JUDGMENT Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee, J. This is an appeal against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Judge dated November 17, 1992 in Matter No. 3088, holding that the writ petition was maintainable against the appellants, and also an interim order that the writ petitioner/opposite party would be entitled to monetary benefit including the salary which was the pay last drawn, and would be entitled to remain in the official quarter until the disposal of the writ application. 2. The question involved in this appeal is of some importance, as to whether a writ lies against Loss Prevention Association of India Limited, which is a company under the Companies Act, and the object of the appellant/Company is, inter alia, to provide organisation and trained men with necessary equipments to attend to the prevention and/or minimization of loss to persons or property of any kind or nature whatsoever, arising out of insurable perils of any nature whatsoever. The general management and control of the business and the affairs of the company vest in a Board of Directors which is elected by the members. 3. Dr. Tapas Banerjee, appearing with Mr. Partha Sarathi Sengupta, contended that no writ lies against the appellant/Company as it is not a statutory body nor any statute governs the conditions of service of the employees employed by the Association. The Association was free in framing the conditions and terms of service of its employees. It is also free to make such terms as it may think fit and proper and that the actions of the Association are in no way controlled by the Government, specially in relation to master servant cause with regard to employment. The Association has no public or statutory duty to perform and has no obligation to perform any duty of public benefit. 4. It was further submitted that there is no governmental control, not to speak of any deep or pervasive control. Besides the insurance companies as ordinary members, money also comes from other sources. The Association is also entitled to receive subscriptions from any source. There is no control over the management and policies of the Association, nor is there any important public service being obligatory functions of the Association. It is alleged that the Association is not carrying out either any governmental activities or governmental functions of vital public importance. 5. The Association is also entitled to receive subscriptions from any source. There is no control over the management and policies of the Association, nor is there any important public service being obligatory functions of the Association. It is alleged that the Association is not carrying out either any governmental activities or governmental functions of vital public importance. 5. It was further submitted that the said company is not controlled or regulated by any statute or rules having the force of law. The terms and conditions of service are governed by contract and it was purely contractual and outside the domain of public law. It was further submitted that there is no scope for any statutory protection of the service conditions of the respondent No.1/Doraiswami Venugopal. In the absence of any statutory protection of rules or regulations having statutory flavour, judicial review by a writ of Mandamus is not available. 6. The writ application was filed by the writ petitioner/opposite party against the appellants against the order of termination dated November 3, 1992. By the letter dated November 3, 1992, the respondent/writ petitioner was informed by the Managing Director of the appellant/Company that the "Board has decided to terminate and accordingly terminates the contract of your employment with the Association w.e.f. immediate effect and hereby gives you one month's notice ............................In view of the simple contractual termination of your services as stated above, you will also be entitled to receive all retirement benefits of gratuity, provident fund and all other dues legally payable subject to adjustment and/or set off against all the dues and obligation that you owe to Association". By the said notice, the writ petitioner/opposite party was called upon to vacate the quarter, hand over the car of the Association and also to hand over the papers, files, documents, articles or properties of the Association that were in the possession of the respondent/writ petitioner. 7. The respondent/Doraiswami Venugopal joined the company deputation from Directorate General, Factories Advice Services and Labour Institute, Bombay, for a period of two years, effective from 30th July, 1981, and the period of deputation expired on 29th July, 1983, and the respondent No. 1, after the expiry of the period of deputation, resigned from the past service and was permanently appointed in the appellant/company. 8. 8. The Managing Director of the appellant/company was informed by the Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Labour & Rehabilitation Department, that the President of India has conveyed the sanction to the permanent absorption of Mr. Venugopal, who was the Assistant Director (Engg,), in the Directorate General, Factory Advice Service and Labour Institute, and on deputation to the Loss Prevention Association of India Limited with effect from 30.7.1983, and that the period of service rendered by Mr. Venugopal under the Loss Prevention Association of India Limited, Bombay, from the date of permanent absorption, will be entitled to all the benefits admissible to corresponding employees of the company and continue to be governed by the Loss Prevention Association of India Limited, Bombay, rules in all respect. 9. By the letter dated March 4, 1983 addressed to the Managing Director of the company, by the Director General, F.A.S.L.I., it was informed that in case the respondent/Mr. Venugopal was desirous of continuing with the Loss Prevention Association of India Limited, under the rules, resignation will be obtained from him with effect from 30th July, 1983, and forwarded at an early date for being forwarded to the Government of India. 10. By the letter dated June 18, 1983, the respondent/Venugoal tendered resignation from the post of Joint Director, Central Labour Institute, Bombay, and he was formally absorbed in the company under the terms and conditions laid down in the contract which was accepted by the respondent/Mr. Venugopal. 11. In usual course, the writ petitioner/opposite party, Mr. Venugopal, would have retired on 30th April, 1996. The question for consideration in this appeal is whether the appellant/company is : (a) a 'state' under Art. 12 of the Constitution, and/or an authority under Art. 226 of the Constitution ; (b) even assuming that the said company is a State within the meaning of Art. 12 and/or an authority under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The relationship between the parties being purely contractual, whether a writ petition will be maintainable for enforcing such contractual rights and/or obligations. In this connection, Dr. The relationship between the parties being purely contractual, whether a writ petition will be maintainable for enforcing such contractual rights and/or obligations. In this connection, Dr. Banerjee relied on the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Chander Mohan Khanna vs. National Council of Educational Research and Training and Others, reported in AIR 1992 SC 76 , wherein it has been held by the Supreme Court that: "The powers, functions, finances and control of the Government are same of the indicating factors to answer the question whether a body is a 'State' or not. Each case should be handled with care and caution. Where the financial assistance from the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the institution, or the share capital of the Corporation is completely held by the Government, it would afford some indication of the body being impregnated with Government character. It may be relevant factor if the institution or the Corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication. If the functions of the institution are of public importance and related to Government functions, it would also be a relevant factor." "Article 12 should not be stretched so as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression 'State' A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. It must not be lost sight of that in the modern concept of welfare State, independent institution, corporation and agency are generally subject to State control. The State control does not render such, bodies as 'State' under Art. 12. The State control, however, vast and pervasive is not determinative. The financial contribution by the State is not conclusive." "The combination of State aid coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the body, and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory functions of the State may largely point out that the body is 'State." 12. Reliance was also placed by Dr. Banerjee to a Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Director, Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science, Jadavpur vs. Asohe Kumar Roy & Ors. reported in 1992(1) CLJ 319 . In this connection, it was stated by Dr. Reliance was also placed by Dr. Banerjee to a Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Director, Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science, Jadavpur vs. Asohe Kumar Roy & Ors. reported in 1992(1) CLJ 319 . In this connection, it was stated by Dr. Banerjee that the Loss Prevention Association of India is not even a Government company. It is a company not by share-holding of paid up shares, but a company by guarantee. The President of India had no share in the company. 13. From the pleadings of the parties as well as from the documents annexed to the writ petition and the affidavit-in-opposition, it appears that there were several classes of members of the company and that they are namely, (a) the General Insurance Corporation of India, (b) The New India Assurance Company Limited, (c) The Oriental Fire & General Insurance Company Limited, (d) The National Insurance Company Limited, (e) The United India Fire & General Insurance company Limited, and such other body corporates and/or other persons as the committee of the Association may at any time and from time to time decide to admit as an ordinary member of the Association, and that these members would be eligible and will be recognized as ordinary members of the company. The management and control of the company vest with the Board of Directors. It also appears that some of the directors were the nominees of the above Insurance companies and/or officers of the Government. But, in the Article of Association and Memorandum of Association, it does not appear that the Government has any manner of control over the management, functions and/or the finance and/or the activities of the company. 14. Mr. It also appears that some of the directors were the nominees of the above Insurance companies and/or officers of the Government. But, in the Article of Association and Memorandum of Association, it does not appear that the Government has any manner of control over the management, functions and/or the finance and/or the activities of the company. 14. Mr. Jayanta Mitra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/writ petitioners, submitted that the said association which is a company, is a State within the meaning of Art. 12 and an authority under Art. 226 of the Constitution, in view of the fact that in the Board of Directors, the nominees of the members of the Association, namely General Insurance Corporation, New India Assurance Company, Oriental Fire & General Insurance Company, National Insurance Company Limited, etc., are there, and that there are certain other Government officials in the Board of Directors, and that accordingly it must be held that the said company is fully owned and controlled by the insurance companies which are the instrumentalities of the State. There is no doubt that the General Insurance Corporation of India Limited and other insurance corporations, which are the creature of the Statute, are definitely instrumentalities of the State. But the question is that when General Insurance Corporation of India Limited and other insurance companies become ordinary members of a company, and by virtue of their position as member, they are elected in the Board of Directors, the complexion of the company changes and makes it a 'State' within the meaning of Art. 12 and/or an authority under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Each ordinary or honorary member has one vote. In addition thereto each ordinary member shall have one vote for every contribution of Rs. 10 lakhs or part thereof made by such ordinary member in the preceding calendar year, and that the said insurance companies have, as a matter of fact, contributed Rs. 10 lakhs or more, and accordingly, having more than one vote. This fact according to Mr. Mitra, goes to show that the company is dominated by the representatives of the Government in an indirect manner and as such the company must be held to be amenable to writ. 15. 10 lakhs or more, and accordingly, having more than one vote. This fact according to Mr. Mitra, goes to show that the company is dominated by the representatives of the Government in an indirect manner and as such the company must be held to be amenable to writ. 15. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation vs. United Labour Union, reported in AIR 1997 SC 645 , the Supreme Court laid down the principles for determination for the purpose of considering whether corporation or instrumentality or agency is under the control of the Government and that writ would lie or not. The principles that have been laid down are as follows : (a) The constitution of the corporation or instrumentality or agency or corporation aggregate or Corporation sole is not of sole material relevance to decide whether it is by or under the control of the appropriate Government under the Act ; (b) If it is a statutory corporation, it is an instrumentality or agency of the State. If it is a company owned wholly or partially by a share capital, floated from public exchequer, it gives indicia that it is controlled by or under the authority of the appropriate Government; (c) In commercial activities carried on by a corporation established by or under the control of the appropriate Government having protection under Art. 14 and 19(2), it is an instrumentality or agency of the State; (d) The State is a service Corporation. It acts through its instrumentalities, agencies or persons-natural or juridical ; (e) The governing power, wherever located, must be subject to the fundamental constitutions and abide by the principles laid in the Directive Principles ; (f) The framework of service regulations made in the appropriate rules or regulations should consistent with and subject to the same public law principles and limitations ; (g) Though the instrumentality, agency or person conducts commercial activities according to business principles and are separately accountable under their appropriate bye-laws or Memorandum of Association, they become the arm of the Government. 16. 16. The important principle that was laid down was that the existence of deep and pervasive State Control depends upon the facts and circumstances in a given situation and in the altered situation it is not the sole criterion to decide whether the agency or instrumentality or persons is by or under the control of the appropriate Government. 17. Further, it was held that functions of an instrumentality, agency or person are of public importance following public interest element. 18. It was also laid down that the instrumentality, agency or person must have an element of authority or ability on effect the relations with its employees or public by virtue of power vested in it by law, Memorandum of Association or bye-laws or Articles of Association, and that such authority renders an element of public service and is accountable to health and strength of the workers, men and women, adequate means of livelihood, etc. 19. In Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, reported in AIR 1981 SC 487 , the Supreme Court laid down the following tests to determine whether the entity is an instrumentality or agency of the State : (1) if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by the Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency or Government; (2) where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character ; (3) it must also be relevant factor whether the Corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected ; (4) existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State, agency or instrumentality; (5) if the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (6) specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of the inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government. 20. (6) specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of the inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government. 20. It is well settled by several decisions of the Supreme Court that where the State has deep and pervasive control over the functions of a society or a corporation or a company, is an agency of the State. It is also equally settled that where an authority is created by a statute, it becomes a statutory body and amenable to writ. Even if it is not created by a statute, but under a statute, the deep and pervasive control and/or functioning and/or the financing by the Government are relevant factors for determining that it is a State within the meaning of Art. 12. 21. It is equally settled by several decisions of the Supreme Court that when right flows from contract and the relationship is governed by the contract, simpliciter writ would not lie for unforeseen contractual obligations. It is also well settled that where the action of a public authority vested with statutory powers is challenged, the writ petition is maintainable even if the right to relief arises out of the alleged use of contract. (see, The DFO South Kheri vs. Ram Sanehi Singh, AIR 1973 SC 205 ). 22. In Director, Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science, Jadavpur vs. Ashoke Kumar Roy, reported in 1992(1) CLJ 319 , a Division Bench of this court, of which one of us was party, held that a mandamus would not lie to enforce private duties or private obligations. The enquiry for the purpose of finding out whether it is an instrumentality of the State or not, has to be not as to how the juristic person is born but why it has been brought into existence. The Corporation may be a statutory Corporation created by a statute or it may be Government company or a company formed under the Companies Act or it may be a society registered under the Societies Registration Act or any other similar statute. Whatever be its genetical origin, it would be an authority within the meaning of Art. 12, if it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and that would have to be decided on a proper assessment of the facts in the light of the relevant factors. Whatever be its genetical origin, it would be an authority within the meaning of Art. 12, if it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and that would have to be decided on a proper assessment of the facts in the light of the relevant factors. The concept of instrumentality or agency of the Government is not limited to a corporation created by a statute but is equally applicable to a company or society and in a given case it would have to be decided, on a consideration of the relevant factors, whether the company or society is an instrumentality or agency of the Government so as to come within the meaning of the expression 'authority' in Art. 12. 23. It was further observed that Art. 12 should not be stretched so as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression 'State'. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. It must not be lost sight of that in the modern concept of Welfare State, independent institution, corporation and agency are generally subject to State control. The State control does not render such bodies as 'State' under Art. 12. The State control, however vast and pervasive, is not determinative. The financial contribution by the State is also not conclusive. The combination of the State and coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the body, and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory functions of the State, may largely point out that the body is 'State'. If the Government operates behind a corporate veil, carrying out Governmental activity and Governmental functions of vital public importance, there may be little difficulty in identifying the body as 'State' within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. 24. On analysis of the factors in the case, it was held that the National Council of Educational Research and Training, which was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, was not amenable to writ jurisdiction as it is not an authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution. In that case, it was also observed that mandamus would lie for the purpose of fulfilling the public duties and/or responsibilities and it would not lie to enforce the private duties and/or private obligations. In that case, it was also observed that mandamus would lie for the purpose of fulfilling the public duties and/or responsibilities and it would not lie to enforce the private duties and/or private obligations. Mandamus is a public law remedy and therefore it would not lie in respect of duties of a private nature, even if the body in question is created by statue and could in respect of other of its functions be compelled by mandamus, as for example, where the Industrial Court was acting as private arbitrator. It that case, it was held that the service of the respondent therein as not controlled or regulated by any statute or the rules having the force of law. It was purely contractual and outside the domain of public law. Only in a case where there are some statutory protections to the service conditions of the employee, in that event it would be open for judicial review by the Writ Court. In the absence of any statutory protection or rules and regulations having the statutory flavour, judicial review by writ is not available. 25. The Supreme Court in the case of Chander Mohan Khanna vs. The National Council of Educational Research & Training, reported in AIR 1992 SC 76 , observed that, "There are only general principles but not exhaustive test to determine whether a body is an instrumentality or agency of the Government. Even in general principles, there is no cut and dried formula which would provide correct division of bodies into those which are not. The powers functions, finances and control of the Government are some of the indicating factors to answer the question whether a body is 'State' or not. Each case should be handled with care and caution. Where the financial assistance from the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the institution, or the share capital of the corporation is completely held by the Government it would afford some indication of the body being impregnated with Government character. It may be a relevant factor if the institution or the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication. If the functions of the institution are of public importance and related to Governmental functions, it would also be a relevant factor. It may be a relevant factor if the institution or the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication. If the functions of the institution are of public importance and related to Governmental functions, it would also be a relevant factor. These are merely indicative indicia and are by no means conclusive or clinching in any case." 26 In that case, after considering the various factors, the Supreme Court held that the National Council of Education and Research was not an authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution. 27. Applying the principles laid down in the above cases, in our view the Loss Prevention Association of India, which is not a creature of a statute, but a company incorporated under the Companies Act and controlled and managed by Board of Directors and that there is no control, financially otherwise. Over the activities of the company by the Government or the Governmental agencies, and under such circumstances can it be said that the same is an authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution and State within the meaning of Art. 12 and an authority under Art. 226 of the Constitution ? The composition of the company, its function, constitution of the management, its activities and finance taken together, can it be said that the said company is an agency of the State? The mere fact that some of the Board of Directors are nominated by some of the State controlled and/or statutory corporations does not make it an instrumentality of the State. From the Articles and Memorandum of Association, it is clear that it is not controlled or managed either by the State or by its instrumentalities even. There is no share capital in the company as it is a company by guarantee. Guarantee is also not given by State or its agencies as per Memorandum or Articles of Association but is given by ordinary members as part of this membership qualification, eligibility etc. The State is not giving financial assistance, nor are General Insurance Corporation or subidiaries giving, What is given is not assistance or subsidy but a discharge of obligation or liability of an ordinary member. There is also no bar for resigning from membership or transfer of the ordinary membership to other. The State is not giving financial assistance, nor are General Insurance Corporation or subidiaries giving, What is given is not assistance or subsidy but a discharge of obligation or liability of an ordinary member. There is also no bar for resigning from membership or transfer of the ordinary membership to other. The company also does not enjoy any monopoly status nor gets any State protection and/or assistance. Its activities cannot be said to be of such a nature as would make the same as a public authority and/or discharging public duties. Its activities are of such a nature which every citizen can perform and/or conduct. The object of the company is not governmental business or activities. It carries on commercial activities. 28. The traditional test for determining whether a body of person is subject to judicial review is the source of its power, i.e. whether the power is derived from statute or prerogative. Not all the activities of public authorities raise public law issues. It is not the sole test. In R. vs. Penal on Take-over and Mergers, ex p. Datafin plc (1987)1 All ER 564 at 847, Lloyd LJ stated the position thus : "Of course the source of the power will often perhaps usually be decisive. If the source of power is a statute, or subordinate legislation under a statute, then clearly the body in question will be subject to judicial review. If at the other end of the scale, the source of power is contractual as in the case of private arbitration, then clearly the arbitrator is not subject to judicial review ; see R. vs. National Joint Council for the Craft of Dental Technicians (Disputes Committee) ex p Neate (1953) 1 QB 704. But in between these extremes there is an area in which it is helpful to look not just at the source of the power but at the nature of the power. If the body in question is exercising public law functions, or if the exercise of its functions have public law consequences, then that may be sufficient to bring the body within the reach of judicial review. It may be said that to refer to public law in this context is to be the question. But I do not think it does. It may be said that to refer to public law in this context is to be the question. But I do not think it does. The essential distinction, which runs through all the cases to which we referred, is between a domestic or private tribunal on the one hand and a body of persons who are under some public duty on the other. Thus in R. vs. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex p Lain (1967) 2 QB 864 Lord Park CJ after tracing the development of certiorari from its earliest days, said at p. 882; The only constant limits throughout were that (the tribunal) was performing a public duty. Private or domestic tribunals have always been outside the scope of certiorari since their authority is derived solely from contract, that is, from the agreement of the parties concerned." 29. A public element suggests a governmental or quasi-governmental element. If the source of power is statute or supporting legislation under the statute then the body in question would be amenable to judicial review. However, the fact that a body is established under statute is not a sufficient consideration for a case involving such a body to lie within the jurisdiction of judicial review. R. vs. Secretary of State of the Environment ex p. British Telecommunication (1991) Independent 5 September. Where a body is exercising contractual powers which are in part regulated by statute, the matter depends on the extent of statutory intervention. There must be some form of statutory rather than contractual restriction of a body's common law powers before judicial review is available. In R. vs. East Berkshire Health Authority, ex p. Walsh, (1985) QB 152, it was held that there was nothing in the employment of the applicant therein which took his case out of the ordinary master and servant category. 30. In Ridge vs. Baldwin, (1964) AC 4, and Vine vs. National Dock Labour Board, (1957) AC 488, as also in Malloch vs. Aberdeen Corpn., (1971) 2 All ER 1278, it was observed that where the courts had accorded the appellants a special status, were distinguished on the basis that there was in all three cases a special statutory provision bearing directly on the right of the public authority to dismiss. In any event the consequences of the status were an additional set of procedural safeguards, which may be matters for the protection of which ordinary proceedings rather than judicial review are appropriate. 31. In McClaren vs. Home Office, (1990) ICR 824 at 836, Woolf LJ summarised the principles applicable as to when proceedings have to be taken by way of judicial review by employees against their employer who is a public body, and that four tests have been laid down, which are as follows : "(i) In relation to his personal claims against an employer, an employee of a public body is normally in exactly the same situation as other employees. If he has a cause of action and he wished to assert or establish his rights in relation to his employment he can bring proceedings for damages, a declaration or an injunction (except in relation to the Crown) in the High Court or the County Court in the ordinary way. The fact that a person is employed by the Crown may limit his rights against the Crown but otherwise his position is very much the same as any other employee. However, he may, instead of having an ordinary master and servant relationship with the Crown, hold office under the Crown and may have been appointed to that office as a result of the Crown Exercising a prerogative power or, as in this case, a statutory power. If he holds such an appointment then it will almost invariably be terminable at will and may be subject to other limitations, but whatever rights the employee has will be enforceable normally by an ordinary action. Not only will it not be necessary for him to seek relief by way of judicial review, it will normally be incorporate for him to do so : see Kodeeswaran vs. A-G of Ceylon (1970) AC 1111; R. vs. East Berkshire Health Authority ex p Walsh (1984) ICR 743 and R. vs. Derbyshire County Council, ex p. Noble. (ii) There can, however, be situations where an employee of a public body can seek judicial review and obtain a remedy which would not be available to an employee in the private sector. This will arise where there exists some disciplinary or other body established under the prerogative or by statute to which the employer or the employee is entitled or required to refer disputes affecting their relationship. This will arise where there exists some disciplinary or other body established under the prerogative or by statute to which the employer or the employee is entitled or required to refer disputes affecting their relationship. The procedure of judicial review can then be appropriate because it has always been part of the role of the court in public law proceedings to supervise inferior tribunals and the court in reviewing disciplinary proceedings is performing a similar role. As long as the 'tribunal' or other body has a sufficient public law element, which it almost invariably will have if the employer is the Crown, and it is not domestic or wholly informal, its proceedings and determination can be appropriate subject for judicial review. An example is provided here by the decision of the Divisional Court in R. vs. Civil Service Appeal Board, ex p. Bruce (1988) ICR 649. If there had not been available the more effective alternative remedy before an industrial tribunal, the Divisional Court would have regarded the decision of the Civil Service Appeal Board in that case as review-able upon judicial review. The decision of this court which has just been given in R. vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Attard (1990) Times, 14 March is another example of the same situation. There what was being considered by this court were the powers of a prison governor in connection with disciplinary proceedings in respect of prison officers. The prison governor's disciplinary powers in relation to prisoners are review-able only on judicial review (see Leech vs. Deputy Governor of Parkhurst prison (1988) AC 533) and they can also be reviewed on judicial review where they affect a prison officer on the application of that officer. (iii) In addition, if an employee of the Crown or other public body is adversely affected by a decision of general application by his employer, but he contends that that decision is flawed on what I loosely describe as Wednesday grounds (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. vs. Wednesday Corpn. (1948) 1 KB 223), he can be entitled to challenge that decision by way of judicial review. Within this category comes Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for the Civil Service (1985) ICR 14. In the House of Lords there was no dispute as to whether the case was appropriately brought by way of judicial review. (1948) 1 KB 223), he can be entitled to challenge that decision by way of judicial review. Within this category comes Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for the Civil Service (1985) ICR 14. In the House of Lords there was no dispute as to whether the case was appropriately brought by way of judicial review. The House of Lords assumed that it was and I would respectfully suggest that they were right to do so. The decision under challenge was on affecting employees at GCHQ generally. The action which was being challenged was the instruction by the Minister for the Civil Service in the interests of National security to vary the terms and conditions of service of the staff so that they would no longer be permitted to belong to trade unions. Although the decision affected individual members of the staff, it was a decision which was taken as a matter of policy, not in relation to a particular member of staff, but in relation to staff in general and so it could be the subject of judicial review. (iv) There can be situations where although there are disciplinary procedures which are applicable they are of a purely domestic nature and therefore, albeit that their decisions might affect the public, the process of judicial review will not be available. However, this does not mean that a particular employee who is adversely affected by those disciplinary proceedings will not have a remedy. The existence of the disciplinary proceedings may be highly material to indicate that the category of employee concerned, unlike an ordinary employee, is not limited to a claim for damages but can in the appropriate circumstances in an ordinary action seek a declaration or an injunction to ensure that the proceedings are conducted fairly, (As to dismissal see Ridge vs. Baldwin (1964) AC 40, 65 per Lord Ried; Law vs. National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd. (1963) 1 WLR 1302 and R. vs. BBC, ex p Lavelle (1983) ICR 99)". 32. 32. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of India as well as the English cases, the claim of the writ petitioner/opposite party that the said Company is an agency or an instrumentality of the State could not be sustained and the principles laid down in Division Bench judgment of this Court in Director, Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science vs. Ashoke Kumar Roy, 1992(1) CLJ 319 stand approved by the above cases which covers this case. 33. In the facts and circumstances of the case, writ cannot lie against the appellant/ Company, and the terms and conditions of service which are governed by contract, do not also come within the scope of public law remedy, and accordingly the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the learned Trial Judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed as no writ lies against the Loss Prevention Association of India Limited. 34. There will be no order as to costs. 35. Vidya Nand, J. : I agree. Appeal allowed.