JUDGMENT - V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.:---The Civil Revision was admitted and heard on 30th April, 1997. On that day, the civil revision was rejected. Following are the reasons for the rejection. It will be better to see the factual panorama: The applicant original defendant/judgment debtor challenges the order passed by the 5th Additional District Judge, Nagpur, confirming the order passed by the Additional Judge, Small Causes Court, Nagpur. The learned Judge of the Small Causes Court rejected the objections raised by the judgment debtor and directed the issuance of warrant of possession under Order XXI, Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That order was confirmed by the Appellate Court, necessitating the present revision. 2.It is an admitted position that a decree has been passed against the judgment debtor for possession of the suit house as also for recovery of Rs. 11,365.75 in Civil Suit No. 358 of 1990. An appeal came to be filed against the decree, being Regular Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1992. The 7th Additional District Judge, Nagpur, dismissed the said appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Small Causes Court. In the said appellate judgment, in the points for determination, point at serial No. 3 was:- "Is institution of suit bad in law for want of permission of competent authority under Slums Act ?" In paragraph 8 of its judgment, the Appellate Court considered the defence of the defendant/judgment debtor that the property was in the slum area and, therefore, no suit could have been filed for eviction unless the permission was obtained from the competent authority under the MAHARASHTRA Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (hereinafter called 'the Slum Areas Act' for the sake of brevity). The Appellate Court has held that there could be no dispute about the proposition of law that if the property was situated within the slum area then the eviction proceedings could not be initiated, unless the written permission was obtained from the competent authority as per the provisions of sections 21 and 22 of the Slum Areas Act. The Appellate Court, however, found on facts that it was not proved that the property was in the slum area. The Appellate Court, however, found on facts that it was not proved that the property was in the slum area. In that behalf, the Appellate Court found that though there was a heavy burden on the defendant/tenant to prove that the property was situated in the slum area and though enough opportunity under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code was granted to the defendant/tenant to put an additional evidence even at the stage of appeal, by producing document in support of her contention, she had not availed of any opportunity and had miserably failed to prove that the suit house was in the slum area. The Appellate Court has also indicated the kind of evidence that could have been required to prove the defendant's contention. The Appellate Court found that the defendant did not call any witness from the office of the Slum Area Improvement, nor did she prove any map or any property extract suggesting that the property was in the slum area. The Appellate Court also found that the concerned property, in respect of which the notification declaring the same to be the slum area, was filed by the defendant in that Court, was Khasra Nos. 239/1 and 291 of Mouja Dhantoli. However, the Appellate Court found that there was nothing on record to suggest that the property in suit was situated in these two Khasra numbers. The Appellate Court also found that the map, which was on record, showed that the notified area was on the east Hampiyard Road, while the suit house was situated on the west of Hampiyard Road and, thus, the Appellate Court came to the clearcut finding that the property was not proved to be in the slum area. It is an admitted position that this judgment and the finding, though were challenged before the High Court, the High Court dismissed the revision and, thus, this judgment and the finding therein became final against the defendant. 3.When the decree was sought to be executed, an objection came to be filed under section 47 read with sections 151 and 144 of the Civil Procedure Code read with section 22(1)(b) of the Slum Areas Act, to stay the execution proceedings till the final decision of the Slum Authority under section 22 of the Slum Areas Act and, alternatively, to dismiss the execution proceedings. The Small Causes Court, by its order dated 15-9-1993, allowed this objection holding that it was essential for the plaintiff/decree holder to have obtained the previous permission from the Slum Authority under section 22(1)(b) of the Slum Areas Act. Significantly enough, the Small Causes Court did not refer to the finding recorded by the first Appellate Court in Appeal No. 1 of 1992, dated 11-9-1992 where the question regarding the Slum Areas Act was finally decided between the parties. 4.Against this, the plaintiff/decree holder filed an appeal, being Misc. Civil Appeal No. 380 of 1993. The 4th Additional District Judge, Nagpur, who decided the appeal, by his judgment dated 7-7-1995, came to the conclusion that the order passed by the Executing Court was not correct. He found that the Slum Authority having been approached, had passed a stay order dated 21-1-1994 in a case bearing No. 183/Slum of 1992 and had directed the stay of the execution of warrant of possession in Darkhast Proceeding No. 554 of 1991. He, however, found that such kind of order was not tenable and there was no necessity for the trial Court to stay the Darkhast Proceeding bearing No. 554 of 1991, as the order of the competent Slum Authority dated 21-1-1994 did not bind the trial Court at all. He, however, held that it was for the landlords/decree holders to produce written permission before the trial Court could order the possession. He, therefore, allowed the Misc. Civil Appeal and held that the order of the trial Court was liable to be set aside and the trial Court was directed to proceed with the Darkhast Proceeding bearing No. 554 of 1991. At serial No. (iv) of his operative order, he directed that the possession warrant of the house should be issued in the name of decree holders subject to the condition that the written permission be filed by the decree-holders from the competent authority as required under the provisions of section 22(1)(b) of the Slum Areas Act. This order was passed on 7-7-1995. This order was passed on 7-7-1995. 5.It seems that thereafter the landlords/decree-holders approached the Additional Judge, Small Causes Court, by an application (Exhibit 21) for proceeding further with the execution application, and filed a certified copy of the order of the Slum Authority in the case instituted by the defendant/judgment debtor, whereby the Slum Authority had finally rejected the application of the defendant and held that the house did not come under the slum area. A copy of this order dated 20th April, 1994 was filed before the Executing Court. The original plaintiffs/decree-holders also filed a communication from the Slum Authority, dated 21st March, 1996, whereby the Executive Engineer of Slum Improvement Section, Nagpur Municipal Corporation, Nagpur, had specifically stated that the house in question, being House No. 251/0+1 owned by the plaintiff P.B. Yadu did not come under the slum notified area. However, the Additional Judge of the Small Causes Court rejected this application (Exh. 21) by his order dated 6-4-1996, on the ground that the Appellate Court had directed the production of a permission from the competent authority and since that permission was not filed, the execution could not proceed. 6.A revision, therefore, came to be filed before this Court, being Civil Revision Application No. 589 of 1996. A limited contention was raised in this civil revision that the Executing Court has not taken into account the letter sent by the Executive Engineer, Slum Improvement Section, Nagpur Municipal Corporation, Nagpur, dated 21-3-1996 and, therefore, had wrongly dismissed the execution application. It was pointed out that in the letter, it was specifically stated that the house did not come under the slum area and, therefore, such letter had to be considered by the Executing Court. The only objection, which was raised on behalf of the tenant then was that the letter was not properly proved before the Executing Court. This Court therefore, allowed the civil revision and gave an opportunity to the landlords to prove the letter. This Court also observed that there after the Court shall proceed with the execution. Thereafter the landlord called one witness and proved the letter, on the basis of which, the Additional Judge of the Small Cause Court allowed the execution and directed the issuance of warrant of possession, by this order dated 1-3-1997. Misc. This Court also observed that there after the Court shall proceed with the execution. Thereafter the landlord called one witness and proved the letter, on the basis of which, the Additional Judge of the Small Cause Court allowed the execution and directed the issuance of warrant of possession, by this order dated 1-3-1997. Misc. Civil Appeal No. 76 of 1977 filed against his order was also dismissed by the 5th Additional District Judge, by his judgment dated 29-3-1997 and as such this civil revision came to be filed. 7.Shri Anjan De, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant/ judgment debtor, urged that the order passed by the 4th Additional District Judge, dated 7-7-1995, in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 380 of 1993 whereby he directed the decree-holders to produce a written permission by the competent authority, required under section 22(1)(b) of the Slum Areas Act, was binding on the decree-holders and unless they produced any such permission, the execution could not have proceeded. The learned Counsel further submits that this order acts as res judicata against the decree-holders and the decree-holders cannot now say that such permission is not required or is not essential under the Slum Areas Act. Shri De further submits that the communication from the Executive Engineer, which the decree-holders have produced, is not properly proved and the same cannot be relied upon by the courts below for holding that the property does not come in the slum area. According to Shri De, in fact, the said communication does not, in any manner, further the cause of the decree-holders as the same cannot be read in the absence of being proved properly in the Court. Shri De also submits that the orders passed by the Executing Court and the Appellate Court, are patently without jurisdiction and, therefore, this Court is bound to interfere in its revisional exercise. 8.As against that, Shri Somalwar, learned Counsel for the non-applicants, supported the orders. He pointed out that there was a finding by the Appellate Court in the very first round of litigation that the property was not situated in the notified slum area. 8.As against that, Shri Somalwar, learned Counsel for the non-applicants, supported the orders. He pointed out that there was a finding by the Appellate Court in the very first round of litigation that the property was not situated in the notified slum area. That question could not have been gone into by the Executing courts and even if there was an order to produce a written permission and even that order was held to be a final order against the landlord, that requirement was fulfilled by producing a letter wherein it is clearly mentioned that the property was not situated in the notified slum area. Shri Somalwar further submitted that there was absolutely no error of jurisdiction in the orders passed by the Executing Court as also the Appellate Court. 9.The history of the litigation, which has been given earlier, would show that there was an issue considered by the 7th Additional District Judge, Nagpur, in Civil Appeal No. 1/92, where the Appellate Court considered as to whether the institution of the suit was bad in law for want of permission of the competent authority under the Slum Areas Act. Therefore, a finding of fact was recorded by the Appellate Court that it was not proved that the property was in the slum area. Admittedly, this finding, that the property was not in the slum area, had attained finality and as such was binding on the parties. Since the finding, that the property was not proved to be situated in the notified slum area and, therefore, the provisions of the Slum Areas Act were not applicable to the same, has become final, the same could not be reagitated in the execution by the judgment Debtor. Therefore, the Executing Court clearly erred in law when it allowed the objections raised in that behalf, by its order dated 15-9-1992. The observation by the Executing Court in that order, that a previous permission should have been obtained from the Slum Authority under section 22(1)(b) of the Slum Areas Act, was clearly illegal. Significantly enough, the Executing Court had only stayed the execution and admittedly that order was set aside by the Appellate Court in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 380 of 1993. Significantly enough, the Executing Court had only stayed the execution and admittedly that order was set aside by the Appellate Court in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 380 of 1993. There, unfortunately, the 4th Additional District Judge, Nagpur, did not realise that the question regarding the applicability of the Slum Areas Act was decided by the Appellate Court while it dealt with the appeal and the same question could not have been reagitated before the Executing Court. The Appellate Court could not have, therefore, issued a direction at Serial No. (iv) in its order dated 7-7-1995. By that direction, the Appellate Court wrongly directed that the warrant of possession should be issued in the name of the decree holder subject to the condition that the written permission was filed by the decree holder, from the competent authority. This order was clearly incorrect and, in fact, this was a jurisdictional error by the Executing Court and the Appellate Court. The finding that the house was not covered by the Slum Areas Act, as it was not proved to be situated in the slum area, had become final and that question could have been reagitated. Therefore, the direction given by the Appellate Court on 7-7-1995 for producing the written permission from the competent authority under the Slum Areas Act, as a pre condition to the issuance of the warrant of possession, was clearly without jurisdiction. Shri De, however, submitted that this direction could not be said to be without jurisdiction. Shri De very fairly conceded that there was no question of applicability of section 22(1)(b) of the Slum Areas Act to the matter and he did not support its legality. He, however, submitted that rightly or wrongly the order has been passed by the Appellate Court and in that a direction was given that the written permission should be produced. According to the learned Counsel, even if that was an incorrect and illegal direction, yet since the judgment has attained the finality, it was binding on the parties, and that direction was clearly a res judicata against the landlord. According to the learned Counsel, even if that was an incorrect and illegal direction, yet since the judgment has attained the finality, it was binding on the parties, and that direction was clearly a res judicata against the landlord. As has already been displayed, in fact, in the wake of the earlier finding by the Appellate Court in the Regular Civil Appeal, this question could not have been gone into at all by the Executing Court and, in fact, the finding by the Appellate Court in Regular Civil Appeal No. 1/92 was a res judicata against the tenant and the tenant could not have been allowed to reagitate that question. 10.Shri De, however, submits that the Appellate Court in Regular Civil Appeal No. 1/92 could not have given this finding. He invites the Court's attention to the provisions of section 42 of the Slum Areas Act. He contends that where the competent authority had the jurisdiction to decide any matter under the provisions of the Slum Areas Act, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the same. He also relied upon section 2(ga) of the Slum Areas Act, which is the definition of the term 'slum area' and pointed out that the slum area means any area which is declared as such by the competent authority. The learned Counsel, therefore, contended that it is a function of the competent authority alone to declare a slum area and, therefore, the Civil Court could not have given any finding regarding a house being in the slum area or out of it. The argument is clearly incorrect. Firstly, in this case, the Appellate Court has not given any finding which was within the exclusive realm of the competent authority. It has not carved out or declared any slum area. The Appellate Court has merely held that the tenant could not prove that the house in question was covered in the slum area. The Civil Court can always find, as a matter of fact, as to whether a particular house is proved to be situated in a slum area, on the basis of the evidence led before it; nay, it is its duty to record such a finding. The Civil Court can always find, as a matter of fact, as to whether a particular house is proved to be situated in a slum area, on the basis of the evidence led before it; nay, it is its duty to record such a finding. It cannot declare a particular area as a slum area, but where there is a notification regarding the particular area being the slum area, it would be always within the power of the Civil Court to consider as to whether the house in question is factually situated in that area or not. The argument of the learned Counsel, that the Appellate Court in Reg. Civil Appeal No. 1/92, erred in holding that the house was not covered within the notified slum area and that the said finding was without jurisdiction being in contravention of section 42 of the Slum Areas Act, is, therefore, patently incorrect. Once it is held that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to give a finding and it had, in fact, given a finding that the concerned house was not proved to be situated in the notified slum area and, therefore, the provisions of the Slum Areas Act were not applicable to the same, that should be the end of the matter. The Executing courts have unnecessarily gone into this matter. In fact, that finding would be a res judicata against the tenant, and the tenant would not be allowed to reagitate that question as she is tried to do in the subsequent execution proceeding. If this argument is accepted, the argument of the learned Counsel for the tenant, that the finding in the execution appeal by the 4th Additional District Judge, Nagpur, in his judgment dated 7-7-1995, amounts to res judicata against the landlord and the landlord could not be granted a warrant of possession, unless he produced a written permission of the competent authority, loses all its significance. 11.Shri De relied upon number of reported decisions to stress his argument on the question of res judicata. He submitted that the Apex Court had held that even an erroneous decision can bind the parties by the principle of res judicata and that the res judicata is a rule of public policy and not a mere technical rule. He also pointed out that the principles of res judicata were also applicable to the execution proceedings. He submitted that the Apex Court had held that even an erroneous decision can bind the parties by the principle of res judicata and that the res judicata is a rule of public policy and not a mere technical rule. He also pointed out that the principles of res judicata were also applicable to the execution proceedings. In support of these propositions, Shri De relied upon (Shenphad Sadashiv Kalwaghe v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur)1, 1970 Maharashtra Law Journal 541; (Kaniram v. Smt. Kazani)2, (Prakash Cotton Mill Pvt. Ltd. v. Municipal Commissioner for Greater Bombay)3, 1982 Maharashtra Law Journal 840 and (Gorie Gouri Naidu v. T. Bodemma)4, A.I.R. 1997 Supreme Court 808. There can be no dispute with the propositions. However, as I have already shown, the principles of res judicata would bind the tenant in this case because of the final finding given by the Appellate Court in Regular Civil Appeal No. 1/92 and not the landlords. In fact, the observations by the subsequent Executing courts as regards the necessity of obtaining a written permission from the competent authority under the Slum Areas Act and the directions given in pursuance thereto by the 4th Additional District Judge in his judgment dated 7-7-1995 were patently without jurisdiction. Even if the direction given by the 4th Additional District Judge, in his judgment dated 7-7-1995, was sought to be complied with by the landlords, by producing a letter, according to me, it would be of no consequence, as it was not at all necessary for the landlords to produce any such permission. It was already amply proved that the Slum Areas Act was not at all applicable and the rented premises were not situated in the notified slum area. 12.For the same reasons, the further argument of Shri De, that the letter was not properly proved by the landlords and the said letter could not be read by the Court, will have to be rejected. In fact, there was no necessity on the part of the landlords to prove any such letter, for the reasons given earlier. It is true that in the earlier round, even this Court gave an opportunity to the landlords to prove the letter properly. By the said letter, it was informed by the competent authority that the house was not situated in the slum area. It is true that in the earlier round, even this Court gave an opportunity to the landlords to prove the letter properly. By the said letter, it was informed by the competent authority that the house was not situated in the slum area. Shri De submitted that the only witness, who has been examined, has not been able to give any details regarding the said letter and mere proof of the signature would not amount to the proof of the contents of the letter. It is true that mere proof of the signature could not prove the contents of the letter. However, that is not a case here. The letter is clear enough, and once the letter is proved by proving the signature of the maker thereof, there would hardly be any reason to doubt the same regarding the veracity of the contents therein. At any rate, nothing has been done by the tenant to question the veracity of the contents of the letter. Again, there is hardly any significance of that letter, as I have already pointed out that the point was concluded in the first round of litigation at the appellate stage itself. That apart, even on merits, the tenant has not given any evidence to suggest that the house was, in any manner, covered by the provisions of the Slum Areas Act, being situated in the notified slum area. The argument in that behalf, therefore, loses all its significance and it has to be held that the courts below were absolutely right in rejecting the objection and issuing the warrant of possession. 13.In the result, the Civil Revision Application has no merits and it is dismissed with costs. However, considering the hardship that it may cause, the time to vacate is granted upto 30th September, 1997. Revision application dismissed.