JUDGMENT Shyamal Kumar Sen, J. In the instant writ petition, the writ petitioner has challenged inter alia the letter of termination dated 21st November, 1995 issued by the Respondent-Company through its Managing Director, forthwith terminating the service of the writ petitioner, who was serving at the relevant time as the General Manager of the Respondent Company. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the said termination order is arbitrary, passed in violation of the principle of natural justice and fair play and also bad in law being violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 2. Initially, on 8th December, 1995 when the writ application was moved, an interim order was passed by this Court directing the respondents to pay the petitioner his emoluments month by month and allow him to enjoy the facilities that were being enjoyed by him while in service, for six weeks from that date with liberty to apply for extension of the said interim order. Liberty was given to the respondents to apply for variation, modification, alteration and/or cancellation of the said order. The respondents thereafter filed an application for vacating the interim order and an application for extension of interim order was also filed by the writ petitioner. The said interim order was subsequently extended upto 22nd January, 1996 and ultimately on 19th January, 1996 there was a direction to the effect that the entire petition should be heard expeditiously and it was directed that the writ application and the application for vacating interim order to be heard analogously and time was fixed for completing all affidavits and the interim order was extended until further orders. 3. Ultimately the matter was heard on 1st March, 1996 when the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ application on the ground that the respondent No. 1 namely the Andaman & Nicobar Islands Integrated Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ANIIDCO) was a part of the Island Administration and that therefore the writ petitioner held a civil post under the Central Government. On the basis of this reasoning the learned Single Judge held that the application under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the termination of the writ petitioner's service was not maintainable and that the appropriate forum was the Central Administrative Tribunal established under the Central Administrative Act, 1985. On the basis of this reasoning the learned Single Judge held that the application under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the termination of the writ petitioner's service was not maintainable and that the appropriate forum was the Central Administrative Tribunal established under the Central Administrative Act, 1985. The Division Bench allowed the writ petitioner's appeal and held that the service under the ANIIDCO was not covered by the provisions of the said Act. The Division Bench, accordingly, allowed the appeal and remanded the matter back for determination on merits. It was, however, made clear that the appellate court had not gone into the question that the ANIIDCO was a ‘State or other authority, within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. The writ petitioner also filed a supplementary affidavit annexing certain documents to show that ANIIDCO was infact amenable to the writ jurisdiction. The respondents have also produced records pursuant to a direction of this Court. 4. The facts involved in the writ petition inter alia are that the petitioner after obtaining B.Tech Degree in Chemical Engineering in First Class in 1982 from Andhra University, Waltair; further obtained, M.Tech (Chemical Engineering) in 1984 in First Class from lIT, Kharagpur; thereafter Post Graduate in Foreign Trade Management from Institute of Export Management, Calcutta in 1985 and thereafter he is further doing MBA from IGNOU, New Delhi. The petitioner consistently from 15th March, 1984 held different posts in RRL, Jorhat, NCB, New Delhi and CLRI, Madras. 5. The petitioner while working as such in the above organisation earned recognition and awards from both National and International organisation and further acquired Membership in various professional bodies, Societies/Academies and served in several Committees. While holding the post of Assistant Director (Rs. 3700-5000/-) in Central Leather Research Institute, Madras, the petitioner applied for the post of General Manager in ANIIDCO, a Govt. undertaking pursuant to an advertisement published in "The Hindu" on 10th August, 1994. The petitioner possessed all the requisite qualifications mentioned in the said advertisement and eminently deserved to be selected for the post advertised pursuant to the application for appointment, the petitioner was called at an interview in the Andaman House at Madras before the selection committee of ANIIDCO on 7th December, 1994. On 28th December, 1994 the petitioner was informed by the then Managing Director Ms. On 28th December, 1994 the petitioner was informed by the then Managing Director Ms. Nita Bali of ANIIDCO that the petitioner was duly selected and the terms and conditions of service were recorded in the offer of Appointment No. ANIIDCO/Corres/88-89/65 dated 28.12.1994. In all respects the terms and conditions of service mentioned in the offer of appointment definitely established beyond doubt that his service was permanent and substantive service in the ANIIDCO Ltd. particularly the terms and conditions No. (4) (a) refers to taking oath of allegiance and it is clear that the employment was not a private employment but a public employment under ANIIDCO Ltd. 6. The petitioner accepted the offer of appointment as above and by his Message dated 30.121994 informed the Managing Director of ANIIDCO that he had already submitted his resignation from the post of Assistant Director of CLRI, Madras and he would likely join to on or before 1st May,1995. By letter dated 3.1.1995 the petitioner was informed by the Managing Director of ANIIDCO that unless the petitioner joined duties latest by 31st January, 1995, it would be presumed that he was not interested to take up the new appointment. By a reply letter dated 6th January, 1995 the petitioner inter alia informed the Managing Director of ANIIDCO that he wished to join on 27th January, 1995. Ultimately by Order No. 759 dated 3rd February, 1995 the CMD of ANIIDCO who also happens to be the Chief Secretary, Andaman and Nicobar Administration appointed the petitioner on 27.1.95 General Manager of ANIIDCO in the scale of pay of Rs. 4500-150-5700/- In the offer letter of appointment dt. 28.12.94 it was clearly mentioned as follows:- "You will be governed by the rules and regulations as applicable to the regular employees of the Corporation." 7. The offer of appointment dated 28.12.94 clearly indicates that the appointment is not a temporary appointment. 8. Pursuant to the said appointment the petitioner joined his duties and duly carried out his responsibilities. Various projects were completed during his tenure as General Manager. However, he was very much surprised when he received the letter No. ANIIDCO/Corres/88-89/dt. 21.11.95 written by Sri K.S. Wahi, Managing Director of ANIIDCO informing the petitioner that the ANIIDCO had decided to terminate his services forthwith. Various projects were completed during his tenure as General Manager. However, he was very much surprised when he received the letter No. ANIIDCO/Corres/88-89/dt. 21.11.95 written by Sri K.S. Wahi, Managing Director of ANIIDCO informing the petitioner that the ANIIDCO had decided to terminate his services forthwith. The letter also informed the petitioner that "as per the rules of the Company, you will be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of one month's pay plus allowances in lieu of the Notice period." It has been alleged in the writ petition that the said letter was issued under following circumstances :- "That the petitioner arrived the Headquarters on 21.11.95 at 11 A.M. from Madras after completing a 10 days official tour and while he was making himself ready for coming to the office he found a vehicle has been sent from his office for his transport to the office of the Managing Director of the Corporation. The petitioner in good faith went straight to the office of the Managing Director instead of reporting for duty at first to his own office. As soon as he reached the office, the Managing Director left his chair and locked the door from inside and handed over the order of termination contained in the letter dated 21.11.95 and a cheque for Rs. 10,355/-. The Managing Director stated that he was under pressure to issue such letter but assured that he would rescue the petitioner from the present trouble, if the petitioner quietly obeyed him. Besides the Managing Director advised the petitioner to send a representation to the Lt. Governor, the Chairman of the Corporation. The Managing Director vowed with authority that if such representation was given, the impugned order of termination would be withdrawn. In that unusual circumstances of shock, surprise and under coercion and malicious act of falsehood, the petitioner was swayed, and he received the letter of termination and cheque for Rs. 10,335/-." 9. The said termination has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that no opportunity was given to the petitioner to show-cause against his termination of permanent service nor the ANIIDCO acted reasonably and failed to follow the principles of natural justice. 10. 10,335/-." 9. The said termination has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that no opportunity was given to the petitioner to show-cause against his termination of permanent service nor the ANIIDCO acted reasonably and failed to follow the principles of natural justice. 10. It has also been contended that the service of the petitioner was a permanent one and can be terminated if at all after holding a disciplinary proceeding and after finding him guilty of any misconduct. In the instant case, the petitioner's services have been terminated with notice and pay, like a temporary employee. It has been contended that the termination of service of the petitioner is ultra vires to the Articles of Association as also to the bye-laws framed if any. It has also been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner's services have been terminated at the discretion of ANIIDCO which discretion has been exercised in an unfair, unreasonable and without following the principles of natural justice. 11. The respondent has raised a preliminary objection as to maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the respondent ANIIDCO is not a 'State' or other 'Authority' within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. Several decisions were cited by the respondents in respect of the submission that ANIIDCO is not an authority or instrumentality of State within the meaning of Art. 12. 12. It may be noted that prior to 1979 the Supreme Court gave a restricted meaning to the word 'authority'. The view however has undergone change with the decision in R.D. Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 . In the aforesaid decision it was clearly held that Corporation set up by the Government to carry out public functions would be subjected to the same limitations in the field of constitutional and administrative law as the Government itself. 13. Mr. A.S. Ray, learned advocate for the respondent ANIIDCO has strongly contended that the ANIIDCO is not a State or instrumentality of State or an authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India and as such the writ petition is not maintainable. 14. 13. Mr. A.S. Ray, learned advocate for the respondent ANIIDCO has strongly contended that the ANIIDCO is not a State or instrumentality of State or an authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India and as such the writ petition is not maintainable. 14. Learned advocate for the respondent ANIIDCO has also submitted that even if it is held that ANIIDCO is an instrumentality of State or an authority under Art. 12 the petitioner cannot be reinstated in service and the proper course will be for directing an Enquiry to be made. He has also submitted that while terminating the service of the petitioner provisions contained in Article of the Company have been complied with. 15. Learned advocate for the petitioner, on the other hand, has submitted that the constitution, composition and the function and the source of finances of ANIIDCO clearly indicate that it is an instrumentality of State and authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution and as such the writ petition is clearly maintainable. In support of his contention he has relied upon the several decisions. 16. The test for determining as to when a Corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government have been enumerated by the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib reported in AIR 1981 SC 478 at 496. The relevant tests gathered from the decision in International Airport Authority of India's case has been considered in paragraph 9 of the said judgment at page 496 of the said report and the Supreme Court observed therein as follows :- (1) ‘One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the Corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government.’ (2) 'Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the Corporation it would afford some indication of the Corporation being impregnated with Governmental character.' (3) 'It may also be relevant factor .............. whether the Corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected.' (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality.' (5) 'If the functions of the Corporation of public importance and closely related to Governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the Corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government.' (6) 'Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a Corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the Corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government.' 17. If on a consideration of these relevant factors it is found that the Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government, it would, as pointed out in the International Airport Authority's case, be an 'authority' and therefore 'State' within the meaning of the expression in Art. 12. 18. It appears that in respect of cases cited on behalf of the respondent five cases are pre-1979 decisions. As already noted that the Supreme Court took a wider approach to the question in post-1979 decisions. 19. The five pre-1979 decisions cited by the learned advocate for the respondent are as under :- (i) Praga Tools Corporation vs. C.V. Immanul reported in AIR 1969 SC 1306 ; (ii) Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in AIR 1970 SC 82 ; (iii) Dr. S.L. Agarwal vs. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Limited reported in AIR 1970 SC 1150 ; (iv) Sabhajit Tewary vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in AIR 1975 SC 1329 ; and (v) Sukhdev Singh vs. Bhagat Ram Sardar reported in AIR 1975 SC 133l. 20. Learned advocate for the respondent has placed strong reliance in Anupam Ghosh vs. Union of India reported in 1991 Lab. IC 226. In the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of this Court affirmed the decision of the learned Single Judge reported in (1981) 1 CHN 475 and held that Andrew Yule & Company Ltd. was not a 'State' within the meaning of Art. 12. The Company in that case was not wholly owned by the Central Government. It did not receive any grant or subsidy from the Central Government. It was the holding Company of tea growing and manufacturing companies. It did not get preferential treatment in its business from the Government. The Company in that case was not wholly owned by the Central Government. It did not receive any grant or subsidy from the Central Government. It was the holding Company of tea growing and manufacturing companies. It did not get preferential treatment in its business from the Government. It generated its own funds and was wholly independent in the matter of policy and management, although its accounts were audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. That was the only control exercised. 21. The other decision cited by learned advocate for the respondent is in the case of Tehraj Vasandi vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1988 SC 469 . In the aforesaid decision it was held that the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, a registered Society was not a 'State' or other authority as at its inception it was not a Governmental department nor were the objects of the society those which a 'State' was to oblige to fulfil. Also the finances were obtained from private resources without Government sanction. 22. The third post-1979 decisions cited by learned advocate for the respondent is in the case of Chander Mohan Khanna vs. The National Council of Education Research and Training reported in AIR 1992 SC 76 . The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case noted the tests set down in the earlier decisions and stated that anyone of the factors mentioned as being relevant to determine whether a Corporation was a 'State' would not be conclusive. The relevant portion is quoted hereunder :- "The combination of State aid coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the body and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory functions of the State may largely point out that the body is 'State'." 23. The aforesaid three post-1979 decisions in fact lay down the same principle as has been enunciated by the Supreme Court in the International Airport Authority's case. In the aforesaid decisions, in the facts it was held that the Government has no financial control over the State Organisations and managing their own affairs so far as the financial side is concerned without being in any way in control of finance by the Government, and as such they do not come within the purview of Art. 12 of the Constitution. 24. 24. Learned Advocate for the petitioner, on the other hand, has relied mainly on the following three decisions namely :- (i) Delhi Transport Corporation vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress & Ors. reported in AIR 1991 SC 101 ; (ii)A.L. Kalra vs. Project and Equipment Corporation of India reported in (1984) 3 SCC 316 ; and (iii) The Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. vs. Broja Nath Ganguly reported in (1986) 3 SCC 156 . In all the said decisions it was held since there was an all pervasive control by the Government, the said authorities come within the purview of Art. 12 of the Constitution. 25. Memorandum and Articles of Association of ANIIDCO have been produced. It is evident therefrom that the only shareholders are the President, the Development Commissioner, and the Secretary, Shipping and Transport, Andaman and Nicobar Administration, Port Blair, in their official capacities. The other subscribers to the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company are the Secretary (Finance), Secretary (Tourism) and the Director of Industries. The total share capital is, therefore, held by the Government. The Memorandum specifies that the Company's ultimate object is to develop and commercially exploit the natural resources of the Union Territory for the balanced and environmentally sound development of the Territory. It cannot be disputed that this is State function - an obligation underlying the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution. The main objectives as deliniated in the Memorandum and Articles of Association, particularly Clauses 14, 15, 16, 17, 32 and 37 would show that the Company has been formed for the purposes of prompting tourism and all businesses for the development of the Territory. These objectives cannot be termed to be of a private enterprise. 26. Clauses 36 and 37 of the Memorandum and Articles of Association also appear to be significant which are as follows :- "36. To acquire, own, construct, lease or manage industrial estates either on its own or as agents of Government or any other body corporate." "37. To develop land on its own account or for the Government for the purpose of facilitating the location of industries and other business units thereon." 27. To acquire, own, construct, lease or manage industrial estates either on its own or as agents of Government or any other body corporate." "37. To develop land on its own account or for the Government for the purpose of facilitating the location of industries and other business units thereon." 27. The trading activities of the Company are incidental to the ultimate object of securing the development of the territory as a whole and not trading for mere profits sake as would be the case of a purely commercial enterprise. 28. All pervasive Governmental control is apparent also from the fact of composition, constitution and source of finances and the nature of functions. 29. It may be noted that public participation in the share holding has been excluded by Clause 2 of the Articles of Association. Arts 34 to 41 of the Articles of Association provide for the approval of the Lt. Governor before the Directors can increase the share capital of the Company or borrow monies or secure payment for monies. 30. Considering all the aforesaid aspects of the matter there cannot be any doubt that ANIIDCO is an instrumentality of State or Authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution and the writ petition is maintainable. 31. In this case the petitioner's service as a General Manager of ANIIDCO was terminated on 21st November, 1995 suddenly, without giving the petitioner any opportunity of being heard and for no reasons disclosed whatsoever. All that is said by the Managing Director of ANIIDCO was "I am sorry to inform you that the Andaman Nicobar Islands Integrated Development Corporation has decided to terminate your services forthwith." 32. The said decision to terminate the service of the petitioner in the manner as has been done in the instant case clearly violates the basic principles of natural justice. 33. It has, however, been contended by learned advocate for the respondent that the service of the petitioner was terminated during the period of probation and as such there is no wrong in terminating the service. 33. It has, however, been contended by learned advocate for the respondent that the service of the petitioner was terminated during the period of probation and as such there is no wrong in terminating the service. It has also been contended that on the basis of Central Government classification and appeal Rules which has been adopted by the respondent, there cannot be regular appointment at the first instance, and as such it is implied that the petitioner was appointed on probation, and the petitioner's service being on probation, the respondent was justified in terminating the service upon payment of one month's salary. He has further submitted that the petitioner suppressed his letter of resignation and as such the writ petition should be dismissed. 34. Mr. Roy, learned advocate for the respondent has also relied upon the judgment and decision in the case of State of Haryana vs. Jagdish Chander reported in AIR 1995 SC 984 and has submitted relying upon the said decision that the Court cannot grant reinstatement of services even if the termination is held to be illegal on the ground of violation of natural justice. The Court may direct the authorities to hold an enquiry. Submission of the learned advocate for the respondent that the petitioner's service was terminated during probation does not appear to be valid. The appointment letter dated 28th December, 1994 issued by ANIIDCO to the petitioner has been produced. In fact the said appointment letter mentioned the Terms and Conditions of appointment to the post of General Manager in ANIIDCO. 35. As already noted that Clause 10 of the said offer letter of appointment clearly shows that he will be treated as a regular and permanent employee of the Corporation. Accordingly the contention of the learned advocate for the respondent ANIIDCO that the petitioner was appointed on probation does not appear to be correct. The petitioner on the basis of the said letter of appointment should be treated as regular employee and as such he cannot be considered as a probationer and his service cannot be terminated in arbitrary manner. 36. It has also been contended by the learned advocate for the respondent that the petitioner's service is terminated without stigma and as such cannot be impugned. The said contention, however, cannot be accepted since he was appointed on regular basis. 36. It has also been contended by the learned advocate for the respondent that the petitioner's service is terminated without stigma and as such cannot be impugned. The said contention, however, cannot be accepted since he was appointed on regular basis. The other contention that the petitioner suppressed his letter of resignation also does not arise in the facts and circumstances of the case since the petitioner's service was terminated on the basis of the said letter of termination. Further contention of the learned advocate for the respondent that the Court cannot grant reinstatement and may direct an enquiry relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Jagdish Chander reported in AIR 1995 SC 984 (supra). 37. In my view, the said decision if properly construed will not apply to the facts of the instant case. In the aforesaid decision the respondent was a constable who was appointed on 30th October, 1985. Since he was absent from duty from 20th April, 1992 to May 15, 1992 by order dated 1.1.92, he was discharged from service as a constable exercising the power under the 12.21 of Punjab Police Rules. Important portion of the aforesaid rules is as "12.21.-A constable who is found unlikely to prove an efficient police officer may be discharged by the Superintendent at any time within three years of enrolment. There shall be no appeal against an order of discharge under this rule." The respondent impugned its validity in CWP No. 12183/92. The High Court by order 14.1.93 allowed the writ petition set aside the and directed the appellant to reinstate the respondent with continuity of the service and consequential benefits. An appeal was filed in Supreme Court by special leave. 38. The said Rule 12.21 contemplate that a police constable will be watched and observed for a period of three years and appropriate action for his discharge may be taken by the S.P. He has therefore no right like a regular employee during such period. Circumstances under which the Supreme Court set aside the order of reinstatement cannot apply to the facts and circumstance of the case. 39. In view of the fact that the petitioner was appointed on regular basis as appears from his letter of appointment and no condition of probation was imposed. Circumstances under which the Supreme Court set aside the order of reinstatement cannot apply to the facts and circumstance of the case. 39. In view of the fact that the petitioner was appointed on regular basis as appears from his letter of appointment and no condition of probation was imposed. Termination of service as made in the instant case without giving opportunity of hearing does not appear to be justified. 40. Power of appointment, suspension and removal of an employee is governed by Art. 78 (e) of ANIIDCO. By the said clause power has been conferred upon the Board of Directors as follows :- "To appoint and, at their discretion, remove or suspend such managers, secretaries, officers, clerks, agents and servants for permanent, temporary or special services as it may, from time to time think fit, and to determine their powers and duties and fix their salaries or emoluments and to require security in such instances of such amount as they think fit; Provided that no appointment, the minimum basic pay of which is more than Rs. 3,000 per mensem, shall be made without the prior approval of the Lt. Governor. 41. The said clause gives unbridled arbitrary and absolute power without any restriction upon the Board of Directors to remove an employee and as such goes against the basic concept of right and employment of an employee in a Governmental public sector company under Art. 16 of the Constitution of India. Similar clauses have been declared invalid by the Supreme Court in the decisions mentioned hereinafter. 42. In this connection judgment and decision of Delhi Transport Corpn. vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress reported in AIR 1991 SC p. 101 may be taken note of. In the aforesaid decision it has been held by the Supreme Court that the Government Company or Public Corporation being State instrumentalities are State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution and as such they are subject to the observance of fundamental rights embodied in Part III as well as to conform to the directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution. In other words the Service Regulations or Rules framed by them are to be tested by the touchstone of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the procedure prescribed by their Rules or Regulations must be reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary, fanciful and unjust. In other words the Service Regulations or Rules framed by them are to be tested by the touchstone of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the procedure prescribed by their Rules or Regulations must be reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary, fanciful and unjust. It has also been held in para 199 of the said judgment at page 166 of the said report by the Supreme Court as follows :- "It is now well settled that the 'audi alteram partem' rule which in essence, enforces the equality clause in Art. 14 of the Constitution is applicable not only to quasi-judicial orders but to administrative orders affecting prejudicially the party in question unless the applicable of the rule has been expressly excluded by the Act or Regulation or Rule which is not the case here. Rules of natural justice do not supplant but supplement the Rules and Regulations. Moreover, the Rule of Law which permeates our Constitution demands that it has to be observed both substantially and procedurely. Considering from all aspects Regulation 9 (b) is illegal and void as it is arbitrary, discriminatory and without any guidelines for exercise of the power. Rule of law posits that the power to be exercised in a manner which is just, fair and reasonable and not in an unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary manner leaving room for discrimination. Regulation 9 (b) does not expressly exclude the application of the 'audi alteram partem' rule and as such the order of termination of service of a permanent employee cannot be passed by simply issuing a month's notice under Regulation 9 (b) or pay in lieu thereof without recording any reason in the order and without giving any hearing to the employee to controvert the allegation on the basis of which the purported order is made." 43. Supreme Court also held that the management cannot have unrestricted and unqualified power of terminating the services of the employees. In the interest of efficiency of the public bodies, however, they should have the authority to terminate the employment of undesirable, inefficient, corrupt, indolent and disobedient employees, but it must be exercised fairly, objectively and independently; and the occasion for the exercise must be delimited with provision and clarity. In the interest of efficiency of the public bodies, however, they should have the authority to terminate the employment of undesirable, inefficient, corrupt, indolent and disobedient employees, but it must be exercised fairly, objectively and independently; and the occasion for the exercise must be delimited with provision and clarity. Further there should be adequate reason for the use of such a power, and a decision in this regard has to be taken in a manner which should show fairness, avoid arbitrariness and evoke credibility. Supreme Court in this aforesaid case Delhi Transport Corpn. vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (supra) also took into consideration the judgment and decision in the case of A.L. Kalra vs. P & E. Corpn. of India Ltd. The said judgment in the case of A.L. Kalra vs. P. & E. Corpn. of India Ltd. reported in AIR 1984 SC p. 1361 (supra) was also relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioner. In the aforesaid decision also it was held where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accuracy so that any ex post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. 44. It has also been held in para 110 of the said judgment of the Supreme Court as follows :- "Notice of hearing may or may not be given, opportunity in the form of an enquiry may or may not be given, yet arbitrariness and discrimination and acting whimsically must be avoided. These powers must, therefore, be so read that the powers can be exercised on reasons, reasons should be recorded, reasons need not always be communicated, must by authorities who are competent and are expected to act fairly, objectively and independently. The occasion for the use of power must be clearly circumscribed in the above limits. These powers must, therefore, be so read that the powers can be exercised on reasons, reasons should be recorded, reasons need not always be communicated, must by authorities who are competent and are expected to act fairly, objectively and independently. The occasion for the use of power must be clearly circumscribed in the above limits. These must also circumscribe that the need for exercise of those power without holding a detailed or prolonged enquiry is there." In the A.L. Kalra's case the Supreme Court took into account its earlier decision in the case of E.P. Royappa vs State of Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 1974 SC p. 555 and Ajoy Hasia's case reported in AIR 1981 SC p. 487 held and observed as follows :- "It thus appears well settled that Art. 14 strikes at arbitrariness in executive/ administrative action because any action that is arbitrary must necessarily involve the negation of equality. One need not confine the denial of equality to a comparative evaluation between two persons to arrive at a conclusion of discriminatory treatment. An action per se arbitrary itself denies equality of protection by law. The Constitution Bench pertinently observed in Ajay Hasia's case and put the matter beyond controversy when it said wherever therefore, there is arbitrariness in State action whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or of an 'authority, under Art. 12, Art. 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action.’ 45. Referring to the aforesaid decision in the case of D.S. Nakara vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1983 SC 130 and in the case of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1978 SC p. 597 Supreme Court observed that Art. 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The judgment and decision in the case of Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corpn. vs Vinay Narayan Vajpayee reported in AIR 1980 SC p. 840 may also be taken note of. In this connection the observation of O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in his concurring judgment at pp. The judgment and decision in the case of Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corpn. vs Vinay Narayan Vajpayee reported in AIR 1980 SC p. 840 may also be taken note of. In this connection the observation of O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in his concurring judgment at pp. 845-46 deserves to be quoted :- "I find it very hard indeed to discover any distinction, on principle, between a person directly under the employment of the Government and a person under the employment of an agency or instrumentality of the Government or a corporation, set up under a statute or incorporated but wholly owned by the Government. It is self-evident and trite to say that the function of the State has long since ceased to be confined to the preservation of the public peace the exaction of taxes and the defence of its frontiers. It is now the function of the State to secure 'social, economic and political justice,' to preserve 'liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship' and to ensure 'equality of status and of opportunity.' That is the proclamation of the people in the preamble to the Constitution. The desire to attain these objectives has necessarily resulted intense Governmental activity in manifold ways. Legislative and Executive activity have reached very far and have touched very many aspects of a citizen's life. The Government, directly or through the Corporations, set up by it or owned by it, now owns or manages, a large number of industries and institutions. It is the biggest builder in the Country. Mammotha and minor irrigation projects, heavy and light engineering project, projects of various kinds are undertaken by the Government, the Government is also the biggest trader in the country. The State and the multitudinous agencies and corporations set up by it are the principle purchasers of the produce and the products of our country and they control a vast and complex machinery of distribution. The Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, Corporations set up by the Government under Statutes and Corporations incorporated under the Companies Act, but owned by the Government have thus become the biggest employers in the country. The Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, Corporations set up by the Government under Statutes and Corporations incorporated under the Companies Act, but owned by the Government have thus become the biggest employers in the country. There is no good reason why, if Government is bound to observe the equality clauses of the Constitution in the matter of employment and in its dealings with the employees, the corporations set up or owned by the Government should not be equally bound and why, instead, such corporations could become citadels of patronage and arbitrary action. In a country like ours which teems with population, where the State, its agencies, its instrumentalities and its corporations are the biggest employers and where millions seek employment and security, to confirm the applicability of the equality clauses of the Constitution, in relation to matters of employment, strictly to direct employment under the Government is perhaps to mock at the Constitution and the people. Some element of public employment is all that is necessary to take the employee beyond the reach of the rule which denies him access to a Court so enforce a contract of employment and denies him the protection of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. After all employment in the Public Sector has grown to vast dimensions and employees in the public sector often discharge as wonderous duties as civil servants and participate in activities vital to our country's economy. In growing realisation of the importance of employment in the public sector, Parliament and the Legislatures of the States have declared persons in the service of local authorities, Government companies and statutory corporations and public servants and, extended to them by express enactment the protection usually extended to civil servants from suits and prosecution. It is, therefore, but right that the independence and integrity of those employed in the public sector should be secured as much as the independence and integrity of civil servants." 46. In the instant case order of termination issued pursuant to the Article conferring power on the authority without recording any reason and without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner cannot stand the test of reasonableness and appears to be wholly arbitrary and uncanalised and the said order violates the principles of natural justice as well as Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. 47. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondent that the Lt. 47. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondent that the Lt. Governor duly approved the proposal of termination of the service of the petitioner. He has produced a xerox copy of note from the file which shows that the proposal for getting rid of the service of the petitioner was mooted on 14th November, 1995 by the Managing Director and Chief Secretary of ANIIDCO and was placed before Lt. Governor on 15.11.95 when the Lt. Governor approved the same. 48. There is nothing on record to show that the Board of Directors have approved the recommendation of the Managing Director and passed any resolution. The said note further records that the petitioner "instead of providing requisite leadership, has been working in a manner that has actually paralysed the working of the Organisation. To avoid unnecessary litigations and judicial interventions, I am refraining from levelling specific charges against him." It is clear from the record (note) that the concerned authority intends to get rid of the service of the petitioner. 49. The said allegation appears to be without any particulars. Be that as it may, it also suggests that the petitioner has been sought to be removed on certain allegation. The petitioner, however, has not been given any opportunity to defend himself against such allegation and as such the procedure adopted violates the basic principles of natural justice. 50. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, the termination order of the petitioner appears to be clearly illegal and arbitrary and cannot be given effect to. There was already an interim order passed by Ruma Pal, J. directing payment of emolument of the petitioner month by month, since the termination is set aside, the petitioner is deemed to be in service with full benefits. 51. In the instant case the service of the petitioner was terminated in an unfair and arbitrary manner by simply serving one month's notice pay. Rule, if any, to the effect that a permanent employee's service can be terminated by merely paying one month's notice pay must be held to be unreasonable and arbitrary. Order of termination accordingly is set aside and the petitioner shall be deemed to be in service without any break and shall be entitled to all consequential benefits. 52. The petitioner accordingly succeeds in the writ petition. There will be no order as to costs. 53. Order of termination accordingly is set aside and the petitioner shall be deemed to be in service without any break and shall be entitled to all consequential benefits. 52. The petitioner accordingly succeeds in the writ petition. There will be no order as to costs. 53. Stay of operation of this judgement and order prayed for by Mr. Mukherjee, learned Advocate on behalf of the respondents is refused. 54. Let the entire records of this case be sent down to the Registrar, Circuit Bench at Port Blair, Andamans expeditiously. Order set aside.