 478 ) the Apex Court has held that whether act complained of has a direct nexus or relation with the official duties of a public servant will depend on the facts of each case. The Apex Court has also referred to the case of M.S. Kochar (supra) and reiterated the same view. In R. Bala Krishna Pillai's case, a Minister was charged with criminal conspiracy on the allegation that he sold electricity in the State of Karnataka without the consent of the Government of Kerala which is an illegal act under the provisions of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and the Kerala Electricity Board Rules framed thereunder. It. was alleged that the Minister in pursuance of the said alleged conspiracy abused his official position and illegally sold certain units to the private industry in Bangalore which profited a heavy amount. The Apex Court held that the act complained of providing electricity was done in the discharge of official duty as a Minister and that the act was directly and reasonably connected with the official duty of a Minister and would, therefore, attract the protection of Section 197 (1) of the Code. 15. The Apex Court held that the act complained of providing electricity was done in the discharge of official duty as a Minister and that the act was directly and reasonably connected with the official duty of a Minister and would, therefore, attract the protection of Section 197 (1) of the Code. 15. It is, thus, settled by the various decisions of the Apex Court that where a public servant is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty, no court shall take cognizance of such offence without previous sanction of the concerned Government. It has also been seen that even if some act is done in excess of the authority, still the protection under Section 197 (1) of the Code would be available to the public servant if it appears that the act done was during the discharge of the official duty or while acting or purporting to act in the official duty. Even if the act be illegal and has been done in contravention of any provision, still the protection under Section 197 (1) of the Code would be available if the act or purporting to act was done in the discharge of his official duty. Keeping in view the legal position as settled by the Apex Court regarding the scope of Section 197 (1) of the Code, we may now take into consideration the allegations made in the complaint to find out whether, according to tile complainant's allegations, the act complained of be said to have been done by the petitioner while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. According to the allegations made in the complaint, the petitioner is Anchal Adhikari who had come in the village on the fateful day along with Panchayat Sevak Mahabir Mandal and some constables in connection with making enquiry on the application of Sarpanch Atiqur Rahman regarding the reduction in units done by the petitioner earlier and on that day the petitioner had made enquiries from the residents of the village. It is alleged that the petitioner was adamant on his stand that the units which have been reduced would remain so as the excess grains have been distributed in two other villages. It is alleged that the petitioner was adamant on his stand that the units which have been reduced would remain so as the excess grains have been distributed in two other villages. It was further alleged that when the complainant O.P. No. 2 insisted on being given grains on his valid units, the petitioner abused and took him into custody. This act of the petitioner appears to have been done during the discharge of his official duty as he was holding enquiry and the complainant insisted on being given grains, according to the units before reduction, while the petitioner was adamant that the reduced units will only be recognised and would be acted upon. If there appears to be obstruction in the performance of the official duty, the concerned public servant if having magisterial power may apprehend any person and take him into custody for obstruction in the official duty. It has not been clearly stated in the complaint that the complainant made good his escape from the custody and entered in the mosque but the allegations made in the complaint are indicative of the said fact. It has been alleged in the complaint' that when the petitioner refused to allow complainant for offering Friday Namaj, he abused the villagers and also ordered constable to apprehend whereupon the accused including the petitioner entered, into the mosque and the petitioner dragged him by holding his neck by Gamcha which caused respiratory trouble and the villagers got him released. As it is also clear that the villagers had got the complainant released on their own whereupon, according to allegations in complaint, on the order of the petitioner, the other co-accused Mahabir Mandal assaulted the complainant by lathi and, thereafter, the accused proceeded to Police Station and his cycle was also taken away by the third co-accused. However, later on he was released. Thus, the entire allegation shows that the act complained of was done by the petitioner while acting in the discharge of his official duty as Anchal Adhikari in connection with flood relief work. The complainant had been taken into custody. He was got released by the villagers whereupon the complainant was apprehended and in that course he was said to have been assaulted by two other co-accused and, thereafter, the petitioner and other co-accused proceeded towards Police Station along with the complainant. The complainant had been taken into custody. He was got released by the villagers whereupon the complainant was apprehended and in that course he was said to have been assaulted by two other co-accused and, thereafter, the petitioner and other co-accused proceeded towards Police Station along with the complainant. Thus, the allegation made in the complaint shows that the petitioner Anchal Adhikari is said to have done the Act complained of in course of discharge of his official duty, If any obstruction is made in the discharge of the official duty and a person is apprehended and other persons forcibly get him released, and the public servant re-apprehends that person with use of some force, he can not be said to have acted beyond the scope of discharge of the official duty and it can not be said that the act complained of in that situation is not an act in the discharge of the official duty, Even if such act be in excess of the official duty, still the protection would be available to the public servant under Section 197 of the Code. The learned Magistrate has not at all considered about the applicability of Section 197 (1) of the Code when the allegations were made against a public servant regarding the acts done while discharging his official duty. In my opinion, sanction of the State Government was necessary against the petitioner before taking cognizance against him on such complaint. The learned Magistrate has erred in taking cognizance without there being any previous sanction from the State Government under Section 197 of the Code for prosecution of the petitioner. 16. In the circumstances, the impugned order in so far as it relates to the petitioner can not be sustained as the cognizance against the petitioner was barred for want of previous sanction under Section 197 (1) of the Code and the same is liable to be set aside. This criminal revision application is, accordingly allowed and the impugned order in so far as it relates to taking cognizance against the petitioner and summoning him is set aside.