JUDGMENT 1. :- By this petition, the petitioner challenges Ex.P/5 page 35 by which his services as Store Purchase Officer have been terminated 2. The petitioner was admittedly appointed on probation and his probation was extended from time to time. Assailing the order of termination, it is contended by the petitioner that the order is a colourable exercise of power and the services of the petitioner were terminated for certain misconduct and consequently, no such termination can take place in violation of the provisions of Art.31 1(2) of the Constitution of India Several grounds as mentioned in the petition have also been canvassed. In reply, it is submitted by the respondents that the petitioner's probation was continued after the period of six months and his services have been terminated as his work during the probation was not satisfactory. The impugned order Annex. 5 does not cast any stigma on the petitioner and is in legitimate exercise of the powers of the respondent to terminate the service of a probationer as per the conditions of service accepted by the petitioner. 3. By ground No.1. it is submitted by the petitioner that his appointment on regularly selected basis and though the probation was for a period of six months and no confirmation order was made, the petitioner is deemed to have been confirmed. I am unable to accept this contention as the law in the question is settled and a person is confirmed only by an order to that effect and there is no deemed confirmation in law. In the present petition also, therefore, there is no question of any deemed confirmation of the petitioner. 4. Ground No.2 challenges the order of termination on the question of competency by the Managing Director of the respondent Mill to terminate the services of the petitioner. The contention is denied An order of termination by the Managing Director cannot be erroneous in any manner the Rules of 1958 did not require that the orders shall be made by the Board. A perusal of the order of appointment will show that it was issued by the Managing Director Annex.P/5 as also issued by the Managing Director, it mentions that the termination is as directed by the Administrator in fact therefore. A perusal of the order of appointment will show that it was issued by the Managing Director Annex.P/5 as also issued by the Managing Director, it mentions that the termination is as directed by the Administrator in fact therefore. the termination either by the Board or by the Administrator as pleaded by the petitioner mere communication of that order by the Managing Director is no violation of law. This contention, therefore, baseless and is rejected. 5. Next contention is that the condition No. 4 by which services can be terminated by 15 days notice is not binding as has been imposed subsequent to his appointment. The contention is baseless The basic letter of appointment itself states that formal order of appointment with conditions of appointments would be given to the petitioner after he joins the services. The contention therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 6. In view of the fact that the petitioner was given 15 days' pay in lieu of the notice contemplated under condition No.4. the condition No.4 is also unsustainable. Lack of notice cannot render the termination bad. 7. Even if the petitioner is considered to be a confirmed employee and the services of the confirmed employee also can be terminated after one month's notice and it is settled position in law that one month's pay is in lieu of such notice is the only claim which can be made. For this reason, condition No.5 mentioned in ground No.5 is also not acceptable. What has been held by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation AIR 1986 SC 1571 : (1986 Lab.IC 1312) is that the unconscionable or unfair condition opposed to public policy is void ab initio. The contention that an employee can be removed from service after due notice is neither unconscionable nor unfair or unreasonable, it is also not opposed to public policy. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court of India is of no avail to the petitioner. The contention that condition No.4 is not therefore, binding in view of this decision is therefore, unsustainable and is rejected. 8. By ground No.7 it is alleged that the petitioner was never served with any charge-sheet and he has been removed as a matter of punishment and hence, it is a colourable exercise of power. In view of the subsmissions made in reply, contention is not acceptable. 8. By ground No.7 it is alleged that the petitioner was never served with any charge-sheet and he has been removed as a matter of punishment and hence, it is a colourable exercise of power. In view of the subsmissions made in reply, contention is not acceptable. The services of the petitioner have been terminated for unsatisfactory service during probation. The material on which reliance is placed by the management for coming to the conclusion that the petitioner's service during probation was not satisfactory. It is contended that consideration of this material amounts to removal of the petitioner for those reasons and is, therefore, penal. I am unable to accept this contention. The order of termination is an order of termination simpliciter without any stigma. The petitioner has alleged that it is a stigmatic order and therefore, bad in law as violative of Art.311(2) of the Constitution of India, Replying this contention: it is pointed out that the services of the petitioner were terminated for unsatisfactory service during probation and material for coming to such conclusion is also shown to this Court to substantiate the case that it is really unsatisfactory and not for any other reasons that the services have been terminated. For this reason also, therefore. the submission is unsustainable. It is obvious that the petitioner's service has come to an end for unsatisfactory completion of probation. Ground No.8 deals with proposition of the rules required disciplinary action. Since the petitioner was not removed from service as a disciplinary action, this contention also does not survive. 9. An order terminating services simpliciter need not be a speaking order and consequently this ground also baseless. 10. Then relying on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1986 (3) SCC 277 : (1986 Lab.IC 1086), it was canvassed that this Court can go behind the order which ex facie is one of innocuoustion termination but in substance the termination is brought about for alleged misconduct. The proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in this case is not and cannot be disputed. In the present case on perusal of the record and the reply. I find that the order of termination is one of innocuous simpliciter termination only and to justify that it is so material is brought before this Court to show that the termination was without stigma. In the present case on perusal of the record and the reply. I find that the order of termination is one of innocuous simpliciter termination only and to justify that it is so material is brought before this Court to show that the termination was without stigma. The petitioner could in due process of law be terminated from service for unsatisfactory completing of his probation that has been done. There is, therefore, no question of well being lifted. I find that the order of termination is one of simpliciter termination is not a stigma of any kind. Pay in lieu of notice has been given to the petitioner and consequently, there is no illegality in the lee mination of the petitioner's service 11. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as costs.Petition dismissed. *******