M. Ramakrishna, C.J.— The Union of India through the Collector of Customs, Meghalaya and two others have presented this writ appeal being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Rule No.451 of 1994 disposed of on 4.7.96. by which the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition with a direction to the Customs authorities to return the goods seized by them immediately with certain other directions in alternative. Aggrieved by this order, this appeal has been presented challenging the correctness and the legality of this order of the learned Single Judge. 2. We have heard the learned counsel on both the sides. 3. The salient facts necessary to be referred to for the purpose of disposal of the appeal are that a certain goods had been seized from Shri Biplab Rakshit. The respondent herein, on 24.12.93. It is stated that since the respondent was also arrested, he moved for an order of bail before the Magistrate. The learned Magistrate concerned refused to grant bail and ultimately the matter was brought before the Sessions Judge having jurisdiction, who is said have passed an order releasing the respondent on bail. However, there was no order in regard to the release of the valuables seized from the respondent. Aggrieved by the action on the part of the appellants, the respondent moved the above Civil Rule No.451 of 1994 challenging the action on the part of the appellants, respondents in the writ petition, in regard to the seizure of the articles from him. 4. In the writ petition, the main contention urged in support of the relief sought for was that whenever the Customs authorities seize any valuable article from a citizen, by virtue of the law as found under section 110 (2) of the Customs Act. 1962, hereinafter referred to as the Act. within a period of six months from the date of seizure, a notice of show cause should be given to the owner of the articles as contemplated under that provision of law failing which the owner shall be entitled to the return of the articles. Since the appellants failed to comply with the requirements of the law as contemplated under section 110 (2) of the Act, the petitioner/respondent would be entitled to the release of the seized articles. 5. Since the appellants failed to comply with the requirements of the law as contemplated under section 110 (2) of the Act, the petitioner/respondent would be entitled to the release of the seized articles. 5. This submission was opposed by the Customs authorities by filing a detailed counter traversing the averments in the writ petition. The learned Single Judge, however, after hearing the learned counsel on both the sides, by an order made on 4.7.96. recorded a specific finding that the authorities of the Customs Department failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of section 110 (2) of the Act inasmuch as. no notice of show cause was given to the owner within the stipulated time of six months. On that ground alone, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and granted the relief. It is this order which is called in question in this writ appeal. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the view taken by the learned Single Judge while interpreting the provisions of section 110 (2) of the Act is not in consonance with the intendment of that provision of law inasmuch as according to him, since sub-section (2) of section 110 of the Act clearly provides power on the competent authority of the Customs Department to extend the said stipulated period by another six months to do so. the learned Single Judge ought to have seen that since in compliance of that provisions of law, the competent authority having passed an order on 8th of July. 1995. there is compliance of the requirements of section 110 (2) of the Act, therefore, the learned Single Judge ought to have seen that since the Parliament has conferred such powers upon the competent authority by way of concession to the Customs authority to keep the seized goods with them for another six months by issuing a show cause notice which, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, the competent authority has done. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is that since the learned Single Judge failed to consider this aspect of the matter, the conclusion reached by him is erroneous. 7. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is that since the learned Single Judge failed to consider this aspect of the matter, the conclusion reached by him is erroneous. 7. Contrary to the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants, the learned counsel for the respondent urged that regard being had to the language employed under section 110 (2) read with section 124 of the Act, if the competent authority of the Department of Customs intends to exercise such power conferred upon them under sub-section (2) of section 110 of the Act, in which event, the competent authority should have exercised that power before the expiry of the first six months and not otherwise. The argument advanced on behalf of the respondent is that since the order passed by the Customs authorities, admittedly, having been passed after the expiry of the period of six months, that would not enure to their benefits. To say so, the learned counsel for the respondent has strongly placed reliance upon two decisions : (i) Chuharmal vs. Union of India & others, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1474 ; (ii) Harbans Lal vs. Collector of Central Excise and Customs, reported in 1993 (67) ELT20 (SC). 8. We will presently refer to these decisions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chuharmal (supra), while affirming the view taken by the High Court from Madhya Pradesh, held as follows : "In the aforesaid decision of this Court in Assistant Collector of Customs vs. Charandas Malhotra (supra), this Court affirmed the view of the Calcutta High Court that the power under the proviso was quasi-judicial, or at any rate, one requiring a judicial approach. This Court reiterated that the right to restoration of the seized goods is a civil right which accrues on the expiry of the initial six months and which is defeated on an extension being granted, even though such extension is possible within a year from the date of the seizure." In the same paragraph, it is further held : "It must be reiterated whether a notice was given or not within a stipulated time for extension as contemplated under section 110 (2) is a question of fact. It is also true that the onus that the order was passed without notice, was on the person who asserts it to be so and this is a question of facts." In Harbans LaPs (supra) case, again the Supreme Court held as follows : "Seizure - Show cause notice if not issued within six months seized goods to be returned but confiscatioin and penalty imposable - Sections 110 and 124 of Customs Act, 1962 are independent, distinct and exclusive of each other - Show cause notice under section 124 survives even if seized goods are returned or returnable to their owner in non-issue of notice in time - Sections 110 and 124 ibid as made applicable to Central Excise under section 12 of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 - Rule 233 A of Central Excise Rules, 1944. -The ratio of this Court afore-quoted in Charandas Malhotra's case, thus settles the question afore-posed and the answer is that these two sections 110 and 124 are independent, distinct and exclusive of each other, resulting in the survival of the proceedings under section 124, even though the seized goods might have to be returned, in terms of section 110 of the Act, after the expiry of the permissible period of seizure." In a latest case in LL Rao, Assistant Collector of Customs vs. Bibhuti Bhusan Bagh reported in 1989 (42) ELT 338 (SC), the same view has been reiterated. Please see paragraph 9 of the decision. 9. In view of the foregoing, we have no alternative but to say that as there is no compliance of the requirements of sub-section (2) of section 110 of the Act within six months, in other words the appellants failed to issue notice of show cause within six months as contemplated in that section, though a notice came to be issued later within a period of one year which is not an answer to the question of compliance of the requirements of section 110 (2} of the Act. Therefore, the conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge in favour of the respondent must be held to be proper, and the learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to persuade us to take a different view from the view expressed by the learned Single Judge. The appellants failed to make out a case. 10. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.