Judgment S. K. Chattopadhyaya, J. 1. The petitioner though filed this writ application for grant of various reliefs but by an order dated 24-8-94 he restricted his prayer only in regard to paragraph 1 (a)of the writ application. Relief, as prayed for, in paragraph l (a) reads thus: - "for quashing the order dated 21-12-1992 (Annexure-5) passed by the respondent No.5 whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from the services of telco Urdu Middle School, Jamshedpur with retrospective effect and for all consequential benefits. " 2. It appears that by an order dated 21-12-92 the Managing Committee of the School (respondent No.5)dismissed the services of the petitioner after holding a departmental proceeding. It is not in dispute that the school in question is a primary school managed and governed by the minority community. Minority status of the school was recognised by the Government as far back as in 1978. The petitioner was directed to show cause, to which he replied, but not being satisfied, the respondent No.5 put him under suspension on 7-3-93. Against that order the petitioner approached the District Superintendent of Education, Jamshedpur, who stayed the order of suspension. Against this interference by the DSE the respondent No.5 moved this Court in CWJC No.1153/93 (R) which was disposed of by a Division bench of this Court on 15-4-93, inter alia, observing as follows: - "it goes without saying that if the assertion of the petitioners that the institution is a minority institution recognised as such by the State of Bihar, be correct, the officers concerned are expected not to interfere in the matter. " 3. Thereafter, Additional Director of Education directed the DSE on 31-3-93 not to take any decision with regard to the action taken by the respondent no.5. Subsequently, the petitioner himself moved this Court in CWJC No.1615/93 (R) challenging the order of suspension dated 7-3-93. He also impugned the aforesaid order of the Additional Director of Education asking the dse not to interfere with the decision taken by the respondent No.5. At the stage of argument of the said application before the Division Bench on 12-7-93, Counsel for the petitioner withdrew the same. He also impugned the aforesaid order of the Additional Director of Education asking the dse not to interfere with the decision taken by the respondent No.5. At the stage of argument of the said application before the Division Bench on 12-7-93, Counsel for the petitioner withdrew the same. Again when the Additional director of Education passed the final order justifying the suspension of the petitioner by respondent No.5, the petitioner again approached this Court in CWJC No.3869/93 (R) but as by that time the petitioner was dismissed by the respondent No.5 through the impugned order, the writ application was withdrawn by the petitioner as it had become infructuous. Admittedly, the petitioner filed a Title Suit No.129/93 making Managing Committee and its other members as defendants, wherein, inter alia, the petitioner prayed for the following relief: - "for a decree for declaration that the defendant No.5 has no power and authority to issue charge-sheet, to suspend, to take disciplinary action against the plaintiff and to take any further action in any meeting on the basis of the incompetent and invalid dated 27-8-93 i. e annexure-1". 4. From the aforesaid relief prayed for, it is clear that very initiation of the disciplinary proceeding by the managing Committee was challenged by the petitioner in the said title suit. He also prayed for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the members of the committee to hold any meeting which was to be held for deliberation on the charges levelled against the petitioner. The Trial Court, it appears, while issuing notices to the defendants, injuncted them from holding the meeting but subsequently on 20-12-93 the order of temporary injunction was vacated. Thereafter, as stated earlier, the dismissal order of the petitioner was passed on 21-12-93. 5. It is alleged by the petitioner that the order of dismissal is nothing but a result of bias against him and mala fide action on the part of the members of the committee. According to him, no disciplinary proceeding was ever initiated and as such, there was no question of issuing any notice to him. The so called enquiry, if any, was held in utter violation of law and procedure and in total disregard to the principle of natural justice. No report of the enquiry officer was ever supplied to him and as such, the petitioner was prevented from making a representation before the authority. 6. The so called enquiry, if any, was held in utter violation of law and procedure and in total disregard to the principle of natural justice. No report of the enquiry officer was ever supplied to him and as such, the petitioner was prevented from making a representation before the authority. 6. It appears that again the Deputy superintendent of Education stayed the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner and called for an explanation from the respondent No.5. The respondent No.5 again approached this Court in CWJC No.85/94 (R) against the order of DSE dated 24-12-93 and this court had admitted the same and stayed the operation of the order passed by the dse. It is pertinent to note here that this Court held that authority of the education Department would not interfere with the disciplinary action taken against a teacher of the present petitioners institution. 7. The stand of the respondent No.5 in its counter-affidavit, on the other hand, is that the writ application itself is not maintainable inasmuch as it is averred that the status of a minority institution of the school is concerned, has been established by this Court by several decisions : one of which is order dated 10th November, 1994 passed in cwjc No.85/94 (R), by reason of which this Court has, inter alia, found: -"here no regulation has been brought to my notice empowering any authority of the Education Department to interfere with the disciplinary action taken against the teacher of the petitioner-Institution. " 8. The fact that against this order the petitioner has filed LPA No.71/94, which is pending, has been suppressed by the petitioner. On 28-11-96 an amendment petition was filed by the petitioner praying therein to delete the name of respondent No.5 and to substitute the name of area Education Officer, Jamshedpur, who is said to have taken over as special officer after dissolution of the earlier Managing Committee. However, by an order dated 16-1-97 the name of said Area Education Officer was permitted to be added as respondent No.6 but without deleting the name of respondent No.5 i. e. the Managing Committee. A supplementary counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondent No.5 on 3-12-96 annexing a copy of the report of the enquiry officer dated 14-6-93 and a copy of the said affidavit was received by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the same day i. e.3-12-96. 9. A supplementary counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondent No.5 on 3-12-96 annexing a copy of the report of the enquiry officer dated 14-6-93 and a copy of the said affidavit was received by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the same day i. e.3-12-96. 9. On the backdrop of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, before entering into the merit of the case, maintainability of the writ application has to be answered. 10. Mr. Alam, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, relying on a decision of this Court in the case of Mubarak Hussain V/s. State of bihar, 1992 (2) BLJR 716, contends that it is too late to suggest that no writ is maintainable against a Managing committee of a minority school. According to him, because the Government has recognised the school as a minority and is giving same aid, it must be held that the Managing Committee is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. In this connection, Mr. Alam has relied on a decision in the case of all Bihar Christian Schools Association v. State of Bihar, 1988 PLJR 7 (SC ). 11. Secondly, when admittedly the suit is pending practically for the same cause of action, it is to be seen as to whether the present writ application can be entertained by this Court or not. 12. Mr. G. P. Singh, learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.5, countering the argument of Mr. Alam, has urged that in view of settled law in the decision of smt. Radha Kumari Singh @ Radha kumari V/s. The Governing Body of mahanth Mahadevanand Mahila mahavidyalaya, 1977 PLJR 110, no writ can be issued against a Managing Committee of a minority school. Distinguishing the case of Mubarak Hussain (supra), it is contended that the same learned single Judge, who presided over in the case of Mubarak Hussain, has held in the case of Nirmala Sinha V/s. State of Bihar, 1992 (2)PLJR 512 that circular No.2501 dated 31-12-1982 is not applicable as far as the minority schools are concerned. 13. Mr. Distinguishing the case of Mubarak Hussain (supra), it is contended that the same learned single Judge, who presided over in the case of Mubarak Hussain, has held in the case of Nirmala Sinha V/s. State of Bihar, 1992 (2)PLJR 512 that circular No.2501 dated 31-12-1982 is not applicable as far as the minority schools are concerned. 13. Mr. V Shivnath, learned GPI, submits that the orders passed by the dse and Additional Director of Education from time to time were subject matter of several writ application in between the parties and in almost all the cases this Court has specifically held that the State authorities have no power to interfere with the internal management and decision taken by the managing Committee. 14. The counter-affidavit of respondent No.4 clearly indicates that the school in question being a minority one, the writ application is not maintainable against the Managing Committee. However, it appears that without noticing the judgment of this Court in the case of Nirmala Sinha (supra), where this Court has pointedly held that circular No.2501 dated 31-12-1982 is not applicable to the minority school. In coming to the conclusion that the order of termination of the petitioner is bad, is not sustainable in law. 15. As noticed above, the school in question is an elementary school with minority status. Nothing has been brought to my notice to show that the school is governed by any statute and as such, is a statutory body. It is true that mr. Alam has strongly relied on circular no.2501 dated 31-12-1982 in support of his contention that the character of the institution cannot be said to be a non-statutory, but in my view, now it is well settled that the said circular has no application to the primary school. 16. In the case of Smt. Radha kumari Singh (supra), a question arose as to what is the remedy of a lecturer appointed by reason of a contract having no legal force and where he has been terminated by the Governing body. The Division Bench after considering number of decisions of the Apex Court as well as the High Courts has held that remedy of such lecturer was by way of a suit for damages and not by way of a"n application under Article 226 of the constitution. The Division Bench after considering number of decisions of the Apex Court as well as the High Courts has held that remedy of such lecturer was by way of a suit for damages and not by way of a"n application under Article 226 of the constitution. The earlier view of a division Bench of the Allahabad High court (Lucknow Bench) was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of vidya Ram Mishra V/s. The Managing committee, Shri Jai Narain College and another, AIR 1973 SC 1450. 17. Relying on the aforesaid decision of Smt. Radha Kumari Singh (supra) in the case of Badri Nath Mishra v. State of Bihar and Ors. CWJC No.2903/93 (R) disposed of on 5th November, 1996, under similar circumstances, I held that a writ is not maintainable against the Secretary of the Managing committee of the concerned school. I also referred the decision in the case of managing Committee, High School jamui V/s. Sri Sheonandan Sinha vikas 1977 PLJR 425, where it has been held that there is a distinct connotation of a statutory body in contradistinction to a body which has been created under the operation of a statute. 18. In the case of Mubarak Hussain (supra), the order of State officials was challenged in which argument on behalf of the Gosner High School was advanced that being a minority institution, the respondent No.2 (State authority) had no jurisdiction to interfere with the management of the said school. Their Lordships did not agree with the submission and noticed the fact that the said school is a minority institution within the meaning of Sec.2 (ga) of the Bihar non-Government Secondary Schools Taking over of management and Control Act, 1981 (Bihar Act No.33 of 1982) and is declared and recognised as such by the state of Bihar in terms of the provisions of Sec.18 of the said School. It was also not disputed before their Lordships that the said High School was an aided school. Under these circumstances, relying on the decision of the Supreme court in the case of All Bihar Christian school Association (supra), their lordships held that the Managing committee was amenable to the writ jurisdiction. On the contrary, in the present case, no such argument could. be advanced, which can show that the school concerned also governed by any statute like Bihar Act No.33 of 1982. 19. On the contrary, in the present case, no such argument could. be advanced, which can show that the school concerned also governed by any statute like Bihar Act No.33 of 1982. 19. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the writ application is not maintainable against the respondent No.5. 20. Secondly, the pertinent point is that admittedly the petitioner moved the civil Court by filing the said title suit against initiation of a departmental proceeding and got an order of interim injunction. Though subsequently the said order was vacated but it is not clear from the records as to whether the said suit is still pending or not. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not throw any light on this matter. This being the position, when during pendency of the said suit order of suspension and thereafter order of termination was issued, in my view, the petitioner could have challenged those orders in the same suit by filing an amendment petition. Without resorting to that he ventured to move this Court in the present writ application. 21. It is now well settled that when for the same cause of action a civil suit is pending and the matter is brought to the notice of the High Court, the High Court will not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 22. In a case of Mohan Pandey V/s. Smt. Usha Rani Rajgaria, AIR 1993 SC 1225 , their Lordships, inter alia, observed as follows: - "further, a suit covering either directly a portion of the house-property which is in dispute in the present case or in any event some other parts of the same property is already pending in the civil court. The respondent justifies the step of her moving the High Court with a writ petition on the ground of some complaint made by the appellants and the action by the police taken thereon. We do not agree that on account of this development, the respondent was entitled to maintain a writ petition before the High Court. " Their Lordships were of the opinion that when a suit is pending, appropriate prayer for amendment of the plaint in the pending suit should have been made by the parties instead of approaching the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. " Their Lordships were of the opinion that when a suit is pending, appropriate prayer for amendment of the plaint in the pending suit should have been made by the parties instead of approaching the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. 23 Having given my anxious consideration in the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion, that no relief can be given to the petitioner in this writ application, which is not maintainable either on facts or in law, 24. In the result, I find no merit in this application and the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. As the writ application is dismissed as not maintainable, in my opinion, there is no need to go into the legality or otherwise of the impugned order of dismissal passed against the petitioner. Petition Dismissed.