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1997 DIGILAW 201 (RAJ)

Deewan Singh v. State of Rajasthan

1997-02-03

P.P.NAOLEKAR

body1997
Honble NAOLEKAR, J. – Since common questions of law and facts are involved in both these petitions, they are being decided by this common order. (2) These petitions are filed claiming the reliefs amounts others which are relevant as submitted by the counsel appearing for the respective parties are (i) for enforcement of the provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959(herein- after referred to as `the Act) specially sections 17/18, 52 & 53 and for the compliance of the directions in the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court dated 14.12.73; (ii) to issue a Mandamus directing the State Govt.to issue a list of Public Trusts to which Chapter X applies as required u/s 52(2) of the Act and specially to include the temple of Shri Rikhabdevji, which is directly managed by the State and to appo- int a Committee of management in terms of s. 53 of the Act; (iii) to quash the judgment of the Devasthan Commissioner dated 25.3.80 and direct registration of the trust under the Act. Certain persons have been permitted as intervenrs by the court who claim the right of Management of the temple on the ground that the temple does not belong only to two sects of Jain Swetamber or Digamber but the Hindu public and they are the persons interested in the public trust. At the very outset, it is made clear that neither of the parties pressed for nor I feel it necessary to determine at this stage the question whether the temple is a Swetamber temple or a digamber temple which would be a question of fact and will require appreciation of evidence. (3) In village Dhulev nearly 40 miles from Udaipur in Rajasthan, there exists a very ancient Jain temple of Shri Rikhabdevji also known as temple of Shri Keshariya Nathji. The main idol is that of Shri Rikhabdevji, the first Tirthanker of Jains and other idols in the said Devries are those of other Tirthankers and of the foot prints of some deities. The temple of Shri Rikhabdevji has religious and chari- table activities for which pilgrims visiting the temple donate large funds. on 23.5.1947 a constitution of Mewar was promulgated in the erstwhile State of Mewar. Thereafter the State of Mewar merged with other States and formed the United State of Rajasthan. The temple of Shri Rikhabdevji has religious and chari- table activities for which pilgrims visiting the temple donate large funds. on 23.5.1947 a constitution of Mewar was promulgated in the erstwhile State of Mewar. Thereafter the State of Mewar merged with other States and formed the United State of Rajasthan. The management of the temple was placed into the hands of the Devasthan Department of the State of Rajasthan and the Devasthan Department has since been maintaining and administering the temple as a Trustee de son Tort. (4) Previously two separate writ petitions D.B Civil Writ Petition No. 501/1962 and D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 407/1962 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India were filed in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur. The writ petitions were filed on behalf of the Swetamber Murtipujak Jains. The case of the petitioners before the High Court was that the said temple of Shri Rikhabdevji was owned by and belonged to the Swetaber sect of Jains and that the management of the said temple had been illegally usurped by the Govt. of Rajasthan through the Devasthan Department and prayed a writ of Mandamus restraining the State Govt. from enforcing certain provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act No. 42 of 1959 and from carrying out the management of the said temple and handover the same to the denomination of the Swetamber Jains. (5) The State Govt. in its counter affidavit had contested the claim of the petitioners and disputed that the said temple was Swetamber Jain temple.The said temple is a Hindu and was built by the Hindu Ruler of Mewar, that Hindus of all sects including Bhils and other members of the Scheduled Castes as also Jains of all sects were permitted to come and worship in the said temple ever since it was built and that it had always been managed by the Hindu Rulers of Mewar. It was refuted that any provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act were unconstitutional. (6) The High Court , by its judgment dated 30.3.66 held that the temple was a Swetember Jain temple and that the management of the said temple was carried on by the State prior to the commencement of the Constitution. The Court, in view of s. 52(1) (a) or (c) read with s. 53(2) of the Act, directed the Govt. (6) The High Court , by its judgment dated 30.3.66 held that the temple was a Swetember Jain temple and that the management of the said temple was carried on by the State prior to the commencement of the Constitution. The Court, in view of s. 52(1) (a) or (c) read with s. 53(2) of the Act, directed the Govt. to constitute a committee for the management of the said temple as provided in the Act. (7) In D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 407/1962, the petitioners had also contended that the administration and management of Nakodaji Parasnath Temple (another temple ) was being carried on by the Trust Committee on behalf of the Swetamber Jain Sangh in which the entire property of the temple vested. It was further contended that in view of the powers vested in the State Govt. in sub-clause 2 of s. 52 of the Act, there was an imminent danger of the State Govt taking over the management and administration of the Trust and that the provisions of the Act, if enforced would go contrary to the religious faith of the petitioners. Accordingly, the petitioners contended that certain provisions of the Act were unconstitutional. The High Court, inter alia, held that the provisions of s. 52 sub-clause (1) (d) and (e) of the Act were ultravirrs inasmuch as s. 53(5) empowered the State Govt. to appoint persons on the Committee of the Management, who might not necessarily be of the same denomination which managed the Trust. The High Court rejected other contentions of the petitioners. Against the judgment of the High Court, both the petitioners and the State of Rajasthan filed appeals in the Supreme Court bearing C.A. No. 1087/67 and 1119/67 respectively. The Supreme Court by its judgment and order dated 14.12.73 allowed the appeals filed by the State against both the judgments of the High Court and at the same time dismissed the appeals filed by the petitioners in both sets of appeals. The judgment is reported in State of Rajasthan & others vs. Sajjanlal Panjawat & others (1). The Supreme Court by its judgment and order dated 14.12.73 allowed the appeals filed by the State against both the judgments of the High Court and at the same time dismissed the appeals filed by the petitioners in both sets of appeals. The judgment is reported in State of Rajasthan & others vs. Sajjanlal Panjawat & others (1). I will extensively refer the judgment of the Supreme Court as the controversy involved and pressed by the parties, is set at rest by the decision of the Apex Court.It has been observed by the Supreme Court in para 11 page 712 and para 12 page 713 as under :- ``In our view, however, without going into the question whether the temple is a Swetamber or a Digamber Jain temple, it will be sufficient for us to consider whether the temple is a Jain temple, or as alleged by the State a Hindu temple. On a consideration of all the documents admitted, which the State has not , and cannot challenge, we have no doubt that Shri Rikhabdevji temple is a Jain temple and the State of Rajasthan has produced no evidence to the contrary to show that it is a Hindu temple where Jains of all sects as well as Hindus of all sects including the Bhils are allowed to worship. After considering the documents, it has been reiterated ``All these documents, there being no document to the contrary filed by the State of Rajasthan, clearly show that Shri Rikhabdevji temple is a Jain temple . (8) Thereafter the question considered by the Court was whether the management of the temple has been taken over prior to the constitution by the erstwhile Udaipur State under a law, and whether that management continued to be vested even after the Constitution in its successor State, namely the State of Rajasthan, and if so, whether the respondents fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 are affected and has held ``There can, therefore,be no doubt that any right which the Jains or any one of the two Jain denominations, namely, the Swetamber or Digambers or both, may have had in the temple or in its management was lost in the pre-Constitution period and is now vested in the State of Rajasthan. (9) The Supreme Court further observed in para 18 page 715 as under :- ``The Constitution under which the properties and management of the temple had vested in the Ruler, and thereafter in the State conti- nued to be law by virtue of Act.372 of the Constitution till it was repealed by the impugned Act. Since the respondents lost the right to manage and administer the temple and its properties prior to the Constitution by a valid law, they cannot now regain that right on the plea that that law contravenes the right guaranteed under Art. 26(d) of the constitution. In Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali,(1962) I SCR 383 =( AIR 1961 SC 1402 ), it was observed at p. 414 that -``If the right to administer the properties never vested in the denomination or had been validly surrendered by it or has otherwise been effectively and irretrievable lost to it,Art. 26 cannot be success- fully invoked. To the contention that the right to manage the temple and its properties falls under Art. 26(b) and not under Art. 26(d),the answer may be two-fold: (1) the Jains, whether Swetamber or Digamber , had lost the right before the Constitution and Acrt. 26 would not re-invest the right in them;(2) the administration of property, being dealt with in Art.26 (d), should be deemed to be excluded from the purview of Art. 26(b). (10) The High Court has struck down s. 52(1)(d) and (e) as the provisions of s. 53 did not lay down proper safeguards for leaving the administration of the properties in the hands of a denomination on that it has been held by the Supreme Court in para 36 page 722 and para 37 page 723 as under :- ``In our view, the hypothesis on which the High Court has based its conclusions is not warranted by the provisions of sub-s (5) of S. 53 of the Act. In the first category, apart from the Committee being constituted from amongst the trustees of public trusts representing the same religion, the Committee can also be constituted from amongst the trustees of the same persuasion. The significance of the word `persuasion and what it connotes does not seem to have been considered by the High Court. The word`persuasion is a synonym of faith, creed, denomination, religion etc. Websters Third New International Dictonarly Vol. The significance of the word `persuasion and what it connotes does not seem to have been considered by the High Court. The word`persuasion is a synonym of faith, creed, denomination, religion etc. Websters Third New International Dictonarly Vol. II,p. 1688 gives the meaning of``persuasion among others (a) as `` a system of religious of other beliefs (the several Protestants...); (b) a group, faction, sect, or party that adheres to a particular system of beliefs or ideas or promotes a particular view, theory, or cause.... The same dictionary in Vol. I gives the meaning of ``denomination at P. 602 as ``a religious group of a community of believers called by the same name. In other words, in the first category also a committee can be appointed from persons of the denomination to which the trust belongs as in the second cate- gory with this appoint it from the trustees representing that denomination or persuasion while in the third category from amongst the persons who belong to the said denomination who may not be trustees as such.It is significant to note that `persons interested falling in the Second category have been defined by sub-s(9) of Sec- tion 2 as including for the purposes of temples and maths in clauses (a) and (b), namely; (a) in the case of a temple, a person who is entitled to attend or is in the habit of attending the performance of worship or service in the temple or who is entitled to partaking or is in the habit of partaking in the distribution of gifts thereof, (b) in the case of a math, a disciple of the math of a person of the religious persuasion to which the math belongs. Even where the persons interested satisfy the above requirements the additional requirement of clause (b) of sub-s. (5) of S. 53 is that such persons must be also persons for whose benefit the trust was founded. A reading of clause (a) of Sub-s. (5) clearly indicates that the trustees must represent the concerned religion or persuasion, which includes a denomination. Even where the persons interested satisfy the above requirements the additional requirement of clause (b) of sub-s. (5) of S. 53 is that such persons must be also persons for whose benefit the trust was founded. A reading of clause (a) of Sub-s. (5) clearly indicates that the trustees must represent the concerned religion or persuasion, which includes a denomination. It could not have been the intention to appoint a Committee of management comprising trustees of a public trust of a particular religion or persuasion who do not belong to that religion or persuasion or de- nomination.Nor does clause (b) of sub-s. (5) of Section 53 empower persons who do not belong in a denomination to be appointed to a public trust of that denomination. Again the word ``denomination is wide enough to include sections thereof, and it cannot therefore be said as the High Court seems to assume, that a section of the denomi- nation managing the property may not be the same as trustees of public trusts representing the same religion, even if the public trust has the same object as that of the public trust the management of which is being transferred to Committee. If Section 53(5) (a) is reading in the manner suggested by us, as it should be the difficulties pointed out by the High Court would not arise at all. It appears to us, therefore, that merely because the provisions of sub-s.(5) of Section 53 enable the Government to appoint a Committee from the two categories specified in that clause, it does not mean that the Government will appoint or can appoint persons who are not constitutionally entitled to be appointed to that particular trust. If the temple is a Swetamber temple, merely because the Digambers, like Swetambers, are also Jains, it does not empower the Government to appoint them as a Chairman and members of the Committee of management. The very fact that the Legislature has provided for the ascertainment of the general wishes of the persons interested is a positive direction to the State Government to take those wishes into consideration in the manner to be prescribed by the Rules framed under the Act. The very fact that the Legislature has provided for the ascertainment of the general wishes of the persons interested is a positive direction to the State Government to take those wishes into consideration in the manner to be prescribed by the Rules framed under the Act. This provision furnishes, in our view, a safeguard against the appointment of the Chairman and the members of the Committee to manage the trusts, who do not subscribe or adhere to the tenants of a particular religion or denomination to which the trust belongs. No such appointment can be made which contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Cons- titution, and if any such appointment is made, those who have a right to challenge it can do so and have the appointment struck down. In this view clause (e) of sub-s. (1) of S.52 read with sub-s(5) of S. 53 as interpreted by us cannot be held to be invalid . The Supreme court has also upheld the validity of sub-section (3) of s. 17 of the Act. (11) thus, it has been held by the Supreme Court that (i) Rikhabdevji temple is a Jain temple; (ii) that the management of the temple is vested in the State of Rajasthan,(iii) A committee would be constituted under sub-section (5) of s. 53 of the Act from amongst the trustees of the same religion or persuasion i.e. of same faith, creed, denomination, religion or / and a group, faction,sect, or party that adheres to a particular system of beliefs or ideas or promotes a particular view, theory, or cause or/ and of same denomination i.e. a religious group of a community of believers called by the same name or from amongst the persons who are not trustees but belong to the denomination to which trust belongs or and the person interested i.e. a person who is entitled to attend or is in the habit or attending the performance of worship or service in the temple or who is entitled to partaking or is in the habit of partaking in the distribution of gifts thereof and who do subscribe or adhere to the tenants of the particular religion or denomination to which the trust belongs. (12) Sub-section (1) of s. 53 which applies to the temple of Shri Rikhabdevji,a public trust, authorises the State Govt.to appoint a committee to manage the public trust from such date as the State Govt. may appoint.Under sub-s. (2) of s. 53 on or before such date is fixed in respect of a public trust, the State shall constitute, by notification in the official Gazette a committee of management and such commi- ttee shall be deemed to be working trustee of the said public trust and its endowment. Under sub-section (5) of s. 53 the Chairman and members of a committee of management shall be appointed by the State Govt. by notification in the Official Gazette from amongst - (a) trustees of public trusts representing the same religion or persuasion and having the same objects, and (b) persons interes- ted in such public trust or in the endowments thereof or belonging to the denomination for the purpose of which or for the benefit of whom the trust was founded, in accordance with the general wishes of the persons so interested so far as such wishes can be ascertained in the prescribed manner. (13) Rule 36 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Rules, 1962 (for short `the Rules he- reinafter) provides that for the purpose of ascertaining the wishes of the persons interested under sub-s.(5) of s. 53, the State Govt.shall direct the Assistant Commissioner to issue a public notice, in such manner as he may think proper, for inviting suggestions for the constitution of the committee of management. The Assistant Commissioner shall forward suggestions so received alongwith his com- ments, to the State Govt. through the Commissioner.The State Govt.may thereafter vest the management of a public religious trust under Sub-section (1) of s. 53 in a committee so appointed under sub-s-(5) of that section. Thus, it is necessary for the State Govt. to direct the Assistant Commissioner to take steps for constitution of the committee u/s 53(5) of the Act. While constituting the committee, the Com- missioner shall keep in mind the category of the persons who can be the members of the committee as mentioned in paragraph 11 of the judgment. For giving effect to the law laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court, the Assistant Commissioner may be required to determine the question as to whether the temple is a Swetamber temple or a Digamber temple. For giving effect to the law laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court, the Assistant Commissioner may be required to determine the question as to whether the temple is a Swetamber temple or a Digamber temple. If such question is agitated, the parties shall be given due opportunity to produce and prove relevant material necessary for adjudication of the question. It is, therefore, ordered that the directions under rule 36 of the Rules shall be issued by the Govt. to the Assistant Commissioner within a period of three months from today and thereafter the Assis- tant Commissioner shall proceed to conduct an enquiry as required under the law in regard to constitution of committee of management and the State shall appoint committee of management in accordance with law. (14) The petitioners submitted an application under sections 17 and 18 of the Act for the registration of the temple of Shri Rikhabdevji, Dhulev. The Assistant Devasthan Commissioner has dismissed the application filed by the petitioners by his judgment in matter No. 1/76 dated 30.9.76. The petitioners preferred an appeal to the Devasthan Commissioner and the same has been dismissed vide his judgment dated 25.3.1980.Thus, the Devasthan Commissioner has held that the registration cannot be made under the Act. However, he has further held that the appe- llants could not be given any relief under section 52/53. This order of the Devasthan Commissioner is under challenge. The trust cannot be registered as a public trust u/s 17 of the Act because the management of the trust is vested in the State Govt. and s. 77 of the Act excludes the application of the provisions of the public Trust Act if the public trust is administered by any agency under the control of the State Govt. and thus, the finding recorded by the Devasthan Commissioner as regards registration of the trust is correct and does not require any interference. The other finding that the petitioners could not be given any relief u/s 52/53 is contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court and is, therefore, set aside. (15) Chapter x of the Act applies to public trust, which is vested in the State Govt. Sub-s.(2) provides that the State Govt. shall as soon as may be after the commencement of Chapter X publish in the official Gazette a list of the public trusts to which Chapter X applies. (15) Chapter x of the Act applies to public trust, which is vested in the State Govt. Sub-s.(2) provides that the State Govt. shall as soon as may be after the commencement of Chapter X publish in the official Gazette a list of the public trusts to which Chapter X applies. It is held by the Supreme Court that Shri Rikhabdevji Public Trust vests in the State of Rajasthan, it is therefore, necessary for the State Govt. to apply the provisions of sub-section (2) of .s. 52 of the Act.The State Govt. has failed to faithfully carry out the legislative direction contained in sub-section (2) of s. 52 of the Act. Even though Chapter X of the Act had come into force on 1.7.62 and the Legislature directed the State Govt. to publish the list in the official Gazette as soon as thereafter. It appears that period of more than twenty years has passed but no list has been published complying with the provisions of law.It is incumbent on the State Govt. to publish the list in the official Gazette of public trusts to which Chapter x applies. The Legislatures mandate has to be complied with by the State within a reasonable time. The period already elapsed cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to be a reasonable period required for fulfilling the mandate of law. It has, therefore, become necessary to direct the State Govt. to publish the list of public trusts to which Chapter X has applied within the period of six months from today. (16) For the reasons stated above, the petitions are allowed. ___