JUDGMENT Satyabrata Sinha, J. The petitioner who is a citizen of India has filed this writ application, inter alia, for the following reliefs- "(a) A declaration that the Transport Minister, Government of West Bengal, Sri Subhas Chakraborty is not entitled to be a member of the Council of Ministers of West Bengal headed by the Chief Minister Sri Jyoti Basu as the former is unable to support important policy decisions of the Government and has refused to bear the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers; (b) A writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the Chief Minister of West Bengal Sri Jyoti Basu to consider to invoke the Governor's pleasure to dismiss Sri Subhas Chakraborty for his reluctance to support import policy decisions of the Government and for his refusal to bear the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers; (c) A declaration that the action of the Chief Minister Sri Jyoti Basu in communicating decisions which are not known to many Ministers to the Governor as that of the decision of the Council of Ministers relating to the administration of the affairs of the State and proposals for legislation arc unconstitutional; (d) A writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the Chief Minister of West Bengal to act in accordance with the constitutional provisions and communicate to the Governor only those decisions of the Council of Ministers relating to the administration of the affairs of the State and proposals for legislature which have been taken collectively by the Council of Ministers and not individually by him or by his chosen few in the Council of Ministers as has been alleged by Sri Subhas Chakraborty the Transport Minister." 2. The second respondent is the Chief Minister of the State whereas the third respondent is the Minister of Transport, Government of West Bengal. The respondents No. 4 to 12 are Editors of the Statesman, The Telegraph, The Times of India, The Asian Age, Ananda Bazar Patrika, Sambad Pratidin, Aaj Kaal and Bartaman. Admittedly the State introduced a Bill in the Legislature of the State of West Bengal known as West Bengal Government Land (Regulation of Transfer) Bill, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the said Bill) which was passed by the Assembly unanimously on 21st July, 1993. It got the President's assent and came into force with effect from 4th March, 1997. 3. Admittedly the State introduced a Bill in the Legislature of the State of West Bengal known as West Bengal Government Land (Regulation of Transfer) Bill, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the said Bill) which was passed by the Assembly unanimously on 21st July, 1993. It got the President's assent and came into force with effect from 4th March, 1997. 3. On 7th March, 1997 the respondent No. 3 allegedly criticised the said Act as impractical. He further alleged that Cabinet decisions always do not take cognizance of all members and are not collective decisions. The said news item was carried in various newspapers, whose Editors have been impleaded as respondents No. 4 to 12, on 8th and 9th Mach, 1997. 4. Mr. Arunava Ghosh, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that a citizen of India, in view of the fact that the Constitution of India was made by the people, is entitled to maintain the writ application as the third respondent in view of his utterances before the Press had deviated from the doctrine of collective responsibility as envisaged under Articles 163, 164 and 167 of the Constitution of India. In support of his aforementioned contention reliance has been placed in State of Karnataka vs. Union of India and Anr. reported in AIR 1978 SC 68 and R. Rajagopal vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. reported in AIR 1995 SC 264 . 5. Mr. S.C. Ukil, the learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the third respondent, on the other hand, submits that the third respondent is a political representative and, thus any statement made by him cannot be called in question in a court of Law and in support of his aforementioned contention the learned Government Pleader relied upon the provision of Art. 163(3), 164(2) and 194 of the Constitution of India. The learned Government Pleader submits that this application is not maintainable as the question raised in this application cannot be decided by this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance in this connection has been placed in State of Karnataka vs. Union of India and Anr. reported in AIR 1978 SC 68 , Kallara Sukumaran vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 1987 Ker 212 , Kallara Sukumaran vs. Union of India and Ors. Reliance in this connection has been placed in State of Karnataka vs. Union of India and Anr. reported in AIR 1978 SC 68 , Kallara Sukumaran vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 1987 Ker 212 , Kallara Sukumaran vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 1986 Ker 122 , A.G. Prayagi vs. State of M.P. and Ors. reported in AIR 1987 M.P. 25 , Dhronamraju Satyanarayana vs. N.T. Rama Rao and Ors. reported in AIR 1988 A.P. 62 and Mahabir Prasad Sharma vs. Prafulla Chandra Ghose and Ors. reported in AIR 1969 Cal 198 . 6. Mr. Manick Chandra Das, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State adopted the aforementioned submission of M. Ukil and added that in terms of Art. 167 of Constitution of India it is only for the Chief Minister to take any decision in the matter and, thus this Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of or in the nature of Mandamus to direct dismissal of a Cabinet Minister. The learned Counsel further submits that the Press Reports are merely secondary evidences and no writ petition can be based only on Press Reports. 7. Mr. Arunava Ghosh in reply submits that it is not a case where a writ of quo-warranto has been sought for nor it is a case where an allegation has been made against Minister for breach of oath. The learned Counsel submits that the decisions relied upon by Mr. Ukil are distinguishable on facts. 8. Before adverting to the questions involved in this application it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions. Article 163, 164(2) and 167(a) and (b) of the Constitution of India read thus :- "163. (1) There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion. (1) There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion. (2) If any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion, the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final, and the validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion. (3) The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the Governor shall not be inquired into in any court". "164(2) The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State". "167. It shall be the duty of the Chief Minister of each State-(a) to communicate to the Governor of the State all decisions of the Council of Ministers relating to the administration of the affairs of the State and proposals for legislation; (b) to furnish such information relating to the administration of the affairs of State and proposal for legislation as the Governor may call for." 9. The Constitution of India is based on separation of power amongst its three limbs, namely, Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary. 10. In Arun Kumar Roy Chowdhury vs. Union of India in reported in AIR 1992 All 1 , it has been held that Arts. 154, 163 and 164 of the Constitution of India should be harmoniously construed. 10A. In State of Karnataka vs. Union of India and anr,. reported in AIR 1978 SC 68 , the Supreme Court while considering a question as to whether the Central Government can appoint a Commission in terms of the provision of s. 3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act held that the Council of Ministers, theoretically appointed by the Governor, is certainly "collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State". But, this "collective responsibility" does not abridge or truncate the power of the Central Government to appoint a Commission under s. 3 of the Act. But, this "collective responsibility" does not abridge or truncate the power of the Central Government to appoint a Commission under s. 3 of the Act. It was further held that in fact, "collective responsibility" has a scope and made of operation which are very/different from those of an inquiry under s. 3 of the Act even though the same or similar matters may, sometimes, give rise to both. 'Collective Responsibility' is basically political in origin and mode of operation. It may arise even in cases which may not call for any inquiry under s. 3 of the Act, and, matters investigated under s. 3 of the Act may have no bearing on any 'collective responsibility'. The purpose of Art. 164(2) of the Constitution is not to find out facts or to establish the actual responsibility of a Chief Minister or any other Minister or Ministers for particular decisions or Governmental acts. That can be more suitably done, when wrongful acts or decisions are complained of, by means done, when wrongful acts or decisions are complained of, by means of inquiries under the Act. Beg, C.J. observed :- "The object of collective responsibility is to make the whole body of persons holding Ministerial office collectively, or, if one may so put it, 'vicariously' responsible for such acts of the others as are referable to their collective violation so that, even if an individual may not be personally responsibility for it, yet, he will be deemed to share the responsibility with those who may have actually committed some wrong., On the other hand, in the case before us, the enquiry under s. 3 of the Act by the Grover Commission has been ordered by the Central Government so as to determine who is actually responsible for certain actions and what could be the motive behind them. The sphere of this enquiry is very different from that in which 'collective responsibility' functions.. Explaining 'collective responsibility', as understood in England, two writers on Constitutional matters (see 'Some Problems of the Constitution' by Geoffrey Marshall and Graeme C. Moodie) say : (at p. 71) 'If responsibility is taken in the formal constitutional sense, there would seem, granted collective governmental responsibility, to be no clear distinction to be drawn between Ministers inside and those outside the Cabinet. To be responsible in this sense simply is to share the consequences of responsibility namely to be subject to the rule that no member of the Government may properly remain a member and dissociate himself from its policies (except on occasions when the Government permits a free vote in the House)'. They add : "The substance of the Government's collective responsibility could he defined as its duty to submit its policy to and defend its policy before the House of Commons, and to resign if defeated on an ,issue of confidence". "Each Minister can be and is separately responsible for his own decisions and acts and omissions also. But inasmuch as the Council of Ministers is able to stay in office only so long as it commands the support and confidence of a majority of members of the Legislature of the State, the whole Council of Ministers must be held to be politically responsible for the decisions and policies of each of the Ministers and of his department which could be presumed to have the support of the whole Ministry. Hence, the whole Ministry will, at least on issues involving matters of policy, have to be treated as one entity so far as its answerability to the Legislative Assembly representing the electors is concerned. This is the meaning of the principle underlying Art. 164(2) of the Constitution. The purpose of this provision is not to find out facts or to establish the actual responsibility of a Chief Minister or any other Minister or Ministers for particular decisions or Governmental acts. That can be more suitably done, when wrongful acts or decisions are complained of, by means of inquiries under the Act. As already indicated above, the procedure of Parliamentary Committees to inquire into every legally or ethically wrong acts was found to be unsatisfactory and unsound. The principle of individual as well as collective ministerial responsibility can work most efficiently only when cases requiring proper sifting and evaluation of evidence and discussion of questions involved have taken place, where this is required, in proceedings before a Commission appointed under s. 3 of the Act." 11. Mr. Ghosh, however, has strongly relied upon paragraph 230 of the said decision wherein Untwalia, J. has referred to a passage from 'Government and Law' by T.C. Hartley and J.A.C. Griffith which states :- "Ministers arc said to be collectively responsible. Mr. Ghosh, however, has strongly relied upon paragraph 230 of the said decision wherein Untwalia, J. has referred to a passage from 'Government and Law' by T.C. Hartley and J.A.C. Griffith which states :- "Ministers arc said to be collectively responsible. This is often elevated by writers to the level of a 'doctrine but is in truth little more than political practice which is common place and inevitable. Ordinarily, Ministers from the governmental team, all being appointed by the Prime Minister from one political party. A Cabinet Minister deals with his own area of policy and docs not normally have much to do with the area of other Ministers. Certainly no Cabinet Minister would be likely to make public statements which impinged on the work of another Minister's department. On a few important issues, policy is determined by the Cabinet after discussion. 'Collective Responsibility' means that Cabinet decisions bind all Cabinet Ministers, even if they argued in the opposite direction in Cabinet. But this is so say no more than a Cabinet Minister who finds himself, in a minority must either accept the majority view or resign. The team must not he weakened by some of its members making clear in public that they disapprove of the Government's policy. And obviously what is true for Cabinet Ministers is even more true for other Ministers, If they do not like what the team is doing, they must either keep quiet or leave" (page 60). 12. The learned Judge while rejecting the contention that in view of Art. 164(2) of the Constitution of India a Minister cannot be personally liable for his individual acts also referred to treatise by A.H. Birch in "Representative and Responsible Government" which is to the following term :- “Ministerial accountability to Parliament has two aspects : the collective responsibility of Ministers for the policies of the Government and their individual responsibility for the work of their departments. Both forms of responsibility are embodied in conventions which cannot be legally enforced. Both conventions were developed during the nineteenth century, and in both cases the practice was established before the doctrine was announced. (Page 131).” 13. Both forms of responsibility are embodied in conventions which cannot be legally enforced. Both conventions were developed during the nineteenth century, and in both cases the practice was established before the doctrine was announced. (Page 131).” 13. The learned Judge further referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad reported in AIR 1967 SC 122 dealing with s. 37 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir which corresponds to Art. 164 of the Constitution of India laying down the law in the following manner:- "Section 37 talks of collective responsibility of Ministers to the Legislative Assembly. That only means that the Council of Ministers will have to stand or fall together, every member being responsible for the action of any other." 14. However, notice is required to be taken to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in S.P. Anand, Indore vs. H.D. Deve Gowda and Ors., reported in (1996) 6 SCC 734 wherein the question arose as to whether the respondent therein could be elected as a Prime Minister although he was not a member of either of the Houses of the Parliament. While dealing with the said subject it was observed :- "Therefore, even though the Prime Minister is appointed by the President after he is chosen by such number of members of the House of the People as would ensure that he has the confidence of the House and would be able to command the support of the majority, and the Ministers are appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, the entire Council of Ministers is made collectively responsible to the House and that ensures the smooth functioning of the democratic machinery. If any Minister does not agree with the majority decision of the Council of Ministers, his option is to resign or accept the majority decision. If he does not, the Prime Minister would drop him from his Cabinet and thus ensure collective responsibility." 15. A bare perusal of the aforementioned decisions and authorities is clear enough that the collective responsibility of the Council of Minister's is only to the Assembly and/or Parliament, as the case may be; 16. In view of the scheme of the Constitution, a Minister is appointed by the Governor on the advise of the Chief Minister. A bare perusal of the aforementioned decisions and authorities is clear enough that the collective responsibility of the Council of Minister's is only to the Assembly and/or Parliament, as the case may be; 16. In view of the scheme of the Constitution, a Minister is appointed by the Governor on the advise of the Chief Minister. He, therefore, can also be removed by the Governor on his advise and not otherwise. The court has no role to play. The collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers although gives rise to confidentiality of proceedings and papers but there are instances where a statement made by a Minister outside the Parliament has been condoned. A disciplinary committee can also be made by the Ministers by agreement amongst them. 17. In Constitutional and Administrative Law by Stanley De Smith and Rodney Brazier at page 174 it is stated:- "Now, Ministers still in office do not maintain a stony silence when they are not making official utterances: they leak information to journalists when it is in their interests to do so for example, to distance themselves from an unpopular Government decision and to let their supporters know their views. Leaks by or on behalf of Ministers can make a nonsense of the confidentiality of Cabinet discussions, but at least the public is better informed than it would otherwise be." 18. The learned Authors elaborated as regard obligation of public unanimity which flows from the doctrine of collective responsibility at page 188 of the said treatise saying:- "It is open to the Prime Minister to condone a verbal indiscretion by a colleague, and even to overlook a studied refusal by a colleague to offer positive commendation of a policy which he dislikes, though the line between half-hearted formal acquiescence and hints of real disagreement may wear thin. Mr. Peter Walker has been said to make some extra parliamentary speeches in such a way as to make clear his lukewarm approval of Mrs. Thatcher's economic policies, despite being a Cabinet Minister since 1979. During the 1974-9 Labour Governments some Cabinet Ministers, notably but not only Mr. Tony Benn, came very close to public dissociation from Government policy. Mr. Wilson had to issue a not wholly successful minute to Ministers reminding them of the doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility. In this century the convention has been expressly waived three times. During the 1974-9 Labour Governments some Cabinet Ministers, notably but not only Mr. Tony Benn, came very close to public dissociation from Government policy. Mr. Wilson had to issue a not wholly successful minute to Ministers reminding them of the doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility. In this century the convention has been expressly waived three times. In 1975 that convention, in so far as it required Ministers not to disagree with Cabinet decision in public, was waived by the Cabinet to allow those Ministers who disagreed to say in public, but outside Parliament, that they dissented from the Cabinet's recommendation that the electorate should vote to remain in the EEC in the referendum held under the Referendum Act of that year. Once the referendum result was announced, full collective responsibility was restored. Secondly, the doctrine was waived on an ad hoc basis, for the purposes of what became the European Parliament Elections Act 1978, because of the deep divisions in the Labour Cabinet and Parliamentary party over direct elections to the European Parliament. Indeed, the Prime Minister, Mr. Callaghan, was moved to remark that '.... I certainly think that the doctrine should apply except in cases where I announce that it docs not.' Both of those suspensions were a success for the Prime Ministers concerned. But the third, and earlier experiment adopted by the 'National' Government in 1932 over its protectionist policies, and which was intended to allow the coalition parties to 'agree to differ' indefinitely, failed after only a few months. Such experiments are obviously rare and, despite occasional deviations from the norm, the general principle stated above is clear." 19. In British Constitution Made Simple by Colin F. Padfield while considering the power of the Prime Minister it is stated :- "Clearly, a Prime Minister may dismiss a weak and ineffectual Minister. It has been said that a Prime Minister must be a 'good butcher'. Macmillan in 1962, for example, dismissed one-third of his Cabinet, i.e. seven Cabinet Ministers, and the loyalty of the Conservative Party endured that strain. But a Prime Minister cannot go too far for fear that the dismissals may recoil on his own head by spreading discontent among backbenchers and insecurity among the remaining Cabinet Ministers. A Prime Minister must, in the last resort, earn the support and confidence of his party members. He cannot compel it." 20. But a Prime Minister cannot go too far for fear that the dismissals may recoil on his own head by spreading discontent among backbenchers and insecurity among the remaining Cabinet Ministers. A Prime Minister must, in the last resort, earn the support and confidence of his party members. He cannot compel it." 20. E.C.S. Wade and G. Phillips in their Constitutional and Administrative Law, 9th Edition after noticing the development and collective responsibility stated the meaning of collective responsibility elaborately at pages 88 to 102 of the said treatise. The learned Authors stated - except for open questions, ministers who did not wish to be publicly identified with Cabinet policies were expected to resign. 21. The learned Authors, inter alia, noticed :- "Some of the purposes for which the doctrine is maintained are controversial. Thus there is disagreement over the degree of protection which should be afforded to the secrecy of decision making, to the authority of the Prime Minister and to the need for external unanimity. In some more open processes of Government, especially in the holding of public inquiries, it is now recognised as essential that the separate views of Government departments should be made public. An assessment of collective responsibility today must take account of the fact that not all important decisions of national policy are taken in full Cabinet. The decisions to manufacture the British atomic bomb, to mount the Suez operation in 1956, to raise the bank rate in 1957 and to devalue the pound in 1967 were effectively taken by a few ministers meeting with the Prime Minister, subject at most to confirmation by the Cabinet. In such cases other members outside the Cabinet to influence the decision before it is taken. For much of the time, the size of modern Cabinets, as well as the heavy departmental burden of most of its members, would seem to preclude active participation by each minister in decisions. But much depends on the nature of the decision to be taken. While the budget proposals are settled by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in consultation with the Prime Minister and not by the Cabinet, following the devaluation of the pound in 1967 a series of extended Cabinet meetings were held early in 1968 to decide on the economies in public expenditure which should be made. While the budget proposals are settled by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in consultation with the Prime Minister and not by the Cabinet, following the devaluation of the pound in 1967 a series of extended Cabinet meetings were held early in 1968 to decide on the economies in public expenditure which should be made. Whether decisions are taken by the Cabinet or are merely reported to it, a minister may at any time resign in protest against decision taken without his participation or with which he strongly disagrees". 22. The responsibility of Ministers in both individual and collective. See O. Hood Philips' Constitutional and Administrative Law (6th Edn.) page 313. The decision of collective responsibility which owes its origin to convention is to the legislature and not to the people and far less to courts. At page 116, of his book 'Constitutional and Administrative Law', O. Hood Philips states :- “The Ministers are collectively responsible to Parliament for the general conduct of the affairs of the country. This collective responsibility requires that on a major question Ministers should be of one mind and voice. If any Minister does not agree with the policy of the majority in the Cabinet, he should resign or, if the matter is a minor one or he is not a member of the Cabinet, at least keep quiet about it. Apart from the dramatic occasions of the 'agreement to differ in 1932 and the EEC Referendum campaign in 1976', there appears to have been some weakening of collective responsibility in Labour Governments since 1974. The old idea was that a Ministry should give collective advice to the Sovereign; but the recent attitude seems to be that, so long as the Government can retain its majority in the House of Commons, the main consideration is its popularity among the electorate”. At page 315, the learned author states :- “The convention of the collective responsibility of Ministers, as we have seen, has been weakening in recent years. Mr. Wilson in the period 1974-76 has to remind his colleagues several times of this principle, and Mr. Callaghan in April, 1976 rebuked the Secretary of State for Energy (Mr. Benn) in the House of Commons for abstaining at a meeting of the Labour Party National Executive in a vote concerning proposed cuts in public expenditure. In March-April, 1975 Mr. Mr. Wilson in the period 1974-76 has to remind his colleagues several times of this principle, and Mr. Callaghan in April, 1976 rebuked the Secretary of State for Energy (Mr. Benn) in the House of Commons for abstaining at a meeting of the Labour Party National Executive in a vote concerning proposed cuts in public expenditure. In March-April, 1975 Mr. Wilson allowed Ministers as well as Labour back-benchers "in the unique circumstances of a referendum" to advocate, outside Parliament opposition to continued membership of the EEC, although continued membership was Government policy, Later in a broadcast he said "after June 6 there will be one Cabinet and one Cabinet view". Admittedly the situation was unique thus far, but an equally important if not more important - constitutional issue would soon arise in the form of proposed Devolution to Scotland and Wales, Another episode was that of the European Assembly Elections Bill 1977 to provide for direct elections to the European Assembly, an item of Government policy contained in the Queen's speech and implementing a Treaty obligation, Mr. Callaghan, the Prime Minister, stated that Ministers as well as Labour back-benchers would be free to vote against the Bill on second reading. When questioned by Mrs. Thatcher, Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Callaghan replied: "I certainly think that doctrine (collective responsibility) should apply except in cases where I announce that it does not", In the event 31 Minister, including six Cabinet Ministers, voted against the Bill, but it was easily carried with the help of Opposition parties. So long as a Government can keep its majority in the House of Commons, its main concern now-a-days appears to be its image amongst the electorate. Dissent in public is allowed if it is thought it will do the party less harm than resignations and press reports of "splits". 23. The position in law, therefore, is clear that it is for the minister concerned either to resign or the Chief Minister to make a recommendation for his dismissal and the Governor to pass an order of dismissal acting thereupon. The doctrine of collective responsibility is a political doctrine and not a legal one. It is for the concerned Minister or the Chief Minister to consider the matter and nor for the courts. 24. The doctrine of collective responsibility is a political doctrine and not a legal one. It is for the concerned Minister or the Chief Minister to consider the matter and nor for the courts. 24. If the Chief Minister intends to condone the lapses on the part of the concerned Minister by not advising the Governor to dismiss him or if the concerned Minister does not resign from the Council of Ministers, the prerogative is theirs. The court has no role to play in the matter. 25. It is also not necessary to the Chief Minister to consult all the members of the Council of Ministers all the time. Various Authors have noted that there may be 'inner cabinet', 'shadow cabinet' etc. In some matters the Ministers themselves may ask the Prime Minister to take "lonely decisions". 26. In K.C. Chandy vs. R Balakrishna Pillai reported in AIR 1986 Ker 116 , the full bench of the Kerala High Court while deciding a question as to whether there was breach of oath of office and of secrecy committed by a Minister is a matter to be decided under Art. 164 (1) for the purpose of the 'pleasure doctrine' applicable to the time in office of a Minister, It was held that the Minister holds office only at the disposal of the Chief Minister and/or Governor and his office is held 'durante bene placito' of the Chief Minister and/or Governor. 27. In N.P. Mathur and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in AIR 1972 Pat 93 , a full bench of the Patna High Court held that the court has no say as regards an advice made by Council of Ministers relating to appointment of Chief Secretary. 28. In Kallara Sukumaran vs. Union of India & Ors. 27. In N.P. Mathur and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in AIR 1972 Pat 93 , a full bench of the Patna High Court held that the court has no say as regards an advice made by Council of Ministers relating to appointment of Chief Secretary. 28. In Kallara Sukumaran vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in AIR 1987 Ker 212 , a division bench of the Kerala High Court following the earlier full bench decision in K.C. Chandy vs. R. Balakrishna Pillai reported in AIR 1986 Ker 116 despite observation of Supreme Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1980 SC 1789 held :- "But we would like to say that it is not because of any disinclination to interfere on the ground that the question has a political complexion but because there is no jurisdiction for judicial interference in such discretionary matters of choosing or removing Ministers that the Court refuses to interfere." 29. It was held that the High Court in exercise of its power under Art, 226 of Constitution of India cannot declare the appointment of a Minister made under Art. 164 of Constitution as unconstitutional on the ground that he treated a breach of oath of office. 30. In Dhronamraju Satyanarayana vs. N.T. Rama Rao und Ors. reported in AIR 1988 A.P. 62 , a full bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held :- "There being many imponderables, the circumstances under which a Chief Minister or a Minister would render himself unfit to hold the office and is liable to be removed from the post could not be exhaustively enumerated in the Constitution, or for that matter, even in any law made by the Parliament. Presumably, it is for that reason the discretion in the matter is vested exclusively in a high dignitary like the Governor by the Constitution. No Governor could, however, afford to exercise that high prerogative in a casual manner without foreseeing the future, the political overtones of the momentous decision and the other repercussions. Presumably, it is for that reason the discretion in the matter is vested exclusively in a high dignitary like the Governor by the Constitution. No Governor could, however, afford to exercise that high prerogative in a casual manner without foreseeing the future, the political overtones of the momentous decision and the other repercussions. Often than not, it is a complex question, not merely a legal issue; and the decision should reflect the wordly wisdom and statesmanship of the person who by the Constitution is charged with the onerous responsibility in the matter." It was further held :- "The question is : Is there any authority for this Court to hold that the charges, if found true, would render the Chief Minister permanently disqualified? If this Court has no such power, in terms of the Constitution or any other law, it would be futile for us to pass an order which could be defeated by the Governor passing another order appointing him to the of the again. So far as the Ministers, including the Chief Minister, are concerned, the appointing authority is the Governor; not in any other authority. To the growth and development of our modern jurisprudence, judicial activism has a vital role to play, but it has its limits and limitations also. If the Court assumes for itself limitlessness of jurisdiction it might lead to a stale of functional anarchy, which has to be avoided in the larger public interest itself." 31. In Mahabir Prasad Sharma vs. Profulla Chandra Ghose and Ors. reported in AIR 1969 Cal 198 , interpreting provisions of Arts. 164 (1), 164 (2) and 163 (2) held that the right of the Governor under Art. 164 (1) to withdraw the pleasure, during which the Ministers hold office, is absolute and unrestricted and the same cannot be called in question in writ proceeding. 32. It is true that the aforementioned decisions were rendered on different set of facts as was submitted by Mr. Ghosh but there is unanimity in the said decisions to the effect that in such matters the Courts have no role to play. Furthermore, in view of Ss. 60 and 63 of the Evidence Act a Newspaper Report must be held to be at best a second hand secondary evidence. 33. In R. Rajagopal alias R.R. Gopal and Anr. Ghosh but there is unanimity in the said decisions to the effect that in such matters the Courts have no role to play. Furthermore, in view of Ss. 60 and 63 of the Evidence Act a Newspaper Report must be held to be at best a second hand secondary evidence. 33. In R. Rajagopal alias R.R. Gopal and Anr. vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., reported in AIR 1995 SC page 264, has no application in the instant case. 34. In Samant N. Balakrishna vs. George Fenandez, and Ors., reported in AIR 1969 SC 1201 , the law is stated in the following terms :- "A news item without any further proof of what had actually happened through witnesses is of no value. It is at best a second-hand secondary evidence. It is well known that reporters collect information and pass it on to the editor who edits the news item and then publishes it. In this process the truth might get perverted or garbled. Such news items cannot be said to prove themselves although they may be taken into account with other evidence if the other evidence is forcible." 35. In view of my findings aforementioned it is not necessary to consider the question of locus of the petitioner in the instant case as even if it be held that the petitioner has locus standi to maintain the application in his individual capacity only on the ground that he is a citizen of India, the writ application must be held to be not otherwise maintainable. 36. For the reasons aforementioned, this application is dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. Application is dismissed of.