Per L. MANOHARAN, J. :---The petitioner was appointed as an assistant teacher on 26-6-1969 in the school belonging to the 1st respondent. He was later confirmed on 26-9-1971 and was promoted as Head Master with effect from 1-7-1973. While he was so working as Head Master, on certain allegations of misconduct his explanation was called for by the 2nd respondent and he submitted his explanation. As his explanation was found to be not satisfactory, the management decided to conduct an enquiry against the petitioner. Accordingly, a committee was constituted, as is required under Rule 36(2)(b) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 (hereinafter called as the Rules), to enquire into the allegations against the petitioner. The charges were duly framed and served on the petitioner. The petitioner filed his reply to the charges. The Committee found him guilty and decided to terminate his services and the management implemented the said decision by issuing Annexure-12 with effect from 1-9-1986. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred Appeal No. 118/86 before the School Tribunal. The School Tribunal dismissed the appeal. In this writ petition, the petitioner challenges Annexure-XII dated 31-8-1986 as well as the judgment of the School Tribunal dated 29-4-1987- Annexure-XVI. 2.The learned Counsel Shri Aney contended that the very enquiry as well as the decision are vitiated on account of disqualification incurred by the 2nd respondent by her entering the witness box and swearing in support of the charge. The precise point urged by the learned Counsel is, the whole proceeding is vitiated because the same was in violation of natural justice. It is maintained by the learned Counsel that in view of the fact that respondent No. 2 incurred disqualification, she could not have participated in the decision making process on account of her interest as well as bias which is spontaneous in her giving evidence in support of the charge. Though the petitioner also has a case that the findings entered by the Committee are not sustainable because the same are not supported by the evidence on record, the point urged by the learned Counsel is that the decision is vitiated because of violation of principles of natural justice as a result of respondent No. 2 participating in the decision making process. 3.On the other hand, learned Counsel for respondents 1 2, Shri Mardikar, maintained that there is absolutely no violation of natural justice because the petitioner got enough opportunity to lead evidence and also to cross-examine the 2nd respondent. Alternatively, it was submitted by Shri Mardikar that, at any rate, natural justice stands excluded because of the doctrine of necessity. The point urged by the learned Counsel is, with due regard to Rules 36 and 37 of the Rules, the presence of 2nd respondent in the Committee cannot be dispensed with. That being the position, inspite of the alleged disqualification incurred by the 2nd respondent on her giving evidence in support of the charge the 2nd respondent is bound and entitled to participate in the proceeding till it reached the ultimate conclusion. In such circumstance, according to the learned Counsel, the finding of the Committee cannot be faulted on the ground that there is violation of principal of natural justice. 4. In the context of the aforesaid rival contentions, it becomes necessary to read the relevant provisions concerning disciplinary proceedings. Section 4(6) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (for short the Act) enjoins, no employee of a private school shall be suspended, dismissed or removed, or his services be otherwise terminated or be reduced in rank by the management, except in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Rule 36 of the rules deals with enquiry committee and Rule 37 deals with the proceedings of enquiry. Rule 36 reads as follows : "36. Inquiry Committee- (1) If an employee is allegedly found to be guilty on any of the grounds specified in sub-rule (5) of Rule 28 and the Management decides to hold an inquiry, it shall do so through a properly constituted Inquiry Committee. Such a Committee shall conduct an inquiry only in such case where major penalties are to be inflicted. The Chief Executive Officer authorised by the Management in this behalf (and in the case of an inquiry against the Head who is also the Chief Executive Officer, the President of the management) shall communicate to the employee or the Head concerned by registered post acknowledgment due the allegation and demand from him a written explanation within seven days from the date of receipt of the statement of allegations. (2) If the Chief Executive Officer or the President, as the case may be, finds that the explanation submitted by the employee or the Head referred to in sub-rule (1) is not satisfactory, he shall place it before the management within fifteen days from the days of receipt of the explanation. The management shall in turn decide within fifteen days whether an inquiry be conducted against the employee and if it decides to conduct the inquiry, the inquiry shall be conducted by an Inquiry Committee constituted in the following manner, that is to say. The management shall in turn decide within fifteen days whether an inquiry be conducted against the employee and if it decides to conduct the inquiry, the inquiry shall be conducted by an Inquiry Committee constituted in the following manner, that is to say. (a) in the case of an employee - (i) one member from amongst the members of the management to be nominated by the management, or by the President of the management if so authorised by the management, whose name shall be communicated to the Chief Executive Officer within 15 days from the date of the decision of the management; (ii) one member to be nominated by the employee from amongst the employees of any private school; (iii) one member chosen by the Chief Executive Officer from the panel of teachers on whom State /National Award has been conferred; (b) in the case of the Head referred to in sub-rule (1)- (i) one member who shall be the President of the Management; (ii) one member to be nominated by the Head from amongst the employees of any private school; (iii) one member chosen by the President from the panel of Head Masters on whom State/National Award has been conferred; (3) The Chief Executive Officer or, as the case may be, the President shall communicate the names of members nominated under sub-rule (2) by registered post acknowledgment due to the employee or the Head referred to in sub-rule (1), as the case be, directing him to nominate a person on his behalf on the proposed Inquiry Committee and to forward the name along with the written consent of the person so nominated to the Chief Executive Officer or to the President, as the case may be, within fifteen days of the receipt of the communication to that effect; (4) If the employee or the Head, as the case may be, communicates the name of the person nominated by him, the Inquiry Committee of three members shall be deemed to have been constituted on the date of receipt of such communication by the Chief Executive Officer or the President, as the case may be. If the employee or such Head fails to communicate the name of his nominee within the stipulated period, the Inquiry Committee shall be deemed to have been constituted on expiry of the stipulated period consisting of only two members as provided in sub-rule (2). If the employee or such Head fails to communicate the name of his nominee within the stipulated period, the Inquiry Committee shall be deemed to have been constituted on expiry of the stipulated period consisting of only two members as provided in sub-rule (2). (5) The Convener of the respective Inquiry Committee shall be the nominee of the President, or as the case may be, the President who shall initiate action pertaining to the conduct of the Inquiry Committee and shall maintain all the relevant record of the Inquiry. (6) The meeting of the Inquiry Committee shall be held in the school premises during normal school hours or immediately thereafter, if the employee agrees and even during vacation." Rule 37 concerns the procedure of inquiry and in the context of this case, sub-rules (3) (4) (5) and (6) thereof are relevant. They read : "37. Procedure of Inquiry - ..... (1) ..... (2) ..... (3) The Management and the employee or the Head, as the case may be, shall be responsible to see that their nominees and the witnesses, if any, are present during the inquiry. However, if the Inquiry Committee is convinced about the absence of either of the parties to the disputes or any of the members of the Inquiry Committee on any valid ground, the Inquiry Committee shall adjourn that particular meeting of the Committee. The meeting so adjourned shall be conducted even in the absence of person concerned if he fails to remain present for the said adjourned meeting. (4) The Convener of the Inquiry Committee shall forward to the employee or the Head, as the case may be, a summary of the proceedings and copies of statements of witnesses, if any, by registered post acknowledgment due within four days of completion of the above steps and allow him a time of seven days to offer his further explanation, if any. (5) The employee or the Head, as the case may be, shall submit his further explanation to the Convener of the Inquiry Committee within a period of seven days from the date of receipt of the summary of proceedings etc. either personally or by registered post acknowledgment due. (5) The employee or the Head, as the case may be, shall submit his further explanation to the Convener of the Inquiry Committee within a period of seven days from the date of receipt of the summary of proceedings etc. either personally or by registered post acknowledgment due. (6) On receipt of such further explanation or if no explanation is offered within the aforesaid time the Inquiry Committee shall complete the inquiry and communicate its findings on the charges against the employee and its decision on the basis of these findings to the Management for specific action to be taken against the employee or the Head, as the case may be, within ten days after the date fixed for receipt of further explanation. It shall also forward a copy of the same by registered post acknowledgment due to the employee or the Head, as the case may be. A copy of the findings and decision shall also be endorsed to the Education Officer or the Deputy Director, as the case may be, by registered post acknowledgment due. Thereafter the decision of the Inquiry Committee shall be implemented by the Management which shall issue necessary orders within seven days from the date of receipt of decision of the Inquiry Committee, by registered post acknowledgment due. The Management shall also endorse a copy of its order to the Education Officer or the Deputy Director, as the case may be." As already noted, the thrust of the argument of the learned Counsel, Shri Aney, is the 2nd respondent who is also the convener of the Inquiry Committee and who played a pivotal role in the adjudication of the charges against the petitioner, once had entered the witness book and gave evidence in support of the charge, was not entitled to participate in the decision making process as it is opposed to principles of natural justice. Now it is necessary to see what is the purport of natural justice as understood in law. In the case of (Union of India ors. v. Tulsiram Patel)1, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1416 the Supreme Court observed: "Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi-judicial and administrative processes. In the case of (Union of India ors. v. Tulsiram Patel)1, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1416 the Supreme Court observed: "Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi-judicial and administrative processes. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is "nemo judex in cause sua" or "nemo debet esse judex in propria causas", that is, "no man ought to be a judge in his own cause .......... The second rule and that is the rule with which we are concerned in this writ petition is "audi alteram partem", that is, "hear the other side." In the case of (Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India)2, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1480 the Supreme Court clarified and emphasised the principles of natural justice referred to in the decision in Tulsiram's case, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1416 and observed : "The principles of natural justice are not the creation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 is not the negetter of the principles of natural justice but their constitutional guardian. Article 14 is not the negetter of the principles of natural justice but their constitutional guardian. The principles of natural justice consist, inter alia, of the requirement that no man should be condemned unheard." As regards this aspect, De Smith at pages 264 and 265 in Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th Edition) states in the context of grievance of an expelled member : "The expelled member will not, therefore, succeed in having the decision set aside by the courts merely by demonstrating that the committee were not, or were not likely to be, impartial towards him; he will have to prove that members of the committee did not fairly consider his case and had made up their minds to expel him before they heard him, or that, for example, the union secretary was both in form and in substance prosecutor and Judge." At page 1513 in Constitutional Law of India (4th Edition) by Seervai it is stated that : "there are two requirements of natural justice: (a) No man shall be a Judge in his own cause; (b) No man shall be condemned unheard, but these requirements may be dispensed with, either by the express words of a statute or by necessary implication, but such an implication must be clear, for Parliament was aware that courts implied these requirements when the law was silent." The principle that no man shall be a Judge of his own cause is on the basis of the fact that a Judge must decide the cause impartially. This principle has been accepted by the courts in a series of decisions and the same is reiterated in the decision in (Rattan Lal Sharma v. Management Committee Dr. Hari Ram (Co-education) Higher Secondary School and others)3, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2155. And the principle applies not only in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding but also in administrative matters where the decision could effect the civil right of the citizen. 5.For incurring disqualification, it is not necessary that bias must actually be proved. It would be enough, under law, that there is reasonable likelihood of bias. And the principle applies not only in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding but also in administrative matters where the decision could effect the civil right of the citizen. 5.For incurring disqualification, it is not necessary that bias must actually be proved. It would be enough, under law, that there is reasonable likelihood of bias. As regards this aspect, in the decision in (State of U.P v. Mohammad Nooh)4, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 76 Supreme Court held that the fact that the act of the Presiding Officer in having his own testimony recorded in the case indubitably would evidence a state of mind which would disclose a considerable bias against the delinquent. In that decision, the Supreme Court quashed the order of dismissal holding inter-alia that the rules of natural justice were grossly violated. This position has been reiterated in the decision in Rattan Lal's case A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2155, referred earlier. The Supreme Court has laid down that the test is not whether in fact, bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member might have operated against him in the final decision of the Tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done. In that case, the Supreme Court states as regards bias in departmental enquiry- where a member of the Inquiry Committee appeared as a witness against the delinquent, the bias of that member percolates throughout the enquiry proceedings. So the findings given by the committee on the remaining charges also gets vitiated. The learned Counsel Shri Mardikar referred us to the decision in (Tata Cellular v. Union of India)5, 1994(6) S.C.C. 651 to maintain that mere participation by giving evidence cannot vitiate the enquiry proceedings. The said decision concerned the acceptance of tender, and the grievance projected in that was the son of one of the members of the recommending authority was an employee of that tenderer, but the acceptance of the tender was found to be not vitiated as the concerned member was only a recommending authority and not a decision making authority, though he participated in the decision making process in view of section 3(6) of Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 as the same was necessary. On the facts of that case it was held that the acceptance of the tender was not vitiated. 6.In this case, a reading of Rule 37(6) would show that the Committee constituted was the enquiring authority as well as the final decision making authority in the sense that the management's role was only to implement the decision of the Inquiry Committee. Therefore, the role of the Committee cannot be treated as only recommendatory. Thus, the Committee really is the decision making authority who was to take evidence and adjudicate the matter. When the nature and character of the Committee is so understood, the whole proceeding must be consistent with the principles of natural justice. 7.It was also urged by the respondent that the petitioner since has cross-examined the 2nd respondent and thus participated in the enquiry he must be deemed to have waived whatever right he has on the ground of bias. Even assuming that the right which the delinquent-Officer has by way of natural justice is waiveable right, it must be immediately observed, at the earliest opportunity, he objected to the 2nd respondent participating in the disciplinary proceeding after the 2nd respondent gave evidence in support of the charge. Annexure-IX is the further reply by the petitioner under Rule 37(5) of the rules on receipt of the copy of summary of proceedings and statements of witnesses under sub-rule (4) thereof. Para 4 of Annexure-IX would convey that the 2nd respondent has incurred disqualification as being President and convener of the Committee, she has entered witness box and gave evidence in support of the charge. Therefore, simply because the petitioner has cross-examined the 2nd respondent it cannot be said that the petitioner has waived his right to plead illegality of the proceeding on the ground that there is violation of natural justice. In view of the fact that the 2nd respondent has incurred disability on account of reasonable liklihood of bias, the proceeding would be vitiated. Possibly, the petitioner could not have objected when the President opted to be a witness in support of the management, for what the petitioner could object was her participating in the decision making process thereafter. In view of the fact that the 2nd respondent has incurred disability on account of reasonable liklihood of bias, the proceeding would be vitiated. Possibly, the petitioner could not have objected when the President opted to be a witness in support of the management, for what the petitioner could object was her participating in the decision making process thereafter. Therefore, once she entered the box and gave evidence, the petitioner had a right to cross-examine her, and the exercise of that right cannot, in the circumstance, amount to waiver of the right to object 2nd respondent participating in the decision making process. The effect of incurring dis-qualification which demonstrates bias, as the President conducted herself as both prosecutor and Judge would render the whole proceeding from the stage of framing charge infirm and invalid. 8.Shri Mardikar, learned Counsel on behalf of 2nd respondent, maintained that the principle of natural justice stood excluded because of doctrine of necessity. The point urged by the learned Counsel is that the President is an inevitable member of the Committee under Rule 36(2)(b) of the Rules. Being so, even if the 2nd respondent has incurred a disqualification, since it is compulsory as per the said rules that the President should be a party to the decision making process, it must be taken that by legislation natural justice stands excluded. In Charan Lal's case, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1480, referred to earlier the Supreme Court held that the principles of natural justice are not the creation of Article 14 of the Constitution; Article 14 is the constitutional guardian of natural justice and proceeded to state, if, however, a Statute expressly or by necessary implication excludes the application of any particular principle of natural justice then it requires close scrutiny by the courts. It may be that natural justice may be excluded by legislation on account of necessity but the rule to which reference has already been made does not expressly state as to the exclusion of natural justice. The only question that remains therefore is, whether by necessary implication natural justice stands excluded. Reference was made by Shri Mardikar, learned Counsel, to the decision of this Court in (Kankubai Shravikashram Trust others v. Kamal)6, 1992 Mh.L.J. 216 to maintain that the President must inevitably be a member of the Committee. The only question that remains therefore is, whether by necessary implication natural justice stands excluded. Reference was made by Shri Mardikar, learned Counsel, to the decision of this Court in (Kankubai Shravikashram Trust others v. Kamal)6, 1992 Mh.L.J. 216 to maintain that the President must inevitably be a member of the Committee. At once it must be noted that the observation in the said decision was not in the context of the question whether natural justice stands excluded. All that is observed is, in constituting a Committee of three members as per Rule 36(2)(b) of the Rules, the President of the management was required to be one such member. As is revealed from para 8 of the decision, the main question dealt by the Court was, whether the 'Head' of an institution stands on par or is equivalent to 'Chief Executive Officer'. This decision does not consider the aspect as now arises in this case whether inspite of bias the President can participate in the decision making process. 9.In deciding as to whether by necessary implication the President should take part in the decision making process, inspite of the fact that she has incurred disqualification, and hence the principle of natural justice stands excluded, certain factors will have to be kept in mind. As has already noted, in the decision in Charan Lal's case, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1480, referred to earlier, though the Supreme Court held that by statute principle of natural justice can be excluded, when the question is whether such exclusion is by necessary implication, close scrutiny of the relevant provision will be required. As to this aspect, in the case of (K.I. Shephard v. Union of India)7, 1988 Bank.J. 396(S.C.) : A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 686 the Supreme Court observes : "The rules of natural justice have developed with the growth of civilisation and the content thereof is often considered as a proper measure of the level of civilisation and rule of law prevailing in the community. Man within the social frame has struggled for centuries to bring into the community the concept of fairness and it has taken scores of years for the rule of natural justice to conceptually enter into the field of social activities." And De Smith at page 277 in Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th Edition) states: "But the rule of necessity ought not to be mechanically applied if its enforcement would be an affront to justice (e.g. where all members of the only statutory body empowered to revoke a licence are subject to disqualifications), and it may be right for a Court to scrutinize the actual conduct of the proceedings closely if the rule cannot be wholly circumvented. If it is possible to constitute a different tribunal unaffected by interest or bias, no difficulty arises." What we want to stress in this connection is, once it is discovered that there is reasonable likelihood of bias or interest for the person who is to decide the matter, one cannot immediately on the plea that by doctrine of necessity the natural justice stands excluded, accept the same. 10.With this back ground, it is necessary now to see whether by necessary implication the principle of natural justice stands excluded. Shri Aney, learned Senior Counsel, urged that since of the three members two members could also proceed with the enquiry and reach a conclusion, there is no difficulty in the President who has incurred disqualification withdrawing from the decision-making process. In other words, according to the learned Counsel, there is no question of doctrine of necessity arising in the said context. Particular stress was made by the learned Counsel on sub-rule (4) of Rule 36. The point urged was, the said sub-rule permits when two members of the Committee could proceed with the enquiry. In the context, sub-rule (3) of Rule 37 is of more relevance. Clearly, the said sub-rule postulates a situation where the Committee could proceed with the meeting in the absence of one of its members. The question really for consideration, in the context of the said plea of necessity is, whether the rule provides for machinery for adjudication of the charges even when the President is disqualified and is not to participate in the Committee. The question really for consideration, in the context of the said plea of necessity is, whether the rule provides for machinery for adjudication of the charges even when the President is disqualified and is not to participate in the Committee. It is necessary for us to refer to the observations of Supreme Court in para 105 in the case of Charan Lal, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1480, referred early. "An adjudicator who is subject to disqualification on the ground of bias or interest in the matter which he has to decide may in certain circumstances be required to adjudicate if there is no other person who is competent or authorised to be adjudicator or if a quorum cannot be formed without him or if no other competent Tribunal can be constituted." As has already noticed, sub-rule (3) of Rule 37 envisages the case of the enquiry being proceeded with in the absence of "any of the members of the Inquiry Committee." The said sub-rule describes the body which is to conduct the inquiry. When plurality of person is to take decision there should be provision for quorum. The rules do not provide for quorum specifically. Therefore, the common law principle of quorum will apply; and the decision in such circumstances has to be by majority. In the context of sub-rule (3) of Rule 37 as well as the principle of common law, the decision has to be atleast by two members and it goes without saying that the decision to be effective in such circumstance can only be unanimous by two members. When the two members do not agree there is no specific rule for referring the same to a third person. It was then submitted by Shri Mardikar, learned Counsel, that this contingency of members differing in the decision being there, it becomes absolutely necessary that the President must be in the Committee which decides the matter; and that the same by implication would show that the principles of natural justice stands excluded. 11.Applying the test laid down in the decision in Charan Lal, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1480, referred above, if there is a forum or machinery to adjudicate the charge, then this argument cannot stand. 11.Applying the test laid down in the decision in Charan Lal, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1480, referred above, if there is a forum or machinery to adjudicate the charge, then this argument cannot stand. It is urged by the learned Counsel, Shri Aney, when there is conflict of opinion between two members there could be no decision which could be implemented by the management as required under sub-Rule (6) of Rule 37. In such circumstance, according to learned Counsel, Shri Aney, the provisions of section 4-A of the Act will come into operation. Mr. Mardikar, learned Counsel, maintained that the two contingencies envisaged in section 4-A of the Act do not take in such a contingency. Consequently, according to him, the question of section 4-A coming into operation does not arise. His point is, for the application of section 4-A(1)(a) the employee against whom misconduct or misbehaviour of serious nature or moral turpitude is alleged is unreasonably exonerated by the Inquiry Committee, and since Clause (b) can have application only where the management has either neglected or refused to hold an inquiry, the learned Counsel maintained, neither of the said contingencies is there. 12.We have already adverted to the importance of observing natural justice and also when natural justice by implication can be stated to have been excluded. It is necessary that adjudication conforms to fair play as it is not enough justice is done, it must also appear to be so. As has already noticed, exclusion of principle of natural justice by implication is not readily made unless the doctrine of necessity emanates from the provision. The value of principle of natural justice is such that, as is observed in K.I. Shephard's case, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 686, the same got developed by growth of civilisation. Adherence to it is the measure of the attainments of the society. Through the centuries men struggled for attaining perfection, and in their pursuit for perfection they did materialise principles of enduring value for the governance of the society. And the most important of all is the principles of natural justice. That being so precious and valuable, the doctrine of necessity can be applied only if conditions for the application of the same are firmly established. The conditions therefor have already been adverted. And the most important of all is the principles of natural justice. That being so precious and valuable, the doctrine of necessity can be applied only if conditions for the application of the same are firmly established. The conditions therefor have already been adverted. According to that one another factor too has to be kept in view in interpreting the scope of section 4-A of the Act. The management of this private school is admitted to grants; thereby it is burdened with a public duty to administer it fairly and justly. The statute has to be interpreted so as to avoid chance of abuse of the power to administer. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) at page 137 states : "On the other hand, there is no doubt that the office of the Judge is, to make such construction as will suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress all evasions for the continuance of the mischief. To carry out effectually the object of a statute, it must be so construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing, in an indirect or circuitous manner that which it has prohibited or enjoined: quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne per quod devenitur ad illud." What is important to be looked into in the context of section 4-A is, whether there was unjustified exoneration. Exoneration can take place when the Committee after examining the evidence holds that the delinquent-Officer is not guilty of the misbehaviour alleged against him. He will also stand exonerated when there is no implementable decision. Conflicting views by the two remaining members, as noticed, cannot be implemented by the management. Therefore, the effect of such a situation is exoneration of the employee. If this is so, section 4-A(1) certainly will come into play in case where the two members excluding the President take different views in the matter. Another contingency suggested by the learned Counsel, Shri Mardikar, is, it could happen that one of the two members is unable to participate. The effect is the same as the two members differing in their views, the delinquent- Officer will stand exonerated. In such situation, the enquiry will continue as per section 4-A. This provision in section 4-A(1) in the absence of other provision for meeting such exigency must bear such an interpretation so as to facilitate an impartial and fair inquiry. The effect is the same as the two members differing in their views, the delinquent- Officer will stand exonerated. In such situation, the enquiry will continue as per section 4-A. This provision in section 4-A(1) in the absence of other provision for meeting such exigency must bear such an interpretation so as to facilitate an impartial and fair inquiry. We must, in this context, remind ourselves that there was no occasion for the said two contingencies when the decision was made. Since the two members could have proceeded with the inquiry, it cannot be held that the rule of natural justice stands excluded because of doctrine of necessity. The said contingencies suggested by Shri Mardikar, learned Counsel, can be taken care of by section 4-A. This finds support from the observations of Supreme Court in the decision in Rattan Lal's case, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2155, referred early. In para 11, Supreme Court has observed that where a committee can be constituted of other members for proceeding with the inquiry the principle of necessity will not be attracted. Here, as noticed, the rules permit that inquiry can be proceeded with the remaining two members, and even in contingency where the two members could not reach an implementable decision the situation can be dealt with under section 4-A by the Director. Thus, it will be idle to contend that there is no machinery to proceed with the inquiry without the President in the committee. So it is difficult for us to agree with the arguments of the learned Counsel. Shri Mardikar, that by the doctrine of necessity natural justice stands excluded. Clearly, the inquiry is bad because the President who has incurred disability on account of giving evidence has demonstrated bias as well as interest and yet participated in the decision making process. Therefore, we have to quash and set aside the decision by the Inquiry Committee as well as that of the School Tribunal. We do so. 13.Now the next question for consideration in the context and circumstance is as to the consequential reliefs that should follow upon our quashing the decision and inquiry. Learned Counsel, Shri Aney, submitted that non observance of principles of natural justice renders the whole inquiry void; consequently the delinquent-employee would stand reinstated, and according to the learned Counsel, reinstatement should follow in such circumstance. Learned Counsel, Shri Aney, submitted that non observance of principles of natural justice renders the whole inquiry void; consequently the delinquent-employee would stand reinstated, and according to the learned Counsel, reinstatement should follow in such circumstance. In support of that the learned Counsel relied on the decision in K.I. Shephard's case, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 686, referred to early. In the decision in (M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v. The Employees of M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd.)8, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 75 the Supreme Court observed : "Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full backwages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness," and proceeded to state, "that full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstance necessitating departure." This view is followed in the decision in (G.T. Lad others v. Chemicals Fibres India Ltd.)9, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 582, and in the decision in (Gujarat Steels Tubes Ltd. v. Its Mazdoor Sabha)10, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1896, the Supreme Court reiterated the position that where the Management discharges a workman by an order which is void for want of an enquiry or for balatant violation of rules of natural justice the dismissal order is void. Therefore, the submission was, when the order of dismissal is quashed and set aside for non observance of principles of natural justice, the effect is the order becomes void and once that is the position according to the learned Counsel, the employee must be deemed to continue in service and consequently he would be entitled to the back wages. One thing we have to note at this juncture, these decisions concern the right of workman govered by the Industrial Disputes Act. On the other hand, Shri Mardikar, learned Counsel for respondents 1 2, maintained that with due regard to the gravity of the charges against the petitioner and also the nature of the material that was placed before the Inquiry Committee as well as the Tribunal, it is not a case where a person like the petitioner can be reinstated particularly when it is noted that the petitioner was the Head Master of High School. The learned Counsel, Shri Mardikar, invited our attention to the copy of the judgment in Criminal Complaint Case No. 158 of 1982 produced by the respondents along with their submissions. The learned Counsel, Shri Mardikar, invited our attention to the copy of the judgment in Criminal Complaint Case No. 158 of 1982 produced by the respondents along with their submissions. It appears that cognizance was taken for an offence punishable under sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Employment Exchange Act, and the accused, who is the petitioner herein, was convicted under section 7(2)(a)(i) of Employment Exchange Act for committing breach of section 5, sub-section (2), of the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 read with Rule 6 of the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Rules, 1960 and was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 125/, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. The learned Counsel, Shri Aney, maintained that on appeal this finding and sentence were set aside and the copy of the appellate Court's judgment filed with an affidavit dated 2-5-97 has been taken on record on oral request. The learned Counsel, Shri Mardikar particularly brought to our notice the character of the charges, which, according to the learned Counsel, includes the charge relating to defaulcation and disobedience of the directions of the management. Therefore, it was urged by Shri Mardikar, learned Counsel, that it is not in the interest of the students as well as that of the institution to allow reinstatement and this is a case which falls in the category of those in which on the setting aside of the inquiry the delinquent employee cannot be reinstated. Consequently, the learned Counsel maintained that it is a fit case which has to be dealt with under section 11(2)(e) of the Act. The character of the charge cannot be conclusive in deciding as to whether an employee can be denied reinstatement. In the decision in the (Management of Monghyr Factory of I.T.C. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court)11, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1428 the Supreme Court has quoted with approval the decision in the case of (Bucklingham Carnatic Mills Ltd. v. Their Workmen)12, 1951(2) Lab.L.J. 314 the following observations : "The past record of the employee, the nature of his alleged present lapse and the ground on which the order of the management is set aside are also relevant factors for consideration." This was in the context of the question of reinstatement of the employee. 14.Arguments were addressed as to the quantum of back wages to which the delinquent-officer on reinstatement would be entitled. We consider that before deciding upon the question of reinstatement and the consequent entitlement for back wages, we have to note the view in the later decisions of Supreme Court in this aspect. The important decision to be noted in this connection is the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of (Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar etc.)13, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1074. Though the question considered was under Article 311 of the Constitution of India the Court specifically considered the position where the inquiry is found to be vitiated on account of non-observance of principles of natural justice. In the said decision, the Supreme Court by majority held that denial of report of Inquiry Officer is denial of reasonable opportunity and breach of principles of natural justice. In that context as to the right of the delinquent-officer for reinstatement and back wages, the Supreme Court observed : "Where after following the above procedure, the courts/Tribunals sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately order should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any, and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law." It is necessary for us to note the decision of Supreme Court in the case of (State of Punjab others v. Dr. Harbhajan Singh Greasy)14, J.T. 1996(5) S.C. 403. There, the respondent before the Supreme Court was charged for being absent from duty in the Emergency for attending the flood victims between July 18, 1975 and July 21, 1975. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report that respondent had admitted that he was having private practice during the period of his suspension inspite of directions issued by the Government in the suspension order to remain at the Head-quarter. On the basis of this, the disciplinary authority removed him from service. The learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition by the employee and directed reinstatement with consequential benefits. On appeal, in L.P.A., the Division Bench confirmed the said order which was challenged before Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted that the respondent has denied the admission relied on by the Enquiry Officer and the alleged admission was not recorded. The Supreme Court observed : "It is now well settled law that when the enquiry was found to be faulty, it could not be proper to direct reinstatement with consequential benefits. Matter requires to be remitted to the disciplinary authority to follow the procedure from the stage at which the fault was pointed out and to take action according to law. Pending enquiry, the delinquent must be deemed to be under suspension. The consequential benefits would depend upon the result of the enquiry and order passed thereon. The High Court had committed illegality in omitting to give such direction." Yet the Supreme Court did not adopt the said course as the respondent by that time had retired from service. Pending enquiry, the delinquent must be deemed to be under suspension. The consequential benefits would depend upon the result of the enquiry and order passed thereon. The High Court had committed illegality in omitting to give such direction." Yet the Supreme Court did not adopt the said course as the respondent by that time had retired from service. The Supreme Court, however, in the facts and circumstances of that case held that the respondent was not entitled to back wages as he avoided responsibility as a Doctor to treat on flood victims; but held that disallowance of back wages would not stand in the way of computation of pensionary benefits as he had continued in service. 15.What is significant to be noticed is, in both the decisions the Supreme Court notes that in the circumstance of quashing the enquiry on the ground of non-observance of principles of natural justice further inquiry is necessary; and on quashing of inquiry on the aforesaid ground the employee is not immediately entitled to consequential relief like back wages. In the aforesaid circumstance, what is laid down by the Constitution Bench in Managing Director, ECIL A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1074, referred to early, has to be followed. As has already noticed, in the said decision, the Supreme Court held that where the courts/Tribunals set aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority to proceed with the enquiry by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the enquiry from the stage where the inquiry became invalid. In view of the fact that the said statement of law covers courts/Tribunals, the said principle has to be read into section 11 of the Act, particularly in the context of the declaration of law in Charan Lal Sahu's case, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1480, referred to early, wherein the Supreme Court held that Article 14 is the guardian of principles of natural justice. At any rate, this Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to resort to the said procedure consistent with what the Supreme Court has declared cannot be controlled by any legislation like section 11 of the Act. The employee has to be reinstated as is held by the Apex Court. Such reinstatement at this stage can only be treated as reinstatement for the purpose of holding fresh enquiry. The employee has to be reinstated as is held by the Apex Court. Such reinstatement at this stage can only be treated as reinstatement for the purpose of holding fresh enquiry. When the principles to be applied is so understood, it becomes necessary to issue direction to the management to reinstate the petitioner but with liberty to proceed with the enquiry from the stage of charge by placing the petitioner under suspension. The benefits such as entitlement of the petitioner for the back wages and other benefits will depend upon the outcome of the enquiry in which if he is directed to be reinstated he will be eligible for the back wages. In that event as to what is the actual back wages to which he is entitled to will also be gone into by the Inquiry Committee. At one stage, it was urged by the learned Counsel, Shri Aney, that the petitioner is entitled to full wages. Shri Mardikar then maintained that the petitioner after the order of dismissal was gainfully employed and, therefore, for that period he would not be entitled to wages. We need not go into the disputed question of fact as the whole matter, as indicated above, has to go before the Inquiry Committee where both the parties will be entitled to agitate their respective cases by adducing whatever evidence they choose to produce before it. 16.Some doubt was expressed at bar whether the Inquiry Committee can go into the consequential relief. It was urged that Rule 34 of the Rules does not enable the Inquiry Committee to go into the said aspect. It is necessary to read sub-rules (4), (5) (6) of Rule 34 of the Rules. They are : "34. ..... (1) ..... (2) ..... (3) ..... (4) When an employee who has been suspended is reinstated, the authority competent to order the reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order - (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the employee for the period of his absence from duty, and (b) regarding the said period being treated as a period spent on duty. (4) When an employee who has been suspended is reinstated, the authority competent to order the reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order - (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the employee for the period of his absence from duty, and (b) regarding the said period being treated as a period spent on duty. (5) Where the authority mentioned in sub-rule (4) is of the opinion that the employee has been fully exonerated or, in the case of suspension that it was wholly unjustified, the employee shall be given the full pay, allowances and pension to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or suspended, as the case may be. The management shall bear expenditure on pay and allowances of substitute, if any, appointed in place of the employee under suspension and such expenditure shall not be held admissible for the Government grant. (6) In other cases, the employee shall be given such proportion of pay and allowances and pension as the Management may decide : Provided that, where the amount of provisional pension sanctioned to the employee during the period of suspension is more than the amount of pension finally held admissible, the difference of such amount shall not be recovered or adjusted from the amount of pension payable to him : Provided further that, the payment of allowances under sub-rules (5) or (6) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible : Provided also that in a case falling under sub-rule (5) the period of absence from duty shall be treated as a period spent on duty, after the Management specifically directs that it shall be so treated (for specified purposes)." The scope and effect of these sub-rules must be understood in the context of sub-rule (6) of Rule 37 which would show that it is the Inquiry Committee which has to take the ultimate decision and the management has only an obligation to implement the decision of the Inquiry Committee. Since jurisdiction conferred on the Committee is as stated above, the rule as per its language as well as the context must be read so that the Committee derives the power and jurisdiction to deal with the incidental reliefs, particularly when as has noticed the Committee has got ultimate jurisdiction to decide whether the delinquent-officer should or should not be in service. The scope of sub-rules (5) and (6) when so understood, there is no doubt in our mind, the Committee when exonerates the delinquent of the charge levelled against him will have the jurisdiction to go into the question as to the consequential relief to which he will be entitled on reinstatement. 17.Another aspect which was raised was that in case the management decides not to pursue the enquiry the teacher will not have a forum to adjudicate his claim of back wages. On the basis of the same, it was urged that leaving the question of pursuing the enquiry to the discretion of the Management could cause prejudice to the employee. We consider that this can be effectively dealt with by suitable directions keeping in view that the Management may not have choice to stall the claim of the employee. 18.In the result, we allow the writ petition and quash the order dated 29-4-1987 at Annexure-XVI, so also the order of termination dated 31-8-1986 at Annexure-XII. We direct the 1st respondent to reinstate the petitioner as Head Master. The 1st respondent shall be at liberty to proceed with the inquiry as per law and also with due regard to what is stated in this judgment by placing the petitioner under suspension and continue the inquiry from the stage of charge. The parties shall be at liberty to substantiate their rival contentions before the Inquiry Committee. The Committee will proceed to decide the question in accordance with law and after culmination of the inquiry if the Committee arrives at a decision exonerating the petitioner, the Committee would adjudicate as to the consequential reliefs to which the petitioner is entitled, including the claim of back wages from the date of dismissal till the date of his reinstatement. The Management will constitute the Inquiry Committee within one month from today and within three months therefrom the Committee will complete the Inquiry. The Management will constitute the Inquiry Committee within one month from today and within three months therefrom the Committee will complete the Inquiry. If for any reason the Management does not constitute the Committee as directed and/or the Inquiry Committee could not for whatever reason complete the inquiry within the time stated above and/or if the Inquiry Committee could not arrive at a finding and decision which can be implemented by the Management, then it would be open to the Director under section 4-A of the Act to take over the inquiry within one month from either of failures mentioned above and dispose of the whole question referred to earlier within three months therefrom. If for any reason the Director does not take over the inquiry on either of the above failures, the suspension of the petitioner shall stand revoked and he shall stand reinstated in service as if he is exonerated of the charge, and then it shall be open to the petitioner to move the Director to adjudicate and decide the consequential benefits inclusive of the back wages payable to him, upon which the Director shall decide the question within a period of one month therefrom. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits before us that the petitioner will co-operate with the Inquiry Committee. Rule made absolute in aforesaid terms. The respondent No. 1 will pay the costs of the petitioner and respondents 1 2 will bear their own costs. Petition allowed. *****