JUDGMENT K.ramaswamy, J.-This appeal by special leave has come up before this Bench, pursuant to a reference order dated November 9, 1994 passed by a two-Judge Bench, to consider whether the confessional statement of the appellant given to the Customs officers under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 (for short, the Act ), though re tracted at a later stage, is admissible inevidence and cold form basis for conviction and whether retracted confessional statement requires corroboration on material particulars from independent evidence? In support of the reference, the learned Judges have cited Kashmira Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh1, and Chandrakant Chimanlal Desai v. State of Gujarat2. 2. The fats in this case are that at 8.00 a.m. on December 6, 1980, 200 gold biscuits of foreign marking were recovered from the compound of the appellant s house in his presence after digging got done by the Customs official, PW-2, T.K. Rajasekaran, superintendent of Customs, and PW-5, N. Gopalan Nambiar, Inspector and two panch witnesses, PW-3 and another. The same were kept concealed in a wooden box burried in the ground visible through the window of his bed - room. The appellant gave, in his own handwriting, confessional statement, Ex. P-4 at 1.00 p.m. on the said date before the Customs officials. In the proceedings for confiscation, 200 gold biscuits, since unclaimed, were confiscated. but the imposition of penalty was set aside which became final. Thereafter, the complaint was filed by PW-1, the Collector of Customs on May 15, 1982 and it was refiled on January 1, 1985. the appellant was apprehended on June 19, 1982. The appellant was apprehended on June 19, 1982 and was released on bail. The prosecution case hinges upon the retracted confessional statement, Ex. P-A, The recovery proceedngs, Ex. P-3, and evidence of witnesses, PWs-1 to 5 for prrof of recovery of the contraband from the compound of the appellant s house. The magistrate by his judgment dated March 29, 1986 acquitted the appellant of the charges under Section 135(1)(i) of the Act and Sections 85(1)(a) and 86 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968. P-A, The recovery proceedngs, Ex. P-3, and evidence of witnesses, PWs-1 to 5 for prrof of recovery of the contraband from the compound of the appellant s house. The magistrate by his judgment dated March 29, 1986 acquitted the appellant of the charges under Section 135(1)(i) of the Act and Sections 85(1)(a) and 86 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968. On apeal, the leanred Single Judge of the Kerala High Court by the impugned judgment dated July 13, 1988 set aside the acquittal andconvicted the appellant of the aforesaid offence and sentenced him to under go imprisonment for a period of 1 year and 6 months respectively and both thesentences were directed to run concurrently. 3. Shri Thakur, learned senior counsel for the appellant, has contended that the confessional statement, Ex. P-4 was obtained by coercion and threaat of implicating his wife in the offences and, therefore, the appellant had not made voluntary statement. The recovery of the gold biscuits from his compound was shrouded with several suspicious features. He further argued that the panch witness, PW-3 was involved in smuggling activities and initially a warrant to search his house was obtained bt when he same proved unsuccessful, recovery came to be made fomr the house of the appellant. They went to the compund and straightaway got the spot located and dugged up the place from which the gold biscuits were recovered. That would go to show that PW-3 had implanted them in the compund of the appellant for safe custody thereof. Unless the appellant had conscious possession of the contraband, he could not be convicted of the ofence. The magistrate has given valid and cogent reasons in support of his conclusion that the prosecutin failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court, without properly appreciating the reasons given by the magistrate and without finding whether or not those reasons wer sustainable on the basis of the evidenc eon record, independently considered the evidence and reached the conclusin that the prosecution had proved its case aginst the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The approach adopted by the High Court is not correct in law. He also contended that the learned Judge shoud have first marshalled the facts and circumstaces to conclude whether prosecution has independently proved its case de hors Ex. The approach adopted by the High Court is not correct in law. He also contended that the learned Judge shoud have first marshalled the facts and circumstaces to conclude whether prosecution has independently proved its case de hors Ex. P-4 which could be considered first to be a coluntary confession or ws obtained by threat, coercion or inducement. Even in reaching the conclusion that it was a voluntary confession it could not by itself form the basis for conviction. It could be used only to corroborate other independent evidence which should inculpate the appellant in the commission of the offence. On proof of those facts, the retracted confessin could be used as evidene corroborative to satisfy the cnscience of the Court that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt from other evidence on record. In support thereof, he placed reliance on Kashmira singh s case and Chandrakant Chimanlal Desai s case. In support of his contention that Customs officers, PW-2 and PW-5 are persons in authority under Section 24 of the Evidence Act, he cited Vallabhdas Liladhar & Ors. v. Assistant Collector of Customs3. He further contended that the moment the Customs Officer had taken the appellant into custody, he had become a person accused of the offence and that the confession made during the custody, obtained by coercion and threat of implication of his wife into the crime was not voluntary and consequently Ex. P-4 is not admissible in evidence under Section 24 of the Evidence Act. In support thereof, he placed reliance on State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya4. The adduction of evidence by the prosecution must be tested on the touchstone of fairness of procedure and its trustworthiness. The confessional statement, Ex.P-4 obtained by threat and coercion being inadmissible, it could not be pressed into service and the prosecution could not make it a base for proving the offences charged against the appellant. The possession of contraband should be conscious possession which must independently be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When the Magistrate considered all the evidence and gave him the benefit of doubt, the High Court did not test the correctness of all the reasons of the Magistrate, reversal of the acquittal by the High Court is bad in law. In support thereof, he relied upon Satbir Singh & Anr. etc. etc. v. State of Punjab5. 4. When the Magistrate considered all the evidence and gave him the benefit of doubt, the High Court did not test the correctness of all the reasons of the Magistrate, reversal of the acquittal by the High Court is bad in law. In support thereof, he relied upon Satbir Singh & Anr. etc. etc. v. State of Punjab5. 4. When we asked the learned counsel appearing for the Union of India whether Customs officer is a person in authority, the learned counsel started arguing that under Section 108 of the Act of officers are empowered to record the statement of the accused and then he pointed out that under the Act, though they were authorised to have the statement of the accused recorded under Section 108, in view of the ratio of Vallabhdas Liladhar case they are persons in authority. He started conceding to the question whether confession is inadmissible in evidence and prosecution could rely thereon, he started conceding to the question. We are constrained to observe at this stage that though the two-Judge Bench referred the question of law to a three-Judge Bench, the learned counsel did not make any attempt to investigate into the questions of law and was on the brink of making concessions and proceeded to argue on that premise. Since wrong concession, in particular on question of law, does not bind this Court and there are plethora of precedents covering the field, we pointed out to the counsel that he rendered no assistance to the Court constraining it to independently investigate into the matter by itself. Accordingly, we closed the arguments. Without meaning any disrespect to the learned counsel, we are at pains to point out that the persons involved in contravention of the provisions of the Act are white-collared offenders and organised gangsters get the best of talent in the profession to assist them. The Union of India should take care to entrust these sensitive cases of far reaching effect, in particular on question of law, to counsel who have experience and ability in that branch of law to defend their cases. Lest it is public justice that suffers and economy of the country is put to jeopardy. Unfortunately, the counsel did not make any effort to analyse the provisions of the Act nor did he make investigation into question of law form the decisions rendered by this Court. Lest it is public justice that suffers and economy of the country is put to jeopardy. Unfortunately, the counsel did not make any effort to analyse the provisions of the Act nor did he make investigation into question of law form the decisions rendered by this Court. At this juncture, it is further relevant to point out that when the Union of India has its panel of counsel, they should see to it that work is assigned to the counsel who can competently argue the case in that behalf lest, for lack of assistance, investigation and marshaling the questions of fact and law, public justice tends to suffer. We would greatly appreciate the counsel appearing for the appellant who placed for consideration all aspects of the case on law and facts. It is, therefore, for the Secretaries of the Departments of Law & Justice and Finance to look into the matter and set their house in order; equally, the Attorney General of India should also see that the affairs in the Central Agency in the Supreme Court are organised accordingly. We have pointed out all this only to express our deep anxiety as the burden on the Court is multiplied to undertake unto itself the task of investigating into all aspects to consider the case so as to reach satisfactory conclusion. 5. The primary question, as referred to us for consideration, is: whether the retracted confessional statement, Ex. P-4, by the appellant is inadmissible in evidence under Section 24 of the Evidence Act and what is the scope for its consideration? Since we did not receive any assistance on the question of law, we have independently investigated the case law ourselves and to the extent we could lay our hands, we are dealing with the relevant case law in that behalf. Section 24 of the Evidence Act deals with admissibility of the confession. It reads as under : "24. Since we did not receive any assistance on the question of law, we have independently investigated the case law ourselves and to the extent we could lay our hands, we are dealing with the relevant case law in that behalf. Section 24 of the Evidence Act deals with admissibility of the confession. It reads as under : "24. Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding.- A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise, having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him reasonable, for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him." 6. A bare reading of the above provision would indicate that for application of Section 24 of the Evidence Act, the following ingredients are required to be established: (a) the statement in question is a confession; (b) such confession has been made by an accused; (c) it has been made to a person in authority; (d) it was obtained by reason of any inducement, threat or promise proceeding from a person in authority; (e) such inducement, threat or promise must have reference to the charge against the accused person; and (f) the inducement, threat or promise must be, in the opinion of the Court is sufficient to give an accused person grounds which would appear to him to be reasonable by supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. 7. The question, therefore, is: whether the appellant was a person accused of an offence on December 6, 1980 at 1.00 p.m. when the confessional statement was given by the appellant, admittedly, in his own hand- writing, (Ex. P-4 being the English translation thereof) on the even date or when he was summoned by PW-2 and PW-5 to the Customs office on the same day? P-4 being the English translation thereof) on the even date or when he was summoned by PW-2 and PW-5 to the Customs office on the same day? Section 108(1) of the Act empowers any Gazetted officer of Customs to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in any enquiry which such officer is making in connection with the smuggling of any goods. The person so summoned has an opportunity of locus penitentiae to give true and correct statement and also an opportunity to reflect upon and tender the evidence, be it recorded or given in his own hand-writing. Under sub-section (3), all persons so summoned shall be bound to attend either in person or by an authorised agent, as such officer may direct, and to state the truth upon any subject respecting which they are examined or make statements and produce such document and other things as may be required. However, by operation of the proviso to sub-section (3), exemption under Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall be applicable to any requisition for attendance under the said section. Sub-section (4) envisages that every such inquiry, as aforesaid, will be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 and Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). 8. In Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal6, a Constitution Bench of this Court held at page 466 that the Customs officers are entrusted with the powers specifically relating to the collection of custom duties and prevention of smuggling and for that purpose they are invested with the power to search any person on reasonable suspicion, to summon, X-ray the body of the person for detecting secreted goods, to arrest a person against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he has been guilty of an offence under the Act, to obtain a search warrant from a Magistrate, to search any place within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such Magistrate, to collect information by summoning persons to give evidence and produce documents and to adjudge confiscation. He may exercise these powers for preventing smuggling of goods dutiable or prohibited and for adjudging confiscation of those goods. He may exercise these powers for preventing smuggling of goods dutiable or prohibited and for adjudging confiscation of those goods. For collecting evidence the Customs Officer is entitled to serve summons to produce a document or other thing or to give evidence and the person so summoned is bound to attend either in person or by an authorised agent, as such officer may direct, is bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting which he is examined or makes a statement and to produce such documents and other things as may be required. The power to arrest, the power to detain, the power to search or obtain a search warrant and the power to collect evidence are vested in the Customs Officer for enforcing compliance with the provisions of the Sea Customs Act. He is empowered to investigate into the infringement of the provisions of the Act primarily for the purpose of adjudicating forfeiture and penalty. He has no power to investigate into an offence triable by a Magistrate, nor has he the power to submit a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, the Code ). He can only make a complaint in writing before a competent Magistrate. The above law was laid down under the Sea Customs Act, the predecessor of the Act. The ratio therein equally applies to the powers exercised by the Customs Officer under the Act. The Act enlarges their powers. The Customs officer is not a police officer nor is he empowered to filed charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code though he conducts enquiry akin to an investigation under some of the provisions of the Code. His acts are in the nature of civil proceedings for collecting evidence to take further action to adjudicate the infringement of the Act and for imposition of penalty prescribed thereunder which would be self-evident from sub-section (4) of Section 108.