Judgment :- This appeal is directed against the judgment of the acquittal delivered by the Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Dindigul in C.C. No. 1269 of 1985 2. The case of the appellant/complainant in short is as follows :- On 12-7-1985 at about 11-35 a.m. the complainant went to the Ice-Cream Stall of the respondent located at Abhirami Theatre, Dindigul and introduced himself as the Food Inspector, to the respondent in the presence of P.W. 2 Mylvel and served Form No. 6 on the respondent which is marked as Ex. P. 1. He purchased 900 grams of Ice-creams from the respondent on payment of Rs. 15/- for which Ex. P2 receipt was issued by the respondent. Ex. P. 2 was signed by the respondent and P.W. 2. Then he divided the Ice-cream into three equal parts and put them in three bottles. On each bottle he also dropped formalin. Then he packed and sealed all the three bottles following the procedures laid down in the Prevention of Food Adulteration act. One of the three bottles was put in a wooden box and that was also packed. It was then sent to Public Analyst, Food Analysis Laboratory, King Institute, Guindy, Madras, for his report, through Railway Parcel. Ex. P. 3 is the receipt issued by the Railways to the complainant examined as P.W. 2 for receiving the freight charge. Ex. P. 4 is the Memorandum in Form No. 7 sent by P.W. 1 to the Public Analyst. Then he entrusted the two other bottles to the Local Health Authority, Dindigul, for which P.W. 1 sent an intimation to the Local Health Authority. The intimation is marked as Ex. P. 5. The acknowledgment issued by the Local Health Authority, Dindigul Municipality for receipt of the two bottles, forms part of Ex. P. 5. The sample which he sent to the Public Analyst was received by the Public Analyst as is soon from the postal acknowledgment marked as Ex. P. 6. The report of the Public Analyst is marked as Ex. P. 8 which would disclose that the sample does not confront to standard for Ice-cream with respect to Milk Fat content, Protien Content since they are deficient to the extent of 35% and 54% respectively. Hence it is adulterated. Thereafter, on receipt of Ex. P. 8, P.W. 1 filed a complaint before the trial Magistrate. P. 8 which would disclose that the sample does not confront to standard for Ice-cream with respect to Milk Fat content, Protien Content since they are deficient to the extent of 35% and 54% respectively. Hence it is adulterated. Thereafter, on receipt of Ex. P. 8, P.W. 1 filed a complaint before the trial Magistrate. He also served a notice under S. 13(2) of the Act. Notice is marked as Ex. P. 9. On receiving the notice from the Court, the respondent appeared. He was served with the copy of the complaint. Since the respondent denied the particulars of the charge, to establish the case of the appellant, examined himself as P.W. 1 and he also examined Mylvel as P.W. 2. In addition, he marked Exs. P. 1 to P. 9. Learned Magistrate, on examining the evidence, acquitted the respondent. Aggrieved against this, the appellant has come forward with this appeal 3. Learned Government Advocate Mr. R. Karthikeyan appearing for the appellant submitted that the acquittal of the respondent on the following three grounds by the trial Magistrate, is not sustainable. Therefore, this Court has necessarily to interfere with the judgment of the acquittal delivered by the trial Magistrate (1) The Food Inspector examined as P.W. 1 was not authorised to launch the prosecution (2) Rule 9(j) has been violated (3) Since P.W. 2 independent witness, has turned hostile, there is no corroborating piece of evidence 4. Per contra, Mr. Senthilnathan, appearing for the respondent submitted that the acquittal of the respondent by the trial Magistrate on the above said three grounds are perfectly correct and this Court need not interfere into the verdict of the trial Court. On account of the above rival contentions of the Government Advocate and the counsel for the respondent, now I will take up the above grounds one after another. The conclusion of the trial Magistrate for acquitting the respondent on one of the grounds that the Food Inspector, P.W. 1 was not authorised, is not correct, because new, it has been well settled by this Court in a few judgments particularly, in State by Food Inspector, Tirunelveli Municipality v. Muthu, 1987 Mad LW (Cri) 340 that the Food Inspectors who have been appointed before the after the issue of G.O. Ms. No. 3691, dated 26-11-1955 and G.O. Ms. No. 1861 dated 6-6-1956 are empowered to launch the prosecution under the Act. No. 3691, dated 26-11-1955 and G.O. Ms. No. 1861 dated 6-6-1956 are empowered to launch the prosecution under the Act. P.W. 1 in this regard would depose that he is authorised to take sample under the first G.O. dated 26-11-1955 and he is also authorised to prosecute the accused as per the second G.O. dated 6-6-1956. Therefore, the first ground taken by the trial Magistrate for acquitting the respondent, is not correct 5. So far as the second ground taken by the learned Magistrate for acquittal is concerned, the stand taken by the Magistrate is also not correct for, in the present case on hand, P.W. 1 visited the Ice-cream stall of the respondent on 12-7-1985 and took the sample. Rule 9(j) was deleted by a Notification No. G.SR. 4(E) dated 4-1-1997. When there was no Rule 9(j) of the Rules, in force on 12-7-1985, the view of the learned Magistrate that Rule 9(j) of the Rules was not followed by P.W. 1 is obviously irrelevant 6. The third ground would be, as noticed above, the since P.W. 2, the independent witness has turned hostile it is not safe to base the conviction on the solitary evidence of P.W. 1. In support of this view taken by the learned Magistrate, the counsel appearing for the respondent placed before me a judgment of the apex Court in State of U.P. v. Hanif, 1993 Mad LJ (Cri) 95 : 1992 CrLJ 1429 ) In the above judgments the Supreme Court has held as follows (para 4 of Cri LJ) :- "It is not the law that the evidence of Food Inspector must necessarily need corroboration form independent witnesses. The evidence of the Food Inspector is not inherently suspicious nor be rejected on that ground. He discharges the public function in purchasing an article of food for analysis and if the article of food so purchased in the manner prescribed under the Act is found adulterated, he is required to take action as per law. He discharges public duty. His evidence is to be tested on its own merits and if found acceptable, the Court would be entitled to accept and rely on it to prove the prosecution case. He discharges public duty. His evidence is to be tested on its own merits and if found acceptable, the Court would be entitled to accept and rely on it to prove the prosecution case. If in a given case where the factum of the every purchase is put in question and any personal allegations are made against the Food Inspector, perhaps it may be necessary for the prosecution to dispel doubt and to examine the Panch witnesses seeking corroboration to the evidence of the Food Inspector" * The above proposition of the Supreme Court goes to show that the conviction can be based on the solitary evidence of the Food Inspector when it is not inherently suspicious in respect of purchasing the article. However, it is not safe to warrant a conviction on the basis of his solitary evidence when the factum of the very purchase is put in question and any personal allegations are made against him by the accused. In such a situation, the prosecution can remove the doubt by independent witnesses. When I go through the entire evidence of P.W. 1, the Food Inspector, I do not find any where that any personal allegations against him have been made by the respondent. To corroborate his evidence, he has examined P.W. 2, one Mylvel, who is an independent witness. P.W. 2 in the Chief-examination has deposed as follows :- The above evidence of P.W. 2 in fact, is self-contradictory for in one way he supports the prosecution and in the next moment he goes against the prosecution. However, this witness was not treated as hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution in the trial Court. On account of the above situation, it could not be said that the evidence of P.W. 1 needs corroboration by the independent witness. The prosecution in discharging their duty, has examined the independent witness, who in fact, as noticed above, supports the prosecution case to some extent. Therefore, that piece of his evidence, namely, that signatures in Exs. P. 1 and P. 2, cannot be ignored. Consequently, that piece of evidence corroborates the evidence of P.W. 1 in this regard. The prosecution in discharging their duty, has examined the independent witness, who in fact, as noticed above, supports the prosecution case to some extent. Therefore, that piece of his evidence, namely, that signatures in Exs. P. 1 and P. 2, cannot be ignored. Consequently, that piece of evidence corroborates the evidence of P.W. 1 in this regard. When the complainant/appellant has examined P.W. 2, the independent witness, to a particular extent, i.e. for the purpose of purchasing the Ice-cream and packing the same etc., I do not find any legal impediment in accepting the solitary evidence of P.W. 1 for this aspect, when it is more convincing and natural. In other words, though the factum of purchase is disputed by the respondent by putting some suggestions to P.W. 1, those suggestions, in my view, are not shaking the case of the prosecution in the matter of purchase which stands established by the oral evidence of P.W. 1. Even in the judgment of the Supreme Court, it has been held that the conviction can be awarded on the basis of the evidence of Food Inspector alone when it is not tainted with inherent suspicious. Therefore, one of the principles laid down in the above judgment of the Supreme Court, that the evidence of Food Inspector requires corroboration by independent witness in a given case when the factum of purchase is disputed is not applicable to the present case on hand. Finally the judgment of the acquittal delivered by the learned Magistrate is not proper and he has not analysed and appreciated the factual and legal aspect of the case. Therefore, this Court has to necessarily interfere with the judgment of the acquittal. In short the judgment of the acquittal is set aside and the respondent is found guilty under Ss. 7(1) and 16(1)(a)(i) read with 2(1a)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, as the evidence of P.W. 1, the Food Inspector is legal, reliable and acceptable in respect of the adulteration 7. The next question would be as to the sentence to be imposed on the respondent. 7(1) and 16(1)(a)(i) read with 2(1a)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, as the evidence of P.W. 1, the Food Inspector is legal, reliable and acceptable in respect of the adulteration 7. The next question would be as to the sentence to be imposed on the respondent. This Court recently, has held in number of judgments that having regard to the long pendency of the criminal case, filed under the Act, the income of the accused from the petty shops, family circumstances of the accused, antecedents of the accused etc., sentence need not be imposed though the accused is found guilty under the Act and the mental agony suffered by the accused during the long period itself is sufficient as a sentence. In the present case on hand, the respondent/accused was 50 years in the year 1988 and therefore, at present he may be about 50 years, the evidence of P.W. 1 signifies that the Ice-cream stall of the accused as located in a Cinema Theatre. Therefore, it is obvious that it is a small business of the accused. When I examined the above circumstances, I am able to understand the mental strain and agony suffered by the accused/respondent a petty Ice-cream stall owner, for the last nine years. Therefore, I feel that separate sentence is not necessary and the mental strain and agony suffered by him are sufficient as sentence 8. In the result, the judgment of the acquittal delivered by the learned Magistrate in C.C. No. 1269 of 1985 is set aside and the respondent is found guilty under S. 7(1) and 16(1)(a)(i) read with S. 2(1a)(a) of the Act. However, I do not proposed to impose any sentence of imprisonment or fine, and the mental agony suffered by the respondent/accused is sufficient as sentence. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.