M. Ramakrishna, C. J.:- Shri Jatindra Nath Barthakur, the appellant herein, was the petitioner in Civil Rule No.515 of 1993 before this Court wherein the petitioner had challenged the notice of termination, Annexure 6 in the writ petition, dated 8.2.93, issued by the Chairman, Assam Co-operative Jute Mills Ltd. Silighat, and the writ petitioner had sought for quashing the same for the gorunds taken in the writ petition. 2. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the learned counsel on both the sides, by an order made on 26th April, 1995, dismissed the writ petition holding that the petitioner failed to make out a case seeking for a writ of Certiorari and that there was no merit in the writ petition. It is this order which is called in question in this writ appeal on the grounds taken therein. 3. We have heard the learned counsel on both the sides, 4. Shri S. Medhi, the learned counsel for the appellant argued two legal points in support of the appeal: That the view taken by the learned Single Judge stating that the legal contentions urged seeking to make out a case that the Assam Co-operative Jute Mills Ltd is a 'State' coming within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is not sustainable in law, is not correct. That the conclusion reached by the teamed Single Judge holding that by virtue of the agreement entered into by the parties, the respondents had a right to terminate the services of the writ petitioner and, therefore, the writ petition having been dismissed is not proper and legal. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents, however, maintained that the conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge, both on questions of law and on questions of facts, was justified and this Court need not interfere with the said order. 6. In order to appreciate the legal contentions urged by the learned counsel for the appellant, let us refer to certain serial facts arising in this case. 7. It is, no doubt, true that the writ petitioner/appellant had been serving as LD Assistant-cum-Typist in the Assam Co-operative Jute Mills Ltd, Silghat, from 20th February, 1968. 6. In order to appreciate the legal contentions urged by the learned counsel for the appellant, let us refer to certain serial facts arising in this case. 7. It is, no doubt, true that the writ petitioner/appellant had been serving as LD Assistant-cum-Typist in the Assam Co-operative Jute Mills Ltd, Silghat, from 20th February, 1968. His services were governed by the Bye-laws of the Assam Co-operative Jute Mills Ltd, hereinafter referred to as the Jute Mills, and the service rules framed by the Mills which were made applicable to the employees working in the Mill. The Mill in question had been established under the Assam Co-operative Societies Act, 1949, with its present intake of about one thousand workmen serving in the Mill. 8. While so serving, the appellant was promoted to the post of UD Assistant in the year 1970, and thereafter he was further promoted as Head Assistant with effect from 1.1.75. Thereafter he was posted as Personnel Officer with effect from 5,1.80. Then, it is in admission that the post of Personnel Officer was abolished by the Mill and the appellant was appointed as Sales Officer and he worked in that post for a period of one year. Later/it is stated that the appellant worked as Superintendent for about one year and he was put in charge of Accounts Officer. 9. Again, it is not in dispute that the Mill was closed down for a period from 6.3:84 to 1.1.86. But, it is stated that the services of the appellant was continued in the Mill in the same capacity except for a period of eleven days from 22nd December, 1985, to 1.1.86. Itis stated that the appellant was again asked to work as Personal Assistant to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director with effect from 1.1.86, when the Mill was re-opened. It is stated that thereafter, after the re-opening of the Mills, the appellant was appointed as Labour Welfare Officer with effectfrom 1st July, 1986. 10. It as againtetated that the appellant having served in that post for about four years sight mon$is, he was promoted to the post of Senior Labour Welfare Officer at a higher pay with effect from 1.4.91. While he was so serving, the appellant was compelled to sign an agreement with the Management with a view to enable him to serve the Mills in that capacity for a period of three years with effect from 1.4.91. While he was so serving, the appellant was compelled to sign an agreement with the Management with a view to enable him to serve the Mills in that capacity for a period of three years with effect from 1.4.91. Certain terms and conditions having been incorporated in the agreement and agreeing to abide by these terms and conditions, the appellant began to function as such officer till 1.4.94. 11. Again it is an admitted fact that according to clause 3 of the agreement, either party shall be at liberty to determine the agreement at any time upon giving to the other, three months' notice in writing to the effect or three months' basic salary in lieu thereof. It is stated that the appellant received a notice dated 8.2.93, issued by the respondent No. 1, in which it was communicated that the appellant had been released from service of the Mills with effect from 8.2.93, in terms of clause 3 of the agreement. But it is stated that no three months' basic salary in lieu of the notice was accompanied along with the notice and it was not paid to the appellant. Against legality and correctness of the said notice, the appellant preferred the above civil rule challenging the correctness and legality of the said notice of termination. 12. In the writ Court, on behalf of the respondents, a detailed statement of objections by way of counter was filed controverting the averments of the writ petitioner in the writ petition. It was brought to the notice of the Court in the said counter that at the outset, the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the preliminary objection that the Assam Co-operative Jute Mills Ltd having not been incorporated as a necessary party, though it is a registered body, in the absence of the said Mill as a necessary party, the writ petition, as brought by the petitioner, was not maintainable. 13. Controverting the specific averments in the writ petition, it was brought to the notice of the Court that on account of some difficulties, when the Mill was closed in the earlier part of the year, 1984, though it was reopened on 1.1.86. 13. Controverting the specific averments in the writ petition, it was brought to the notice of the Court that on account of some difficulties, when the Mill was closed in the earlier part of the year, 1984, though it was reopened on 1.1.86. during the said period, a skeleton staff including the petitioner was maintained in the Mill, but it is stated that the services of the writ petitioner/appellant were terminated and dispensed with, with effect from 22nd December, 1985. The writ petitioner, as was the case with the other workers, as on that date, ceased to be an employee of mat Mill from that date, though a large number of employees were dispensed with by virtue of the termination order with effect from 6.3.84. the date on which the Mill was closed. In other words, it is stated in the counter that by virtue of the order of termination dispensing with the services of the writ petitioner from 22nd December, 1985, he ceased to be an employee of the Mill. However, it is stated mat by virtue of the agreement between the parties, the writ petitioner was appointed as Labour Welfare Officer purely on contract basis subject to certain terms and conditions incorporated therein. It was a fresh appointment made on temporary basis from 1.1.86, and it was made clear by incorporating a specific term in the contract that either of the parties shall be at liberty to serve a notice and to determine the agreement at any time upon giving to the other three months' notice in writing to that effect, or three months' basic salary hi lieu thereof; which means, by virtue of the terms of the contract between the two parties, the Management was at liberty to exercise this power conferred upon the Manage-ment to issue a notice determining the contract subject to the same condition. 14. At the outset, it is pointed out that by virtue of the services of the writ petitioner having been terminated as far back as on 22nd December, 1985, the appointment as Labour Welfare Officer, appointing him purely on contract basis commencing from 1.1.86, is governed by the said contract, therefore, the question of counting his earlier, service for the purpose of giving benefit of that service will not arise. 15. 15. In so far as the legal contention urged that the Mill coming within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution and to be construed as such considering the Mill as 'State', etc, is fallacious and this argument has no basis' whatsoever. 16. The learned Single Judge, considering the argument advanced by both the parties and refering to the pleadings in the writ petition, had raised a legal question as to whether the Mill could be said to be a 'State' coming under the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. But, referring to certain authorities and also the material available on record, held that the Mill in question cannot be said to be a 'State' coming under the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Thus, he held against the writ petitioner. 17. Although, Mr. S. Medhi, the learned counsel for the appellant, made an attempt to argue that the Mill, though not made a party in the writ petition or in the appeal, is a 'State' construed in Article 12 of the Constitution, we do not see any force in the argument of Shri Medhi for the following reasons : At the outset it is pointed out and it is not very much in dispute that the services of the writ petitioner having been terminated and dispensed with as far back as on 2nd December, 1985, that order of termination dispensing with the services of the writ petitioner was not called in question in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or in a suit. Therefore, the order of termination has become final. The only grievance of the petitioner in the instant case is that the notice of termination issued by the Management in terms of the contract with a view to dispense with the services of the writ petitioner, according to clause 3 of the contract, is not sustainable in law for the ground, mainly, that the notice is not accompanied with three months' basic salary. Although there is some force in this submission, we are clearly of the view that if the notice of termination, Annexure 6, issued by the Mill is not found to be in accordance with clause 3 of the contract, it is. always open to the writ petitioner to challenge the same in a civil suit. Although there is some force in this submission, we are clearly of the view that if the notice of termination, Annexure 6, issued by the Mill is not found to be in accordance with clause 3 of the contract, it is. always open to the writ petitioner to challenge the same in a civil suit. On the other hand, invoking the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, with a view to challenge such a notice of termination cannot be entertained regard being had to the limitation in the exercise of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The raising of the question as to whether the Mill is 'State' coming within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution, is not based upon any foundation as such. 18. The learned counsel for the appellant brought to our notice that the Govt of Assam by virtue of the action taken by it, in the Fourth Schedule of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Assam Legislative Assembly, held in the year, 1993, having brought the Assam Co-operative Jute Mills Ltd, Silaghat at entry No.33, and, therefore, it is covered in the list of Public Undertakings coming within the Fourth Schedule, Part I, and hence, the said Co-operative Mill said to be a' State' under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, is not sustainable in law; because it does not answer the necessary parameters to hold that the Mill in-question is a' State' coming within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution. We hold that this is not necessary in this case to go into this question for the simple reason that the action of the Mill terminating the services of the writ petitioner/appellant on 22nd December, 1985 and making a fresh appointment under a contract appointing the writ petitioner as Labour Welfare Officer with effect from 1.1.86, is governed purely under the terms of the contract. Therefore, a termination by virtue of the power conferred upon either parties under the contract having been exercised, such an act cannot be called in question in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 19. This is the view taken by the Mysore High Court in Gangadhar Gurusiddappa vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1963 Mysore 193. 19. This is the view taken by the Mysore High Court in Gangadhar Gurusiddappa vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1963 Mysore 193. In that case arising in a regular appeal out of a decree passed by the civil Court, referring to the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the Division Bench of the High Court held as follows : "There is nothing in Article 311 of the Constitution which takes away the power of a competent authority to terminate the services of an employee according to the terms and conditions of an agreement of service executed by him, unless such terms and conditions are repugnant either to that provision or any of the provisions in the law of contract." (Please see para 13 of the judgment) The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in a decision rendered in the case of Satish Chandra Anand vs. The Union of India, reported in AIR 1953 SC 250 . In that decision, refering to the provisions of Articles 14, 16(1), 32(1) and 311 of the Constitution, refering to the order of termination arising out of a contract, a Bench of four Judges of the Supreme Court, held as follows : "A civil servant, who had been engaged on the basis of a special contract for a certain term, reappointed by a further contract on a temporary basis. In accordance with the Government rules, which formed part of the contract, he was discharged from Service after notice. The petitioner filed a petition under Article 32 (1) seeking redress for breach of his fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 (1). It was argued that the rights infringed were those conferred by Article 311:" But the Supreme Court further held : "that Article 311 had no application because there was neither a dismissal nor a removal from service, nor a reduction in rank. As Article 311 had no application, no question of discrimination arose." (Please see paras 7 and 9 of the judgment) In para 10, their Lordships further held as follows : "There was no compulsion on the petitioner to enter into the contract he did. As Article 311 had no application, no question of discrimination arose." (Please see paras 7 and 9 of the judgment) In para 10, their Lordships further held as follows : "There was no compulsion on the petitioner to enter into the contract he did. Having accepted the offer, he still had open to him all the rights and remedies available to other persons similarly situated to enforce any rights under his contract which had been denied to him, assuming there were any, and to pursue in the ordinary Courts of the land such remedies for a breach. The remedy of a writ was, therefore, misconceived." In the light of these decisions, we are clearly of the view that it is unnecessary for the writ Court to consider as to whether the Jute Mill in question comes within the purview of 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution. 20. Be that as it may, we do not see any force in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant seeking to make out a case before us. If at all the petitioner/appellant has got any grievance in regard-to tile breach of any contract under which he was functioning, it was Open to such person to seek for the redressal in a civil suit. A writ petition is not a remedy for such a case. 21. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. ………………..