JUDGMENT Surinder Sarup, J.(Oral): This appeal of the defendant is directed against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the two Courts below, whereby the suit of the plaintiff-respondent has been decreed. The judgment of the lower appellate Court is that of Shri V.K. Ahuja, Addl. District Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan dated 25-10-1989 and that of the trial Court is that of Shri. B.D. Sharma, Sub Judge, Sirmaur Camp at Sarahna dated 31- 05-1989. The trial Court had decreed the suit of the plaintiff for declaration as well as for grant of permanent injunction restraining the defendant - appellant from interfering in the suit land. The appeal of the defendant having been dismissed, he has come up in the second appeal. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through die record. It is not necessary to go into the facts inasmuch as one of the issues framed in this case is Issue No.6 to the effect that whether this Court has so jurisdiction to try the present suit as alleged? “The onus to prove this issue was on the defendant The trial Court dealt with this issue as follows: "To rebut the plea of the defendant that the Court has so jurisdiction to the present suit, it would be revenant to place reliance cr. A.IR 1981 page 18 wherein it has been held that where there is a dispute about the status of tenancy, the Civil Cert jurisdiction is not excluded. Admittedly, the dispute between the parties in this is with regard to their status pertaining to the tenancy of the suit land and thus in view of the law laid down in the above authority, I hold that the jurisdiction of this Court is not ousted. This issue is decided against the defendant." 3. In appeal, s perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate Court shows that this aspect of the case has not been gone into at all by the learned lower appellate Court, though this issue goes to the root of the case. 3 A. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under Section 115 of the I H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. 3 A. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under Section 115 of the I H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. What has happened in the present case is that the Assistant Collector, 2nd Grade, Pachhad vide his order dated 10-2-1977, in exercise of powers vested in him under the Act, sanctioned all mutations regarding the suit land in favour of the plaintiff. Against that order, the defendant Nek Ram went up in appeal under Section 114 of the H.P. Tenancy Act. That appeal was disposed of by Shri S.K. Dash, Divisional Collector, Rajgarh on 10-1-1983, vide his order, certified copy of which is placed as Ex.P-7 on the record. Admittedly, a second appeal lay against that order under Section 114(2) of the said Act. However, instead of filing any appeal as provided under the said Act, the plaintiff approached the Civil Court by way of present suit necessitating the framing of issue regarding jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the matter. 4. Shri Kuldip Singh, learned counsel for the respondent has very ably argued his case and has submitted that admittedly the appeal before the Sub Divisional Collector was time barred, having been Hled against the order dated 10.2.1977 as late as 10-2-1982, as is clear from the perusal of Ex.P-7 itself It is manifest that the appeal was hopelessly time-barred. Admittedly, the same was accompanied by an application for condoning the delay. Admittedly also, there is a provision in the second appeal, for condoning the delay on sufficient cause being shown. The said application has not at all been considered vide order Ex.P-7 aforesaid. Moreover, after recording the fact that the case was called thrice on 10-1-1983 but the plaintiff did not appear despite having been served, the appeal has been accepted by the Sub Divisional Collector. This is another illegality in that order, as it is not a reasoned order. Buttressed by these admitted facts, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has submitted that in these circumstances, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred. For this proposition, he has cited a Full Bench judgment of this Court reported as Chuhniya Devi v. Janki Ram, 1991(1) Shimla Law Cases 223. In this case, two questions were referred for being answered by the Full Bench. For this proposition, he has cited a Full Bench judgment of this Court reported as Chuhniya Devi v. Janki Ram, 1991(1) Shimla Law Cases 223. In this case, two questions were referred for being answered by the Full Bench. These two questions were "Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction, in respect of an oreder, (a) Made by the competent authority under the H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1954, and (b) of conferment of proprietary rights under Section 104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972." After going into all the pros and cons of that case sic therein, the Full Bench has by its detailed judgment, running into 64 pages answered both the questions in the following terms: "(a) that an order made by the competent authority under the H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1954, is open to challenge before a civil court to the extent that it relates to matters falling within the ambit of Section 37(3) and Section 46 of that Act; and (b).the civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into any question connected with the conferment of proprietary rights under Section .104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, except in a case where it is found that the statutory authorities envisaged by that Act bad not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure or where the provisions of the Act had not been complied with." 5. It is clear from answer (b) that where it is found that the statutory authorities envisaged by the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure or where the provisions of the Act having not been complied with, the civil court has got the jurisdiction to go into any question connected with the conferment of proprietary rights. 6. Relying on this ratio, Shri Kuldip Singh, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has vehemently argued that the civil court had the jurisdiction in the matter. 7. Not retting on his laurels, he has also challenged Ex.P-7, that it does not contain any reasons. In support of this plea, he has cited I.L.R. 1986 (H.P. Series) page 814 Parkash Singh v. State of H.P. & ors. 7. Not retting on his laurels, he has also challenged Ex.P-7, that it does not contain any reasons. In support of this plea, he has cited I.L.R. 1986 (H.P. Series) page 814 Parkash Singh v. State of H.P. & ors. It has been laid down therein: "It is a cardinal principle of rule of law which governs our polity that every judicial or quasi-judicial authority must, while adjudicating disputed claims, make speaking orders, that is to say, orders which deal with all the contentions raised and in which the conclusion drawn and findings recorded are supported by reasons which can be tested by reference to the material on the record of the case, including oral and documentary evidence. This is imperative so that the litigants and, more particularly, the aggrieved party, know the grounds which weighed in the mind of such authority in determining the questions offsets and law arising for its determination. This is imperative also for the fair and equitable administration of justice since it ensures that the decision on a disputed claim is reached according to law and is not the result of caprice or whim or fancy or extraneous factors. When there is a statutory provision for appeal, the fulfillment of the requirement is all the more essential in order td enable die appellate authority to know or be apprised of the reasons which impelled the adjudicating authority of the first instance to pass die order under appeal. Even the appellate authority must record a reasoned decision so mat the revisional authority, if any, or the High Court in die exercise of its writ jurisdiction, is able to test the validity of the decision. The recording of reasons in deciding cases affecting die rights of parties is now held to be a mandatory requirement of die rules of natural justice." 8. Relying on this authority, he has submitted that the impugned order vide Fx.P-7, not being a speaking order is nonest and without jurisdiction, and in view of the Full Bench Judgment of this Court in Chuhniya Devi’s. Case (supra), it is open to challenge in die Civil Court. He has men gone on to challenge that order on die ground that die delay was not condoned, although admittedly it was there being of almost 5 years, and there was an application for condoning the delay. He has men gone on to challenge that order on die ground that die delay was not condoned, although admittedly it was there being of almost 5 years, and there was an application for condoning the delay. For this, he has cited another judgment of this Court reported as I.L.R. 1986 (H.P. Series) 721 - Kailash District Co-operative Society v. Sher Singh & ors. It has been laid down therein that the order passed in time barred appeal by the Registrar under Section (2) of the H.P. Co-operative Societies Act is directly under challenge in the preceding and it is certainly for this Court to examine if the order suffers from any error of law or other infirmity so as to call for interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It being she original jurisdiction, die principles indicated therein are applicable to the original jurisdiction of the Civil Court as argued by Shri Kuldip Singh. 9. Considering die totality of die circumstances in this case, without going into the merits of the case, I remand die appeal to the learned lower appellate Court to decide all these questions, inasmuch prima facie, he has completely failed to consider Issue No.6, which as stated above, was vital to the case. , 10. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal is allowed to the extent that the impugned judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside. The case is remanded back for fresh decision in die light of the observations made herein above, in accordance with law. The parties, through their learned counsel are directed to appear before the lower appellate Court on 30.06-1997. It shall proceed to decide die appeal with in three months from that date on the evidence already on record..