C. K. THAKKER, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed against an order passed by the learned Single judge in Special Civil Application No. 10720 of 1995 on 6th September 1996. In the operative part of the judgment, the learned Single Judge has observed;"in view of the aforesaid, this Special Civil Application is allowed and the impugned order passed by the Director of Agriculture Marketing and Rural finance dated 13. 9. 1994 and the order passed by the State Government dated 22. 11. 1995 are hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioners and the respondents No. 3 to 8 are declared to be elected as Members of the Patan agriculture Market Committee from the Agriculture Constituency. Rule made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs. " ( 2 ) FEW relevant facts to appreciate controversy raised in the present appeal may now be stated : on 4th January 1994, election of the Members of the Managing Committee of Patan agriculture Produce Market Committee was held. On 5th January 1994, results were declared. On 11th January 1994, Election Petition No. 1 of 1994 was filed before the competent Authority i. e. before the Director of Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance, gujarat State, Gandhinagar. Respondents No. 1 to 8 who were declared as elected, were joined as opponents. ON 1st of June 1994 a reply-cum-pursis was filed by one Bhudarbhai Chhaganbhai patel, (opponent No. 4 in Election Petition) inter alia stating that voters list was not prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Market act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and Gujarat Agricultural Produce Market rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules" ). It was also stated that had the authorised officer not removed names of nineteen co-operative societies, the result of election might have changed. This reply was sent by said Bhudarbhai Chhanganbhai Patel to the competent authority. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner before the Director that reply was filed on behalf of all the opponents. All the elected candidates were represented by one advocate. THE Director by his order dt. September 13, 1994 held that the election was not conducted in accordance with law and that it was liable to be set aside and accordingly it was set aside. He also passed an order for holding fresh election. All the elected candidates were represented by one advocate. THE Director by his order dt. September 13, 1994 held that the election was not conducted in accordance with law and that it was liable to be set aside and accordingly it was set aside. He also passed an order for holding fresh election. The said order was challenged only by two elected candidates out of eight returned candidates by filing revision application to the State Government under Sec. 40 of the Act. The said revision application also was dismissed on November 22, 1995. Against the order in revision application, they approached this court by filing a Special Civil Application which came for final hearing and the learned Single Judge by a Judgment and order dt. November 6, 1996 allowed the same and passed the order, operative part of which has already been extracted above. ( 3 ) WE have heard Mr. P. K. Jani, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. M. R. Shah, learned counsel for the respondents. ( 4 ) MR. Jani, mainly raised the following contentions: (1) A writ of certiorari was sought by the petitioner. It was not open to the learned Single Judge to undertake the task of counting of votes and to interfere with the orders-passed by the Election Tribunal as well as by the revisional authority. (2) The learned Single Judge has committed an error of law apparent on the lace of record in reaching a finding that the result of the election was not "materially affected". The said doctrine could not be pressed in service to a small body like market committee. It would apply to larger bodies under the provisions of the Representative of the People Act, 1951. (3) Principles of natural justice were violated inasmuch as before deleting names of 176 voters, no notice was issued, no explanation was sought and no opportunity of hearing was afforded. In this connection, reliance was placed on Bhagwanbhai Narottamdas Patel and Ors. vs. Authorised Officer of the district Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Mehsana and Ors. , 20 (2) GLR 406 and Dharamsinhbhai Taljabhai Desai and Ors. vs. Babulal Jethalal Patel and Ors. , 30 (2) GLR 1195. In this connection, reliance was placed on Bhagwanbhai Narottamdas Patel and Ors. vs. Authorised Officer of the district Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Mehsana and Ors. , 20 (2) GLR 406 and Dharamsinhbhai Taljabhai Desai and Ors. vs. Babulal Jethalal Patel and Ors. , 30 (2) GLR 1195. (4) It was not open to the petitioners to challenge the order passed by the election Tribunal and Revisional authority inasmuch as reply-cum-pursis was filed by Bhudarbhai not only on his behalf but on behalf of all the returned candidates including the petitioners and that the petitioners were also represented by the same advocate. The authorities were right in observing that the doctrine of equitable estoppal would apply and no relief could be granted to the petitioners. (5) Even if the petition deserved to be allowed, the relief ought to have been granted only to the petitioners. The learned Single Judge has committed an error of law in extending the relief in favour of the persons who had not approached the court. ( 5 ) MR. Shah, for the original petitioners on the other hand, supported the order passed by the learned Single Judge. He submitted; (1) So far as jurisdiction of issuance of a writ of certiorari is concerned, no point was taken before the learned Single Judge at the time of hearing. The learned single Judge to avoid remand called for records and proceedings and they were placed before the learned Single Judge at the time of hearing. With consent of all the parties including the present appellant, the record was scrutinised by the court and final order was passed. It is, therefore, not open to the appellant now to contend that the learned Single Judge ought not to have undertaken task of looking at the original record. (2) On principle also, there is nothing illegal or abnormal if the court looks, inspects and verifies the original record. On the contrary, it is expected of a superior Court to certify the record of a subordinate court or an inferior tribunal and to correct an error, if it is patent. (3) Even if the finding recorded by the Election Tribunal is accepted as correct, according to the Tribunal, an irregularity had been committed in the including certain names in the voters list. The so-called irregularity was in respect of 121 votes. (3) Even if the finding recorded by the Election Tribunal is accepted as correct, according to the Tribunal, an irregularity had been committed in the including certain names in the voters list. The so-called irregularity was in respect of 121 votes. However, the difference between returned candidates and the last candidate who lost the election was of 152 votes. The learned single Judge was, therefore, right in coming to the conclusion that the result would not have been "materially affected". If the petition was allowed on that ground, no grievance can be made by the appellant. (4) Regarding pursis, no doubt, it was stated in the reply that it was on behalf of the opponents. The fact, however, remains that it was signed by opponent no. 4 and not by others. Moreover, even if a returned candidate concedes that there was irregularity in preparation of voters list, the authority has to exercise powers in accordance with law particularly when other candidates were also elected at the said election. (5) When the election was challenged as a whole and the learned Single Judge observed that the election was held in a legal and lawful manner and all the candidates were elected in accordance with law, there was nothing wrong in granting relief in favour of all returned candidates. ( 6 ) HAVING considered rival contentions of the parties, we do not see any substance in the appeal. We are of the view that no interference is called for against the order passed by the learned Single Judge. ( 7 ) IN our view, the learned Single Judge has rightly exercised the power conferred under Art. 226 of the Constitution. On principle, a writ of certiorari could be issued against judicial or quasi-judicial authority if it had exceeded its jurisdiction. When the learned Single Judge was of the opinion, that the election was legal, the action setting aside the election was obviously unlawful and without jurisdiction. It could have, therefore, been interfered with. ( 8 ) THERE was no question of estoppel in the instant case. Apart from the fact that the election was conducted in consonance with law, a pursis was not signed by all elected candidates. Opponent No. 4 alone could not have conceded on behalf of other successful candidates that the election was contrary to law. ( 8 ) THERE was no question of estoppel in the instant case. Apart from the fact that the election was conducted in consonance with law, a pursis was not signed by all elected candidates. Opponent No. 4 alone could not have conceded on behalf of other successful candidates that the election was contrary to law. ( 9 ) WHEN the record was before the court and with consent of parties, it was inspected and it was found that at the most there could be said to be irregularity of 121 votes, the result would not have been materially affected inasmuch as there was margin of more than 150 votes (152) between the votes secured by the last successful candidate and first defeated candidate, the learned Judge was perfectly justified in granting relief in favour of the petitioners. ( 10 ) IN this connection, the learned Single Judge in paras 6 and 7 observed : (6) Mr. S. K. Zaveri, Sr. Advocate contends that the Director committed an error in proceeding on the basis of total numbers of voters deleted from the voters list instead of proceeding on the basis of actual number of voters legally entitled to vote. He submits that all the 167 voters whose names were deleted were not entitled to be included in the voters list. At the first instance, the objections were raised only by 12 societies and as such, there could be correction in the revised voters list with respect to the said societies only. On the consideration of the said objection, only the names of 86 voters can said to have been wrongly excluded or if all the 18 co-operative societies are taken together, then also it can be said that the names of 128 voters were wrongly excluded. Thus, the contention of Mr. Zaveri is that the Director should have taken the figure 128 instead of 167. If this figure is taken, then the margin of votes between the last elected and first defeated candidate i. e. 152 is more than the number of voters deleted. In such situation, it cannot be said that the election has materially affected. He further submits that it is not a matter of simple calculation, but further the onus is on the person challenging the election to establish by a positive and reliable evidence that the excluded votes would have gone in his favour. In such situation, it cannot be said that the election has materially affected. He further submits that it is not a matter of simple calculation, but further the onus is on the person challenging the election to establish by a positive and reliable evidence that the excluded votes would have gone in his favour. He placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shri Shivcharan Singh vs. Chandmbhan Singh Shri and Ors. , reported in AIR 1988 SC 637 . On the other hand, it is contended by Mr. P. K. Jani, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents that the principle laid down by the Apex Court in various decisions with respect to the marginal votes materially affecting the elections pertains to election under the Representations of Peoples Act which cannot be applied to the election of small body like the Agriculture Produce Market committee. He further submits that there are only 40 co-operative societies with the agriculture credit, out of which 18 co-operative societies have been excluded. Therefore, instead of taking the number of voters, it must be taken that about 50% of the societies have been deprived of right to vote. (7) The first question which arises for consideration is whether the Director was right in considering that 167 voters were deprived to cast their votes. It is not in dispute that, on publication of the preliminary voters list, it was pointed out that 19 societies have sent the names of more persons as members of the managing Committee, than the prescribed under the bye-laws. In view of this, the authorised officer deleted all the 176 members of the Managing committee of the said 19 Societies. The said societies thereafter sent the resignations of the members of the committees excess in number fixed under the bye-laws. Among the 19 societies, it was found that the name of Morpa gopalak Mandali was wrongly excluded and as such, the names of 9 members of the Managing Committee of the said society were reinducted in the voters list or to say the names of the 9 voters were deleted from the figure 176 which made the figure 167. From the 18 co-operative societies, there could be only 128 voters, that being the outer number of members of the managing Committee under the bye-laws. From the 18 co-operative societies, there could be only 128 voters, that being the outer number of members of the managing Committee under the bye-laws. It has been brought to my notice by learned A. G. P. that, out of 18 co-operative societies, the names of the members of the Managing Committee of Kansa Gopalak Vividh Karyakari society were excluded as it was found by the Authorised Officer that the said society was not dispensing with Agriculture Credit. On exclusion of 7 members of the said society, there remained only 121 (128-7 = 121) members of the Managing Committee, who were eligible to be included in the voters list, or to say, only 121 persons were entitled to vote from the list of voters, whose names were deleted. Thus, in my view, the Authorised officer was wrong in deleting the names of 121 members who were eligible to cast votes. The Director, therefore, was in obvious error in proceeding on the assumption that 167 voters were deprived to cast their votes. This aspect has also not been properly appreciated by the State Government while deciding the revision. ( 11 ) REGARDING grant of relief in favour of the persons who had not approached this court, we are of the view that when the election was one, wherein all the eight candidates were elected and the said election was held to be legal and valid, we do not see any ground which could prevent the learned Single Judge in granting relief in favour of all the candidates. ( 12 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, we do not see any ground to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The LPA, therefore, deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances there is no order as to costs. .