JUDGMENT 1. - The Petitioner who is an ex-employee of the Indian Red Cross Society has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the impugned order of dismissal dated 28.7.92 (Anhexure-36) whereby the services of the .Petitioner as a Deputy Secretary came to be terminated by the Respondent No. 2. 2. The facts given rise to the filing of the Writ Petition briefly stated are that the Petitioner was initially appointed as Upper Division Clerk-cum-typist-cum-Accountant w.e.f. 10.6.1971 vide Annexure-1. He was confirmed on the said post on 27.6.72 vide Annexure-2 and his designation was notified as Asstt. Accounts Officer (A.A.O.) with due approval of the Managing Committee of the Respondent Society w.e.f. 8.7.1981 vide Annexure-3. Subsequently the petitioner was promoted on the post of Deputy Secretary w.e.f. 24.1.1989 after due sanction of the Managing Committee of the Respondent Society vide Annexure-4. The promotion of the Ztitioner as Deputy Secretary was also approved by a resolution dated 5/6th March, 1989 by the Managing Committee and he was fixed in the pay scale of Rs. 2100-3550 w.e.f. 24 January, 1989. 3. The main ground on which the impugned order of termination has been assailed by the Petitioner are : (i) Mala fide action of Respondent No. 3, (Chairman of the Respondent-Society) in terminating the services of the petitioner, (ii) Disciplinary enquiry initiated against the Petitioner was without jurisdiction, (iii) Impugned dismissal order is also without jurisdiction, (iv) Violation of principles of natural justice by the Respondents in passing the impugned order of dismissal. 4. With regard to the first ground of malafides, it has been contended by the petitioner that Dr. Pitambar Dayal Mathur (Respondent No. 3) who was the then Chairman of the said Branch of the Respondent-Society, had developed inimical behaviour against the Petitioner in view of the fact that he was under the impression that the Petitioner was instrumental in getting Mr. Jaideep Dayal Mathur (son of Respondent No. 3) removed from the post of Asstt. Secretary of the Society who 4d, earlier been appointed as, Asstt. Secretary, since the Managing Committee did not concure with his appointment, he had tendered his resignation w.e.f. 29.7.1989 and which was accepted w.e.f. 31.7.1989. Jaideep Dayal Mathur (son of Respondent No. 3) removed from the post of Asstt. Secretary of the Society who 4d, earlier been appointed as, Asstt. Secretary, since the Managing Committee did not concure with his appointment, he had tendered his resignation w.e.f. 29.7.1989 and which was accepted w.e.f. 31.7.1989. It has been further contended in this regard that since the Managing Committee of the society had not rectified the action of the Chairman and had subsequently not approved the appointment of Mr. Jaideepdayal Mathur, the latter had tendered his resignation from the post of Asstt. Secretary of the society on 29.7.1989 and his resignation was accepted by the society on 31.7.1989. The Petitioner happened to be the Member Secretary of the managing committee and as Respondent No. 3 was of the view that the Petitioner was instrumental in getting his son Jaideepdayal Mathur removed from the post of Asstt. Secretary and on this count as well as the FIR which was lodged at P.S., Motidoongari in respect of the alleged incident dated 8.9.1989, Jaideepdayal Mathur who was not working at the relevant time with the Respondent-Society the Petitioner has alleged malafides against Dr. Pitambar Dayal Mathur (Respondent No. 3), who was serving as Chairman of the Respondent-Society during the relevant period. 5. With regard to the resignation which was earlier tendered by Jaideepdayal Mathur and which accepted by the Society on 31.7.1989 it has been contended by the petitioner that it was surprisingly allowed to be withdrawn after 110 days on 15.11.1989 (vide Annexure-6) mentioning therein that the Executive Committee had rectified the said action on 1.9.1989 in absence of the agenda, discussion or resolution before the Executive Committee and since Respondent No. 3 was of the impression that the Petitioner was instrumental-in persuading the members of the Executive Committee for not approving the appointment of his son Jaideep Dayal Mathur and this incident had annoyed Respondent No. 3, he had determined himself to get rid of the Petitioner and started taking retaliatory action. It has been further contended that on 18.10.1989 the Petitioner was placed under suspension and he challenged the same before this court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1892/91 which was decided on 27.5.1992 reported in 1992(1) RLR 472 . It has been further contended that on 18.10.1989 the Petitioner was placed under suspension and he challenged the same before this court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1892/91 which was decided on 27.5.1992 reported in 1992(1) RLR 472 . However, it was observed by this court that since the Petitioner has not been able to place any convincing material before this court with regard to the impugned action taken by Respondent No. 2 (who is Respondent No. 3 in this writ petition) in passing the suspension order as to whether it was actuated by malice the same was not open to challenge by the petitioner and the writ petition was not maintainable. It has further been contended by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that subsequent events and materials which have now been placed on the record in the present Writ Petition were not there on, the record in the earlier Writ Petition and in which the petitioner had assailed his-suspension from services of the Respondent-Society which would prove the malafide action of the Respondents. During the intervening period various notices were served on the Petitioner by Respondent No. 2 to which the Petitioner submitted his reply. TWo charge-sheets dated 13.8.1991 and 20.8.1991 vide Annexure-9 & 10 respectively were served on the Petitioner and an Enquiry Officer was appointed vide order dated 17.8.1991 and 9.9.1991 (Annexures-24 & 25). The Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry and submitted his report to the society on 11.11.1991 and 1.1.1.992 vide (Annexures-34 & 35) respectively. 6. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that in the earlier writ petition No. 1892/1991 against the suspension order which was decided on 22.5.1992, the question regarding the competence of the Chairman (Respondent No. 3) to take disciplinary action against the Petitioner was directly and substantially involved in the said case and the Petitioner had consequently made representations to the Chairman as well as the Enquiry officer requesting them to stay the enquiry proceedings till the decision of the writ petition. The request of the Petitioner to stay the enquiry proceedings was ignored by the Chairman as well as by the Enquiry Officer. It has further been contended that the Managing Committee in its meeting dated 12.2.1992 considered the matter and constituted a committee known as Thanvi committee comprising of four members. The request of the Petitioner to stay the enquiry proceedings was ignored by the Chairman as well as by the Enquiry Officer. It has further been contended that the Managing Committee in its meeting dated 12.2.1992 considered the matter and constituted a committee known as Thanvi committee comprising of four members. The said committee submitted its report to the society on 27.7.1992 vide (Annexure R-2/3). The perusal of the said committee's report reveals that the Petitioner was heard in detail and on the perusal of all the relevant record which was in possession of the secretary of the Respondent-Society and on the basis of the documents furnished by the Petitioner, the committee was of the view that the enquiry conducted and the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were in order. Keeping in view the gravity of the charges levelled against the Petitioner and the enquiry conducted against the Petitioner, the continuation of the Petitioner in service of the Respondent-Society was not warranted and, therefore, the committee recommended that the services of the Petitioner may be dispensed with in the interest of Respondent-Society. The committee was also of the view that if there was proper control and supervision over the effects of the Society, the incidents of the kind, which have been referred to in the charge-sheet against the Petitioner would not have taken place and it was due to gross financial impropriety of the erring officials, who had acted against the interest of the society, it had become necessary to conduct thorough enquiry into the affairs of the society and the committee recommended the impugned action of terminating the services of the Petitioner. 7. It is, however, significant to note in this connection that the Managing Committee in its meeting dated 12.2.1992 had observed that for fixing the responsibilities of others involved in this case action to dispense with the services of the petitioner should be taken. The Thanvi committee in its report dated 27.7.1992 vide Annexure R-2/3 also observed that there may be many more officials who may have exercised gross financial impropriety and acted against the interest of the society but have not been properly brought to book. The Thanvi committee in its report dated 27.7.1992 vide Annexure R-2/3 also observed that there may be many more officials who may have exercised gross financial impropriety and acted against the interest of the society but have not been properly brought to book. It has next been contended that the aforesaid report of the Thanvi Committee should not have been acted upon by the Respondents since only two out of four members had put their signatures and hence no action should have been taken on the basis of the said report, which according to the petitioner, establishes the allegation of malafide against. the Chairman (Respondent No. 3). 8. With regard to question of competence of the Chairman in having taken the impugned action it has been contended by the petitioner that in the earlier petition No. 1892/1991 which was decided by this court on 27.7.1992 the question of competence of the Chairman was directly and substantially involved and wherein the petitioner had challenged the impugned action of the Chairman in initiating the disciplinary action against the petitioner as he was not appointing authority and hence the entire enquiry proceedings stood vitiated as the same was actuated with malafides of Respondent No. 3. It has further been contended that it is on account of lack of competence of the Chairman in initiating the disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner, the same has been alleged to be without jurisdiction, consequently the impugned order of dismissal dated 28.7.1992 (Annexure-36) has been alleged to be without jurisdiction. It has. further been contended that in the earlier writ petition against the order of suspension of the petitioner, he had advanced specific contentions regarding the competence of the Chairman to take disciplinary action -but the learned counsel has not been able to clarify as.to whether it is still open to the petitioner to have agitated the grounds of competence as well as of malafides of the Chairman again in the present writ petition in view of the earlier decision of this Court in which this court has already 'upheld the validity 'of decision of the Respondent-Society in having passed the suspension order against-the petitioner and consequently the writ petition was not held maintainable and the same was dismissed. It was also held that the malafides which had been attributed by the petitioner to the Managing Committee in passing the impugned order of suspension is not sustainable as the same has not been proved or established. The petitioner has taken the same grounds in addition to the ground of the violation of principles of natural justice and has also challenged the jurisdiction of the Managing Committee in passing the impugned order of dismissal from service and in my considered opinion it is not open to the petitioner to involve the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India time and again in this manner. 9. It has further been contended by the learned counsel that the petitioner had never submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the enquiry officer and hence the enquiry conducted against the petitioner was ex-parte which is not only unfair and improper but also without jurisdiction. In this regard I am of the opinion that in departmental enquiry which has been initiated by the competent authority against the delinquent employee doesn't become ex-parte if the said delinquent employee voluntarily decides at his option not to submit himself or to participate in the enquiry proceedings and the said allegations are wholly unfounded and contrary to the record. 10. On merits it has been contended that the impugned order of dismissal dated 28.7.1992 is without jurisdiction in view of the fact that the respondent society and its Rajasthan State branches have been constituted under the provisions of the Indian Red Cross Societies Act, 1920 (for short the Act'). In view of the amended provisions of the Act particularly Section 12 which envisages a provision regarding the powers of Branch committees, the State Branch Committees cease to have power to regulate its own procedure and constitution w.e.f. 23.1.1992 and, therefore, the Chairman who was elected under the constitution of Society dated 14.2.1995, ceased to hold office w.e.f. 23.1.1992 and hence could not pass any order against the petitioner who was an employee of the Respondent Society and hence the impugned order of dismissal is without jurisdiction. 11. 11. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the following judgments of the Apex Courts as well as this Court:- Union of India v. Mohammad Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 , State Bank of India v. D.C. Agrawal, AIR 1993 SC 1197 , Managing Director E.C.I.L. Hyderabad v. B. Karunakaran, AIR 1994 SC 1074 and M. Radhakrashan v. Union of India, 1993(2) RLR 319 . In the matter of Union of India v. Mohammad Ramzan Khan (supra) it was held by the Apex Court that disciplinary enquiry is quasi judicial in nature and if the delinquent has been deprived of knowledge of the material against him though the same has been made available to the punishing authority in the matter of reaching his conclusion, rules of natural justice would be affected. Hence supply of the copy of the enquiry report alongwith recommendations, if any, in the matter of principles of punishment to be inflicted would be within the rules of natural justice and delinquent would therefore be entitled to the supply of the copy thereof.In the matter of State Bank of India v. D.C. Agrawal (supra), it was held by the Apex Court that the imposition of punishment on material neither supplied nor disclosed to the delinquent was not proper and the order stood vitiated not because of the mechanical exercise of the power or for non-supply of enquiry report but for relying and acting on material which was not only irrelevant but could not have been looked into.In the matter of Managing Director E.C.I.L. v. B. Karunakaran (Supra), it was held by the Apex Court that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has right to receive the copy of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusion with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him and this principle applies to all the establishments whether Government or non-government, public or private. I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court only with regard to the principles laid down therein but in my considered opinion the ratio of the aforesaid decisions are not applicable to the instant case keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case. 12. I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court only with regard to the principles laid down therein but in my considered opinion the ratio of the aforesaid decisions are not applicable to the instant case keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case. 12. The respondents on being noticed by this court have opposed the maintainability of this writ petition on the grounds inter-alia that section 12 of the Act, 1920 as amended by the amending Act 1992, was published in the gazette of India extraordinary dated 4.4.1992 has been made retrospectively effective from 23.1.1992 which is evident from the perusal of Section 12 of the Act, 1992. There is repeal and saving clause under the Act of 1992 and according to that section' any thing done or any action taken under the principal Act as amended by the said ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the Principal Act, as amended by the said Act. It does not mean that existing Rules already made by the Respondent Society for regulating its own procedure under the original Act have become non-existent and so long as they are not repealed or replaced, they continue to be operative. In this regard I am of the opinion that the object of the amendment of Section 12 of the Act is to create uniformity in all the state branches of the Respondent-Society and if the interpretation as put forth by the petitioner is to be accepted, as correct, it will make the functioning of the State Branch of Respondent-Society of Rajasthan and other Branches of the State completely unworkable and non-functional. I am further of the opinion that any interpretation of the statute which is contrary to the aims and objects of the legislation as enshrined in its preamble should be strictly avoided as the same would not only make an institution non-functional, but wholly ineffective and such an interpretation should be treated as absurd and must be avoided. I am further of the opinion that any interpretation of the statute which is contrary to the aims and objects of the legislation as enshrined in its preamble should be strictly avoided as the same would not only make an institution non-functional, but wholly ineffective and such an interpretation should be treated as absurd and must be avoided. The aims and objects of amendment if interpreted in true perspective should be to place harmonious construction on the statute so as to make it functional and effective and not with a view to deprive the powers already vested with.an Institution so as to make it non-functional which would not only be detrimental to the institution itself but also to the society as a whole. Hence in my view the Rules which stood in force as per the relevant provisions of the Act of 1.920 as amended by the Amending Act of 1992, were duly observed in this case by the Management of respondent-Society and the petitioner was dismissed in accordance therewith by a resolution of the Managing Committee of the Respondent-Society and since the Managing Committee has concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer in dispensing with the services of the petitioner, in my view the same is not open to challenge by the petitioner by way of this writ petition all the norms and modalities as envisaged by the Rules have been adhered to by the respondent-Society. 13. With regard to the validity of the dismissal order dated 28.7.1992, I am of the view that the amendment was made in Section 12 of the Act of 1920 by the Indian Red Cross Society (Amendment Ordinance 1992) and later on by the amendment Act, 1992 (No. 14/92). The said amending Act has a retrospective effect w.e.f. 23.1.1992 as would be evident from Section 1 of the Act of 1992, while the dismissal order was passed much later on after the aforesaid amendment on 28.7.1992. Hence it cannot be said that the amendment in section 12 of the Original Act, 1992 had deprived the society or its State Branch to regulate its own procedure and the constituting so as to deprive its Managing Committee of the Respondent-Society to pass impugned order of dismissal dated 28.7.1992 against the Petitioner. Hence it cannot be said that the amendment in section 12 of the Original Act, 1992 had deprived the society or its State Branch to regulate its own procedure and the constituting so as to deprive its Managing Committee of the Respondent-Society to pass impugned order of dismissal dated 28.7.1992 against the Petitioner. 1 am further of the view that it will he wholly incorrect to contend that any action which was taken by the Managing Committee of the State Branch of the Respondent Society is without jurisdiction and without authority. It will he noteworthy to observe that the petitioner had earlier filed a writ petition in this court vide S.B. C.W.P. No. 1892/1991 (reported in 1992(1) RLR 472 ) against his suspension order dated 18.10.1989 and the learned single judge of this court dismissed the same on 27.5.1992 by a detailed order observing that the minutes of the Managing Committee consciously approved the action taken by the Chairman of the Respondent Society regarding suspension of the petitioner and the order dated 21.4.1989 cannot be questioned on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It was further held by this court that in view of ratification of the action taken by the Chairman made by, the Managing Committee, the scope of the jurisdiction and the powers of Respondent No. 2 with regard to the service conditions of the officers and employees of Respondent No. 1 was not open to question. 14. In this context it is significant to mention that it is the aforesaid order of suspension of the petitioner which the petitioner had assailed before this court in the aforesaid writ petition and the validity of which was upheld by this court in the aforesaid writ petition and which finally culminated in passing of the impugned order of dismissal of the petitioner dated 28.7.1992, in my considered opinion, is not open to challenge since the grounds which the petitioner has urged in the present writ petition had also been urged earlier while assailing the impugned order of suspension in the aforesaid writ petition and the validity of the same having been upheld earlier by this court, the present writ petition is not maintainable since no fresh grounds have been urged by the petitioner which would entitle the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11 may further be added.that the petitioner has filed a D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 158/1993 against the earlier decision of this court dated 27.5.1992 and the said Appeal was dismissed by the learned Division. Bench of this Court vide order 30.4.1993 summarily having no merits. 15. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the Respondent Society has contended at the Bar that the decision to refer the matter to the Managing committee was an unanimous decision of the Respondent-Society and the said committee submitted its report to the Chairman on 27.7.1992 and finally the Chairman of the State Branch of the Respondent Society having been specifically conferred powers by the Managing Committee by a resolution dated 12.2.1992, passed the impugned order of dismissal dispensing with the services of the petitioner with immediate effect and hence the impugned order is not open to challenge before this court. The petitioner was given full opportunity of hearing and was directed to appear before the said committee on 7.4.1992 and since he chose not to appear before the enquiry officer, the matter was referred to the Managing Committee and a resolution was passed in the meeting of the committee held on 12.2.1992 constituting a committee under the Chairmanship of Shri S.N. Thanvi, Director Social Welfare Department with three other members to scrutinise the enquiry report and to recommend suitable disciplinary action against him.- Accordingly the said committee held deliberations and further afforded full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and thereafter passed the impugned order of dismissal against the petitioner in compliance with the Rules and Principles of Natural Justice. Hence it cannot be said that the Managing Committee of the Respondent Society lacked the jurisdiction to pass the said order or that the said order was actuated by any malafides of the then chairman of the respondent-society. 16. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in this writ petition and the same is dismissed with no order p s to costs. Consequently the validity of the impugned order of dismissal dated 28.7.1992 (Annexure-36) passed against the petitioner by the Respondent-Society is upheld.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******