JUDGMENT 1. - On January 28, 1977 PW-1 Sri Hari Dutta Sharma, Food Inspector, Bharatpur, purchased the sample `pedas' prepared with Mawa, from the petitioner at his shop, M/S Radha Bhallabh Gopal Dass, Chobarja Bazar, Bharatpur. On analysis of the sample `Pedas', the Public Analyst reported them adulterated for their containing non-permitted metanil yellow and basic dye(yellow shade,) food colour. On the complaint of the Food Inspector, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bharatpur (CJM) tried the petitioner for an offence punishable Under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954(the Act) and found him guilty thereof. He, therefore, convicted the petitioner of the same and sentenced him to one year RI and fine of Rs. 2,000/-. In appeal, the learned special Judge, Bharatpur confirmed the order of the conviction and sentence of the petitioner. Hence this revision application under Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code before this court. 2. Mr. R. N. Khandelwal, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the specified authority granted the sanction in this case without aoplying his mind to the facts of the case, hence the very foundation of the prosecution of the petitioner was infirm. Mr. Khandelwal supported his argument on the point with a good number of case law from this court as well as other courts but in view of the authoritative pronouncement by the Apex Court in the case of Dhian Singh v. Municipal Board Saharanpur, 1973 F.A.C. 404 , I do not think that the cases taking a contrary view should be discussed. 3. In the case of Dhian Singh (Supra) a Food Inspector, with written consent of the Municipal Board, Saharanpur, had filed a complaint Under section 7/16 of the Act against the accused. The order of acquittal of the accused by the trial court was reversed by the High Court. In appeal to the Supreme Court by the accused the maintainability of the very complaint filed by the Food Inspector was challenged on the grounds, interalia, that the authority authorising the prosecution did not apply its mind to the facts of the case before granting its written consent Under section 20 of the Act. Their lordships settled down the controversy on this and other allied issues in para 5 of the report in the following manner: 5. It is true that the complaint was signed by the Food Inspector. Their lordships settled down the controversy on this and other allied issues in para 5 of the report in the following manner: 5. It is true that the complaint was signed by the Food Inspector. As seen earlier it competent (sic) for the Municipal Board to authorised by the Municipal Board to the filed (sic) the complaint was never put into issue. Both the parties to the complaint proceeded on the bass that it was a validly instituted complaint. If the Municipal Board had not authorised him to file the complaint then the complaint itself was not maintainable. If that is so, no question of the invalidity of the appear (sic) arises for consideration. It was never the case of the accused that the complaint was invalid. In K.C. Agarwal v. Delhi Administration, Criminal Appeal No. 100 of 1996, D/d. 27-3-1969 this Court has held that a complaint filed by one of the officers of a local authority at the instance of that authority is in law a complaint instituted by that local authority. Therefore if the complaint with which we are concerned in this case had been filed by the Food Inspector on the authority of local board, the complaint must be held to have been instituted by the local board itself. The question whether the Food Inspector had authority to file the complaint on behalf of the local board is a question of fact. Official acts must be deemed to have been done according to law. It the accused had challenged the authority of the Food Inspector to file the complaint the trial court would have gone into that question. The accused cannot be permitted to take up that contention for the first time after the disposal of the appeal. This court refused to entertain for the first time an objection as regards the validity of his sanction granted in Mangal Das Regi aij v. State of Maharashtra . Mr. Garg, learned counsel for the accused urged that a permission under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 to file a complaint is a condition precedent for validly instituting a complaint under the provisions, of that Act. The fulfillment of that condition must be satisfactorily proved by the complainant before a court can entertain the complaint. Mr. Garg, learned counsel for the accused urged that a permission under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 to file a complaint is a condition precedent for validly instituting a complaint under the provisions, of that Act. The fulfillment of that condition must be satisfactorily proved by the complainant before a court can entertain the complaint. Without such a proof, the court will have no jurisdiction to try the case, In support of that contention of his he sought to take assistance from the decision of the Judicial Committee in Gokul Chand Dwaraka Das v. The King and Madan Mohan Singh v. The State of U.P. Both those decisions deal with the question of the validity of sanctions given for the institution of certain criminal proceedings. The provisions under which sanction was sought in those cases required the sanctioning authority to apply its mind and find out whether there was any justification for instituting the prosecutions. The Jurisdiction Committee as well as this Court has laid down in such cases, the Court must be satisfied either from the order of sanction or from the other evidence that all the relevant facts had been placed before the sanctioning authority and that authority had granted the sanction after applying its mind to those facts. The ratio of those decisions has no bearing on the facts of this case. Under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. no question of applying one's mind to the facts of the case before the institution of the complaint arises as the authority has to be conferred long before a particular offence has taken place. It is a conferment of an authority to institute a particular case or even a class of cases. That Section merely prescribes that persons or authorities designated in that Section are alone competent to file complaints under the statute in question." 4. In view of the above authoritative pronouncement of the legal position by the Apex Court there remains no room for the argument that application of mind by the authority concerned to the facts of the case is necessary for grant of "written consent" Under section 20 of the Act. In view of the above authoritative pronouncement of the legal position by the Apex Court there remains no room for the argument that application of mind by the authority concerned to the facts of the case is necessary for grant of "written consent" Under section 20 of the Act. In fact the words "written consent" used in the language of Section 20 of the Act and sanction" used in some other statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act (Sec. 6), the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ss 195/197)etc. convey different meanings, whereas "written consent" may imply mere concurrence or agreement, "Sanction" confers an authority on the person in whose favour it is granted. To appreciate the difference between the two in the context of Section 20 it is well to remember that in the scheme of the Act a complaint even by a purchaser of the adulterated food article is maintainable Under section 12 of the Act. The law cannot be much different in the cases of complaints filed by Food Inspectors whose duty is to prevent the violation of the Act and bring the offenders to book. Since that duty basically lies on the Central Government and State Governments and other specified authorities, with the view that the Food Inspectors may not abuse their authority provision for conferment of authority on them to prosecute the offenders has been made in section 20 of the Act. Therefore, the words"written consent" used in the language of section 20 are not to be equated in meaning with the word "sanction" Since authority to do an act may be conferred under section 20, by a general or special order before the actual commission of that act. no question of applying mind to the facts of the case which is yet to take place arises; 5. Apart from the above, there is no material on the record of this case to record a finding that the authority according its/his "written consent" had not applied its/his mind to the facts of the case before granting such written consent. Both the courts have rightly negatived the vague objection. There is no force in the argument advanced and it is accordingly rejected. 6. Mr. Both the courts have rightly negatived the vague objection. There is no force in the argument advanced and it is accordingly rejected. 6. Mr. Khandelwal next urged that the trial of the petitioner stood vitiated by adopting the procedure of warrant case in the trial of the offence which was required to the tried in a summary way as per provisions of section 16A of the Act. This argument too has no force. 7. Section 16A, inserted by Act, 34 of 1976 w.e.f. 1.4.1976, does certainly require that all offences punishable Under section 16(1) shall be tried in a summary way by specially empowered Magistrates or Metropolitan Magistrates. The object behind bringing this section on the statute book was that cases involving food adulteration should be tried and offenders brought to book as quickly as possible. But despite a mandate given in the main section exception to the general rule has been carved out in the second Proviso to the section. The llnd Proviso says that looking to the nature of the case and the possibility of the desirability of imposing punishment exceeding one year's imprisonment the Magistrate may adopt a procedure different from that mentioned in the main section. In other words adoption of warrant case procedure in the trial of offences Under section 16(1) has not been barred. The only essential requirements for deviating from the normal procedure of summary trials in such case are (i) the satisfaction of the Magistrate on the nature of the case, desirability of imposing sentence exceeding one year or for some similar reasons and, (ii) the hearing of the parties and recording an order to than affect. If the Magistrate is found to have acted in the manner stated in Proviso no fault can be found is trying an offence punishable Under section 16(1) as per procedure for warrant case. 8. In the instant case a close study of the record of the Magistrate's court discloses that the substance of accusation was read over and explained to the petitioner on 27.6.79 and on his pleading not guilty prosecution was directed to produce their evidence. By 4.6.82 two witnesses were examined. During the meanwhile the petitioner had exercised his right under section 13(2) and the second sample had been sent to the Director, Central Food Laboratory, for analysis. By 4.6.82 two witnesses were examined. During the meanwhile the petitioner had exercised his right under section 13(2) and the second sample had been sent to the Director, Central Food Laboratory, for analysis. The certificate of the Director was received on 17.8.82 and on that day the Magistrate on finding that non-permitted coal tar dye had been found used in the preparation of pedas by the petitioner and on being of the opinion that the procedure of a warrant case was required to the adopted, made after hearing the parties, an order to that effect in his record and completed the recording of pre-charge evidence, framed charged Under section 7/16 against the petitioner and recalled the witnesses, who had been already examined in pre-charge stage, for further cross-examination by the petitioner. The Magistrate had thus complied with the requirements of the second Proviso the Section 16A. 9. Above all it is a matter of the procedure only adopted in the trial of an offence. If the procedure adopted is found to be in accordance with the legal provisions in that behalf and is shown to have given full opportunity to the accused to know the accusation against him, to cross- examine the prosecution witnesses and rebut the evidence produced by his adversary the requirement of fair trial is satisfied. Therefore, untill and unless prejudice is shown to have occasioned to an accused by not adopting a particular procedure, trial held, cannot be declared as vitiated. "Technicalities and Illegalities as was observed by the Apex Court in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 . "which do not occasion failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice." No challenge to order dated 17.8.82 was ever given by the petitioner during the trial against him. No prejudice caused to him by adopting the procedure-of warrant case, which gave him double opportunity to cross- examine the witnesses, was shown and no failure of justice was alleged to have occasioned. 10. Here I pause for a while and avail of this opportunity to observe that experience of the trial of criminal cases of all kinds in general and those involving socio-economic offences in a summary way in particular by the subordinate judiciary in the state tells a sorry tale. 10. Here I pause for a while and avail of this opportunity to observe that experience of the trial of criminal cases of all kinds in general and those involving socio-economic offences in a summary way in particular by the subordinate judiciary in the state tells a sorry tale. Since the day speedy trial has been recognised as part of fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of a litigant- citizen and delay has been considered as giving a fatal blow to such right, early and speedy disposal of criminal cases, either by adopting the procedure of a sessions case or of a warrant summons or summary case, is, day by day going to be a remote possibility. Day in and day out this court comes across such criminal cases in which the disposal has been delayed either due to callous careless attitude of the prosecution in producing their witnesses or willful and deliberate efforts of the accused to cause delay in the disposal of the case or the passive role of the judge in controlling the proceedings of the case. This court has yet to see a case, tried summarily, which did not take years together to see the day of its judgment. Almost all agencies appear to be working against "speedy trials" so that cry for breach of "fundamental right" may be raised at a subsequent stage. Fundamental rights as enshrined in Part. IIIrd of our Constitution, are such sacred and valuable rights as any civilised people may legitimately feel proud of we must protect and preserve them for our own benefit and for the benefit of those who have to follow us. The sanctity of speedy trial should not be allowed to be spoiled for making out a case for undeserved and unmerited acquittal particularly in the context of socio-economic offences. 11. Be that as it may, I should now proceed further. Mr. Khandelwal next urged that the trial stood vitiated by non-compliance of Rr. 7(1) & 18 of the Rules in as much as that the Food Inspector had not sent the memorandum and specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet in a sealed packet separately to the Public Analyst immediately. I find no basis for taking such a view in the present case. 12. 7(1) & 18 of the Rules in as much as that the Food Inspector had not sent the memorandum and specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet in a sealed packet separately to the Public Analyst immediately. I find no basis for taking such a view in the present case. 12. In his statement on oath the Food Inspector has given the detailed account of his having followed the procedure of sealing packing and sending to the Public Analyst the sample for analysis, as per relevant rules. In this behalf the Food Inspector was corroborated not only by PW-3 Ram Pratap but also by PW-1 Shankar Lal who was declared hostile on another point. In his report, Exp-4, the Public Analyst had specifically mentioned that he had received not only the sample in properly sealed and unbroken condition but also the specimen impression of seal sent separately to him. Neither the petitioner in his examination Under section 313 nor the only defence witness DW-1 Bigha Ram had stated facts contrary to those stated by the prosecution witnesses. The objection raised is without any basis and is over ruled as such. 13. The sample was taken on 28.1.77 and the Public Analyst received the same on 29.1.77, as stated in his report. There was no violation of the provisions contained in Section 11(3) read with Rr 7(1), 17, 18 of the Rules. Thus irrespective of the question whether these provisions are directory or mandatory or prejudice has or has not been caused to the petitioner, the compliance of all the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules are found to have been made in this case. The argument advanced is, therefore, dismissed 14. It was next urged that the independent witness PW-1 Shankar Lal had not supported prosecution case on the point of adulteration, hence the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of doubt. Both the courts below have found the Food Inspector and PW3 Ram Pratap as truthful and reliable witnesses. The petitioner himself and his witness Bigha Ram had admitted the factum of sale of pedas to the Food Inspector PW 1. Shankar Lal himself had also admitted that fact. For what reason the prosecution case should be disbelieved was not pointed out. I fail to disturb the concurrent findings of fact as recorded by the courts below. 15. Mr. The petitioner himself and his witness Bigha Ram had admitted the factum of sale of pedas to the Food Inspector PW 1. Shankar Lal himself had also admitted that fact. For what reason the prosecution case should be disbelieved was not pointed out. I fail to disturb the concurrent findings of fact as recorded by the courts below. 15. Mr. Khandelwal next urged that the right of the petitioner Under section 13(2) got frustrated by not examining the Public Analyst to prove that the outer cover of the sealed packets of the sample `pedas' was also having the impression of the seal used to seal the packet and sent separately to him. It has been held above that all the relevant provisions in the Act and under the Rules had been complied with by the Food Inspector in the sampling and packing the samples and sending one of them to the Public Analyst. There is, therefore, no valid scope for the argument to the contrary. However, I have again examined the record of the lower court and noted that the petitioner at no stage of the proceedings complained of any act of omission of commission by the Food Inspector and/or the Public Analyst. He never disclosed his intention to exercise and avail of his right Under section 13(2). On 5.6.82 the Asstt. Public Prosecutor had certainty moved on application Under section 311 Criminal Procedure Code to recall PW-1 Hari Dutta Sharma, Food Inspector to produce the receipt evidencing the receipt of the sample by the Public Analyst. The learned Magistrate had allowed such application on 10.1.1983 and recalled the witness. On the next date the APP closed his evidence without re-examining the Food Inspector and examining the Public Analyst who was desired to (he examined vide application dated 28.12.82. It may be noted that the F.l. had already been examined cross-examined and re-examined The report of the Public Analyst had also been tendered in evidence and exhibited at the trial. The petitioner never prayed for recalling the F1 or summoning the PA. to explain any defect in his report. Non-production of these witnesses by the prosecution did not deprive the petitioner of any of his rights and no prejudice to him and failure to justice was caused. This argument too is rejected. 16. The petitioner never prayed for recalling the F1 or summoning the PA. to explain any defect in his report. Non-production of these witnesses by the prosecution did not deprive the petitioner of any of his rights and no prejudice to him and failure to justice was caused. This argument too is rejected. 16. It was next urged that the sample of pedas could not have been adjudged as adulterated by the Public analyst for bare presence of Metanil Yellow and basic yellow colours as Rule 28 itself permits the use of certain coal tar food colours. 17. The report of the Public Analyst, it may be pointed out on the point of the sample containing Metanil yellow and basic yellow colours was not challenged by the petitioner, Rule 28 no doubt, interaiia, permits the use of Tartrazine yellow colour in preparation of food articles. Metanil yellow and basic yellow colours which were found in the sample Pedas' were not the permitted colours. The sample was therefore adulterated. The use of these colours was harmful to human health and therefore the Rule making authority and the standard-fixing committee of scientific experts had prohibited their use in the preparation of consumable articles of food. 18. In the end Mr. Khandelwal submitted that since the offence was committed in the year 1977 the petitioner be either let off with some increase in the amount of fine or be released on probation. 19. The provisions, contained in Section 16(1) clearly mandate that offenders under the Act must get minimum of 6 months RI and fine of Rs. 1,000/-. There seem to be no good reasons for not giving the true meaning to these legislative mandates which got judicial approval in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rangadamppa, AIR 1982 SC 1492 . 2. We are unable to understand why the High Court reduced the sentence. The statute prescribes a minimum sentence. It does not provide for any exceptions and does not vest the court with any discretion to award a sentence below the prescribed minimum under any special circumstances. The learned Judge has himself noticed that the sentence imposed is the statutory minimum. Having noticed that the statute prescribes a minimum sentence for the offence, the High Court was clearly in error in doing so. We think we have said enough to correct the error. The learned Judge has himself noticed that the sentence imposed is the statutory minimum. Having noticed that the statute prescribes a minimum sentence for the offence, the High Court was clearly in error in doing so. We think we have said enough to correct the error. It is unnecessary to pursue the matter further by granting special leave. The petition is dismissed with the above observation." 20. Regarding extending the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, I can do no better than to quote Iyer, J of the Supreme Court in RK. Tejani's case ( 1974 (1) SCC 167 ). "28. The kindly application of the probation principles is negatived by the imperatives of social defence and the improbabilities of moral proselytisation. No chances can be taken by society with a man whose anti social operations, disguised as a respectable trade, imperil numerous innocents. He is a security risk. Secondly these economic offences committed by white collar criminals are unlikely to be dissuaded by the gentle probationary process. Nether casual provocation nor motive against particular persons but planned profit making from number of consumers furnishes the incentives-not easily humanised by the therapeutic probationary measure. It is not without significance that the recent report (47th report) of the Law Commission of India has recommended the exclusion of the Act to social and economic offences by suitable amendments. It observed: " We appreciate that the suggested amendment would be in apparent conflict with current trends in sentencing. But ultimately, the justification of all sentencing is the production of society. There are occasions when an offender is so anti social that his immediate and sometimes prolonged confinement is the best assurance of society's protection. The consideration of rehabilitation has to give way, because of the paramount need for the protection of society. We are therefore, recommending suitable amendment in all the Acts, to exclude probation in tne above case." 29. In the current Indian conditions the probations movement has not yet attained sufficient strength to correct these intractaoles. Maybe, under more developed conditions a different approach may have to be made. For present we cannot accede to the invitation, to let off the accused on probation." 21. In view of the above legislators' as well as judge-made law I am unable to accept the prayer of Mr. Khandelwal. Maybe, under more developed conditions a different approach may have to be made. For present we cannot accede to the invitation, to let off the accused on probation." 21. In view of the above legislators' as well as judge-made law I am unable to accept the prayer of Mr. Khandelwal. The presence of the non-permitted coal tar metanil yellow and basic yellow colours in the Pedas' sold at his Halwai shop by the petitioner to the Food Inspector and which colours were harmful to human health dissuades us from interfering with the judicially exercised discretion of the lower courts in awarding appropriate sentence to the petitioner. 22. The petition is dismissed. The petitioner snail surrender to his bail bonds and the CJM Bharatpur shall see that the petitioner is sent to jail to serve out the remaining part of his sentence.Revision Dismissed. *******