Judgment :- KANAKARAJ, J. 1. All these writ petitions challenge the validity of Regulations 5(e) and 5(f) of the Regulations framed in exercise of the powers conferred under clauses (f) and (g) of Sub Section 2 of S. 32 read with Ss. 14 and 15 of the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (Act No. 73 of 1993 (hereinafter called as the ‘Act’). The said Regulations were framed by the National Council for Teacher Education. In some of the writ petitions, the prayer is to direct the Authorities to consider their applications for grant of recognition without reference to the Regulations 5(e) and 5(f) of the Regulations, meaning thereby that those Regulations are unconstitutional and as such cannot be given effect to. Thus, in substance, all the writ petitions relate to the validity of the said Regulations. 2. Though facts are not very material, all the same, no decision is complete, unless the facts leading to the necessity of the petitioners to challenge the Regulations are noticed and set out. In this view of the matter, we will refer to the facts in W.P. No. 1079 of 1996. That Writ Petition has been filed by an institution claiming to belong to the minority community. It was started on 1.4.1991. They sought for recognition as a Teacher Training Institute before the Joint Director (Secondary Education) and the same was rejected on 3-9-1991. In W.P. No. 14714 of 1991, this Court directed the first respondent to grant temporary recognition and to consider the request for permanent recognition within a period of six months. However, on inspection by the Authorities and after completing the requirements of G.O. Ms. No. 536, dated 17-5-1989, the second respondent by his proceedings, dated 28-8-1992 rejected the application for permanent recognition. An appeal against the said order was dismissed on 7-5-1993. The challenge to the said Government Order Ms. No. 536, dated 17-5-1989 also failed, when a Division Bench of this Court dismissed all such writ petitions. The petitioner filed another W.P. No. 14253 of 1995 to quash the order of the Director of Teacher Education, dated 28-9-1995, rejecting the application for grant of recognition under G.O. Ms. No. 803, dated 16-9-1994, modifying the earlier G.O. Ms. No. 536, dated 17-5-1989. The petitioner filed another W.P. No. 14253 of 1995 to quash the order of the Director of Teacher Education, dated 28-9-1995, rejecting the application for grant of recognition under G.O. Ms. No. 803, dated 16-9-1994, modifying the earlier G.O. Ms. No. 536, dated 17-5-1989. In the meanwhile, the present Act came into force on 29-12-1993, under which every Institution offering a course of Training for Teacher Education and unrecognised on or after 17-8-1995, has to seek recognition in accordance with law by making an application to the respective Regional Committee of National Council for Teacher Education. In so far as the Institutions imparting Teacher Education under proper recognition granted on-or before 16.8.1995, are concerned, they are required to apply for fresh recognition within a period of six months from the date of establishment of the National Council. It is under those circumstances that the writ petitioner filed an application for recognition on 18-1-1996 with the Southern Regional Committee. While the application of the petitioner was pending with the Regional Committee, the third respondent had announced about the conduct of the examinations for the benefit of the students in certain Government and Government aided private schools. Though the prayer in that writ petition is to quash the said notice, proposing to conduct the examinations for other institutions, there is an alternative prayer, seeking a direction to the respondents to consider the grant of recognition to the petitioner institution without waiting for a no objection certificate from the State Government as required under Regulations 5(e) of the Regulations. 3. In all the other writ petitions, the petitioners are not the institutions, which were legally recognized prior to 17-8-1995 and therefore, all of them are required by law to apply for a fresh recognition under the Act. Consequently, they are compelled to comply with Regulations 5(e) and 5(f) of the Regulations, seeking a no objection certificate from the State Government. This requirement, directing the petitioners to go before the State Government for obtaining a no objection certificate is the irking factor which compelled the petitioner to file the writ petition. We have dealt with separately the correctness of the notice of the respondents, proposing to conduct examinations in respect of the recognised institutions, recognised prior to 17-8-1995. We are therefore concerned in this batch of writ petitions only with regard to the validity of Regulations 5(e) and 5(f) of the Regulations. 4. Mr. We have dealt with separately the correctness of the notice of the respondents, proposing to conduct examinations in respect of the recognised institutions, recognised prior to 17-8-1995. We are therefore concerned in this batch of writ petitions only with regard to the validity of Regulations 5(e) and 5(f) of the Regulations. 4. Mr. V. Selvaraj, leading the arguments has taken us through the various provisions of the Act and in particular to S. 32 of the Act. The said S. 32 of the Act enables the National Council for Teacher Education to make Regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made therein. In particular sub clauses (e)(f) and (g) of sub section 2 of S. 32 of the Act enables the Council to prescribe the form and the manner in which an application for recognition is to be submitted under sub Section 1 of S. 14 of the Act. Sub Section (f) prescribes the conditions required for the proper functioning of an Institution and the conditions for granting recognition. Sub Section (g) prescribes the form and the manner in which an application for permission is to be made under sub Section 1 of S. 15 of the Act. The Regulations themselves were issued by the National Council for Teacher Education on 3-11-1995. The Regulations which are challenged before us are as follows:— “(e) Every institution intending to offer a course or training in teacher education but was not functioning immediately before 17th August, 1995, shall submit application for recognition with a no objection certificate from the State or Union Territory in which the institution is located and (f) Application for permission to increase in intake by recognised institutions under sub Regulation 2 of Regulation 4 above shall be submitted to the Regional Committee concerned with no objection certificate from the State or Union Territory in which the institution is located. ..” Mr. Selvaraj argues that under the guise of framing Regulations, the power of recognition itself has been given to the State Government. In support of this argument, reference is made to the decision reported in A.N. Parasuraman v. State of Tamil Nadu ( AIR 1990 SC 40 ). The said decision related to the validity of the Tamil Nadu Private Educational Institutions (Regulations) Act 1966. In support of this argument, reference is made to the decision reported in A.N. Parasuraman v. State of Tamil Nadu ( AIR 1990 SC 40 ). The said decision related to the validity of the Tamil Nadu Private Educational Institutions (Regulations) Act 1966. That Act required a private educational institution to obtain permission of the competent Authority for the purpose of running the institution. S. 6 of the Act empowered the competent Authority to deal with such an application. S. 7 of the Act empowered the competent Authority to cancel the permission granted in certain circumstances. The contravention of a direction issued by the competent Authority could give rise to a cancellation of the permission under S. 7 of the said Act. The Apex Court on examination of the entire issue has found and observed as follows: “It is well established that determination of legislative policy and formulation of rule of conduct are essential legislative functions which cannot be delegated. What is permissible is to leave to the delegated authority the task of implementing the object of the Act after the legislature lays down adequate guidelines for the exercise of power, when examined in this light the impugned provisions miserably fail to come to the required standard. ..” The Supreme Court proceeded to say that the entire powers had been delegated to the competent Authority and found fault with the same in the following words: “S. 6 which empowers the competent authority to grant or refuse to grant the permission for establishing and running an institution does not give any idea as to the conditions which it has to fulfil before it can apply for permission under the Act, nor are the tests indicated for refusing permission or cancelling under S. 7 of an already granted permission. The authority concerned has been left out with unrestricted and unguided discretion which renders the provisions unfair and discriminatory. ..” What is more in the said Act, the State Government had been vested with the unrestricted discretion in the matter of the choice of the competent authority. Under the above circumstances, the Apex Court held that the entire Act was liable to be declared as ultra vires the Constitution of India. 5. That is not the position of the matter before us. We have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Act. Under the above circumstances, the Apex Court held that the entire Act was liable to be declared as ultra vires the Constitution of India. 5. That is not the position of the matter before us. We have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Act. The grant or refusal to grant recognition is vested with the Regional Committee of the National Council for Teacher Education. The National Council has itself framed the Regulations for giving the guidelines to the Regional Committees. Apart from the Regulations, detailed norms and standards for Teacher Education have also been prescribed in three parts viz. , 1. Pre-primary, 2. Elementary and 3. Secondary. A perusal of these norms and guidelines show that there are detailed instructions to the Regional Committees and that there is no chance of the Committees acting arbitrarily. Even if a particular Regional Committee acts arbitrarily and passes an incorrect order, the same can be challenged in appropriate proceedings. But, the argument before us is that Regulations 5(e) and 5(f) of the Regulations do not lay down any guidelines to indicate the circumstances under which a no objection certificate can be refused under the said Regulations 5(e) and 5(f). In other words, the apprehension of the petitioners is that the State Government will act arbitrarily in refusing to grant no objection certificate, which is the sine qua non for the consideration of an Application for recognition. In other words, the petitions apprehend that they will be shut out at the threshold in their attempt to get recognition for their institution. The second limb of the argument of Mr. Selvaraj, that there are no guidelines for the State Government to exercise their power under the impugned Regulations, has no substance. This is because the object of the Act and provisions contained therein coupled with the norms and the guidelines, as found in the Regulations which we have already referred to provide sufficient guidelines for the State Government to exercise their power. That apart, the power has been vested with the highest authority viz. , the State Government and there is no reason to presume the highest Authority will act in an unbiased manner, keeping in view the public interest and interest of the Teacher Education. That apart, the power has been vested with the highest authority viz. , the State Government and there is no reason to presume the highest Authority will act in an unbiased manner, keeping in view the public interest and interest of the Teacher Education. In a case where the State Government passes an order, contrary to the well established principles of justice and fair play and the decision is affected by irrelevant and extraneous considerations, it is always open to the affected party to challenge such individual orders of the State Government. The apprehension of the petitioners which cannot be termed as reasonable and well founded cannot lead to the conclusion that the impugned Regulations are invalid and ultra vires the Constitution of India. This is so because, the petitioners are only concerned with the Southern Regional Committee before whom they have made their applications. There are similar other Regional Committees and the Court cannot come to a conclusion that the Regulations are invalid, merely because the Southern Regional Committee or the State Government are likely to act arbitrarily. This argument of the petitioners has been squarely dealt with by the learned Central Government Standing Counsel with reference to the various authorities, and we will advert to the same a little later. The necessity for a No Objection Certificate, has also been explained in the counter affidavit. 6. Hence both the contentions are rejected. The third contention relates to the minority institutions, who claim that the impugned Regulations violate their rights enshrined under Article 30 of the Constitution of India. Since considerable emphasis is laid on this point by Mr. Paul Vasanthakumar, learned counsel for some of the petitioners, we would like to refer to the arguments in detail. To start with, Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India says that all minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. Sub clause (2) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India says that the State shall not discriminate against any educational institution in the matter of granting aid on the ground that the institution is a minority institution. There is a catena of decisions on the scope and content of Article 30 especially with regard to the right of the minority to establish an institution and at the same time get recognition or affiliation therefor. There is a catena of decisions on the scope and content of Article 30 especially with regard to the right of the minority to establish an institution and at the same time get recognition or affiliation therefor. Reliance is placed by the petitioners on the decision reported in In re Kerala Education Bill , 1957 ( AIR 1958 SC 956 ). That is a famous case presided over by seven Judges of the Apex Court, on a reference made by the President of India under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India relating to the validity of the Kerala Education Bill, 1957, in particular while dealing with sub clause 5 of clause 3 of the bill, which says that after the commencement of the said Act all new Schools will be governed by the provisions of the Act and any School established without complying with the provisions of the Act shall not be entitled to recognition. The observations of the Apex Court on the validity of the said clause are summarised as follows. “There is no force in this last mentioned point, for, the Legislature, it must be remembered knows the needs of its people and is entitled to confine its restriction to those places where the needs are deemed to be the clearest and, therefore, the restrictions imposed in areas of compulsion are quite permissible on the ground of classification on geographical basis. Whatever other provisions of the Constitution, such restriction may or may not violate, which will be discussed later, it certainly does not infringe Art. 14..” Reliance is next placed on the decision in Frank Anthony Public School Employees Association v. Union of India ( AIR 1987 SC 311 ). Hereagain, the observations of the Apex Court do not really help the petitioners. The observations are as follows: “These words indicate that the extent of the right is to be determined, not with reference to any concept of State necessity and general social interest but with reference to the educational institutions themselves, that is with reference to the goal of making the institutions ‘effective vehicles of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to them’. It follows that regulatory measures which are designed towards the achievement of the goal of making the minority educational institutions effective instruments for imparting education cannot be considered to impinge upon the right guaranteed by Art. 30 (1) of the Constitution. The question in each case is whether the particular measure is, in the ultimate analysis, designed to achieve such goal, without, of-course, nullifying any part of the right of management in substantial measure. ..” Mr. Paul Vasanthakumar would contend that the impugned Regulations are contrary to S. 32 of the Act itself. We do not agree. The argument of learned counsel is that the Act nowhere says that a no objection certificate should be obtained from the State Government. Therefore, the Regulations cannot be inconsistent with the Act and the requirement as to obtaining no objection certificate from the State Government in the Regulation is therefore illegal and void. The question of inconsistency will come only if there is a provision in the Act, which says that recognition should be accorded without reference to the State Government. In the absence of such a provision the Regulation cannot be said to be inconsistent with the Act. On the other hand, under S. 2(d) of the Act, the examining body itself is the State authority. It is very relevant to notice that the State Government is concerned with the Education in General and the Teacher Education in particular, as such, the State Government cannot be considered to be an authority unconnected or unconcerned with Teacher Education, On the contrary, the State Government is vitally concerned with Teacher Education. Therefore, the impugned Regulations 5(e) and 5(f) cannot be held to provide an out of the way or unnecessary requirement of obtaining ‘No Objection Certificate’ from the State Government. It is the State Government, which has to ensure law and order, safety, security, health and hygiene. Therefore, the requirement of obtaining a “No Objection Certificate” as per Regulation 5(e) and 5(f) cannot be held to be unreasonable. It cannot also be held to amount to a restriction, much less an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of a religious or linguistic minority. The next reference is to the unreported Judgment of a Divisional Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 2022 of 1982, dated 23-1-1985. It cannot also be held to amount to a restriction, much less an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of a religious or linguistic minority. The next reference is to the unreported Judgment of a Divisional Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 2022 of 1982, dated 23-1-1985. In the said decision, a reference was indeed made to the question of establishment and the question of recognition of a private school. A careful reading of the said Judgment shows that the only ratio which was laid down was as follows: “After having framed these rules and made them unknown to the public, it is not now open to the State Government to reject an application on a ground which falls outside these rules. It is clear, therefore, that one of the grounds on which the application for recognition was rejected is wholly untenable. ..” The next case which is referred to is reported in St.Xaviers College v. Gujarat( AIR 1974 SC 2009 = 1975 I SCR 173). That decision was more or less in the same terms as the Judgment of the Apex Court in In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957s case (cited supra). But the following observations indicate that the right of the minority vis-a-vis Art. 30 of the Constitution of India has been undergoing considerable change having regard to the development of education with the changing nature of the society. For instant, in this decision, the Apex Court observes as follows: “The right of a linguistic or religious minority to administer educational institutions of their choice, though couched in absolute terms has been held by this Court to be subject to regulatory measures which the State might impose for furthering the excellence of the standards of education.” The decision in St. Stephens College v. Universityof Delhi( AIR 1992 SC 1630 ) related only to the admission of a student and the Supreme Court observed thus: “The State may regulate the intake in this category with due regard to the need of the community in the area which the institution is intended to serve. But in no case such intake shall exceed fifty per cent of the annual admission. The minority institutions shall make available at least fifty per cent of the annual admission to members of communities other than the minority community. The admission of other community candidates shall be done purely on the basis of merit.” 7. But in no case such intake shall exceed fifty per cent of the annual admission. The minority institutions shall make available at least fifty per cent of the annual admission to members of communities other than the minority community. The admission of other community candidates shall be done purely on the basis of merit.” 7. We are unable to see how the above decisions advance the case of the petitioners in any manner. 8. In W.P. No. 2165 to 2167 of 1996, the petitioner not only challenges Regulations 5(e) and 5(f), but also challenges the norms and standards for Teacher Education Institutions with reference to elementary schools under clause. Clause 2.2 says as follows: “In addition, institutions under private management should have an endowment fund of at least Rs. 5.00 lakhs and a reserve fund to cover three months salary of all staff (1.5 lakhs). ..” In the above clause the challenge is made only to the endowment fund of Rs. 5 lakhs. Learned counsel for the petitioners says that he is not attacking the requirement for a reserve fund to cover three months salary of the staff to the extent of Rs. 1.5 lakhs. In support of his contentions, learned counsel relies on the decision reported in MadrasEnglish Baptist Church, Madras v. The State of Tamil Nadu (1991 Writ LR 419). A Division Bench of this Court dealing with G.O.Ms. No. 587 (Education), dated 22-3-1978, requiring such institutions to create a cash endowment of Rs. 25,000/- . as a pre-condition for a minority institution to seek recognition, held that the requirement was violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. In doing so, the Division Bench relied on an earlier Judgment in W.P. No. 4478 of 1974, dated 17-12-1975, which Judgment is pending consideration in the Supreme Court of India. As on date the above decisions hold the field. Mr. Joseph Thatheus Jerome, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. No. 3087 of 1996 argued that the Act in question being a Central Act, the consideration for recognition should originate from the Central Policy. The State Government is developing a State policy for rejecting applications for no objection certificate, whenever, an institution applies for the same under Regulation 5(e) of the Regulations. Therefore, he argues that in essence the question of recognition is relegated to the State Authority, which is improper. The State Government is developing a State policy for rejecting applications for no objection certificate, whenever, an institution applies for the same under Regulation 5(e) of the Regulations. Therefore, he argues that in essence the question of recognition is relegated to the State Authority, which is improper. We are of the opinion that the validity of an order by the State Government, while considering an application under Regulation 5(e) of the Regulations is totally a different matter and as and when such a question arises, it will be time enough to consider the validity of the order of the State Government. We have already indicated that if orders of the State Government are found to be illegal or in violation of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India, it could always be challenged by the parties aggrieved. That stage has not yet arisen. 9. Our views are further fortified by the decisions of the Supreme Court on which reliance is placed by Mr. V.T. Gopalan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Central Government. The first decision referred to by Mr. V.T. Gopalan is reportd in St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. State of Tamil Nadu ( (1993) 3 SCC 595 = 1993-2-L.W. 219 = 1993 Writ L.R. 830), wherein an identical contention was raised stating that G.O. Ms. No. 536, dated 17-5-1989 had imposed unreasonable conditions for the establishment of Teacher Training Institutions which practically ousted the parties from the field of education. The Supreme Court upheld the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court and also approved the eight principles culled out by the Division Bench as being the rights of the minority under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. For the purpose of our case, it is only necessary to quote the principles 4 and 5, which are as follows: “(4) There is no fundamental right to recognition and any institution seeking recognition should abide by the regulations prescribed by the State as conditions thereof; and (5) The minority institutions must be fully equipped with educational excellence to keep in step with other institutions in the State. ..” On the question of arbitrariness, it is pointed out that the power is given to the State Government, which is the highest authority of the State. ..” On the question of arbitrariness, it is pointed out that the power is given to the State Government, which is the highest authority of the State. Therefore, relying on the decision in Express Hotels Private Ltd. v. State of Gujarat ( (1989) 3 SCC 677 ), it is argued that the power having been vested with the State Government, it cannot be said that it will be exercised in an arbitrary manner. The following passage is apposite: “Another relevant consideration is the identity and status of the repository of the power. The power is given to a high authority like the State Government. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the power is an uncanalised power and is an arbitrary or unreasonable one. There are statutory guides governing its exercise and the guidelines are governed by well settled principles of interpretation. There is no substance in contention (e) . ..” The one other argument of Mr. Joseph Thatheus Jerome was that the State Government cannot act contrary to the provisions of the Central Government viz. , the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 and that therefore, the impugned Regulation giving a scope for the State Government to reject at the threshold an institution seeking recognition is invalid. For this purpose reliance was placed on the decision in T.K.V.T.SS. Medical Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Tamil Nadu ( AIR 1996 S.C. 2384 ). In our opinion, that Judgment related to certain provisions of the State Act being inconsistent with the Central Act and it was held that the Central Act alone will apply. In this case, the very Regulation which is now challenged before us is the Regulation framed under the Central Act by the National Council. Therefore, that decision has no application to the facts of the present case. On the other hand a passage in the said Judgment supports the stand of the respondents. The passage is extracted below: “It is no doubt true that in the scheme that has been prescribed under the Regulations relating to establishment of new Medical Colleges one of the conditions for the qualifying criteria laid down is that Essentiality Certificate regarding desirability and feasibility of having the proposed college at the proposed location should be obtained from the State Government. The said condition about obtaining an essentiality certificate from the State Government regarding desirability and feasibility of having the proposed college at the proposed location cannot be equated with obtaining prior permission of the State Government for establishing a new Medical College as required under the proviso to S. 5(5) of the Medical University Act. For the purpose of granting the essentiality certificate as required under the qualifying criteria prescribed under the scheme, the State Government is only required to consider the desirability and feasibility of having the proposed Medical College at the proposed location. The Essentiality Certificate cannot be withheld by the State Government on any policy consideration because the policy in the matter of establishment of a new Medical College now rests with the Central Government. ..” 10. An argument was advanced stating that the above passage indicates that the State Government cannot withhold the Essentiality Certificate on any policy consideration. We have already indicated that we are not concerned in these cases about the validity or otherwise of the orders of the State Government on the question of granting or refusing the No Objection Certificate. When such matters are brought to our notice, we will examine the issue in detail whether the State Government had exercised their powers reasonably and in accordance with the provisions and the objects of the Act, and the Constitution of India. 11. Mr. V.T. Gopalan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Central Government has filed a memo adopting the counter affidavit of the Central Government in W.P. No. 1106 of 1996, wherein reasons have been given for framing the Regulations 5(e)and 5(f) of the Regulations. It has been clearly indicated in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit that the requirement of a no objection certificate from the State Government was found to be necessary, keeping in view the overall perspective of the situation prevailing in the State or Union Territory with particular reference to the man power requirement in Teacher Education. They have also referred to the ‘norms’ and ‘standards’ fixed by the National Council for achieving planned and co-ordinate development of Teacher Education. They have also referred to the ‘norms’ and ‘standards’ fixed by the National Council for achieving planned and co-ordinate development of Teacher Education. It is also pointed out that such institutions have to necessarily get academic support only from the State Government like man power, admission modalities and grant-in-aid etc., Therefore, it is contended that the Regulation, requiring the no objection certificate is perfectly legal and necessary for the upliftment of Teacher Education in the State Government. We accept the stand taken in the above counter affidavit. 12. We therefore do not find any substance in any of the points raised by the petitioners to invalidate Regulations 5(e) and 5(f) of the Regulations. We therefore uphold the validity of Regulations 5(e) & 5 (f). So far as the requirements to make a cash endowment of atleast Rs. 5 lakhs, we hold that the same cannot be enforced, in view of the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Madras English Baptish Chruch Madras v. The State of Tamil Nadu (1991 Writ L.R. 419). In this view of the matter only the said requirement is held to be illegal and ultra vires the rights of the minority institution. Relief is therefore granted only to this extent in Writ Petition No. 2165 to 2167 of 1996. In all other respects, all the above writ petitions are dismissed reserving liberty to the petitioners to challenge individual orders of the State Government, granting or refusing the No Objection Certificate. However, there will be no order as to costs.