D. Krishnakumar v. Vinubhai Shantilal Sanghavi — 1997 DIGILAW 196 (GUJ)

JUDGMENT A.R. DAVE, J. 1. BY way of this Civil Revision Application, the petitioners-original defendants tenants in respect of the suit premises have challenged the judgment dated 17-7-1995 passed by the Appellate Bench of Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad in Civil Appeal No. 71/93 whereby the Appellate Bench of Small Causes Court has quashed and set aside the judgment and decree dated 23-7-1993 passed in HRP Suit No. 1751/83. 2. THE facts pertaining to the case are as under : THE respondent-plaintiff had filed HRP Suit No. 1751/83 in Small Causes Court No. 13 at Ahmedabad against Shri Krishnakumar Devdatta Sehgal for possession of the suit premises on the ground that the plaintiff wanted to have the suit premises for his bona fide personal use especially because his children wanted to reside in the suit premises for their studies. It was also submitted by the plaintiff that the defendant had not paid rent from 15-7-1982 to 14-4-1983 and thereby the defendant was in arrears of rent. During the pendency of the above-referred suit, the defendant expired and thereafter wife and children of late Shri Krishnakumar Sehgal were joined as defendants who have been described herein below as defendants. The Trial Court was pleaded to dismiss the suit by coming to a conclusion that the defendants were not in arrears and the plaintiff was not having bona fide requirement of the suit premises. It is pertinent to note here that in para-3 of the plaint, it was submitted by the plaintiff that he was not paid rent for a period commencing from 15-7-1982 to 14-4-1983 and the premises in question were required for personal bona fide requirement of the plaintiff. Though, no specific averment with regard to retirement of the plaintiff was made in para-3 of the plaint, the plaintiff had averred that he was transferred to Godhara and, therefore, the suit premises were required for his children as they were studying at Ahmedabad. At the relevant time, the plaintiff was residing at Baroda in Govt. Quarter as the plaintiff was in a Govt. service. As the plaintiff was a Govt. servant at the relevant time, he was transferred to Godhara and in the circumstances, he had averred in the plaint that the suit premises were required as his children wanted to stay at Ahmedabad for their studies. Quarter as the plaintiff was in a Govt. service. As the plaintiff was a Govt. servant at the relevant time, he was transferred to Godhara and in the circumstances, he had averred in the plaint that the suit premises were required as his children wanted to stay at Ahmedabad for their studies. At the time when the plaintiff was examined by the Trial Court in August 1992, the plaintiff had retired from service and, therefore, he had stated in his examination-in-chief that after his retirement, he wanted to stay in his own premises at Ahmedabad. He had further stated that he was staying in the premises of his friend Shri C. D. Singh at Baroda at the relevant time and as Mr. C. D. Singh wanted to have premises in which the petitioner was staying, it had become necessary for the plaintiff to have possession of the suit premises. 3. WHILE dismissing the suit, the Trial Court had observed that there was no averment with regard to the requirement of the suit premises on account of retirement of the plaintiff. For the first time, the plaintiff had stated in his examination-in-chief that he had retired and on account of his retirement, he wanted to shift to his own flat which was given on rent to the defendants. The Trial Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that as there was variance between the pleadings and evidence, the ground with regard to bona fide requirement of the suit premises on account of the plaintiffs retirement cannot be considered. Moreover, the ground on which the suit premises were required did not exist at the time when the suit was decided because by that time, children of the plaintiff had completed their studies. In the above-referred circumstances, the suit was dismissed. 4. BEING aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff had filed Civil Appeal No. 71/93 before the Appellate Bench of Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad and by the judgment and order dated 17-7-1995, the said appeal was allowed. While allowing the appeal, the Appellate Court was pleaded to grant some time to the defendants for handing over vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff. Time up to 31st July 1996 was granted to the defendants for handing over the suit premises and it was also directed that a sum of Rs. While allowing the appeal, the Appellate Court was pleaded to grant some time to the defendants for handing over vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff. Time up to 31st July 1996 was granted to the defendants for handing over the suit premises and it was also directed that a sum of Rs. 660/ p.m. should be paid by the defendants to the plaintiff as mesne profits. While deciding the appeal, the Appellate Court has held that the plaintiff was in bona fide need of the suit premises on account of his retirement. It has been noted by the Appellate Court that though the fact with regard to the retirement was neither specifically pleaded in the plaint nor the said fact was brought on record by amending the plaint, the plaintiff had very well stated in his deposition that he had retired and on account of his retirement, he wanted to reside in his own premises at Ahmedabad. The Appellate Court did not become technical by coming to a conclusion that there was variance between the pleadings and evidence by observing that "the defendants very well knew the grounds on which the plaintiff wanted to have suit premises". In examination-in-chief, the plaintiff had very well stated the fact with regard to his retirement and in the circumstances, in view of the Appellant Court, the Trial Court had committed an error in dismissing the suit. 5. THE Appellate Court has also come to the conclusion that Smt. Sureshbala K. Sehgal-defendant No. 1 is a Govt. employee and she could have very well got accommodation in government quarters. There is sufficient evidence on record to show that defendant No. 1 ? a Central Govt. employee ? could have got government quarter at Ahmedabad immediately upon giving an application for quarter, but for the reasons best known to defendant No. 1, she never applied for a government quarter. It is very clear from the evidence that there were sufficient number of quarters at certain places and one of them could have been allotted to defendant No. 1 within a very short period. 6. IN view of the above-referred circumstances, the Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that defendant No. 1 would not have been put to hardship in the event of vacating the suit premises whereas the plaintiff ? a retired govt. 6. IN view of the above-referred circumstances, the Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that defendant No. 1 would not have been put to hardship in the event of vacating the suit premises whereas the plaintiff ? a retired govt. servant, was in dire need of his own premises as he had retired and was staying in somebody else's premises at the relevant time. IN view of the above-referred circumstances, the appeal has been allowed and the judgment of the Trial Court has been quashed and set aside. Being aggrieved by the above-referred judgment and order passed in appeal, the defendants-tenants have approached this Court by way of this Civil Revision Application. 7. LD. Advocate Shri S. M. Shah appearing for the defendants has submitted that the impugned order passed in the appeal is illegal and, therefore, it deserves to be quashed and set aside. LD. Advocate Mr. Shah has submitted that the Appellate Court was absolutely wrong in setting aside the judgment delivered by the Trial Court for the reason that the plaintiff had not made any averment with regard to his retirement in the plaint. In his submission, the Trial Court was right while dismissing the suit for the reason that the fact with regard to the retirement of the plaintiff could not have been taken into account while deciding the suit. He has submitted that the averment with regard to retirement was not in the plaint because at the time when the suit was filed, the plaintiff was in government service. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff retired but the plaintiff did not amend the pleadings. According to LD. Advocate Shri S. M. Shah, the facts which had not been pleaded, could not have been taken into account by the Trial Court and even if there was any evidence with regard to the retirement of the plaintiff, the Trial Court could not have considered the said evidence in absence of pleading with regard to the retirement of the plaintiff. In support of his above-referred submissions, LD. Advocate Shri Shah has relied upon the following judgments : (1) Central Bank of India v. H. P. Jalan, reported in AIR 1972 SC 1272 (2) Abu Bakar Abdul Inamdar, By his L. R. v. Haroon Abdul Inamdar, reported in AIR 1996 SC 112 (3) Rameshwar and Ors. v. Jot Ram and Ors. In support of his above-referred submissions, LD. Advocate Shri Shah has relied upon the following judgments : (1) Central Bank of India v. H. P. Jalan, reported in AIR 1972 SC 1272 (2) Abu Bakar Abdul Inamdar, By his L. R. v. Haroon Abdul Inamdar, reported in AIR 1996 SC 112 (3) Rameshwar and Ors. v. Jot Ram and Ors. reported in AIR 1976 SC 49 (4) Manjulaben Jayantilal and Anr. v. Laxmibai Shivaji, reported in 24(2) GLR 1469 8. LD. Advocate Shri Shah has submitted that there was no evidence with regard to the requirement of the suit premises on the ground of education of the children of the plaintiff? the only ground which was stated in the plaint. He has tried to show that though the plaintiff was transferred from Morbi to Ahmedabad in 1991, he let the premises in question on 14-12-1991. He has tried to show that though the plaintiff was in Ahmedabad, he had given the suit premises on rent and, therefore, he has tried to submit that in fact, the plaintiff was never in need of the suit premises. Ld. Advocate Shri Shah has thereafter submitted that Exhs. 53 and 54 being letters written by Shri C. D. Singh to the plaintiff could not have been exhibited by the Trial Court for the reason that the said letters were not proved. The plaintiff has led evidence by producing the above-referred two letters to the effect that Shri C. D. Singh was in need of the premises occupied by the plaintiff. In the circumstances, the plaintiff had to vacate the said premises and, therefore, he was in need of the suit premises. As submitted by Ld. Advocate Shri S. M. Shah, Shri C. D. Singh was not examined and the plaintiff had not stated as to how he knew handwriting of Shri C. D. Singh and, therefore, the above-referred two letters ought not to have been exhibited. By making the above-referred submission, Ld. Advocate Shri Shah wants' to submit that in fact Shri C. D. Singh was not in need of the premises occupied by the plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiff was not having bona fide requirement of the suit premises. 9. LD. Advocate Shri Shah has also submitted that defendant No. 1 is to retire in 2001. Advocate Shri Shah wants' to submit that in fact Shri C. D. Singh was not in need of the premises occupied by the plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiff was not having bona fide requirement of the suit premises. 9. LD. Advocate Shri Shah has also submitted that defendant No. 1 is to retire in 2001. Defendant No. 1 had not applied for a government quarter during the pendency of the suit or before the suit was filed: After the suit was dismissed, defendant No. 1 did not think it necessary to apply for a government quarter as she thought that she would not be called upon to vacate the suit premises. In the above- referred circumstances, if the defendants are asked to vacate the suk premises at this stage, undue hardship would be caused to them whereas on the other hand, the plaintiff can very well continue to stay at the place where he is staying at present. 10. LD. Advocate Shri S. M. Shah has further submitted that the retirement of the plaintiff was a subsequent event which could not have been taken into account by the Court. In support of his above-referred submission, he has relied upon a judgment delivered in the case of Lilaram Jamiatrai and Others v. Meghraj Hardasmal Kalwani and Others, reported at page 56 of AIR 1972 Gujarat. In addition to the above-referred submissions, it has also been submitted by LD. Advocate Shri Shah that had Mr. C. D. Singh been examined by the plaintiff to prove the letters alleged to have been written by him to the plaintiff, the defendants could have got an opportunity to cross-examine Mr. C. D. Singh and perhaps, in pursuance of the cross-examination, the defendants could have brought out some more facts which would have supported case of the defendants. In view of the above-referred circumstances, no weightage could have been given to the letters alleged to have been written by Shri C. D. Singh which were produced at Exhs. 53 and 54. Ld. Advocate Shri Shah has also submitted that the Appellate Court was in error while considering the fact with regard to commutation of the plaintiff from Baroda to Ahmedabad on account of his so-called job. Shri Shah has submitted that the plaintiff had not adduced any evidence to show that he was serving at Ahmedabad. 53 and 54. Ld. Advocate Shri Shah has also submitted that the Appellate Court was in error while considering the fact with regard to commutation of the plaintiff from Baroda to Ahmedabad on account of his so-called job. Shri Shah has submitted that the plaintiff had not adduced any evidence to show that he was serving at Ahmedabad. He has drawn my attention to certain contradictory statements made by the plaintiff with regard to his employment at Ahmedabad. It has also been submitted by Shri Shah that railway pass relied upon by the plaintiff was for the period of January and February 1992 though the plaintiff was examined some-where in August 1992. It has been submitted by the Ld. Advocate Shri Shah that had the plaintiff been actually in service in August 1992, the plaintiff would have surely tried to rely upon railway pass issued to him during July or August 1992. He has, therefore, submitted that the railway pass could not have been considered as evidence by the Appellate Court to come to a conclusion that the plaintiff was attending to his duty at Ahmedabad from Baroda every day in pursuance of service taken up by him after his retirement. 11. LD. Advocate Shri Shah has also submitted that the Appellant Court was in error in reappreciating the evidence. He has relied upon a judgment delivered in the case of Madhusudan Das v. Smt. Narayanibai and Ors. reported at page 114 of AIR 1983 SC to show that the Trial Court is normally having an advantage of observing witnesses and the manner in which they depose and, therefore, in the matter of appreciation of evidence, the findings of the Trial Court should be given more weightage. He has also relied upon the judgment in the case of W. C. Macdonald v. Fred Latimer and others reported at page 15 of AIR 1929 PC for submitting that whenever there is a conflict in findings with regard to facts arrived at between the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, findings given by the Trial Court should not be interfered with. On the basis of the above-referred submissions made by LD. Advocate Shri S. M. Shah, he has submitted that the judgment and order passed by the Appellate Court deserve to be quashed and set aside. 12. ON the other hand, Ld. On the basis of the above-referred submissions made by LD. Advocate Shri S. M. Shah, he has submitted that the judgment and order passed by the Appellate Court deserve to be quashed and set aside. 12. ON the other hand, Ld. Advocate Shri R. V. Desai appearing for the plaintiffs has vehemently supported the reasons and findings given by the Appellate Court. Ld. Advocate Shri Desai has tried to show that the conclusions arrived at by the Appellate Court and the reasons given by the Appellate Court for setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court are absolutely just and proper. Ld. Advocate Shri Desai has mainly submitted that the plaintiff had filed a suit for recovery of possession on the ground of arrears of rent and for bona fide requirement of the suit premises under the provisions of Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents (Hotel and Lodging House Rates) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rent Act"). He has submitted that the plaintiff has specifically averred in the plaint that he wanted to have the suit premises for his personal use. The said fact has been stated in paras 3 and 4 of the plaint. In addition to the above-referred fact, the plaintiff has stated that the suit premises were required as children of the plaintiff wanted to study at Ahmedabad. 13. LD. Advocate Shri R. V. Desai has stranuously submitted that at the most pleadings were vague for the reason that the fact with regard to the retirement of the plaintiff was not pleaded even by amending the plaint subsequently. It is an admitted fact that at the time when the suit was filed, the plaintiff was in services and at the time when he had led evidence, he had" retired. LD. Advocate Shri Desai has submitted that as the plaintiff had already deposed in the examination-in-chief that he wanted the suit premises due to his retirement, attention of the defendants was duly drawn to the said fact. Moreover, the defendants were very well aware of the fact, that the plaintiff wanted the suit premises for his bona fide requirement as the plaintiff wanted to stay in the suit premises after his retirement. 14. IN the above-referred circumstances, he has tried to support the reasonings given by the Appellate Court. Moreover, the defendants were very well aware of the fact, that the plaintiff wanted the suit premises for his bona fide requirement as the plaintiff wanted to stay in the suit premises after his retirement. 14. IN the above-referred circumstances, he has tried to support the reasonings given by the Appellate Court. He has submitted that it is also not necessary for the plaintiff-landlord to give complete details with regard to his requirement in the plaint. It is sufficient if he makes it known in the plaint that he required the suit premises. Ld. Advocate Shri Desai has also submitted that the events which take place after filing of the plaint should be taken into account by the Court. In the instant case, the plaintiff had retired after filing the plaint. At the time when he was examined, he had already retired and, therefore, he deposed in examination-in-chief that he wanted the suit premises upon his retirement as he wanted to shift to Ahmedabad especially when he was not having any house anywhere and he was working at Ahmedabad as a Consultant. 15. IN support of his above-referred submissions, Ld. Advocate Shri Desai has relied upon several judgments. He has submitted that even if a particular avement is not specifically stated in the pleading, but if attention of the concerned party is drawn in the course of evidence, the Court should look at the facts stated in the evidence so as to do justice to the concerned litigant. 16. HE has also submitted that according to the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Madan Gopal Kanodia v. Mamraj Mamiram and Others AIR 1976 SC 461 ), if pleading is drafted loosely, the Court need not become too technical but the Court should try to see that genuine claim of a citizen is not defeated merely because pleadings are drafted loosely. He has also relied upon the judgment delivered in the case of Smt. Manjushree Raha and others v. B. L. Gupta and Others ( AIR 1977 SC 1158 ) and has submitted that even if there is some negligence in drafting the pleadings, but if sufficient evidence is led, the Court should look into the evidence to do justice to the concerned litigant. He has also submitted that in the interest of justice, the Court should look into the evidence so as to do justice to the concerned litigant. 17. HE has further submitted that when parties to the litigation were aware of the fact especially when evidence was led and attention of the party was drawn to a particular fact, it would not be proper on the part of the aggrieved litigant to submit that pleadings were incomplete. So as to substantiate the said submission, he has relied upon the judgment delivered in the case of Kaliprasad Agrawala (Dead by Legal Representative) and Others v. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Others, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1530 . 18. THUS, Shri R. V. Desai has submitted that the plaintiff landlord has stated in the plaint that the suit premises were required by him for his personal use. In the plaint, he has also stated that he wanted his daughter to study at Ahmedabad. Subsequently, in examination-in-chief, he has stated that after his retirement, he wanted to stay at Ahmedabad. THUS, necessary averment was made in the plaint with regard to personal use of the suit premises. At the time when the suit was filed, the plaintiff- landlord was in Govt. service and at the time when evidence was led by him, he had already retired and, therefore, the fact with regard to requirement of the said premises due to retirement was stated as the time of examination-in-chief. It is true that there is no specific averment with regard to retirement of the plaintiff in the plaint. At the time when the plaint was filed, the plaintiff-landlord wanted the suit premises so as to enable his daughter to stay in the suit premises at Ahmedabad for the purpose of her studies. Subsequently, when he retired, at the time of examination-in-chief, he made averment pertaining to his retirement. Upon hearing the concerned advocates and upon persual of the relevant papers, it is clear that though no specific averment with regard to retirement has been made in the plaint as the plaintiff-landlord was in service at the relevant time, it is very clear that at the time of leading evidence, the plaintiff-landlord has made averment with regard to his retirement. Thus, the fact with regard to retirement of the plaintiff was made known to the defendants-tenants. Thus, the fact with regard to retirement of the plaintiff was made known to the defendants-tenants. Nothing has been said by the defendants with regard to any other premises belonging to the plaintiff where he could have resided after his retirement. It is also an admitted fact that the plaintiff was staying in a building belonging to somebody else at the time when evidence was led. Even at present, as submitted by Ld. Advocate Mr. Desai, plaintiff landlord is staying in a house belonging to his daughter's father-in-law at Baroda. Retirement of the plaintiff landlord is a subsequent event. Necessary evidence was led by the plaintiff to show that he had retired. According to the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amarjitsingh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarin, reported in AIR 1987 SC 741 , it is clear that a subsequent event can be taken into consideration for the purpose of administration of justice. In the instant case also, as the plaintiff landlord required the suit premises upon his retirement and when . the said fact has been clearly stated in the evidence, in the interest of justice, there would be nothing wrong if cognizance of the said fact is taken by the Court. 19. LD. Advocate Mr. Desai has also drawn my attention to the evidence led by the plaintiff to the effect that he was commutting from Baroda to Ahmedabad for the purpose of his service. The said fact has also not been disputed by the LD. Advocate Mr. S. M. Shah as the plaintiff landlord has placed on record his railway pass to substantiate his averment that he was commutting from Baroda to Ahmedabad. Of course, the said railway pass pertains to earlier period namely for January and February 1992, though the plaintiff was examined subsequently in August 1992. It was submitted by LD. Advocate Mr. S. M. Shah that the plaintiff ought to have placed on record current railway pass or railway pass issued to him in the month previous to the month in which he was examined. Looking to the above-referred evidence, it is also clear that at the relevant time, the plaintiff landlord was commutting from Baroda to Ahmedabad and was thus put to much inconvenience as he was not in a position to occupy his own house and thus he was in need of his own premises. 20. LD. Looking to the above-referred evidence, it is also clear that at the relevant time, the plaintiff landlord was commutting from Baroda to Ahmedabad and was thus put to much inconvenience as he was not in a position to occupy his own house and thus he was in need of his own premises. 20. LD. Advocate Mr. Desai has submitted that the plaintiff-landlord was put to much hardship and it was open to defendant No. 1 to occupy government quarter which could have been allotted to her in normal circumstances. LD. Advocate Mr. Desai has drawn my attention to the evidence given by the employees of the office of the Accountant General (Exhs. 74 and 86) whereby it has been brought on record that had defendant No. 1 tenant given an application for allotment of a quarter, she could have been given quarter at Meghaninagar or Shastrinagar within a very short period. For the reasons best known to defendant No. 1, she did not give any application for availing a quarter though, in fact, she was entitled to get the Government Quarter. When it was possible for defendant No. 1 to get quarter at Ahmedabad, defendant No. 1 ought to have applied for the quarter so as to accommodate herself and her family in the govt. quarter. At this stage, Ld. Advocate Mr. S. M. Shah has submitted that defendant No. 1 did not apply for a quarter as she had succeeded before the Trial Court. She thought that she would be in a position to continue to remain in the suit premises and, therefore, she did not give application for a govt. quarter. The said submission of Ld. Advocate Mr. Shah does not appear to he proper for the reason that in that event defendant No. 1 ought to have applied for a quarter when appeal filed by the plaintiff- landlord was allowed. Ld. Advocate Mr. Desai has, therefore, submitted that hardship of the plaintiff landlord is much more than that of the defendants-tenants and, therefore, Appellate Court was absolutely justified in allowing the appeal. 21. IN the instant case, at the time when suit was pending before the Trial Court, landlord and tenant both were in government employment. Ld. Advocate Mr. Desai has, therefore, submitted that hardship of the plaintiff landlord is much more than that of the defendants-tenants and, therefore, Appellate Court was absolutely justified in allowing the appeal. 21. IN the instant case, at the time when suit was pending before the Trial Court, landlord and tenant both were in government employment. The landlord, due to his transferable service, was posted at different places from time to time and as he was not in a position to stay in the suit premises he had rented the suit premises. Defendant No. 1 is also in government employment and as per the evidence adduced before the Trial Court. she was not only entitled to govt. quarter, but she could have been allotted govt. quarter within a very short period if she had applied for the same. As stated hereinahove, for the reasons best known to defendant No. 1, she never applied for the quarter. Now the plaintiff-landlord has retired from service and it is an admitted position that he is not having any house either at Baroda or at Ahmedabad except the suit premises and when he is in need of the suit premises, I do not find any illegality in the order passed by the lower Appellate Court whereby the defendants have been asked to vacate the suit premises in view of bona fide requirement of the plaintiff-landlord. Ld. Advocate Mr. Desai has also relied upon judgments delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Traders and Agencies and Anr., Smt. Parvatidevi v. T. V. Krishnan, reported at pages 344 and 353 of 1996(5) SCC respectively. Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the above-referred two judgments that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. When the landlord is not having any other premises, it would be just and proper to decree his suit filed against the tenant for eviction. IN the circumstances, I do not think that the order passed by the Appellate Court should be interfered with. 22. EVEN as per the submission made by Ld. Advocate Mr. S. M. Shah, defendant No. 1 is still in service and, therefore, she can still get government quarter if she applies for the same. IN the circumstances, I do not think that the order passed by the Appellate Court should be interfered with. 22. EVEN as per the submission made by Ld. Advocate Mr. S. M. Shah, defendant No. 1 is still in service and, therefore, she can still get government quarter if she applies for the same. As the plaintiff-landlord is not having any other accommodation and as defendant No. 1 is still in a position to get accommodation elsewhere, I do not think that the order passed by the Appellate Court whereby the defendants have been directed to hand over possession of the suit premises to the landlord should be interfered with. Submission made by Ld. Advocate Mr. S. M. Shah with regard to not examining Shri C. D. Singh is not of much relevance in view of the admitted fact that the plaintiff-landlord was a licensee and was admittedly staying at a premises belongiing to his friend. The averments with regard to variance between pleading and evidence are also not of much relevance in view of the fact that attention of the defendants was clearly drawn by the plaintiff- landlord while leading his evidence that he had retired and he wanted to stay at Ahmedabad and, therefore, he was in need of the suit premises. In the interest of justice, it would not be proper to become so technical so as to set aside a well-reasoned and a just order passed by the Appellate Court whereby the defendants have been directed to hand over possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff-landlord who is not having his own house anywhere. On the other hand defendant No. 1 is still in a position to occupy govt. quarter as she is still a govt. employee. It is pertinent to note that defendant No. 1-tenant could have applied for a government quarter and as per the evidence, had she applied for a quarter, she would have got a quarter within a very short period, but for the reasons best known to her, she did not apply for a govt. quarter. In view of the above-referred circumstances I have no hesitation in coming to a conclusion that hardship of the plaintiff landlord is much more than that of the defendants tenants. 23. quarter. In view of the above-referred circumstances I have no hesitation in coming to a conclusion that hardship of the plaintiff landlord is much more than that of the defendants tenants. 23. FOR the aforesaid reasons, I do not sec any illegality in the impugned order passed by the Appellate Court and, therefore, this Revision Application is dismissed and ad interim relief granted earlier is vacated. So as to see that the defendants-tenants arc not put to undue hardship, it would be just and proper to grant some time so that in the meanwhile the defendants can make an alternative arrangement and, therefore, while dismissing this Revision Application, the defendants tenants are given time up to 30-6-1997 for vacating the suit premises on a condition that they pay Rs. 660/- p.m. to the plaintiff as directed by the lower Appellate Court by way of mesne profits and on a condition that the defendants-tenants file usual undertaking within two weeks from today.