Govindan v. Subaida Beevi — 1997 DIGILAW 189 (KER)

Judgment :- Ramakrishnan, J. The short question arising for consideration in this revision is this : Whether the general principle of constructive res judicata or S.15 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short'the act ) would preclude a landlord from claiming eviction on any one of the grounds mentioned in S.11 of the Act after an adverse finding in an earlier petition for eviction filed on some other grounds under that Section, if such omitted ground was available to him at the time of filing the earlier petition and the adverse decision thereon? 2. The brief facts of the case necessary for disposal of the revision are thus: Respondent-landlady filed rcp 53 of 1989 claiming eviction of the petition schedule building from the petitioner-tenant under S.11(3) and 11(4)(iii) of the Act. It was alleged in the petition that the landlady assisted by her husband wanted to open a new stationary business and a showroom and depot in the petition schedule building for the sale of Match boxes produced in the Match factory owned by her husband and as such the building is needed bonafide for her occupation. It was also alleged in the petition that the tenant has acquired possession of one-and-half cents of land and a shop room situated therein very close to the petition schedule shop room facing the road and sufficient enough to satisfy the requirements of the tenant to carry on his business conducted in the petition schedule building. It was on the basis of the above allegations, landlady has claimed eviction. Tenant denied all the material allegations in the petition by filing a detailed counter affidavit. Disputing the existence of the need alleged and its bonafides, i t was submitted that on mere or less similar grounds an earlier petition, RCP 40 of 1982, was filed by the landlady which was dismissed by all the statutory authorities including this Court. In the earlier petition, RCP 40 of 1982, the need alleged was that the landlady's husband wanted a godown and shop room to be opened in the petition scheduled building and for that purpose he needs the building. It was contended that there is no change in the circumstances as alleged in the petition and as such the petition is one filed without any bonafides. It was contended that there is no change in the circumstances as alleged in the petition and as such the petition is one filed without any bonafides. As regards the ground under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act, apart from denying the fact that he is in possession of another building sufficient to satisfy his requirements in the locality, it was submitted that the landlady is not entitled to claim eviction on that ground also. After filing the original written objection, an amendment petition was filed to amend the written objection already filed by incorporating 3 additional paragraphs as 11(a), 11(b) and 11(c) of which 11(a) alone is relevant and deserves to be quoted. Additional paragraph 11(a) is in the following terms: "The petition itself is barred by Resjudicata. The petitioner has no cause of action as alleged in the petition. The cause of action alleged is false and only repetition of the previous suits. There is no change of circumstances as stated in the petition. Hence, the counter petitioner strongly denies that no new cause of action arose on the dates mentioned in the petition". In the light of the objection raised, it was submitted that the petition is liable to be rejected summarily. 3. The Rent Control Court dismissed the petition finding that the petition in its entirely is barred under S.15 of the Act. In the appeal filed by the landlady, the appellate Authority has found that the eviction sought for under S.11(3) is barred by S.15 of the Act. However, the appellate Authority found that the bar pleaded under S.15 of the Act against the eviction claimed under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act is unsustainable in law. On merits the claim for eviction under S.11(4)(iii) was found sustainable. It was found that the tenant as a matter of fact was admitted during his cross-examination that he has acquired a building subsequent to the commencement of the tenancy and has failed to establish specifically that the said building is not reasonably sufficient for his requirements. As such the appellate Authority has ordered eviction under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act while allowing the appeal in part. Aggrieved by the order of eviction, the tenant has preferred this revision mainly raising the question already noted by us, along with some other minor points. 4. As such the appellate Authority has ordered eviction under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act while allowing the appeal in part. Aggrieved by the order of eviction, the tenant has preferred this revision mainly raising the question already noted by us, along with some other minor points. 4. Before we deal with the main question, we may dispose of the subsidiary challenge raised against the sustainability of the finding that the tenant has failed to discharge the burden of showing that the other building in his possession is not reasonably sufficient for his requirements. Having gone through the evidence given by the tenant as RW.1 we are satisfied that the appellate Authority was perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that the tenant has failed to discharge the burden of proving that the building which was acquired by him subsequent to the commencement of the tenancy is not reasonably sufficient to satisfy his requirements. As such we do not find any merit in the challenge raised against the above finding. 5. Sri. S. A. Nagendran, learned senior counsel has strongly argued that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellate Authority ought to have found that the petition under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act is also barred either by the general principle of constructive res judicata or by the provisions contained in S.15 of the Act. It was forcefully submitted that even as per the averments in the petition, the landlady was aware of the fact that the tenant was having possession of another building in his possession even at the time when the earlier eviction petition, RCP 40 of 1982, was filed by her. As such even at the time of riling of RCP 40 of 1982, the ground under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act was available to the landlady for claiming eviction of the building in question. The landlady has not claimed eviction under S.11(4) (iii) of the Act in the earlier petition for eviction. As such it has to be held that the petition filed under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act is barred under S.15 of the Act. It was a ground which she ought to have raised in the earlier petition in support of her claim for eviction and the principle of constructive res judicata will also preclude her from raising the said ground in the present petition. 6. In answer to the above contentions, Sri. It was a ground which she ought to have raised in the earlier petition in support of her claim for eviction and the principle of constructive res judicata will also preclude her from raising the said ground in the present petition. 6. In answer to the above contentions, Sri. P.G. Parameswara Panicker, learned counsel for the respondent-landlady, has submitted that there is no scope for application of the general principle of res judicata in the case of proceedings under the Act in the light of the provisions in S.15 of the Act. Even assuming that the principle of constructive res judicata applies to the proceedings under the Act, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no scope for applying the same. It was further contended that S.15 of the Act also' may not bar the application in the facts and circumstances of the case. Further it was pointed out that neither the pleadings nor the orders passed in the earlier RCP except Ext. A2 order passed by this Court in CRP 2440 of 1986 are produced in the case. In the absence of such documents a plea of res judicata or constructive res judicata cannot be sustained in law. On that short ground itself the bar pleaded based on the principle of constructive res judicata should be rejected as not sustainable in law. It was further submitted that a mere reading of the provisions contained in S.15 of the Act itself would show that the said provisions may not be a bar against the landlady in claiming eviction under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act. Learned counsel has a further contention that the finding that the claim sought for under S.11(3) is barred by the provisions contained in S.15 of the Act itself is unsustainable in law and the landlady is entitled to get an order of eviction even under that section. 7. Before dealing with the rival contentions it may be useful to advert to some of the important legal aspects of the Act and the scheme of the provisions in the Act. 8. As far a the Act is concerned, it has been held to be a self contained statute. 7. Before dealing with the rival contentions it may be useful to advert to some of the important legal aspects of the Act and the scheme of the provisions in the Act. 8. As far a the Act is concerned, it has been held to be a self contained statute. In the light of the provisions in the Act, it has been held that the rights and liabilities of the landlord and tenant are to be governed by its provisions and not by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act (See Joy v. Stephen Jacob 1984 KLT 72). Itis relevant to note that only certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure indicated in S.23 of the Act are made applicable to the proceedings under the Act as per that Section and that too subject to the conditions and limitations as may be prescribed under the Act. However, having regard to the scheme of the Act especially the provisions contained in S.23, it has been held mat the procedural provisions of the CPC may be applied to rent control proceedings in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, or in the absence of a conflict between the provisions of the CPC and the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder (See Pius v. Albin Rozario,1990 (1) KLT 104). Thus, S.10 and O. IX R.9 of the CPC have been specifically held to be not applicable to the proceedings as such under the Act (See Sathyanarayanan Chettiar v. Rent Controller, 1992 (2) KLT 298 and Pius case (supra). 9. In view of the above settled legal position, S.11 of the CPC as such may not have any application to the proceedings under the Act. However, it is well settled that S.11 CPC is not exhaustive of the doctrine of res judicata and the general principles of the res judicata applies even in cases where S.11 CPC as such may not have application (See Workmen, C.P. Trustv. Board of Trustees, AIR 1978 SC 1283, Ar/ww Singh v. MohindraKumar, AIR and Narayanan and Narayanan Chettiar v. Annamalai Chettiar, AIR 1959 SC 275). Therefore, the question is how far the general principle of res judicata and constructive res judicata may have application to the proceedings under the Act in the light of the provisions contained in the Act. 10. Board of Trustees, AIR 1978 SC 1283, Ar/ww Singh v. MohindraKumar, AIR and Narayanan and Narayanan Chettiar v. Annamalai Chettiar, AIR 1959 SC 275). Therefore, the question is how far the general principle of res judicata and constructive res judicata may have application to the proceedings under the Act in the light of the provisions contained in the Act. 10. While considering the above question, it is important and necessary to note S.15 of the Act which is in the following terms: "S.15. Decisions which have become final not to be re-opened - The Rent Control Court shall summarily reject any application under sub-s.(2), (3), (4), (5), (7) or sub-s.(8) of S.11 which raises between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim substantially the same issues as have been finally decided or purports to have been finally decided in a former proceeding under this Act or under the corresponding provisions of any law in force prior to the commencement of this Act or the corresponding provisions of any law repealed or superseded by such law." As the side heading indicates it is a provision specifically incorporated to ensure finality of the decisions once rendered under the Act and to prohibit re-opening of such decisions which have become final. The principle underlying the above provision cannot be anything other than the doctrine of res judicata partly incorporated in the provisions in S.11 CPC. As such it has to be held that the object of the provision in question and that of S.11 CPC is more or less the same, namely that there should be an end to litigations and no man should be vexed twice over for the same cause, expressed since ancient times in the Roman Maxims 'interest Republicae ut sit finis litium' and 'Memo debat bis vixari Pro una at eadem causa'. Since the legislature has incorporated S.15 provision more or less akin to S.11 CPC in the Act which this Court has held to be a self contained statute it is only reasonable to hold that even the general principle of res judicata and constructive res judicata will apply to the proceedings under the Act only to the extent and subject to conditions incorporated or indicated in S.15 of the Act and not in toto. Intention of the legislature in incorporating Section 15 of the Act seems to be to add a provision corresponding to S.11 CPC in a modified manner and thus to make the statute a self contained one excluding impliedly the application of the corresponding provision contained in S.11 CPC and the general principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata. If that was not the idea, the legislature could have very well included S.11 CPC also as a provision in S.23 of the Act along with the other provisions of the CPC included therein. As such in the light of the specific provisions in S.15 of the Act it has to be held that neither S.11 CPC nor the general principle of res judicata and constructive res judicata as such will have application to the proceedings under the Act. As a corollary it has also to be further held that in the matter of deciding the question whether an earlier decision rendered in an application filed under sub¬ss.(2), (3), (4), (5), (7) or (8) of S.11 of the Act and which has become final would bar a decision on merit of a later application under any of the said provisions, S.15 alone will have application to the exclusion of all other provisions of law. 11. Before dealing with the question whether S.15 of the Act would preclude the landlady in this case from claiming eviction under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act, we may at this stage consider the question, the question whether she would be precluded so by the general principle of constructive res judicata even assuming that such principle will apply to the proceedings under the Act also. Sri. Nagendran, learned senior counsel, has vehemently contended that it was upto the landlady to have included the ground of eviction available to her under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act in the earlier application, RCP 40 of 1980 and to claim eviction on that ground also in that application. Reliance was placed in this connection upon the 'might and ought' principle incorporated in Explanation IV to S.11 CPC and the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in P.K.Vijayan v:Kamalakshi Amma (AIR 1994 SC 2145). 12. The earlier application in this case was one filed admittedly under S.11(2) and 11(3) of the Act alone. Reliance was placed in this connection upon the 'might and ought' principle incorporated in Explanation IV to S.11 CPC and the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in P.K.Vijayan v:Kamalakshi Amma (AIR 1994 SC 2145). 12. The earlier application in this case was one filed admittedly under S.11(2) and 11(3) of the Act alone. There was no claim for eviction put forward under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act or under any of the sub-clause of sub-s.(4) of S.11 of the Act in the earlier application, though a claim under S.11(4)(iii) could have been included by the landlady in that application. As no claim for eviction on the ground mentioned in S.11(4)(iii) was made in the earlier petition there was no occasion for the tenant also to controvert the same and invite a decision on that ground one way or other. In fact also no decision was rendered on the question whether eviction is liable to be ordered or not under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act also. A mere reading of the various provisions contained in S.11 of the Act especially those contained in sub-ss.(2), (3), (4), (5), (7) & (8) mentioned specifically in S.15 would show that each of the grounds mentioned in those sub-sections would constitute separate causes of action for claiming eviction. Sub-s.(4) further deals with 5 separate grounds for eviction each of which may again furnish separate and independent cause of action to the landlord to claim eviction. It is important to note in this connection that though the landlord may be entitled to get eviction on the basis of all or any of the grounds mentioned in the various subsections the nature and content of the relief of eviction is not identical in all the cases. Orders of eviction on different grounds mentioned under different sub-clauses of S.11 can be passed only subject to different conditions mentioned under various provisions of the Act itself. For example, an order of eviction passed on the ground of arrears of rent sub-s.2(a) is liable to be vacated under S.11(2)(c) of the Act. Similarly in the case of eviction ordered on the ground of reconstruction, the evicted tenant is entitled to get the reconstructed building leased out to him on payment of fair rent. For example, an order of eviction passed on the ground of arrears of rent sub-s.2(a) is liable to be vacated under S.11(2)(c) of the Act. Similarly in the case of eviction ordered on the ground of reconstruction, the evicted tenant is entitled to get the reconstructed building leased out to him on payment of fair rent. In the case of eviction ordered on the ground of bonafide need under S.11(3) of the Act, the tenant is entitled to apply to the Rent Control Court to put him back in possession of the building in case the landlord fails to comply with the requirements of sub-s.(12) of S.11 within the prescribed time mentioned in that sub-section. The facts and circumstances to be alleged and proved to establish the various grounds mentioned in the sub-sections of S.11 are not entirely different in each case. The nature of the defences available in the case of applications filed under various sub-sections of S.11 of the Act are also different. All the above aspects would in our view clearly indicate that each of the sub-sections of S.11 and the 5 grounds in sub-s.(4) of S.11 would furnish separate causes of action for eviction of the building and the landlord will be entitled to claim eviction on all or any one of the grounds so available to him at any point of time. 13. In this connection we find that with reference to the provisions dealing with the grounds of eviction contained in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the Supreme Court and the High Court of Delhi and with reference to similar provisions in East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 High Court of Punjab and Haryana have taken a similar view and have held that different grounds for eviction provided under the Act furnishes separate and independent cause of actions for eviction (See Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, AIR, 1980 SC 161, S.R. Singh v. Royal Studios, AIR 1972 Delhi 150 and Harnam Singh v. Surjith Singh AIR 1984 P&H 126 (FB). Since the scheme of the provisions contained in S.11 of the Act is more or less similar to the scheme of the relevant provisions providing grounds for eviction in the Delhi and East Punjab Act, we would respectfully follow the reasoning contained in the above decisions and would hold that the various grounds mentioned in S.11 of the Act would furnish separate and independent causes of action for eviction to the landlord. If that be the correct legal position it may not be possible to hold that a landlord having different and independent causes of action to claim eviction of a building is bound to include all such causes of action in one application itself and that if he omits to include any one of such independent causes of action in any application filed on the basis of some other cause of action he will be precluded from claiming eviction by filing a fresh application based on such omitted cause of action after an adverse finding is rendered in the earlier application. For, we find that the doctrine of constructive res judicata may not have application to such a case. 14. In this connection, we may briefly refer to the relevant aspects of the doctrine of res judicata with reference to which the point has to be decided. As far as English Law is concerned in Chapter VI of the book "The Doctrine of Res judicata" while dealing with the topics same and different causes of action' and the doctrine of "issue estoppel' the learned authors Spencer Bower and Turner have stated the Law on the point thus, "Cause of action estoppel is applicable solely to the case where the same cause of action is alleged in successive proceedings. It is a reciprocal estoppel, and operates both as an estoppel per rem judicata m and conversely by way of merger But where one cause of action has been the subject of final adjudication between parties, those determinations of particular issues which are its essential foundation, without which it could not stand, may be used as the basis of issue estoppels between the same parties when another cause of action together is set up ...." (See para. 192) The doctrine of issue estoppel has been pithily stated thus in paragraph 193. 192) The doctrine of issue estoppel has been pithily stated thus in paragraph 193. "Where the decision set up as res judicata necessarily involves a judicial determination of some question of law or issue of fact, in the sense that the decision could not have been legitimately or rationally pronounced by the tribunal without at the same time, and in the same break, so to speak, determining that question or issue in a particular way, such determination, even though not declared on the face of the recorded decision, is deemed to constitute an integral part of it as effectively as if it had been made so in express terms: but, beyond these limits, there can be no such thing as a res judicata by implication". Further in this case, it is particularly relevant to note the statement of law given at paragraph 201 while dealing with the topic 'Questions omitted to be raised in the earlier proceedings' with specific reference to separate causes of action which is as follows: "And indeed, wherever a plaintiff has two separate causes of action (though they arise* generally under any duty to set up both in the first proceedings which he may institute. As will later be seen, if he sets up one cause of action only, and is successful, he is not thereby precluded by the operation of the doctrine of merger from proceeding subsequently on the other; and the same result will attend if he fails in his first proceedings - he may thereafter, notwithstanding such failure, proceed independently on the separate and independent cause of action which has not yet been litigated. He is under no duty by which he is compelled to join all his available causes of action in the first proceedings.". 15. Turning to the Indian Law, relevantly we may quote the statement of law made by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain (AIR 1977 SC 1680) which is to the following effect: "The principle of estoppel per rem judicata is a rule of evidence. It may be said to be 'the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion o f a cause of action". It may be said to be 'the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion o f a cause of action". This doctrine is based on two theories: (i) the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of the community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the interest of the individual that he should be protected from multiplication of litigation. It therefore, serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action, for otherwise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the courts to recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore, survive the judgment, or give rise to another cause of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the general principle of res judicata. But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have therefore, treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process. This is another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has sometimes been referred to as constructive res judicata which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle". An analysis of the above principles would show that the general principle of res judicata applies to cause of action and issues decided already in earlier proceedings. That is why this other rule has sometimes been referred to as constructive res judicata which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle". An analysis of the above principles would show that the general principle of res judicata applies to cause of action and issues decided already in earlier proceedings. The bar of 'cause of action estoppel' which is part of the doctrine of res judicata under English Law will apply only in cases where there is identity of causes of action. But in India, the principle applies even in cases where causes of action are different, if they arise recognising the difference between English Law and Indian Law it is clear that the bar of constructive res judicata will apply only if a party omits to include one of the several causes of action arising out of the same set of facts and not when different and independent causes of action arises out of altogether different set of facts. In other words, only causes of action or grounds of attack or defence arising out of the same set of facts would come within the scope of might and ought' rule which is the basis of the principle of constructive res judicata. If this be the correct legal position, then in the legal light of our finding that grounds mentioned in the various sub-sections of S.11 of the Act furnishes separate and independent cause of action, we have no hesitation in holding that omission to claim eviction on the ground available under sub-s.4(iii) of S.11 of the Act in the earlier petition in this case cannot bar a fresh application on the said ground even though the earlier application was dismissed on merits and the dismissal has become final. For, we find that the different causes of action under different sub-sections of S.11 of the Act arises out of different set of facts and can never be considered as arising out of same set of facts so as to attract the bar of constructive res judicata as held in Nawab Hussains 's case (supra). There is also no question of applying the principle of issue estoppel. 16. There is also no question of applying the principle of issue estoppel. 16. It was however, strenuously contended, relying upon S.R. Singh's case (supra) that the object of an eviction petition under the Act is to be deemed as a single one, namely the eviction of the tenant and all grounds for eviction available on the date of filing of the earlier petition are bound to be included in the said petition itself as grounds of attack as provided in Explanation IV to S.11 CPC. It was submitted that Explanation IV to S.11 CPC is stricter than O. IIR. 2 CPC and according to Explanation IV to S.11 CPC any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in a former suit or proceeding shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suitor proceeding and would bar afresh proceeding on such omitted ground. Though Despande, J, has in the decision relied upon, proceeded on the basis that object of the eviction petition under the Act should be treated as a single one namely eviction of the tenant and all the grounds available to the landlord are bound to be included in one and the same application, we are unable to agree with the said view in the light of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Nawab Hussain's case (supra), to which we have already referred to. The learned judge himself has found in the above decision that the grounds mentioned in the various provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 with reference to which the decision was rendered furnishes separate and independent causes of action. The above finding itself is sufficient to hold that the other conclusion reached by the learned judge that all such separate and independent causes of action are bound to be included in one and same application is incorrect and unsustainable in law, in view of the decision in Nawab Hussain 's case (supra). In the above case, the Supreme Court has indicated categorically that only causes of action arising out of the same set of facts are bound to be included in a suit or proceeding and omission to include all the causes of action arising out of the same set of facts will alone attract the bar under the principle of constructive res judicata. In other words, the rule under Explanation IV to S.11 CPC is stricter only to that extent when compared to the rule under O.II R. 2 and not to the extent indicated in S.R. Singh's case (supra). To the extent indicated above we would therefore, respectfully disagree with the view expressed by Deshpande J. in S.R. Singh's case (supra). 17. The other decision relied upon and which requires to be noticed is P.K. Vijayan's case(supra). That is a case where the Supreme Court has found that omission to take up a plea which could have been taken as a defence in an earlier proceeding under the Land Reforms Act would preclude the party from taking it up as a defence in a later suit with regard to the same subject matter. The said decision is clearly distinguishable and we do not find any merit in the argument of the learned counsel that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the above decision has to be applied to the case on hand. 18. Thus we are of the view that even if general principle of constructive res judicata is held to be applicable to the proceedings under the Act, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the said principle will not preclude the landlady in this case from prosecuting RCP 53 of 1989 in spite of the adverse order in the earlier petition, RCP 40 of 1982. 19. Turning to the applicability of S.15 of the Act, the first thing to be noted is that it refers only to issues finally decided or purports to have been decided in a former proceeding under the Act or under the corresponding provisions of law in force prior to the commencement of the Act or the corresponding provisions of any law repealed or superseded by such law, as the sole or main basis for giving effect to the statutory mandate given to the Rent Control Court to summarily reject an application filed under sub¬ss.(2), (3), (4), (5), (7) & (8) of S.11 of the Act. Of course, the Section also insists that the issues decided or purported to have been decided must be substantially same and that parties to the proceedings must also be same or are parties under whom they or any of them claim. Of course, the Section also insists that the issues decided or purported to have been decided must be substantially same and that parties to the proceedings must also be same or are parties under whom they or any of them claim. Going by the wording of S.15, applications, filed under various sub-sections of S.11 of the Act are directed to be summarily rejected only if substantially same issues arising for consideration in such applications are shown to have been either decided expressly or purported to have been decided already in a proceeding under the Act. Thus, analysed an application filed under any of the sub sections can be rejected summarily as barred under S.15 only if the issue or issues arising for consideration in that application have already been finally decided or purported to have been decided in any earlier proceeding under the Act. For example, to reject an application filed under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act, as in this case, it must be established that the substantially same issue or issues arising for consideration in that application have already been decided or purported to have been decided in a proceeding under the Act. The main issues that may arise for consideration in an application filed under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act are: whether the tenant at the time of commencement of the tenancy was already having a building in his possession or has subsequently acquired possession of a building or put up a building reasonably sufficient for his requirement in the same city, town or village as provided in S.11(4)(iii) of the Act and if so is not the landlord entitled to an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building scheduled to the application. Of course, issues regarding the title of the landlord and bonafides of the landlord may also arise for consideration if the tenant raises such disputes also. Such questions normally arise and could be decided to purported to have been decided only in an application filed under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act and not in applications filed under any other sub-sections of S.11 of the Act. Such questions normally arise and could be decided to purported to have been decided only in an application filed under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act and not in applications filed under any other sub-sections of S.11 of the Act. As such in the absence of a case that there was an earlier application under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act, we are of the view that there is no scope for application of S.15 of the Act and rejecting summarily an application filed under that sub-section as barred under S.15 of the Act. Admittedly, there is no case for the tenant that the earlier application, RCP 40 of 1982, was one filed under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act. In fact, it was one filed under S.11(2) & 11(3) of the Act. There is also no case for the tenant that the parties have joined issue with reference to the requirements under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act during the trial of the earlier application and the said question was expressly or impliedly decided therein. There is also no case for the tenant that a decision with reference to the requirements of S.11(4)(iii) of the Act was necessary or essential for a final adjudication of the earlier application filed under S.11(2) and 11(3) of the Act namely RCP 40 of 1982. In the absence of any such contention it is difficult to accept the contentions that the application filed under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act is liable to be rejected summarily as barred under S.15 of the Act in the light of the decision in RCP 40 of 1982. 20. The view which we have taken in the matter about the scope and effect of the provision in S.15 of the Act has found favour with two learned judges of this Court namely Varghese Kalliath, J. in M. Ex-Servicemen's Co-operative Society v. Rajamma (1986 KLT 513) and T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, J. in Pius's case (Supra) who had occasion to consider the applicability of the above provisions with reference to successive applications filed under S.11(2) and 11(3) of the Act. 21. In the light of the above discussion, we find no merit in the revision and the s ame is only to be dismissed. 22. 21. In the light of the above discussion, we find no merit in the revision and the s ame is only to be dismissed. 22. However, the petitioner is granted a period of three months from today to vacate and surrender vacant possession of the premises in question to the landlady on condition that the petitioner undertakes to do so in an affidavit to be filed before the Rent Control Court within a period of three weeks from today. Revision is accordingly dismissed. Parties will bear their respective costs.