Judgment :- 1. The above suit is filed by the plaintiff to recover a sum of Rs. 10,74,100.22 together with interest at 19% per annum on the said sum, from the date of plaint till date of realisation and for costs. 2. The plaintiff is a statutory incorporated Corporation incorporated under the Food Corporation Act 1964 for the purpose of Trading in foodgrains, food stuffs, fertilisers and other essential commodities. In the course of its activities, the plaintiff precures foodgrains and other essential commodities from various places in the country and outside the country and effect movement of the same to places where they are required. The Senior Regional Manager of the plaintiff invited tenders on 17.11.1981 in No. S & C/13/1/4/81- Cont., for the appointment of transport/handling contractors for transportation/handling of sugar stocks from the places of storage referred to therein to Salt Cotaurs and load them into wagons for different destinations as per the movement programmes given by the District Manager, Madras District Office, Egmore and by the Senior Regional Manager of the Corporation or their nominees. It is the case of the plaintiff that pursuant to the said notice of the said invitation of tenders, the first defendant submitted their quotations and tender on 18.11.1981. On 1.12.1981 the Senior Regional Manager of the plaintiff communicated his acceptance of the rates at which the contract has to be performed and services rendered for transportation of sugar stocks from Central Warehousing Corporation godowns at Chromepet and Tollgate respectively to Salt Cotaurs and loading into wagons. On receipt of the said acceptance, the first defendant furnished a Demand Draft for a sum of Rs. 5,000/- in respect of Chromepet work as security. Similarly the first defendant furnished another sum of Rs. 5,000/- towards security in respect of Tollgate work. It is the further case of the plaintiff that the first defendent commenced operation on 10.12.1981 and has been carrying on the said operation till 2.1.1982 and so far as the despatch of imported sugar from Salt Cotaurs to (a) Guna in the State of Madhya Pradesh, (b) Pandhurna, in the State of Madhya Pradesh, (c) Betul, in the State of Madhya Pradesh, (d) New Cooch Behar in the State of Assam and (e) New Bongaigon in the State of Assam. Under the terms of the contract as well as the procedure adopted in practice in executing works, the first defendant was exclusively executing the work on his own responsibility, risk and obligation. The plaintiff further contends that when the wagons reached destinations and goods were taken delivery, it was found at the time of taking delivery that there were various kinds of shortages, namely, the shortages were partial in the sense that the bags were found to contain sugar less than the normal weight, and in other cases the shortage was found to be of full bags in the sense that there were shortage in the actual number of bags. On receipt of information and complaints from the destination ends, it was found that the contractor did not obtain clear Railway Receipts as envisaged and obliged under the terms of the contract but has secured qualified Railway Receipts with certain super imposed remarks and conditions. In some other cases the first defendant obtained equations “said to contain” Rail way Receipt. After ascertaining the particulars and details, the plaintiff found the loss caused to them initially at Rs. 3,83,870/-. The District Office of the plaintiff sent a notice on 3.5.1982 to the first defendant to reimburse the said loss. The first defendant sent a reply on 12.5.1982 and on 24.5.1982. The plaintiff after verification ultimately arrived at the total loss and damages on account of shortages calculating the double of the prevailing market rate as follows:— SI. No. Destination of places Shortage in weight Rate Rs. Value Rs. P. 1. Guna 2,575.500 MTs. 11,800/- per MT 30,390.90 2. Pandurana 3,964.000 MTs. ,, 46,775.20 3. Betul 26,560.800 MTs. ,, 3,13,417.44 4. New Coouch Behar 21,428.000 MTs ,, 2,52,850.40 5. New Jalpaiguri on deversion) 12,682.090 MTs ,, 1.49.648.66 6. New Bonagaigoam (Diverted to Nalbari) 7,332.500 MTs ,, 86,523.50 Total 8,79,606.10 According to the plaintiff, the defendants are jointly and severally liable to pay the sum of Rs. 10,74,100.22 together with interest at 19% on the above said with effect from 3.5.1982 till date of realisation and for costs. 3. The defendants filed a written statement. The first defendant is the firm and the defendant Nos. 2 to 4 are the partners of the said firm. 10,74,100.22 together with interest at 19% on the above said with effect from 3.5.1982 till date of realisation and for costs. 3. The defendants filed a written statement. The first defendant is the firm and the defendant Nos. 2 to 4 are the partners of the said firm. The defendants resisted their liability stating that the loading in the trucks provided by the first defendant from various godowns was done by the labourers of the Central Warehousing Corporation and they had used hooks of abnormal size making even new containers susceptible for leakage and these things happened only in the presence of officials of the plaintiff. W hen huge stocks had to be loaded, they had to be loaded in jumbo racks and wherever loading/was made in jumbo racks, the Railway Authorities gave receipts only with a remark ‘said to contain’. This was done only with the knowledge of the plaintiff. It is the further case of the defendants that the suit claim is very vague and does not contain the particulars as to when the plaintiff found out the alleged mistake of the first defendant and the shortages, and that the suit claim is barred by limitation. I t is also the case of the defendant that the suit as framed is not maintainable and the District Manager cannot represent the plaintiff in the suit. 4. On the basis of the above pleadings, issues were framed as follows:— (1) whether the plaintiff is entitled to judgment and decree for a sum of Rs. 10,74,100.22 together with interest at 19% p.a. from the date of plaint till the date of realisation? (2) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (3) Whether the District Manager is competent to sign the plaint and file the suit on behalf of the Food Corporation of India? (4) Whether the defendants performed their duties and obligations in accordance with the specific terms and conditions of the contract dated 1.12.1981? (5) Whether the defendants committed default in not obtaining clear Railway Receipts from the Railways which resulted in the loss to the plaintiff? (6) Whether the plaintiff waived the conditions requiring the defendants from obtaining of clear Railway Receipts? (7) Whether the plaintiff is estopped from claiming the damages suffered against the defendants? (8) Whether the defendants are liable to pay interest as claimed? (6) Whether the plaintiff waived the conditions requiring the defendants from obtaining of clear Railway Receipts? (7) Whether the plaintiff is estopped from claiming the damages suffered against the defendants? (8) Whether the defendants are liable to pay interest as claimed? (9) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim twice the market rate of the price of the alleged short landed goods? (10) Whether the plaintiff is estopped from claiming the suit amount? 5. The plaintiff examined one Natarajan as P.W. 1 and marked Exs. P-1 to P-22. On the side of the defendants one Duraipandian was examined as D.W. 1 who is second defendant in the suit and marked Exs. D-1 to D-14. 6. Issue Nos. 1, 4 to 7 and 10: Since all the above issues are interconnected, they have been taken together. The facts that the Senior Regional Manager of the plaintiffs Corporation invited tenders under Ex. P-1, and the first defendant, in which the defendants 2 to 4 are partners submitted the tender under Ex. P-2 which has been accepted by the Senior Regional Manager of the plaintiff-Corporation under Ex. P-3 are not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the first defendant commenced operation relating to the suit transacation on 10.12.1981 and carried on the said operation till 2.1.1982. 7. The suit transaction between the plaintiff and the defendants is regarding the transportation of Sugar from Salt Cotaurs to Guna in the State of Madhya Pradesh, to Pandhurna, in the State of Madhya Pradesh, to Betul, in the State of Madhya Pradesh, and to New Cooch Behar, in the State of Assam, and New Bongaigon, in the State of Assam. Some of the consignments despatched to New Cooch Behar and New Bongaigon were diverted in transit to New Jalpaiguri and Nalbari respectively in the State of Assam. This fact is also not denied by the defendants. 8. The case of the plaintiff is that when the wagons reached destinations and the goods were taken delivery, it was found that there were various kinds of shortages. According to the plaintiff, in certain cases the shortages were partial, in the sense that the bags were found to contain sugar less than the normal weight and in certain other cases, the shortage was found to be of full bags, in the sense that there was shortage in the actual number of bags itself. According to the plaintiff, in certain cases the shortages were partial, in the sense that the bags were found to contain sugar less than the normal weight and in certain other cases, the shortage was found to be of full bags, in the sense that there was shortage in the actual number of bags itself. According to the plaintiff the actual short age of weight with respect to Guna, Pandhurna, Betul, New Cooch Behar, New Jalpaiguri, and New Bongaigon are 2,575.500 Mts., 3,964.000 MTs., 26,560.800 MTs., 21,428.000 Mts., 12,682.090 MTs. and 7.332.500 MTs. respectively. According to the plaintiff, the quantum of shortages had been arrived at on the basis of Exs. P-16 to P-20. To fix the value of the said shortages, the plaintiff sought to rely on clause I (e) of the terms and conditions, annexed to Ex. P-1, which reads as follows:— “The contractors shall be responsible for the safety of the goods from the time they are loaded on their trucks from sidings/godowns/until they have been loaded into wagons and the clear RRs are handed over to the FCI. They shall provide tarpaulin on decks of the trucks so as to avoid loss etc. through the holes/crevices in the decks of the trucks. They shall deliver the number of bags, and the weight of articles etc. received by them and loaded on their trucks and shall be liable to make good the value of any loss, shortage or damage during the transit at double the prevailing market rate thereof except when RM (whose decision will be final) decides that the difference between the weight as taken by the despatching and receiving ends is negligible and is due to discrepancies between scales, gain or loss in moisture or other cause beyond the contractors control” On the basis of the said clause, the plaintiff has calculated double the prevailing market rate and arrived at a sum of Rs. 8,79,606.10 towards the value of the shortages. To substantiate the claim, the learned counsel for the plaintiff sought to rely on Exs. P-1 and P-3 to contend that the defendants would obtain clear Railway Receipts and not any qualified one. According to him in certain cases, he produced Railway Receipts with the remarks “said to contain”. 8,79,606.10 towards the value of the shortages. To substantiate the claim, the learned counsel for the plaintiff sought to rely on Exs. P-1 and P-3 to contend that the defendants would obtain clear Railway Receipts and not any qualified one. According to him in certain cases, he produced Railway Receipts with the remarks “said to contain”. According to the learned counsel for the plaintiff, there is gross violation of the terms and conditions, as well as violation of duties and obligations by the defendants. The learned counsel for the defendants met this argument submitting that the alleged short age was not due to the negligence or unworkman like performance of services under the contract by the defendants and so the defendants are not liable for the suit claim. I am unable to accept the contention that merely because the defendants did not produce clear Railway Receipt, it cannot be said that the defendants are liable for the shortages due. The plaintiff has to prove that the shortages had occurred only due to the negligence on the part of the defendants while performing their duties under the contract. 9. Now, we will proceed to examine whether the plaintiff has established his case to claim loss and damages against the defendants. The plaintiff produced Ex. P-10 and P-11, the two books maintained by them regarding the Railway Receipts. Though there is a column in that register to mention about the shortages, I do not find any remarks in the said column. It gives only particulars about the Railway Receipts and from those registers it cannot be established that the alleged shortages were due to the negligence of the defendants. Similarly, Exs. P-12 to P-15 were produced which are the truck sheets with respect to the suit transactions. Regarding those exhibits, P.W. 1 in his chief-examination states as follows:— “At the time of loading, the defendants supervised the loading and satisfied themselves. They will verify number of books. After satisfying the contents and weight and the number of books the defendants representative will acknowledge the receipt of the trucks”. So, from this evidence, the particulars regarding the weight and contents of the bags had been verified and officials of the plaintiff were also present when the goods were loaded in trucks. 10. They will verify number of books. After satisfying the contents and weight and the number of books the defendants representative will acknowledge the receipt of the trucks”. So, from this evidence, the particulars regarding the weight and contents of the bags had been verified and officials of the plaintiff were also present when the goods were loaded in trucks. 10. The learned counsel for the defendants pointed out at the time of loading into the wagon, the plaintiffs, staff, railway staff and the representatives of the defendants would be present and the railway staff would put the seal in the wagon. This fact has been spoken to by D.W. 1. There was no cross-examination on this aspect. Therefore, it proves that at the time of loading the wagon the plaintiffs staff were present and the railway staff after loading the consignment put the seal in the wagon. It is not the case of the plaintiff that even at the time of loading there was some pilferage, causing shortages. It is the specific case of the plaintiff even in the plaint that on receipt of informations and complaints from the destination ends, only it was found that there was some shortage, that too for the first time on 3.5.1982 under Ex. P-7, such a claim was made. D.W. 1 has specifically stated in his evidence that at the time when he handed over Railway Receipts, the plaintiff did not raise any objection. In the cross examination of D.W. 1 it was tried on behalf of the plaintiff to put a suggestion that without disturbing the seals whether sugar bags can be removed. That suggestion itself shows that the alleged shortages had occurred only after loading and during transit. Even this suggestion was denied by D.W. 1 11. The learned counsel for the plaintiff relied on Exs. P-16 to P-20 which are the statements received from the respective destinations, and from Railways in support of his submission that these documents proved the shortages and so the defendants cannot deny their liability. The said documents are copies of statements attested by some officials of the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, as stated by P.W. 1 the said documents were prepared at Madras on the basis of short message notices received from the respective destinations. The plaintiff has not chosen to produce those notices which are the basic documents to prepare Exs. The said documents are copies of statements attested by some officials of the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, as stated by P.W. 1 the said documents were prepared at Madras on the basis of short message notices received from the respective destinations. The plaintiff has not chosen to produce those notices which are the basic documents to prepare Exs. P-16 to P-19. 12. The learned counsel for the defendants submit that Exs. P-16 to P-19 are the statements prepared on the basis of some other documents. In the absence of original documents, and in the absence of primary evidence Exs. P-16 to P-19 cannot be relied on, and even those documents will not prove the case of the plaintiff. According to P.W. 1 the originals are available in the Central Office, and they have not chosen to file the same. As spoken to by P.W. 1, the plaintiff filed counter in application No. 2486 of 1987 stating that the plaintiff can prove the case only with the help of the documents available with the railway authorities, and admittedly, as stated by P.W. 1, the plaintiff had not taken any steps to mark the originals of the abovesaid documents. The abovesaid documents, namely, Exs. P-16 to P-19 are the statements prepared on the basis of the railway records. Those documents did not indicate that the alleged shortages had occurred due to the negligence on the part of the defendants. 13. The documents filed and marked in a case have to be admissible and even if it is admissible, they have to be proved in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act so that the documents can be taken as evidence. It cannot be denied that Exs. P-16 to P-19 are the statements prepared on the basis of some other documents and so now we have to examine whether Exs. P-16 to P-19 would come under the scope of Sec. 63 of the Evidence Act. It cannot be denied that Exs. P-16 to P-19 are the statements prepared on the basis of some other documents and so now we have to examine whether Exs. P-16 to P-19 would come under the scope of Sec. 63 of the Evidence Act. Sec. 63 runs as follows:— “Secondary evidence :— Secondary evidence means and includes- (1) Certified copies given under the provisions herein after contained; (2) Copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies; (3) Copies made from or compared with the original; (4) Counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them; (5) Oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it.” 14. In the present case, the plaintiff has mainly relied on Exs. P-16 to P-20, as submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. Those documents do not satisfy the requirements of Sec. 63 of the Indian Evidence Act. While dealing with the scope of Sec. 63. the Supreme Court, in A.I.R. 1990 S.C.-396 ( Kalyan singh v. Chhoti ) has held as follows:— “The High Court said, and in our opinion very rightly, that Ex. 3 could not be regarded as secondary evidence. Sec. 63 of the Evidence Act mentions five kinds of secondary evidence. Clauses (1), (2) and (3) refer to copies of documents; clause (4) refers to counter-parts of documents and clause (5) refers to oral accounts of the contents of documents. Correctness of certified copies referred to in clause (1) is presumed under Sec. 79; but that of other copies must be proved by proper evidence. A certified copy of a registered sale deed may be produced as secondary evidence in the absence of the original. But in the present case Ex. 3 is not a certified copy. It is just an ordinary copy. There is also no evidence regarding contents of the original sale deed. Ex. 3 cannot, therefore, be considered as secondary evidence. The appellate Court has a right and duty to exclude such evidence”. Ex. P-16 and Ex. P-17 are the ‘true copies’ as admitted by P.W. 1. Such an espression is unknown to Evidence Act. Only the copies which are made and compared with the original would be admissible. All ‘true copies’ may not necessarily satisfy this qualification. The appellate Court has a right and duty to exclude such evidence”. Ex. P-16 and Ex. P-17 are the ‘true copies’ as admitted by P.W. 1. Such an espression is unknown to Evidence Act. Only the copies which are made and compared with the original would be admissible. All ‘true copies’ may not necessarily satisfy this qualification. In this case no evidence is available that Exs. P-16 and P-17 had been compared with the original. Morever P.W. 1 admits that originals are available in the Head Office. In the absence of evidence that Exs. P-16 and P-17 had been made from or compared with the original these documents cannot be relied on by the plaintiff to its case. Morever, the plaintiff failed to examine the person who prepared these documents. Exs. P-18 and 19 are the statements prepared on the basis of the Railway Receipt etc. Though the documents on which basis the same were prepared are available, as admitted by P.W. 1, no step was taken to produce the same to prove the contents of Exs. P-16 to P-19. It is admitted by P.W. 1 Ex. P-19 is a carbon copy of the letter. Ex. P-19 relates to the shortages took place in New Cooch Behar, but it was prepared at Madras by the District Manager on the basis of the statement provided by the officials at New Cooch Behar. Admittedly the said statement was not made available before this Court. Nor the plaintiff examined the officer at New Cooch Behar who prepared the original statement to prove the correctness of the contents of Ex. P-19. While considering the admissibility of the true copies, in the decision reported in AIR 1984 Gujarat - 69 (Maganbhai v. Ishwarbhai), the Division Bench of that Court held as follows:— “Where the document tendered in evidence was a handwritten copy of the original issued as true copy under the signature of the concerned officer, the same would not be admissible in evidence under S. 63(2) when it was not stated that it was a copy made from the original by mechanical process or copy compared with such copy. In such a case, sub-S. (3) of S. 63 also could not be pressed into service for admission of the copy in question as secondary evidence of the original” 15. In such a case, sub-S. (3) of S. 63 also could not be pressed into service for admission of the copy in question as secondary evidence of the original” 15. The learned Judge of Patna High Court (Ranchi Bench) has decided the issue in the decision reported in A.I.R. 1989 Patna 96 (Harijiwan Sahu v. Jairam Sahu ) as follows:— “Sub-Sec. (3) of S. 63 prescribes two alternatives. First that it may be a copy made from the original and, or second that it must be a copy compared with the original. If either of these two requirements had been satisfied then the document would be a proper and valid secondary evidence. Sub-Sec. (3) of S. 63 does not require that it must be proved that the copies were made from the original as well as compared with the original”. The same view has been taken by this Court in the decision reported in 1996-1 L.W.-608 ( ArulmiguVisweswaraswami & Veeraraghava Perumal Temples, etc., Tiruppur v. R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder & another). 16. Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with the manner of proof. A secondary evidence can be admitted and relied on only in the cases mentioned in Section 65 of the Act. If the originals were not produced at any time nor was any foundation laid for the establishment of the right to give secondary evidence, those documents cannot be admitted and relied on. The protection is given in Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act to the person who in spite of best efforts are unable due to circumstances beyond their control to place before the Court the primary evidence. It is not the case of the plaintiff that the original consists of numerous records which cannot be conveniently be examined in Court. As mentioned earlier, P.W. 1 admits that originals/primary documents are available. 17. Next document relied on by the learned counsel for the plaintiff is Ex. P-20. Ex. P-20 is photostat copy of the statement alleged to have been sent by railways, which according to the plaintiff contains the details of shortages. This document admittedly does not contain signature of the author. There is nothing to show who sent it to whom and who received it. No acceptable evidence is available to prove the custody of the document. P-20 is photostat copy of the statement alleged to have been sent by railways, which according to the plaintiff contains the details of shortages. This document admittedly does not contain signature of the author. There is nothing to show who sent it to whom and who received it. No acceptable evidence is available to prove the custody of the document. When photostat copy or xerox copy is sought to be adduced as evidence, the Court is duty bound to be more cautious. Photostat or Xerox copy is not admissible and reliable when original was not produced and there is no evidence of any person who deposed having seen the original document and the photostat copy was made from the original. 18. While dealing with the admissibility of photostat copies the Supreme Court in the case reported in 1975 S.C. 1748 ( Ashok v. Madhavlal ), has held as follows:— “It was, however, nowhere stated in the affidavit that the original document of which the photostat copy had been filed by the appellant was in the possession of respondent No. 1. There was also no other material on the record to indicate that the original document was in the possession of respondent No. 1. The appellant further failed to explain as to what were the circumstances under which the photostat copy was prepared and who was in possession of the original document at the time its photograph was taken. Respondent No. 1 in his affidavit denied being in possession of or having anything to do with such a document. The photostat copy appeared to the High Court to be not above suspicion. In view of all the circumstances that the High Court came to the conclusion that no foundation had been laid by the appellant for leading secondary evidence in the shape of the photostat copy. We find no infirmity in the above order of the High Court as might justify interference by this Court.” So, from the above discussion, it is very clear that Exs. P16 to P-20 cannot be relied on by the plaintiff as evidence in support of its case. 19. Moreover the documents Exs. P-16 to P-20 mainly relied on by the plaintiff do also not establish that the alleged shortage as claimed by the plaintiff was due to the negligence or act of the defendants. P16 to P-20 cannot be relied on by the plaintiff as evidence in support of its case. 19. Moreover the documents Exs. P-16 to P-20 mainly relied on by the plaintiff do also not establish that the alleged shortage as claimed by the plaintiff was due to the negligence or act of the defendants. At the risk of repetition, it can be stated that the evidence are available in the case the goods were loaded in the wagon in the presence of the plaintiffs officials and sealed by the railway officials. The plaintiff has failed to prove that the alleged shortage was due to the negligence of the defendants or of their employees. 20. The production of the Railway Receipts with endorsements viz. , “said to contain” will not automatically prove the defendants negligence. There is no evidence to support the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that only because of short despatch such Railway Receipts were made. 21. It is the case of the plaintiff that there was a full package loss also. According to P.W. 1, the substantial shortage was due to loss of full package. It is not the case of the plaintiff that the defendants had not loaded the bags at all or short-loaded package. On the other hand, the defendants have established that the goods have been loaded in the presence of the officials of the plaintiff and so at the time of loading the entire stock given to the defendants have been loaded in the wagons. While so if there is any full package loss, it should not be due to the negligence or act on the part of the defendants. The plaintiff would have claimed damages against the railways. The suggestion put to P.W. 1 in the cross-examination to that effect was also denied by him. There is no other documents, except Exs. P-16 to P-20, were produced before the Court, to prove the claim of the plaintiff. As discussed earlier, the plaintiff cannot rely on Exs. P-16 to P-20, and the plaintiff has not taken any steps to summon to produce the original of those documents. There is no other documents, except Exs. P-16 to P-20, were produced before the Court, to prove the claim of the plaintiff. As discussed earlier, the plaintiff cannot rely on Exs. P-16 to P-20, and the plaintiff has not taken any steps to summon to produce the original of those documents. Leaving the above said documents, in the absence of any other documents or oral evidence, to accept the case of the plaintiff that the shortages were due to the negligence on the part of the defendants or such damages were only due to the violation of the contract, the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree as claimed. Hence I answer these issues against the plaintiff. 22. Issue No. 2 :— It is the case of the defendants that the suit is barred by limitation on the basis that the loading operations were completed before 5.1.1982 and the suit was filed only on 5.1.1985. The dates are not disputed. But the Court reopened on 7.1.1985 after Christmas Holidays. The plaintiff was entitled, under Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, to file the suit on 7.1.1985 to avoid limitation. But it was filed on 5.1.1985 itself. So, I find that the suit was filed well within the time. 23. Issue No. 3 :— According to the defendants, the District Manager is not competent to sign the plaint filed on behalf of the plaintiff. It is the case of the plaintiff that the District Manager has been duly authorised to file the suit under Ex. P-21. Except stating so in the written statement, no other material is placed before the Court to accept the case of the defendant Under the document Ex. P- 21. The District Manager was duly authorised to sign the plaint and the said issue is answered in favour of the plaintiff, and against the defendant. 24. Issue Nos. 8 and 9 :— Since the main claim has been rejected, the question of deciding of payment of interest and the correctness of the calculation of the quantum of damages twice the prevailing market rate will not arise. So, these issues are answered accordingly. 25. In the result, the suit is dismissed with costs.