D. K. SETH, J. The petitioner has filed an application on 11- 12-1996 for an ap propriate order restraining the respondents from harassing the petitioner during the pendency of the writ petition. The writ peti tion was admitted on 17-6-1996. The ap plication for interim order was rejected on the same day. Counter and rejoinder af fidavits have already been exchanged. In order to decide the present application dated 11-12-1996, it appears that the matter is to be gone into on its merits. Both the learned counsels addressed the Court on the merits of the case. It is agreed by the counsel for both the parties that they have addressed on the merits of the writ petition itself in supporting and opposing the application dated 11-12-1996. They have, therefore, prayed that the writ petition may also be disposed of along with the said application. Accordingly the writ petition is taken up for hearing along with the application dated 11-12-1996. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Vivek Shandilya contends that in view of Regulation 8 of the U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission (Procedure for Approval of Punishment) Regulations, 1985, the Commission can only approve or disapprove the punishment proposed by the Committee of Manage ment, but it has no jurisdiction to substitute the proposal for punishment. According to him, in the present case, while disapproving the proposal for punishment, the Commis sion had passed a fresh order by reason whereof the Commission itself has inflicted punishment on the petitioner. According to him, the Commission may issue direction but it cannot pass an order of punishment Nor the Commission can inflict punishmem and usurp the jurisdiction of the Committee of Management in absence of a fresh ordei of punishment. His second contention wa; that even or merits, as has been proved 01 the enquiry and noted in the discussion b; the Commission. Stoppage of two incre ments is also not justified. He further con tends that the findings of guilt on the basi of the charges alleged are not supported b materials and are perverse. Therefore, ac cording to him, the orders are liable to be quashed and the petitioner should not be made to suffer any kind of disadvantage on account of the order impugned. 3. Mr. B. N. Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondents, opposes the contention of Mr. Therefore, ac cording to him, the orders are liable to be quashed and the petitioner should not be made to suffer any kind of disadvantage on account of the order impugned. 3. Mr. B. N. Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondents, opposes the contention of Mr. Shandiyal on the ground that Regula tion 8 postulate issue of other directions as may deem fit in the said case. The said phrase is wide enough to include the kind of order that has been passed in the present case. According to him, the power of ap prove or disapprove includes the power to modify. Therefore, the Commission is em powered to substitute its own order by means of reduction of punishment and since what has been done in the present case. Secondly he contends that the finding of guilt is a finding of fact which has been elaborately dealt with by the Commission. This Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot delve into deciding disputed ques tions of fact. Over and above, according to him, nothing has been shown as to how the finding of guilt is perverse or is based on no material. The materials relied upon are mostly records and, therefore, it leaves little scope of perversity unless it is shown to the Court from the records itself or at least by pointing out some thing to that end that it is so perverse. 4. The learned Standing counsel, on the other hand, supports the contention of Mr. Agrawal and makes out a similar con tention. He contends that the Commission has taken a lenient view and has inflicted a lesser punishment. The order itself indi cates elaborately the details of the enquiry report resulting into a finding of fact since being disputed by the petitioner, with which dispute, this Court cannot interfere while exercising writ jurisdiction. 5. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it appears that Regulation 8 of the said 1985 Regulations, referred to above, does not postulate an interpretation as has been sought to be made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Inasmuch as Regulation 8 provides: "the Commission shall after due considera tion approve or disapprove the punishment proposed or may issue any other directions deemed fit in the case. " 6. Mr. Inasmuch as Regulation 8 provides: "the Commission shall after due considera tion approve or disapprove the punishment proposed or may issue any other directions deemed fit in the case. " 6. Mr. Shandaliya, relying on the order contained in Annexure T, contends that the text of the order is in the nature of an order. By no stretch of imagination, according to him, the same could be termed as a direc tion. The phrase direction does not postu late any scope for passing another order. It can only issue direction, nothing more noth ing less. The contention of Mr. Shandilya cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the power to approve or disapprove includes the power to modify, which power is implicit in it and is an established prin ciple by now. It is an established principle that when an order is open to a superior authority to decide on the merits of it for the purpose of either affirming or reversing the same, the same is also akin to approving or disapproving. Inasmuch as though two dif ferent terms have been used, they mean the identical situation. To approve or to disap prove has the same meaning for all practical purposes to affirm or reverse. In respect of the appellate jurisdiction, it is the consis tent view of the High Courts and the Apex Court that the power to affirm or reverse includes the power to modify. Unless such power or jurisdiction is barred by express provision, the same is always explicit in it. But in the present case, the inclusion of the phrase "or may issue any other directions deemed fit in the case," indicates the very existence of the power to modify. Such ex pression cannot be interpreted to narrow down the meaning so as to make the provision ineffective. An interpretation which furthers the aims and objects of the Statute is preferable to be accepted, against an interpretation which frustrates the same or narrows down the scope. The intention of the legislature, if not explicit or express or cannot be covered even by implication, in that event, a narrow meaning cannot be imputed for interpreting a Statute. In the present case, it does not appear that the legislature had ever intended to narrow down the meaning so as to confine the power or jurisdiction only on power to ap prove or disapprove. In the present case, it does not appear that the legislature had ever intended to narrow down the meaning so as to confine the power or jurisdiction only on power to ap prove or disapprove. The inclusion of the expression in the phrase referred to above clearly indicates that the legislature had in tended some more powers beyond the nar row lane of approval or disapproval. There fore, the order modifying the punishment to a lesser extent cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. Though argued with great vehemence and intelligently, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Shandilya with regard to this point. 7. Then again unless an act is expressly prohibited by law, the Court is not supposed to presume as a matter of general principle that certain act is prohibited beyond what has been expressly conferred to the extent it is acceptable on the principle as enunciated in the foregoing para, namely, to the extent that the power to approve or disapprove a particular order includes the power to modify such order as well particularly when the structure of the Statute conceives of a liberal interpretation furthering the object and purpose for which the same is incor porated. The purpose and object of incor poration of the approval and disapproval has been ensured to safeguard the interest of the delinquent from the arbitrary and highhanded actions on the part of the Com mittee of Management. The checks and balance on the high handedness of the Com mittee of Management, as has been sought to be introduced by reason of incorporation of the power to approve or disapprove sure ly will further the object and purpose if the construction as is being made herein, is ac cepted in the light of the observations made above. In the case of Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey ILR 5 Allahabad 163, it was laid down: "courts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly forbidden by the Code but on the perverse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law, as a matter of general prin ciple prohibitions cannot be permitted. " Following the said decision in the case of Narsingh Das (supra), in the case of Smt. Rukmani Devi v. District Judge, Gorfkhpur (1983) 9 ALR95, it was held: "the Tribunal in absence of express prohibi tion can be deemed to have possessed a power which was necessary to do the right and undo wrong in course of determination of justice. " 8. So far as the merit of the case is concerned, admittedly the writ Court can not enter upon deciding disputed question of fact. The finding of fact can be reversed or interfered with only in cases where it is based on no material or where no reasonable man can arrive at such a con clusion on the basis of materials on record or in cases where it is altogether perverse. I have been led through the order and the supporting reasoning given by the Commission. It does not appear to me that the find ings are based on no material or are per verse or that no reasonable man can arrive at such a conclusion. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, has not been able to point out any such perversity or any other material on which this Court can form such an opinion so as to enable this Court to interfere with the said finding. From the materials through which I have been led, to my mind, it appears that the reduction of punishment and its imposition on the petitioner is not excessive or unwarranted on the basis of the charges proved against the petitioner. 9. For all these reasons, I am not in clined to interfere with the order impugned. 10. The application dated 11-12-1996 is thus disposed of. By reason of the above order passed on the application dated 11-12-1996 nothing remains to be decided in the writ petition. The writ petition, there fore, stands dismissed in terms of this order. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .