Judgment :- 1. Having failed before the Authorities below under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), the sub-tenant has filed this Civil Revision Petition against the concurrent eviction order passed by the said Authorities against him as well as the Chief Tenant, who was 1st Respondent in the R.C.O.P. 2. Actually speaking, the 1st Respondent did not even file the first appeal. R.C.A. No. 4 of 1995 was filed only by the petitioner herein. The eviction order that was passed was on two grounds, viz. wilful default under Section 10(2)(i) of the Act and sub-letting under S. 10(2)(ii) (A) of the Act. 3. What learned counsel for the petitioner submits is that both the Authorities below have not manifested the required “Satisfaction” spoken to in Section 10(2) of the Act and so, the, impugned orders of both the Authorities are actually non-est orders. In this connection, he relies on Khader Md. Rowther & co. v. Sundaram ((1978) I M.L.J. 79=91 L.W. 122). 4. However, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 6 landlords points out that even though respondents 1 and 2 in the R.C.O.P. filed counter statements opposing the petitioners claim, both of them remained ex parte at the time of the trial and the 1st Respondent in the R.C.O.P. also did not file any first appeal against the original eviction order passed in the R.C.O.P. While so, he relies on the relevant observations in K.K. Chart v. R.M. Seshadri AIR 1973 S.C. 1311 Paragraph 27) and Hiralal Mool Chand Doshi v. Barot Ramanlal Ranchhoddas (1993) 2 SCC 458 (Paragraphs 14 and 29)). He also submits that in an unreported Judgment dated 24.1.1997 in Padmini Jayasundar v. N.S. Chandrasekaran (C.R.P. No. 3355 of 1994) (Since reported in 1997-1-L.W. 535) S.S. Subramani, J. of this Court has held that (1978) I M.L.J. 79 = 91 L.W. 122 ( Supra ) is no longer good law in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court. 5. I have considered the rival submissions. The relevant portion of Section 10(2) of the Act runs as follows:— “A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application is satisfied (i).. 5. I have considered the rival submissions. The relevant portion of Section 10(2) of the Act runs as follows:— “A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application is satisfied (i).. (ii)” (emphasis supplied) (1978) I M.L.J. 79 = 91 L.W. 122 (supra) was a case of petition for eviction for personal occupation of the landlord, and the tenant was absent on the date of hearing and eviction was ordered. In that context, learned Judge, who decided the said case held that the orders of eviction did not show the requisite “Satisfaction” of the Rent Controller and that hence the order was a nullity. While doing so, no doubt, learned Judge sought to distinguish AIR 1973 SC 1311 (supra) on the ground that the said decision related to an order of eviction passed on the basis of compromise between the landlord and tenant and that hence the said decision would not apply to the facts before him. 6. After going through AIR 1973 SC 1311 (supra) no doubt I also find that it is a case of eviction order passed on the basis of compromise between the landlord and tenant. But, there is also the following observation in the said decision in paragraph 27:— “It is no doubt true that before making an order for possession the Court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlords claim if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. So, even in a case, where eviction is not passed based on a compromise between the parties, the above said satisfaction spoken to in Section 10(2) of the Act is required only if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. In the present case, in my view, it cannot be said that there is “a dispute between the landlord and tenant”. Even assuming that respondents 1 and 2 have raised a dispute in their respective counter statements to the R.C.O.P. both of them remained ex parte and have not chosen even to cross examine P.W. 1, one of the landlords. Neither of them entered the witness box to support their alleged claim made in their respective counter statements. Even assuming that respondents 1 and 2 have raised a dispute in their respective counter statements to the R.C.O.P. both of them remained ex parte and have not chosen even to cross examine P.W. 1, one of the landlords. Neither of them entered the witness box to support their alleged claim made in their respective counter statements. When such is the case, it cannot be said that there was really a dispute between the parties. 7. Even assuming that there was a dispute between the parties in the present case, relying on another observation of the Supreme Court in the latter decision, viz. , (1993) 2 SCC 458 (supra), I must hold that there is no infirmity in the impugned orders. No doubt the above said (1993) 2 SCC 455 arose under Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. But, there too the same terminology “Satisfied” is used. The initial portion of Section 13 of the said Act, runs as follows:— “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of Sections 15 and 15-A a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Courts is satisfied.” No doubt, it is also true that the said Supreme Court decision arose out of an execution proceeding. But, that will not make any difference. There too, the contention was that the eviction was a nullity and that aspect has to be gone into by the Execution Court. No doubt in the present case, even before the matter has reached the execution stage, in this Court the contention of the petitioner is that the eviction order is a nullity on the above said ground. So, here also, the same reasoning would apply. 8. Now, the relevant passages in the said Supreme Court decision can be seen. The relevant portion in paragraph 14 of the said judgment runs as follows:— “There is no doubt that if there is a contest the Court can pass a decree for eviction only if the Court is satisfied about the existence of grounds mentioned in two sections quoted hereinabove. But the satisfaction can also be inferred impliedly”, (emphasis supplied) Regarding the above referred to implied inferential satisfaction, there is also reference in paragraph 20 of the judgment thus:— “The Court also considered the extent to which the Executing Court could go into the matter. But the satisfaction can also be inferred impliedly”, (emphasis supplied) Regarding the above referred to implied inferential satisfaction, there is also reference in paragraph 20 of the judgment thus:— “The Court also considered the extent to which the Executing Court could go into the matter. It was observed that if the decree on the face of it discloses some material, on the basis of which the Controller could be satisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it was not open to the Court to go further and it must accept it and Execute the decree as it stands. If on the face of it, the decree does not show the existence of such material or jurisdictional fact the Executing Court may look to the original record of the trial court to ascertain whether there was any material furnishing a foundation for the trial courts jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material existed its task is complete. It is not necessary for it to go further and question the presumed or expressed finding of the trial Court on the basis of that material. All that it has to see is whether there was some material on the basis of which the rent Court could have as distinguished from must have-been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction.” 8-A In the present case it would be easily inferred or implied that both the Courts have had satisfaction even though they had not expressly stated about such a satisfaction. In the order of the Rent Controller the following relevant observation is there: Tamil The relevant observations of the first appellate authority are as follows:— Tamil It is clear from the above referred to observations in both the orders of the Authorities below that the requisite satisfaction can be impliedly inferred from the said order itself. Therefore, relying on the above referred observations in (1993) 2 SCC 458 (supra). I have only to uphold the orders of the Authorities below. 9. Therefore, relying on the above referred observations in (1993) 2 SCC 458 (supra). I have only to uphold the orders of the Authorities below. 9. I also find that in the above referred to unreported judgment dated 24.1.1997 in C.R.P. No. 3355 of 1994 (1997-1-L.W. 535) S.S. Subramani, J., after referring to (1978) I M.L.J. 79 (supra) and also another decision in G. Kuthahaksh v. A.P. Swamy (93 L.W. 615) has held thus:— “In both these decisions, it was held that the order of eviction itself must show that the Controller was satisfied about the claim. I do not think the said decisions are any longer good law, in view of the decision reported in (1993) 2 SCC 458 (supra) wherein their Lordships held that satisfaction can also be inferred impliedly’ (see para 14 of the judgment). It is further clear from paragraph 20 of the judgment that if on the face of decree, satisfaction cannot be read into it the executing Court can look into other materials including the pleadings to come to the conclusion whether such satisfaction was impliedly inferred by the Rent Controller.” 10. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is not admitted but dismissed. No costs. Consequently C.M.P. No. 16876 of 1996 is dismissed.